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What has Karl Barth (considered by some to be the greatest theologian
of the twentieth century) to say about the problem of time and thus
eternity? Has what he wrote much significance and how does it relate to
both the history of theology and philosophy as well as the modern era?
The Enlightenment conditioned the thought of the nineteenth century
particularly as regards the possible foundations of systematic theological
thought. The dialectic of antitheses (that is of eternity and time,
finite and infinite) was subsumed in the complex agnosticism of Kant's
transcendental idealism; resolved into overall monistic synthesis by
Hegel; broken apart in Trendelenburg's critique; and, finally, reasserted
in existential paradox by Kierkegaard. Barth in his early work extended
Kierkegaard's precarious Christological Paradox to destruction in a
logical reductio thus making a new theological starting-point an imperative
need.
Barth posited this new beginning in the Word of God, the threefold
occurrence of which is grounded upon God and thus the doctrine of God. The
historicity of God's own being in his trinitarian life constitutes the
'possibility' of the 'reality' of revelation and as such contains within
itself an understanding of time. It is this which is explicated in the
main body of the thesis.
God's being in the Trinity is being in act and the temporal
correlate of this fundamental reality is the doctrine of eternity. Given
the exclusive source of the knowledge of God in revelation, the 'full
contemporaneity' of the divine act assumes crucial significance because
the basis of the time of revelation is to be given in revelation itself.
The doctrine of 'God's time' (eternity) posits the active triumph of God's
dynamic freedom in his unseparated past, present and future over the
division and loss of 'before' and 'after' in time. The theological
impulse of Earth's thought is expressed in the integration of God's
being and his perfections.
The central doctrine of 'God's time' is exploited throughout the
Church Dogmatics in the doctrines of God, election, incarnation,
Christology, creation and of 'Man in his Time'. The latter passage,
usually seen as Barth's definitive statement on time is in fact merely
the overt consummation of a theological theory of time which has been
used extensively. Barth's doctrine is a creative development of many
strands to be found in the Christian tradition. It contains, however,
certain flaws and ambiguities which reflect upon the whole theological
structure of the Church Dogmatics. Most serious of these is the lin¬
guistic dialectic apparent in the negation of man's time and yet the
creative derivation of 'God's time' from a selective analysis of common-
sense concepts of time. This is the logical Achilles* heel of the
finest theological theory of time in the history of the western tradition.
Use other side if necessary.
I declare that the following thesis is
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ABSTRACT OF THESIS
What has Karl Barth (considered by some to be the
greatest theologian of the twentieth century) to say about
the problem of time and thus eternity? Has what he wrote
much significance and how does it relate to both the history
of theology and philosophy as well as the modern era?
The Enlightenment conditioned the thought of the
nineteenth century particularly as regards the possible
foundations of systematic theological thought. The
dialectic of antitheses (that is of eternity and time,
finite and infinite) was subsumed in the complex agnosticism
of Kant's transcendental idealism; resolved into overall
monistic synthesis by Hegel; broken apart in Trendelenburg's
critique; and, finally, reasserted in existential paradox
by Kierkegaard. Barth in his early work extended
Kierkegaard's precarious Christological Paradox to
destruction in a logical reductio thus making a new theolo¬
gical starting-point an imperative need.
Barth posited this new beginning in the Word of God,
the threefold occurrence of which is grounded upon God and
thus the doctrine of God. The historicity of God's own
being in his trinitarian life constitutes the 'possibility'
of the 'reality' of revelation and as such contains within
itself an understanding of time. It is this which is
explicated in the main body of the thesis.
God's being in the Trinity is being in act and the
temporal correlate of this fundamental reality is the
doctrine of eternity. Given the exclusive source of the
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knowledge of God in revelation, the 'full contemporaneity*
of the divine act assumes crucial significance because the
basis of the time of revelation is to be given in revelation
itself. The doctrine of *God's time* (eternity) posits the
active triumph of God's dynamic freedom in his unseparated
past, present and future over the division and loss of
'before' and 'after* in time. The theological impulse of
Barth's thought is expressed in the integration of God's
being and his perfections.
The central doctrine of 'God's time' is exploited
throughout the Church Dogmatics in the doctrines of God,
election, incarnation, Christology, creation and of 'Man in
his Time*. The latter passage, usually seen as Barth's
definitive statement on time is in fact merely the overt
consummation of a theological theory of time which has been
used extensively. Barth's doctrine is a creative develop¬
ment of many strands to be found in the Christian tradition.
It contains, however, certain flaws and ambiguities which
reflect upon the whole theological structure of the Church
Dogmatics. Most serious of these is the linguistic
dialectic apparent in the negation of man's time and yet the
creative derivation of 'God's time' from a selective
analysis of common-sense concepts of time. This is the
logical Achilles' heel of the finest theological theory of
time in the history of the western tradition.
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ANALYTICAL SUMMARY OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER I 1
THE IMMEDIATE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF BARTH' S DOCTRINE OF
TIME IN THE CHURCH DOGMATICS
The problem of dialectic in nineteenth-century thought
traced through the contrasting resolutions of Kant, Hegel,
Trendelenburg and Kierkegaard presented an ontological
vacuum to Barth. He posited a new beginning and a new
method after destroying the old theological order in the
Epistle to the Romans.
CHAPTER II 45
THE WORD OF GOD, THE TRINITY, AND THE PROBLEM OF TIME
IN THE CHURCH DOGMATICS
The doctrine of the Word of God explicates that reality
given to man as a 'pure fact1 and a novum. The 'contingent
contemporaneity' of the act of God in his revelation is
based upon the 'possibility* of God's own historicity and
temporality in his trinitarian life and being. The
contingency of revelation is the supreme contingency of God's
own 'act' in the acts of revelation - the Jungel hermeneutic.
CHAPTER III 91
ACT AND ANALOGY
Berth's Church Dogmatics has presented a dilemma to subsequent
theologians - Jenson secularises and Zahmt eternalises.
The basis of this work is the integration of God's act in
his being as the overall ontological core of reality. God's
act. is explicated by the doctrine of attribution - God's
active perfections - which are one in the uniqueness and
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simplicity of his actus purus et slngularis. Eternity is
the dynamic expression of God's being in act and freedom.
CHAPTER IV 134
ACT AND ETERNITY
God's active being is transcendent temporality - to be seen
in his omniscience. Barth combines the biblical and dogma¬
tic traditions - the Boethian toturn simul and active God of
the Bible. Cullmannsand Barr's critiques are anticipated
and superseded. God's eternity (his 'time') is itself
beginning, succession and end. As God is the prototype
and fore-ordination of all being, so he is of time. This
'time' lacks the fleeting nature of the present, the
separation between before and after. The being of God in
act, expressed in eternity 'surrounds' and 'includes' time.
CHAPTER V 174
ETERNITY AND TIME: PREDESTINATION AND RESURRECTION
God's act from eternity is in the election of Jesus Christ.
Barth rethinks this doctrine in and through the centrality
of Jesus Christ. The realisation of reconciliation in
'primal history' and in time leads to a tension and ambiguity.
Is man saved in eternity or time? Is the scheme of eternal
antecedence and temporal consequence compatible with the
historicity of the incarnation and resurrection which is
itself the active declaration and concrete fulfilment of
time?
CHAPTER. VI 204
ETERNITY AND TIME: INCARNATION
The incarnation consummates God's act in election and the
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resurrection is the fulfilment of time. The simple
fact and reality of God is the 'midpoint of time* but in
contrast to Cullmann Barth asserts that the Word became
time in Jesus Christ in God's act from eternity. Is this
•time* real? What does the 'flesh' and 'time' parallel
reveal? The contrast with Augustine is seen most clearly
in the resurrection in which eternity ('God's time') over¬
comes the bounds of time. Can time remain time or is
there a contradiction between resurrection as irreversible,
once-for-all event and unbound temporal transcendence in
eternity?
CHAPTER VII 245
ETERNITY AND TIME: CHRISTOLOGY
The primary and irreducible unio hypostatica and the
assumption of grace in divine condescension is the basis
of the reconciliation of the 'natures' of the God-man Jesus
Christ and thus of eternity and time. The mystery of the
incarnation is realised in a dynamic Christology of
integrated 'person' and 'works' in correlation with God's
act in his being. Covenant and atonement co-inhere in the
God-man Jesus Christ as the ultimate primacy of grace is
established. Time and eternity, finite and infinite are
subordinate to the 'Novum'.
CHAPTER VIII 285
CHRISTOLOGY AND CREATION
Origen and Athanasius - the problem of distinguishing God,
Christ and creation. Florovsky's critique of the two
fathers reveals the integration in Barth's thought of
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Christology and creation. The problem of God's act in
generation of the Son and creation. Does Barth blurr this
distinction? Has Florovsky misinterpreted the Athanasian
distinction of God's being and his act? Barth's
Christological synthesis rests upon the pattern of
antecedence and consequence and is realised in the mutuality
of covenant and creation.
CHAPTER IX 330
MAN IN HIS TIMES TRUE TIME
As Jesus Christ has been central to creation so he is to
our understanding of the creature - 'Man in his Time'.
True human nature is known in Jesus Christ and the fulness
of temporal reality is likewise shown in him. The relation
of Creator and creature revealed in him discloses in turn
the relation of Creator and creation. God is supremely
'temporal' and his 'authentic temporality' is simultaneous
and abrogates the succession of past, present and future.
This conflicts with Jesus' contingent *once-for-all*
existence leading to an inner tension.
CHAPTER X 372
MAN IN HIS TIME: GIVEN TIME
The fundamental ontological framework of Jesus' time is
•given time' which overcomes the fragmented temporality
of man as understood and expressed in the sceptics*
arguments. The problem of the 'ontic' and the 'ontolo¬
gical* and the status of Barth's theory of time - has
time fallen or merely man's being in time? We cannot know
time outside of human existence and only in 'God's time*.
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An ambiguity lies in Barth's positive theological solution
to a problem arising out of an empirical scepticism. God
himself provides the particular movement of my 'now1 in a
movement from past to future - Heidegger.
CHAPTER XI 415
MAN IN HIS TIME: BOUNDED TIME
The bounds in which man lives are temporal - he protests
against this and craves for 'life' not •duration*. God*s
time •allots1 man's time in which he is to find his proper
fulfilment. The 'reality' of man's past, present and
future is guaranteed by God's time. God is man's 'beyond'
in death. So it is that all aspects of lost human time
are restored by God's time. The central notion of divine
eternity has been fully exploited but the difficulties
remain - How can we conceive of the relation of created
and re-created reality in the mature theology of Barth?
CHAPTER XII 451
CONCLUSION
The notion of 'God's time', that is 'eternity', is
systematically exploited throughout the Church Dogmatics.
Given the ontological source exploited in this work how
adequate is this point of derivation for a doctrine of time?
The ontology of the divine being explicated in the structure
of God's time leads to a categorial reduction and implicit
contradictions, which although resisted with vigour, are
the basis of systematic ambiguity. There is an implosion
of time and being. Barth's triumphant theological theory
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of time preserves, however, the basic and irreducible
duality of incarnation in time of the Word begotten from




The problem of time (and thus its corollary eternity)
has long lain at the centre of philosophical and theological
thought. Since the Enlightenment the rise of historical
consciousness and the widening gulf between philosophy and
theology has caused the sphere of time to become an area
of sharp conflict and complex interaction. It is against
such a background that a theological work which has a very
great deal to say about time and eternity cannot but have
intrinsic interest. The work in question, the Church
Dogmatics of Karl Barth has not merely theological importance
but is beyond this nothing less than a total response to
the deep dualisms and dichotomies of the thought of the
nineteenth century. Barth attempted this through the un¬
compromising re-assertion of an ontologically based dogmatics
which is grounded upon foundations that comprise both
transcendence and concrete and particular historicity.
There is much deep-rooted and often ill-informed prejudice
abroad concerning the work of Barth and so in this study an
attempt is made to penetrate into the core of the Church
Dogmatics and to pursue this investigation along the axis
of eternity and time. By approaching Barth*s work in its
historical context and from the standpoint of the anti¬
theses of finite and infinite, time and eternity, it proved
possible to appreciate the magnitude of his endeavour and
accumulate the grounds for making a well-founded judgement.
Barth strove to effect a reconciliation of these antagon¬
istic elements within one thoroughly and unashamedly theolo¬
gical creative synthesis which resists arbitrary or illicit
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reduction at all quarters.
Such a vast endeavour is the product of true genius
and therefore presents considerable difficulties to the
reader both in terms of sheer bulk but also as regards
the extraordinary thoroughness and care taken in its
argument. It remains possible to reveal the nature of
Barth's theological integration and Christological resolution
of the traditional antitheses by showing the crucial role
undertaken by the theme of time in the Church Dogmatics.
The exposition and analysis that is to follow is placed
in an initial historical context and then continues with
reference to those theologians and traditions of theological
thought which appear to have had a notable influence upon
the development of Earth's doctrines of eternity and time.
In following this course fairly ruthless excision of less
relevant materials had to take place. The range of back¬
ground reading undertaken in the initial stages of research
is indicated in the bibliographies and it was in the light
of this that the writer of this dissertation felt that the
particular line of approach to the problem of eternity and
time that he took up reflected the essential thrust of
Barth's thought on the subject. Not until the full extent
and import of this, the greatest theological treatise
with regard to time undertaken in this century had been
appreciated, could it prove possible to draw parallels or
comparisons with other areas of contemporary or past thought.
The central theme of this dissertation is pursued
through the whole conspectus of the doctrines of God,
attribution, election, incarnation, Christology, creation
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and theological anthropology. In and through all these
the axis of tine and eternity is not merely a linking
element but arguably the ontological backbone of the Church
Dogmatics. It is this vertebral place of the theological
theory of time in both the development and the full
flowering of Barth's thought which is exposed in the
following study. A full appreciation of the centrality
and importance of this inner axis and its attendant 'logic*
allows the reader to make some judgements about the nature
of the Church Dogmatics itself. It is hoped that certain
new insights into both the range and the limitations of
Barth's thought will be forthcoming which will in turn cast
light on the nature and possibilities of theological
activity in the present day.
The writer chose to quote freely from the work of
Barth where this was felt necessary rather than risk
distortion or misrepresentation in paraphrase. The
passages quoted do in fact form an intrinsic part of the
argument of this thesis. It will soon become apparent why
this study has had to part company with the notable inter-
preters of Barth*s dogmatic achievement although it quite
naturally borrows from or reacts against their work. This
is because the writer wished to do justice both to the
theological concerns of Barth and yet at the same time
demonstrate an awareness of the language and conceptual
structures in his thought, in that way managing to combine
something of both dogmatic and philosophical method.
There are many issues which impinge upon full
consideration of the problem of time in contemporary thought
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and historical context. The transformation of basic
categories -wrought in the development of thought from
Newton to Einstein as well as the related and highly-
significant debate between Leibniz and Samuel Clarke on the
theories of relational and absolute space and time immediately
spring to mind. These considerations do not figure
directly in this work because they appeared to the writer
peripheral to the most basic core of Barth's reaction to
and development from the fundamental theological dilemmas
with which he was faced at the outset. This in no way
lessens the importance of these problems, it merely makes
them consequent upon prior exposition and analysis.
The writer found himself drawn towards a recognition
of the truth of T.F. Torrance's assessment of BarthJs
achievement, that it represents a 'thorough integration of
the ontic and the dynamic* and a reinterpretation of 'the
whole of Christian theology by setting it more squarely
upon its proper foundations' but at the same time felt
impelled to voice the dangers to which this appears to him
to lead.
Finally, and upon a more personal note, the writer
would like to say that in his opinion the Church Dogmatics
contains the most consistent and comprehensive theological
account of the relation of eternity and time that has graced
the Christian tradition. Having attempted first and fore¬
most to do justice to this achievement in an essay in
dogmatic theology it then becomes possible, without undue
reduction or distortion, to analyse the logic of Barth's
theological concepts, thus providing those elements to the
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following study which justify its title as an essay in
philosophical theology. This Essay is therefore an
attempt to expose the 'inner logic' of the Church Dogmatics
as it is comprised in the axis of time and eternity and then
analyse this 'theo-logic' in accordance with the criteria
of ordinary logic. In this way we discover that in the
context of massive and magnificently sustained theological
thought there remains an unresolved and pervasive dialectic
on the level of the temporal concepts and terms that Barth
employs.
The reader will find that there is no simple or
easily attained judgement to be made upon Karl Barth's
understanding of time. In the following study there is a
presentation of the argument upon which judgement might be
based, giving full weight to the intentions of the author
himself, yet allowing the reader to see Barth's work both
in an informative context and under critical analysis.
Beyond this the study of Barth demands both humility and
a freedom from damaging preconceptions: neither of which
virtue and state of innocence is easy to attain. Karl
Barth*s words in Evangelical Theology are nowhere more apt
than when applied to the aspirant student of his own great
work: 'There can be no theology without distress, but
also none without courage in distress'.
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CHAPTER I
THE IMMEDIATE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF BARTH*S DOCTRINE
OF TIME IN THE CHURCH DOGMATICS
The relation of the thought of Karl Barth to the
history of western theology and philosophy is extremely
complex and, therefore, incapable of undistorted abbreviation.
In view of this, and in order to secure both relevance and
simplicity, a single central theme will be isolated in the
context of a limited general discussion of Barth's theological
method. The main theme is that of the dialectic of time and
eternity which underwent a progressive development and trans¬
formation in the nineteenth century following Kant's
•Copernican revolution'. In his encounter with the culmin¬
ation of the tradition of German idealism, and its critics in
the thought of Trendelenburg and Kierkegaard, Barth was
forced to develop a theological method which could transcend
the ontological and epistemological deficiencies of the
nineteenth century.
The dialectic of antitheses (finite and infinite, time
and eternity and so on) underwent contrasting resolutions in
the work of Kant, Hegel, Trendelenburg and Kierkegaard. Barth
took up this dialectic and extended it to the point of self-
destruction before effecting its Christological transformation
in what he later called the 'dialectic of grace'."'" In the
context of Earth's reaction to Kantian strictures on the
1. Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, First Com-
plete English Edition, London, 1972, p. 420 (= Protestant
Theology).
2
possibility of theological knowledge and his epochal study
of Anselm, it is possible to detect the emergence of the
crucially important theme of analogia fidei (or analogia
gratia^ which informs Earth's creative and positive account
of the divine perfections. The nature of Barth's doctrine
of time and its correlate eternity is determined by this
framework of analogy. In isolating and analysing these
factors it will prove possible to demonstrate the continuity
of Barth's thought with certain antecedent factors in his
theological and philosophical background, yet reveal his
creative and corrective response, which was both revolutionary
and profound.
There are a number of ways in which Barth's mature
theology may be interpreted. It can, for example, be seen as
a sustained attack upon the Kantian, 'subjective' account of
the categories of space and time in the doctrines of trans-
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cendental idealism. Thus T.F. Torrance can compare the
relation of Kant and Barth with that of Newton and Einstein
in that both Barth and Einstein released their respective
scientific disciplines from an alien conceptual bondage.
2. Barth is in fact somewhat ambivalent on this point, see
below, Ch. X.
3. Theological Science, London, 1969. This demanding study
raises the complex questions surrounding the relation of
the methods of science and theology. This study of time
and eternity follows more closely the relation of Barth's
treatment of these themes to its historical context.
Torrance moves from an analogy to a direct parallel:
'What Karl Barth has attempted to do in theology, then,
is not unlike what several great physicists have been
attempting in the development of a general field theory
which will bring together and transcend the corpuscular
and undulatory theories of light. But to say that is to
indicate that Barth has brought classical theology to
much the same point where natural science now stands
poised.' ('Newton, Einstein and Scientific Theology',
Religious Studies 8, 1972, 233-250).
Some comment on this is offered below, pp.M>l-^77
3
Again Barth's work may be seen as the consistent maintenance
of realism (i.e. epistemological realism) over against the
incipient idealism of the German tradition and the nominalism
A
of much contemporary theological thought. The stand-point
of this thesis is less committed as it seeks to present
critically Barth's doctrine of time and eternity in a full
context without any prejudgements, either positive or negative.
The central, structural and fundamental theme of time and
eternity is a category shared by both philosophy and theology.
In exposing its role in the theology of Barth the very back¬
bone of his thought is revealed, for the dual aspects of
this category and its cosmic and anthropological universality
raise profound problems for theological endeavour.
Before embarking upon exposition of the dialectic of
antitheses in its historical context some reference to Barth' s
own explicit response to the nineteenth century is desirable.
In Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century Barth hints
obliquely at an aspect of Kant's insight into the nature of
the theological task, which was ignored by his immediate
successors. It is not perhaps too much to suggest that in
Barth's comments there is a clue to his own theological under¬
taking.
'Be this, however, as it may: looking at the matter
purely objectively there is just the one question as
to whether, behind Kant's segregation of the philoso¬
phical and theological function, with or without irony,
an insight lies hidden, which had and still has, a
4. These problems are dealt with in this thesis from the
historical standpoint and in an examination in depth of
Barth's claim that the time of God's revelation is
'real' time.
4
right to be heard, and insight which, it is true, was
of no direct usefulness within the framework of Kant's
undertaking, but one in which that determination of
the place of theology might well have its deep and
justified reason.'
(Protestant Theology, pp. 311-312).
This insight concerns 'biblical theology', practised,
in Kant's words, by the 'biblical theologian' who 'proves
that God exists by means of the fact that he has spoken in
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the Bible'. Given the Kantian critiques of reason and of
religion 'within the limits of reason alone', there neverthe¬
less remains, according to Barth's interpretation, a
scientific living-space for theology in relation to its proper
object. What is the proper object of tneoiogy? Barth does
not set out to answer this question in Protestant Theology
(originally delivered in the form of lectures in 1932-3) but
in his notable studyb of Anselm's Proslogion, first published
a year earlier (1930) at a crucial juncture in his life. In
this work he posits a unified theological ontology and
epistemology which serves precisely to give a positive impulse
to the 'point of departure'.
•This...would, in a word consist in theology
resigning itself to stand on its own feet in relation
to philosophy, in theology recognising the point of
departure for its method in revelation, just as
decidedly as philosophy sees its departure in reason,
and in theology conducting, therefore, a dialogue with
philosophy, and not, wrapping itself up in the mantle
of philosophy, a quasi-philosophical monologue.'
(Anselm, p. 107)
In Anselm there is to be found Barth's recognition of
the point of departure of theological method in revelation.
5. cf. Protestant Theology, pp. 311-312.
6. Anselm:Fides Quaerens Intellectum, London, I960. (=Anselm)
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This is in a notable correlation between the critical and
constructive aspects of his thought at an important stage in
his theological development, just prior to the appearance of
the Prolegomena (volume 1/1) of the Church Dogmatics.^ Here
Barth provides 'a vital key, if not the key, to an under¬
standing of that whole process of thought that has impressed
me more and more in my Church Dogmatics as the only one proper
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to theology'. There is a direct influence of this study
upon the Church Dogmatics (to which he moved straight after¬
wards) which cannot be ignored if his treatment of the dialectic
of time and eternity is to be correctly understood and its
extensive and complex consequences fully grasped.
The most relevant feature of Earth's argument and inter¬
pretation in Anselm is his realisation of the unity of
epistemology and ontology apparent in the basic doctrine of
ratio fidei, that is:
'...the conception of a ratio peculiar to the object
of faith and we can say: if the ontic ratio were to be
proved by means of the knowing ratio of the human
faculty of making concepts and judgements, after the
object of faith is given by revelation, then this con¬
ception would not be correctly interpreted until we
take into account that Anselm recognises a third and
ultimate ratio, a ratio veritatis. Strictly under¬
stood the ratio veritatis is identical with the ratio
summa naturae, that is with the divine Word consub-
stantial with the Father. It is the ratio of God.
It is not because it is ratio that it has truth but
because God, Truth, has it. This Word is not divine
as word but because it is begotten of the Father—
spoken by Him....Truth is not bound to it but it is
bound to Truth.'
(Anselm, pp. 45-46)
This statement contains the very core of the positive
7. Church Dogmatics, The Doctrine of the Word of God,
Edinburgh, 1936-, (=Church Dogmatics 1/1 etc. in text,
=CD 1/1 etc. in Notes). ~—
8. Anselm, p. 11.
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theological hermeneutic exploited with tremendous power in
the Church Dogmatics. God in his sovereign objectivity-
grasps our word in ratio end begets his own Word in the ratio
veritatis. Human knowledge of God is the product of divine
condescension, not speculative ratiocination. This is the
starting point of analogia fidei and is not the source of an
apparently static mode of quasi-mystical, direct acquaintance
with divine being. It is, on the contrary, dynamic, because
through this grasping of human reality in divine grace the
insights of sola fide and sola scriptura are allowed full
expression. The primal verity that Earth lays down in the
first volume of the Church Dogmatics is this epistemological
and ontological unity, for by God himself God is known, as
•It is in the Truth and by the Truth, in God and by God that
the basis is a basis and that rationality possesses rational-
ity.9
A brief but sympathetic account of this fundamental
parallel between the limitations of theological activity set
out by Kant and the positive possibilities to be found in
Anselm has been given as they are exploited by Barth. This
does not imply agreement with such a doctrine of the knowledge
of God but the whole-hearted appreciation of the fact that
only on this basis can the mature oeuvre of Barth be under¬
stood. In the light of the unified impulse of his thought
expressed in this doctrine it will be possible to assess and
analyse the structural theological themes of time and eternity.
The initial reflections in this chapter have conveyed
9. Op.cit., p. 51
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some idea of the most fundamental theological impulse implicit
in the Church Dogmatics which will underlie the ensuing study.
By deliberate contrast the dialectical movement of nineteenth
century thought will now be outlined, so as to reveal the
ontological and epistemological poverty of a tradition in
which the Christian theological gospel had become submerged
and grossly distorted. Barth's fulcrum, the inception of
analogia fidei, has been crystallised above. It is necessary
to see how and why this response was forthcoming in his
theological development.
As stated in the first paragraph of this chapter the
theme of this whole thesis may now be examined as it is mani¬
fested in the dialectic of antitheses. The problem of time
and eternity as the conflict of finite and infinite has been
a feature of philosophical thinxing since the pre-Socratic
age. This will be appreciated in this thesis when reference
is made to relevant philosophical background and the major
influences made by philosophy and metaphysics upon the history
of Christian theology, and, indeed, upon Earth. As Ronald
Gregor Smith has said,"^
'In Barth we have the last, and possibly the greatest,
certainly an awe-inspiring, effort on the part of
traditional theology to overcome the difficulty of
relating 'God in his being for himself* with 'God
for the world in Christ'. But if you begin with
'being', is there any way to the world of time and
movement, the historical world where'itakes its rise?'
(The Doctrine of 6od, p. 91)
10. The Doctrine of God, London, 1970. In these posthumous
Vvarfield Lectures Ronald Gregor Smith shows himself to
be one of the few to have grasped the significance of the
doctrine of God in the Church Dogmatics, see especially
Chapter III, 'God as Being*.
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This assessment of Earth is redolent with theological,
philosophical and metaphysical questions all of which will
arise in the following pages. Gregor Smith goes on to remark
in a footnote that 'Earth is so clearly part of the main
theological picture of our time, and yet he is such a volu¬
minous writer that it is very difficult to pin him down'.
This study is precisely an attempt (if the wrestling analogy
may he pursued a little further) to grapple with Earth's
thought in the Church Dogmagics along the lines indicated in
Gregor Smith's comments, by taking hold of the axis of
eternity and time (divine being and world, and so on), and
examining its role, structure and implications throughout
this work. In doing this the relation of philosophical and
theological thought is continually important, for in the
axis of time and eternity, the temporal category spans both
spheres.
The immediate context of Barth* s theological develop¬
ment was deeply and pervasively influenced by idealism
which grew on the ground originally ploughed by Kant and his
understanding of the antithesis of time and eternity. In the
following pages the pattern of nineteenth century thought as
it developed in successive stages of agnosticism, synthesis
and diastasis will be outlined from its radical basis in the
critical thought of Kant.
Kant successfully challenged the accepted basis of
metaphysical and speculative thought as he encountered it in
the textbooks of Leibnizian metaphysics prepared by Christian
Wolff. Kant accepted the 'strict method' of Wolff, 'the
9
greatest of all dogmatic philosophers* in the architectonic
thoroughness of his work. Kant's criticism was not of the
method, but of the faculty employed in the elaboration of any
method; he offered a critique of 'the organ, that is of
pure reason itself'."''"*' In the Critique of Pure Reason
Kant set out the doctrine of transcendental idealism which
was grounded upon an examination and statement of the innate
and inherent limitations of the human mind as reasoning
faculty. The consequences of this basic statement in the
first Critique are developed and applied in the successive
Critiques of Practical Reason and of Judgment. The deter¬
minative core of his thought is found in the first Critique
and it is this which influenced decisively the nature of the
anti thesis of finite and infinite time series and thus the
way in which the relation of time and eternity might be under¬
stood.
In the Transcendental Aesthetic of the Critique of Pure
1?
Reason Kant asserted that space and time were the forms
under which all appearances were mediated in sensibility, that
is in outer and inner sense respectively. This account which
1*
determines 'all principles of a priori sensibility' ^ has
immediately consequences for natural theology and the possible
knowledge and existence of God. Time and space are, Kant
argues, the 'a priori conditions of the existence of things'
11. The Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Norman Kemp
Smith, London, 1968, p.33. (= CPR).
12. Op.cit., p. 65.
13* Op.cit., p. 66.
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and 'As conditions of all existence in general, they must
14
also he conditions of the existence of God'. The epistem-
ological limitations of Kant's theory of knowledge have, it
is a commonplace to observe, distinct and inevitable onto-
logical corollaries.
There is much in Kant's doctrines of transcendental
idealism (for example, the intrinsic a priori status of
Euclidean geometry in sensibility or the analogous
structural role accorded to Aristotelian syllogistic in the
schematism of the categories) which is dated and dubious,
but the central message of the first Critique, in curbing the
illusory pretensions of speculative reason by the delineation
of the 'bounds of sense', had a salutory and persistent
influence. In the crowning achievement of The Critique of
Pure Reason, the Transcendental Deduction, Kant sought to
prove that,
•The objective unity of all empirical consciousness in
one consciousness, that of original apperception, is
thus the necessary condition of all possible perception;
and (this being recognised we can prove that) the
affinity of all appearances, near or remote, is a
necessary consequence of a synthesis which is grounded
a priori on rules.'
(CPR, p. 145)
This is the core of Kant's arguments which are an
attempt to prove the necessary unity and determined nature
of human e:xperience. A concrete example of this is the
Second Analogy in which Kant extends his argument to the
principle of causality, that had been decisively (and in Kant's
opinion disastrously) disposed of by Hume. Here Kant
0p« cit., p. 90.
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maintains that,
Experience itself - in other words, empirical know¬
ledge of appearances - is thus possible only in so
far as we subject the succession of appearances, and
therefore all alteration, to the law of causality;
and, as likewise follows, the appearances, as objects
of experience, are themselves possible only on con¬
formity with the law.'
(CPR, p. 219)
The mutual parallelism of the conditions of thought
and of experience may not appear directly relevant to the
problem of time and eternity and the antitheses, but it is
important to grasp the following facts first. Kant's treat¬
ment of the antimonies is not merely an arbitrary agnosticism
based upon the equal validity of two arguments for finitude
and infinitude respectively, but raises a more radical
difficulty which determined the thought of the nineteenth
century with respect to theological ontology and epistemology.
Second, this reorientation of thought was based upon a theory
of knowledge that was part and parcel of the so-called
Copernican revolution which affected the structural basis of
the conceptual preconditions of both thought and empirical
experience. In so far as Kant was dealing with the
conditions and not the results of any possible experience, he
transformed metaphysics into psychology (albeit 'transcendental')
and withdrew from the traditional arguments to criticise them
from this fundamentally agnostic standpoint.
The 'dialectical play of cosmological ideas', of which
the first, the antimony of finite and infinite space and time
concerns the argument in this thesis, presents irresolvable
metaphysical problems. Of course, great differences exist in
the form of each antimony; Kant's architectonic zeal had
12
played its part in the organisation of this passage, and it
is vital to appreciate that Kant sees them as imposed as
problems upon the human mind by the nature of reason itself,
15
not objective entities or experience. It is not merely
the apparent equal validity of these conflicting arguments
alone, which is fundamental to Kant's position but the
devastating ascription of metaphysical puzzlement to the
innate character of the human mind itself.
'We have now before us the dialectic play of cosmolo-
gical ideas. The ideas are such that an object
congruent with them can never be given in any possible
experience, and that even in thought reason is unable
to bring them into harmony with the universal laws of
nature. Yet they are not arbitrarily conceived.
Reason, in the continuous advance of empirical synthesis,
is necessarily led up to them whenever it endeavours
to free from all conditions and apprehend in its un¬
conditioned totality that which according to the rules
of experience can never be determined save as
conditioned.'
(CPR, p. 422).
The legitimate pretensions of reason run up against
insurmountable obstacles which impede any advance to the
necessarily illusory speculative knowledge of the unconditioned,
and thus the potentially infinite. It would be possible to
examine Kant's arguments in detail but to do this would be to
digress from the main concern of this chapter. What it has
been necessary to show is that there is a deep metaphysical
agnosticism in Kant's thought, which despite the 'practical'
reassertion of metaphysical entities as heuristic fictions in
ethics, had a deep influence not only in offering a challenge
to Hegel, responded to in his philosophy of synthesis, but,
15. That is they concern synthetic a priori possibilities
not a posteriori results of empirical experience.
13
as has been shown, in shaping the field of play for subse¬
quent theology. Barth, as has been made apparent, was
influenced by the latter factor, but it remains to be seen
how he combats the deeper problems of ontology and epistem-
ology on the macroscopic scale of the Church Dogmatics.
Kant turned the antithesis of finite and infinite into
an antimony thus making an actual cosmologically significant
problem into one which was in principle irresolvable owing to
the necessary limitations of human reason. It would be
possible to dwell much on Kant's epistemology and its conse¬
quent ontology (for example in considering the distinction
of noumena and phenomena) but this brief and inevitably highly
selective summary of Kant's thought places the reader in a
position to grasp the root of this agnosticism, against which
Hegel was to rebel in the reassertion of the dialectic of anti¬
theses, and, what is most significant, their resolution in
synthesis.
At the heart of Hegel's thought1^ lies the positing of
absolute knowledge, which is in direct contrast to Kant's meta¬
physical agnosticism. It is now desirable to give another
brief yet relevant account, this time of Hegel, for, as in
the case of Kant, his influence, albeit implicit rather than
explicit, cannot be ignored. Once more in Barth's Protestant
Theology a useful starting point is forthcoming, but the scale
16. A useful starting-point for Hegel's specifically theolo¬
gical doctrines are the Lectures on the Philosophy of
Religion, London, 1895, and for the problem of time, the
Philosophy of Nature, London, 1970. W. Pannenberg's article
on Hegel's treatment of Christianity in Basic Questions
in Theology, Volume III, proved helpful also"! Cf. Bib- -
liography at the end of this thesis.
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of the problem involved in a full comparison of the two
thinkers is truly vast.
The positing of absolute knowledge was realised in the
•dialectic* in which Hegel strove to overcome in synthesis,
the antitheses of finite and infinite. In his dialectic
Hegel reacted against Kant's elimination of absolute know1-
ledge from the range of noetic human possibilities. Kant,
as has been outlined above, by his distinction of noumena and
phenomena, by his placement of the ideas of God, freedom and
immortality outside the area of the knowable, as postulates of
practical reason, and by the overall impulse of his doctrine
of transcendental idealism, strictly limited the pretensions
of human knowledge within a complex empiricism. In Hegel's
dialectic it is precisely the subsumption of contradictory
aspects of reality, including those of finite and infinite
(and thus time and eternity), into a single overall process
which is ultimately resolvable into pure thought, that runs
directly counter to Kant's circumscription of possible human
knowledge. In the dialectic thought and being enter into
identity. The being of God and the being of man become one
through the coming to self-consciousness of God through human
self-consciousness.
Hegel's all-embracing synthesis presents a notable
contrast with that of Earth's Christological synthesis.
J.M.E. McTaggart has said of the Christian elements of Hegel's
philosophy that 'The Incarnation is identical with the
creation. To say that God is incarnate in the finite is mis¬
leading. We should rather say that the finite is the
15
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incarnation of God*. It is important to note that Barth's
dogmatic resolution of the antithesis of finite and infinite
should escape such an identity and this problem will recur
in the course of this thesis. Indeed Barth is well aware
of the danger, for, in criticism of Hegel's doctrine of God,
he argues that later theologians failed to grasp the positive
notion of synthesis in his thought.
'Was it really impossible (Barth asks) to take up and
make fruitful the entire Hegelian concept of the
synthesis, so soon as it was taken seriously, more
seriously perhaps than Hegel himself took it, with the
realisation that it could be a question only of the
incomprehensible synthesis of God?'
(Protestant Theology, p. 417)
Once more it is both interesting and important to note
with some care Barth's explicit assessment of one of his most
significant fore-runners. His comments in the Church
Dogmatics cast little light on the importance of this
encounter for, as with Kant, Barth's real response is in his
1 ft
actual theological construction, but,despite this, further
hints are afforded in Protestant Theology. Barth presents a
Hegel who threatened the theologians with a trinitarian renewal
17. J.R.:e. McTaggart, Studies in Hegelian Cosmology. Cambridge,
1901, p. 218. This work and Studies in Hegelian
Dialectic, Cambridge, 1896, remain most interesting despite
their age and the caution that J.N. Findlay offers vis a vis
both Bradley and McTaggart in his Hegel: a Re-Examination,
London, 1958, p. 21; and on the so-called 'unreality of
time', p. 146.
18. The point here is parallel to that made by T.F. Torrance
with regard to the later response of Barth to
Kierkegaard's relation of the possibility to the reality
of the Incarnation, which is pervasive 'although the name
of Kierkegaard is rarely mentioned in the subsequent
volumes' Tthat is of the Church Dogmatics cf. Theological
Science, p. 7.). Likewise here the relation of Barth to
Hegel is 'implicit' and involves the content and structure
of his whole work. Barth's references to Hegel are spora¬
dic and unsystematic in the Church Dogmatics, but his
response is total in its scale.
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of theology which they did not want. Moreover Hegel over¬
came the dualism of transcendental and historical spheres
20
of reality, re-asserted a powerful (even if finally mistaken)
21
doctrine of the Trinity existing, or rather subsisting, in
22
act, and a grounding of philosophy and theology within one
23
system of thought. It has been said of Marx that he turned
Hegel on his head. It might well be argued that Barth out-
24
Kegels Hegel by a discrete but momentous shift in ontology.
There is much in Barth's mature thought that reflects Hegel
in his understanding of the truth as •movement* and the histori¬
cally of God*s own being. In fact Barth sees in Hegel one
who was able and willing to disturb the pedestrian logic of
western thought and one with whom he can marginally identify
himself. Would it be too much to suggest further that in
Hegel Barth sees one who cries in the wilderness but who fails
to recognise the coming One? Is there not in Hegel an
agitation of the torpid rationalism that limited the logical
capacity of an age that lay bound and unexpectant within its
own (man-made) horizons?
•Hegel*s demand consists...in the fact that he asserts
the contradiction as the law of truth understood as
history. It consists in the fact that he thought he
could show that the dialectical method was the one
which alone exhausted and comprised the truth. The
truth is God, God, however, is God only in actu. This
19. Protestant Theology, p. 414.
20. Op.cit., p. 418.
21. Op.cit.. p. 414.
22. Op.cit.. p. 413.
23. Op.cit.t pp. 412-414.
24. By asserting the ontology of created and uncreated being
over against Hegel's complex but ultimately monistic
ontological synthesis.
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means for Hegel, only as the God who is free in One,
the eternal process which consists in something dis¬
tinguishing its parts, separating them, and absorbing
them into itself again. Life itself is not a unity
resting in itself, but a perpetual a=non a, in despite
of the whole of western logic. It is, quite simply,
life, and not the task of life to adapt itself to
logic. The unity of truth - and no one fought for it
more vigorously than Hegel - is the unity of contra¬
dictions, more, the reconciliation which is effected
between them. It is in their reconciliation, but
also the establishment of their basis, their necessity,
and their adjustment and dissolving.1
(Protestant Theology, p. 413)
Hegel had made a partial discovery of the truth in a
willingness to disrupt the logical pattern imposed upon
reality; but he vitiated this by imposing his own pattern, the
dialectic of triadic development, upon his doctrine of God.
The freedom of God is contained and channelled into alien
paths in an incomplete emancipation and a concatenation of
syntheses ultimately resolved in a complex monistic identity.
Barth's conclusion is significant in that it points the
reader to his own later work and a possible principle of
interpretation which may well help in understanding the
Church Dogmatics.
•Hegel in making the dialectical method of logic the
essential nature of God, made impossible the know¬
ledge of the actual dialectic of grace, which has
its foundation in the freedom of God.•
(Protestant Theology, p. 420)
Barth's attitude to Hegel is not without ambivalence.
In asserting and developing at great length the 'dialectic of
grace' he repudiates the 'dialectical method of logic' and
places great emphasis, as will be seen in the following chapters
of this thesis upon the freedom of God. At the same time
Barth claims that Hegel introduces the notion of 'truth...as
18
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a movement, as a history'. In subsequent criticism of
Hegel it is this alleged temporality or 'history' which is
subjected to sharp criticism by Trendelenburg and, following
him, by Kierkegaard. Does Barth in releasing the doctrine of
God from another 'logic', that of dialectic, provide an
adequate doctrine of time, so as to secure both the eternity
of God and the temporality of the world and cosmos, the theatre
of revelation? At least the starting-point is clear, Barth
seeks an emancipation in Protestant Theology from the Hegelian
logic imposed upon the Trinity. The new alternative that
Barth provides will be the centre of attention in Chapters II
and III, where his doctrine of the Trinity will be stated and
examined in the light of these, and other questions pertaining
to the doctrine of time and eternity. Barth thought that
Hegel had confused the 'incomprehensible synthesis of God' with
that implicit in the Hegelian dialectic. In the Church
Dogmatics there is Earth's answer to this in his account of the
•incomprehensible synthesis' and the 'dialectic of grace'. The
student of Barth is confronted with a creation of awesome
dimensions and intense ambition. It falls to this study to
follow out, as mentioned, the temporal aspect of this, an
aspect not, as will be seen, without its importance for the
whole structure of the Church Dogmatics.
25- Op.cit., p. 412.
26. Compare CD II/l, p. 270. 'Hegel speaks forcefully of God
....But it is not a description of God, whose movement is
infinitely more than our self movement even when the
latter is hypostatised, i.e., projected into eternity, and
by whose movement this hypostatisation and projection is
necessarily forbidden and prevented.'
19
Barth's critical observations on Hegel, for example,
that Christian theology demands exegesis rather than the
27
Hegelian type of system, that God can have nothing to do
2Q
with the absolutizing of human nature and being, and, above
29
all, that Hegel lost the real infinitude of God, all direct
attention forward to his own creative and innovatory response
in the Church Dogmatics. An examination of the reconciliation
of time and eternity, eternity and time in this putatively true
synthesis and the exact nature of each arm of this category
will constitute the core of this thesis. It carries the
reader to the heart of both Barth's theological intentions,
and, indeed, his achievement.
Barth's arguments and criticisms in Protestant Theology
have been used in inaugurating this study of the doctrine of
time because of the insight they offer into the probable moti¬
vation of his great constructive work. At the same time the
actual development in the nineteenth century has been followed be
cause it is in "the context of the generalised movement of
Kantian agnosticism, Hegelian synthesis and Kierkegaardian
diastasis, that Barth's early theological work may be under¬
stood. Protestant Theology presents, as was noted earlier,
the understanding Barth had just prior to the appearance of
27. CD 1/1, p. 483. 'Therefore a biblical theology can never
consist in more than a series of attempted approximations,
a collection of individual exegeses.*
28. Cf. CD 11/1, pp. 74-75.
29. CD II/l, p. 467. 'God's "infinity,"...is true infinity
because it does not involve any contradiction that it is
finitude as well.' Barth's treatment of infinity is
properly speaking theological and positively reflects what
has been called Kantian 'agnosticism' in this thesis, as
the condition of theological freedom of exposition on the
basis of which the freedom of divine being can be
developed.
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the Prolegomena to the Church Dogmatics. Barth reviews
theological history in this former work, but in The Epistle
"50
to the Romans and the Church Dogmatics, he himself was to
make such history.
It is not possible to offer a general comparison of
Barth and Hegel in the space available, even if this were
desirable. Fortunately it is through the medium of time, or
rather its criticism, that a link between Hegel and Kierkegaard
exists which in turn connects the early work of Barth with
this tradition. In examining this theme attention is
diverted from generalities and brought down to a fine focus
upon the temporal character of the Hegelian synthesis to
which allusion has been made above. It is a difficult prob¬
lem to work out exactly what Hegel meant by 'time.' This
difficulty has been compounded by both F.H. Bradley and
J.M.E. McTaggart who argued for the ♦unreality1 of time. Both
placed a construction upon Hegel and this consequently raises
■351
very wide issues indeed. It is the case that Hegel's
understanding of time has much more to it than such utterances
as 'the being which, inasmuch as it is, is not, or which, in-
asmuch as it is not, is,' might immediately suggest, for it
is the teleological aspect of his doctrine of time which is
distinctly characteristic of his thought.
'In the positive sense of time one can therefore say
that only the Present is, while what is before and
30. The Epistle to the Romans, translated by E.C. Hoskyns,
London, 1933, (- Romans).
31. Hegel's understanding of time will of course recur as a
problem later in this thesis.
32. Cf. Philosophy of Nature, pp. 78-8o.
after is not. The concrete Present is, however, the
result of the Past, and is pregnant with the Future.
The true Present is therefore pregnant with eternity.'
(Philoaophy of Nature, p. 86)
This positive doctrine of Hegel does bear distinct
similarities to that employed in the Church Dogmatics, at
least superficially in the notion of a •fulfilment' of the
present by eternity. This will be referred to later in
relation to Barth and it is in structural terms in relation to
the overall movement of the system of each that their temporal
doctrines emerge more clearly. The 'unreality' account of
time made current by Bradley and McTaggart relies upon what
can be termed the 'semantic argument' that exemplifies the
much-denounced metaphysical methods of generating conclusions
concerning what there is, from the 'surface' of language and
■35-5
paradox. Both these contrasting accounts of Hegel must
be put to one side at this juncture for the historical develop¬
ment of the critical reaction to Hegel in theology turned on
the 'logical question in Hegel's system.' This critical
34
reaction was initiated by Adolf Trendelenburg and it is
upon his work that this particular aspect of the theology of
Kierkegaard and therefore Barth depends. On the larger scale
the structural affinities of Hegel and Barth may be dimly dis¬
cerned lying before the reader. To that pertains the positive
development of the concept of eternity in relation to the
33^ Both the themes of temporal 'fulfilment' and 'metaphysical
argument' will occur later, see below, Chs. IX-XII.
34. Notably in his Logische Untersuchungen, Leipzig, 1870.
The only English translation of Trendelenburg's work
appears to be 'The Logical Question in Hegel's System',
translated by Thomas Davidson, Journal of Speculative
Philosophy, V (1871), pp. 349-59; VI (1872), pp. 82-93,
pp. 163-175, pp. 350-361.
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'Present' in time which will come to the forefront later. It
is on the smaller scale, in the historical encounter of
Kierkegaard with the thought of Hegel, informed hy the
achievement of Trendelenburg, that there is to be found the
source of the new movement towards theological destruction
and the possibility of renewal.
There are many facets to the encounter of Hegel and
Kierkegaard which concern the conflict of the 'logical' and
the 'existential' categories. Kierkegaard took deep
exception to Hegel's assertion that the products of his
thought-experiment actually corresponded with reality itself.
Hegel's bold exploits with Aristotelian categories were
exposed by Trendelenburg who brought to bear his critical and
philological expertise practised on the text of Aristotle.
Kierkegaard found that many of his own criticisms of Hegel,
wliich were fundamental and pervasive, were confirmed by
Trendelenburg, who had revealed the latter's misuse of
Aristotle. In particular Trendelenburg exposed the deep
Hegelian ambiguity produced by the radical confusion of
categories which stemmed from the synthesis of incompatibles.
This was not merely the sophisticated synthesis of finite and
infinite (this is an extremely complex question in Hegel) but
the danger of illusion resulting from the imposition of
necessity, that is logical necessity, upon the historical
35
process subsumed into dialectic. The logical progression
imposed upon the allegedly historical transition from possible
35. Cf. The Concept of Dread, Princeton, 1944, for example,
p. 43, 'In logic no movement can come about for logic is
and everything else logical simply is.'
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to real, was, in fact, a denial of the Aristotelian concept
of KLvrjcr/$ , a real movement implicit in the change
36
characteristic of time. Thus despite Hegel's use of this
notion, the conflict between logical necessity and its strict
absence from the realm of temporal change, was fundamental
and highly misleading. In simple terms real contingency was
constantly in danger. Such a complete and comprehensive set
of abstractions as was Hegel's system destroyed the genuine
distinction of divine and human being.
It is upon this blurring and synthetic tendency in
Hegel's thought that Kierkegaard spent much destructive effort
in the positing of an 'irreducible diastasis'; thus using
the logical tools forged by Trendelenburg to force apart the
false and illusory categorial homogeneity of idealism. In
Philosophical Fragments, Concluding Unscientific Postscript
and the Introduction to The Concept of Dread this attack is
37
presented. Thus in, for example, the Postscript Kierkegaard
argued on two main fronts insofar as his work relates to this
study. First he asserted the overwhelming importance and
indispensability of the category of personal existence, lost
(so Kierkegaard would argue) by Hegel, and, second, he
36. Concluding Unscientific Postscript, translated by
O.F. ".Swenson and W. Lowrie, Princeton, 19^1, p. 306,
(=Postscript) 'The transition from possibility to
actuality is, as Aristotle rightly says, a vfTwjen^
a movement. This cannot be expressed or understood in
the language of abstraction; for in the sphere of the
abstract, movement cannot have assigned to it either
time or space which presupposes movement or are pre¬
supposed by it.'
37. The generalised account of Kierkegaard in this chapter is
indebted to H. Piem, Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Existence,
translated by H. Knight, Edinburgh, 1959, and James Collins,
The Mind of Kierkegaard, Chicago, 1965• For additional
bibliography see Bibliography below.
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developed and sustained the absolute distinction of divine
and human existence. In conjunction these factors are
important for this introductory chapter because of their
initial influence upon Earth's early work and then after that
of
as the nodal point of the process /rejection and self-
correction which preceded the emergence of the Church Dogmatics.
In the Postscript Kierkegaard juxtaposes the subject
(who exists in becoming) and truth, in a relation of contra¬
diction. He therefore grasps the Hegelian state of
alteration between being and non-being but at the same time
discards Hegel's abrogation of the principal of non-contra- «
diction. Thus:
'The existing subjective thinker is in his existential
relation to the truth as negative as he is positive;
he has as much humour as he has existential pathos,
and he is constantly in process of becoming, i.e. he
is always striving.•
(Postscript, p. 74)
Kierkegaard transforms 'dialectic' from 'quantitative' to
'qualitative'. The 'infinity' of the Hegelian dialectic is
transformed into infinite certainty of personal existence.
-za
The danger of existence sub specie aeterni is exposed, for
38. Postscript, p. 270. The 'contradiction' implicit in the
divine-human encounter is disposed of by Hegel,
'Hegel is utterly and absolutely right in asserting
that viewed eternally, sub specie aeterni, in the
language of abstraction^ in pure thoughtand pure
being, there is no either-or. How in the world could
there be, when abstract thought has taken away the
contradiction, so that Hegel and the Hegelians ought
rather be asked to explain what they mean by the
hocus-pocus of introducing contradiction, movement,
transition, and so forth, into the domain of logic....
the either-or of contradiction is ipso facto nullified
when ix is lifted out of the sphere of the existential
and introduced into the eternity of abstract thought.•
(pp. 270-71)
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it rests upon an elision of the true distinction of divine
and human being. Existence as conceived in speculative
thought is therefore strictly inauthentic and rests upon a
move from real existence into false construction.
'Nothing historical can become infinitely certain
for me except the fact of my own existence (which
again cannot become infinitely certain for any other
individual, who has infinite certainty only of his
own existence), and this is not something historical.
The speculative result is in so far illusory, as the
existing subject proposes qua thinker to abstract from
the fact that he is occupied in existing, in order to
be sub specie aeterni.'
(Postscript, p. 75)
The disjunction of historical and eternal truths is
absolute and can only be expressed in paradox and decision
and overcome by a 'leap' made in the extremes of existential
passion and pathos. 'The paradoxical nature of Christianity
consists in its constant use of time and the historical in
59
relation to the eternal'-^ whereas 'The systematic Idea is
the identity of thought and being' but 'Existence, on the
40
other hand is their separation'. The most pressing problem
was how it was possible for 'eternal truth...to be understood
in determinations of time by one who as existing is himself
41
in time'. The divine 'incognito' is of course part of
the response Kierkegaard made to this, along with the doctrine
of encounter. Christianity is, according to Kierkegaard,
•no doctrine concerning the unity of the divine and the human,
or concerning the identity of subject and object' but 'the
42
fact that God has existed'. Contrary to popular under-
39. Op.cit., p. 88.
40. Op.cit., p. 112.
41. Op.cit., p. 172.
42. Op.cit., p. 290.
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standing of Kierkegaard's thought Christology is not
paradox in a crude objective sense but in the actual encounter.
Kierkegaard's position is well summarised in the following
quotation which has significance for the final stage in
this brief survey, a consideration of the early theology of
Barth. It is Barth's re-emphasis and reinterpretation of
Kierkegaard's notion of the divine-human diastasis which
drove division to the point of final dissociation.
'When subjectivity, inwardness, is the truth, the
truth becomes objectively a paradox; and the fact
that the truth is objectively a paradox shows in turn
that subjectivity is the truth....The paradoxical
character of the truth is its objective uncertainty;
this uncertainty is an expression for the passionate
inwardness, and this passion is precisely the truth....
The eternal and essential truth, the truth which has
an essential relationship to an existing individual
because it pertains essentially to existence..., is
a paradox. But the eternal essential truth is by no
means in itself a paradox; but it becomes paradoxical
by virtue of its relationship to an existing
individual.•
(Postscript, p. 183)
Kierkegaard was concerned to state a new dialectic of
existence and encounter which ousted the illusory constructs
of the Hegelian dialectic in synthesis. This 'new'
dialectic (if it may be so described) was built upon
Trendelenburg's 'infinite specific difference of God and the
world' and the irreducible diastasis could be bridged, or more
accurately crossed, only in paradox. The encounter of time
and eternity is in time and both Kierkegaard's Christology
and doctrine of encounter are animated by an insistent
AX
emphasis upon temporality. J This unbridled notion of time
43. Cf. J. Heywood Thomas, 'Kierkegaard's View of Time',
Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, Vol. 4
No.l, January 1973, pp. 33-40.
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(unlike Hegel*s doctrine of time, vitiated in Kierkegaard's
eyes by 'the introduction of movement into logic' which is
\ /[
'sheer confusion of logical sciences') is to be understood
as the arena of divine possibility in revelation, and for man.
'For as the eternal comes into the world at a moment
of time, the existing individual does not in the
course of time come into relation with the eternal
and think about it(...), but in time it comes into
relation with the eternal in time; so that the
relation is within time.'
(Postscript, p. 506)
Eternity, as was seen above, is thought in relation
to the individual and to time. Abstract notions of eternity
are inimical to Kierkegaard for,
'The goal of movement for an existing individual is to
arrive at a decision, and to renew it. The eternal
is the factor of continuity; but an abstract eternity
is extraneous to the movement of life, and a concrete
eternity within the existing individual is the
maximum degree of his passion....The eternity of
abstract thought is arrived at by abstracting from
existence. The realm of pure thought is a sphere in
which the existing individual finds himself only by
virtue of a mistaken beginning; and this error
revenges itself by making the existence of the
individual insignificant, and giving his language a
flavour of lunacy.*
(Postscript, p. 277)
As with the other encounters of the great thinkers
sketched out in this chapter it has only been possible to
indicate the general movement of thought in the nineteenth
century tradition rather than allow the central argument to
disappear under a superfluous wealth of detail and complexity.
Hegel reasserted a new and involved synthesis of both
Aristotelian and Platonic philosophical elements (for example
the doctrine of time and the identity of being, respectively).
Kierkegaard broke this false and categorially reductive
44. Postscript, p. 99
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synthesis through the critique of categories of logic and
existence and the consequent positing of paradox in real time.
He achieved this by means largely clarified in Trendelenburg's
work on Aristotle and his critical analysis of Hegel.
It is now time to ask once more how theological
epistemology and ontology have fared in this development.
Clearly Hegel, in his union of philosophy with theology in
the dialectic, subsumed both these elements into an all-
embracing realization of human and divine consciousness in
the realm of pure thought and being. The illusory pretension
of this was exposed by Kierkegaard. By his constant and
searching concentration upon the passionate infinity of the
qualitative dialectic in subjectivity Kierkegaard lost touch
with ontology in the face of the overwhelming epistemological
(and thus for Kierkegaard existential) question. Kierkegaard
maintained that he accepted the orthodox Christological
formulations once the problem of their actual appropriation
45
in inwardness had been honestly faced. The starting point
of his theological impulse is, however, in the paradoxical
encounter of subjectivity and Subject in time, and in despair.
The Christological adequacy of this is doubtless a complex
problem in purely exegetical assessment of Kierkegaard, but
in the immediate history of theology Barth made destructive
use of the stark antithesis of finite and infinite in
destroying the precarious Christological equilibrium achieved
in Kierkegaard's work.
45. J. Heywood Thomas, op.cit., p. 3o, cf. also 'The
Christology of S. Kierkegaard and Karl Barth*, Hibbert
Journal, 1954-55» p. 281ff.
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As has been shown Kierkegaard exhausted the meaning¬
ful notion of the infinite (as opposed to Hegelian
abstraction) in existential passion and inwardness. In his
early work Barth was to take the second aspect of Kierkegaard's
criticism of Hegel (the acute diastasis of divine and human
being as an ontological distinction) and force it into an un¬
paralleled theological reductio ad absurdurn, thus posing the
question of theological ontology in its sharpest possible
form. What was to be the basis of revelation and knowledge
of God? Such questions were formed in Barth's mind later as
was shown earlier in this chapter. By tracing Barth's own
development it will be possible to grasp the significance
of his reaction to,and use of Kierkegaardian insights as the
fulfilment of the nineteenth century dialectic in a
destructive consummation,but, beyond this, to see how this
ground-clearance opened the way to his great constructive work.
In pursuing the final sections of this investigation the
innovatory genius of Barth will be revealed as he strove to
re-establish Christian theology upon its own foundations in
ontological and epistemological uniqueness and power.
Whether Barth succeeds in avoiding the hazards and pitfalls
that have threatened all such endeavours, ancient and modern,
will be a central concern in the ensuing exposition and
analysis of the doctrine of time and eternity in the Church
Dogmatics proper.
There are many factors influencing the early thought
of Karl Barth and indeed Henri Bouillard has argued that his
first great work, The Epistle to the Romans is the most
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difficult to analyse of all.^° This may well he an
exaggeration but it is true that this work is open to inter¬
pretation rather than subject to straightforward exegesis.
The thought of Kierkegaard had a decisive influence upon
the development of Barth*s theology and this will be
assessed prior to showing Barth's emancipation from
Kierkegaardian concepts,particularly regarding the ontological
and epistemological implications of the diastasis of time and
eternity.
The Epistle to the Romans in its second and influential
edition occupies a key position in the history of the theology
of the twentieth century. It has been regarded by some as
47
the theological expression of Spenglerian pessimism, for
others it •fell like a bomb on the playground of the
48
theologians.' Undoubtedly its importance was decisive.
All major interpreters of Barth consider with care the
relation of this work to the mature masterpiece, the Church
Dogmatics itself. Von Balthasar, Kiing, Berkouwer and Torrance
46. Karl Barth, Gen&se et Evolution de la th£ologie
dialectique, Paris, 1957, P. 29. •De tous les ecrits de
Barth, le Commentaire sur l'Epitre aux Romains est le
plus difficile & analyser.•
47. Cf. H. Berkouwer's account of the varieties of Barthian
interpretation in The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of
Karl Barth, p. 23 (^Triumph of Grace). ~~
48. T.F. Torrance cites Karl Adam in his indispensable Karl
Barth, An Introduction to his Early Theology, 1910-1931•
I have taken an independent line from this and the other
standard introductory works in considering the nineteenth
century as ontological dearth answered by putative ontolo¬
gical plenitude in the Church Dogmatics. The doctrine of
time and eternity has a vital structural role in this.
(=Karl Barth;Early Theology)
49. Cf. H.U. von Balthasar, Darstellung und Deutung seiner
Theologie Koln, 1951, (translated and abridged in an
American translation by John Drury, The Theology of Karl
Barth, New York, 1972); G.C. Berkouwer, The Triumph of
(Contd.
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for example, all point to a reorientation in Barth's
thought and pursue this along specific lines in their
respective accounts. Radicals like R.W. Jenson
see the whole 'post-Christian' era in the light of this work
which is for him 'the final triumph of platonic religion
y
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over the believing apprehension of history' and prime mover
in the theology of the 'death of God.' For the purposes of
this study these approaches are noted, but eschewed, for
there is to be found in Barth's work a coherent,progressive
development and transformation concerning the theme of time
and eternity in relation to the questions of fundamental
ontology and epistemology.
Jenson rightly remarks that Karl Barth's dialectic is
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born of a basic contradiction between time and eternity.
In the decisive edition of Romans which appeared in 1922
Barth states that if he has a 'System', then,
'...it is limited to a recognition of what Kierkegaard
called the "infinite qualitative distinction between
time and eternity" - "God is in heaven and thou art
on earth".... The relation between such a God and such
a man, and the relation between such a man and such
a God, is for me the theme of the Bible and the
essence of philosophy.'
(Romans, p. 10)
Contd.) Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth, London, 1956;
H. Kung,*"Justification, The Doctrine of Karl Barth and a
Catholic Reflection and T.F. Torrance's Introduction (see
note 48) all develop a major theme or themes of creative
and innovatory significance in the work of Barth. This
thesis is centred on the problem of time and its dynamic
correlate, eternity, and therefore follows an independent
course dictated by the. nature of the source material.
50. R.W. Jenson, God after God, The God of the Past and the
God of the Future. Seen in the Work of Karl Barth,
Indianapolis and New York, 1969, p. 19. This isthe only
full-scale study of the problem of time in the theology
of Karl Barth known to me. It is, however, highly idio¬
syncratic and polemical and leaves room for the present
study.
51. Jenson, op.cit., p. 11.
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Barth continues,
'Philosophers name this KRISIS of human perception -
The Prime Cause: the Bible beholds at the same
crossroads - the figure of Jesus Christ.'
(Romans, p. 10)
In this analysis and account of the relation of Romans to
Kierkegaard, and to the Church Dogmatics, it will be argued
that although the very core and goal of Earth's thought is
Jesus Christ as the intersection of divine and human
reality, Barth's understanding of the fundamental ontology
of the divine being in relation to human being changed drama¬
tically. In the theology of dialectical diastasis Christology
was to be destroyed by the 'infinite qualitative distinction*,
once this had been rendered unstable by the intrusion of
radical eschatology which removed any feasible basis for
creation and the relation of time and eternity (as a corollary
of the other divine-human attributes) in the God-man Jesus
Christ. By the rediscovery and reassertion of dynamic
Christology upon the Anselmic basis, examined in the earlier
parts of this chapter, Barth restored the ontological and
epistemological powerbase of Christian dogmatics. In the
sustained development of the true 'dialectic of grace' (lost,
the reader will remember, in the Hegelian dialectic and false
synthesis) time and eternity become the corollates of the re¬
conciliation effected in the Christological synthesis of the
unio hypostatics. It is their role at the very core of the
Church Dogmatics which then becomes crucial in the new
ontology of divine grace. So as to conclude this chapter
the place of Romans in the demolition and renewal of Christian
theology will now be traced in explication of the above-
mentioned issues.
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In Romans the dichotomy between time and eternity is
absolute and, therefore, unmediated. Their 'relation'
.(this word is misleading here) is in the neo-Hegelian
dialectical juxtaposition of the divine 'Yes' and 'NO'. A
mutual annihilation takes place for '...time is nothing when
52
measured by the standard of eternity'. The dialectical
Yes and No correspond to a comprehensive division of reality
into the spheres of God's wrath and his righteousness, finite
and infinite, time and eternity, and so on. The 'Krisis' of
revelation, that is of eternity over time, is understood
purely in terms of tangential intersection. Such 'Moments*
of intersection, expressed in geometrical imagery (in common
with Luther and Kierkegaard), can be traced through history
as the 'crimson line' of points of the eschatological inter¬
vention of a timeless eternity, for, according to Barth,
'through all history there runs the line of intersection
between time and eternity, between the present and the
55
future world.'
Now it must be appreciated that there are both distinct
affinities and marked discontinuities between the epochal
commentary on the Epistle to the Romans and the Church
Dogmatics. These are recorded elsewhere in the major
commentators and interpreters of Barth as noted above. It
is desirable, however, to record some of these thematic
coronations in the progress of this exposition for they cast
further light upon those questions most relevant to it. The
52. Romans, p. A3.
53. Op.cit., p. 47.
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Epistle to the Romans broke, as is well known, with the
culturally conditioned Liberal Protestantism personified in
Adolf von Harnack. This was largely achieved by the
assertion of irreducible diastasis and the rediscovered extreme
eschatology Barth used to emphasise the judgemental aspect
of revelation over against all human effort. The relation
of time and eternity adumbrated in the last paragraph must
now be seen in a fuller context informed by wider, but highly
relevant, considerations.
Kierkegaard had, according to J. Heywood Thomas, a
Christology of the God-man Jesus Christ for 'To believe is
. 54
to believe the divine and human together in Jesus Christ*.
The point of relation of time and eternity is in Jesus Christ
primarily, and. secondarily, in the divine-human encounter of
faith. The centrality of Jesus Christ is maintained, however
great the ultimate ontological weight placed upon the encounter
as the determinant of infinity, in infinite passion. This
Christological centrality is lost in The Epistle to the Romans
in the following way, that is by allowing the consistent
impulse of the dialectical tension of time and eternity to
run free. There is the mere assertion of the relation, the
identity, of the divinity and the humanity of Christ and this
is overwhelmed by the power of ontological diastasis and the
annihilation of time by eternity. Indeed '...time is nothing
55
when measured by the standard of eternity.' ^ Human temporal¬
ity is an affront to God as 'our duration consists in a
54. J. Heywood Thomas, art cit., p. 3o» quotes Kierkegaard's
Papirer IX, A101.
55. Romans, p. 43.
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solemn affirmation of ourselves and of the world and a pious
56
setting aside of the contradiction.' In this can be seen
both the destructive move of Barth in opening the way to the
annihilation of time by eternity, and yet beyond this the seed
of an even deeper reorientation of his thought. This very
destruction which has ontological implications for the
temporal order is the preliminary purging, at a deeper level,
57
of any human or earthly justification of man before God.
In other v/ords an immense blast clears the way for justifi¬
cation b>? God himself, for justification by faith, the very
quintessence of the message of St. Paul. This is a pre¬
liminary step on the path to the Church Dogmatics, the most
consistent and comprehensive exposition of the Reformation
insight, sola gratia, by grace alone. There Is indeed,
according to Barth, 'no magnificent temporality of this world
that can justify man before God.The Epistle to the
Romans betrays to the percipient reader the beginnings of
Earth's ever-increasing theological transformation of all
the categories of human existence, including, of course, that
of time. In nuce, Barth kills to make alive; employing the
negative insight of Kierkegaard, the infinite qualitative
distinction and its theological corollaries, he makes
possible the innovation and creative work which came later.
'The man of God is aware of the true and tragic and
paradoxical state of affairs.... The men of God know
that belief is faith only when it is the product of
no historical or spiritual achievement. They know
that faith is the ineffable reality of God, that
clarity of sight is no system, no discovery of research,
56. Op.cit., p. 44.
57. Cf. op.cit., p. 88, 'All the world is guilty before God.'
58. Op.cit.. p. 56.
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but the eternal ground of perception. They know
also that in itself faith can be no more justified
than any other human achievement. They do not
escape from the paradox by making it another frag¬
ment of the concrete world. They do not evacuate
the divine negation by too nearly accommodating it
to their own human negation. They do not blunt the
austerity of judgement by supposing it to be a
temporal station through which they have passed in
their spiritual pilgrimage (ordosalutis) and which
they have left behind. They do hot make of the
dawning righteousness of the Gospel of salvation a
hole into which they can creep or a fortress in which
they can resist the attacks of others. They know
the judgment of God to be according to the standard
of truth; and if men are measured by the standard of
the truth of God, who can withstand it? Can stability
be attained anywhere or at any time?1
(Romans, p. 56)
If all the grounds of man's boasting before God are
to be removed then this includes his standpoint in time.
Earth explodes human security by a dazzling application of
theological insight to time. By this the reader is made
aware that in the theology of Earth he is to encounter a
theological conditioning, more than this, a theological
constitution, of the problem of time of an unprecedented power
and complexity. The theme of time lies at the heart of
Earth's ongoing theological development and achievement*
demonstrating the thoroughness and ultimacy of his thought.
By studying the role of time in this the deepest intentions
of Barth are revealed and, as will become apparent, the inner
structure of his dogmatic and architectonic creation.
What it is most significant to realize about Barth's
use of idealist dialectic, mediated through Kierkegaard from
Hegel, is that his intention in the first instance is
theological, through and through. The pattern of destruction,
and consequent re-construction is effected through the medium
of dialectic. Philosophy is subservient to theology. A
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philosophical tool obeys a theological impulse in this
instance, but the distinction that can be made between the
two is far from obvious or clearcut when examined super¬
ficially. Once such an encounter is placed in its histori¬
cal context,as has been attempted in this chapter and will
be continued throughout this thesis, then this *borderland1
can be profitably explored. On this basis it will be
possible to advance a critique of Barth's work, in particular, of
the Church Dogmatics, which legitimately transcends that a
priori theological purity of which he is accused by those who
think of him as venturing upon fideism. In his development
from Romans to the Church Dogmatics during a vital decade in
theological history it will become apparent that Barth moved
from this instrumentalist attitude to philosophical dialectic
towards the systematic explication of the putative theo-logic
of Christian revelation. In Romans Barth's use of temporal
concepts faithfully reflects his theological intentions but
in the Church Dogmatics it allegedly crystallises the veritable
'inner logic' of the being of God as it is known in
revelation, his active being-in-becoming. The shift in
reference is momentous and the implications extensive. Such
is the subject matter of the following essay which moves
along the paths of both dogmatic and philosophical theology.
Barth uses the diastasis inherited from Kierkegaard to
consummate a theological via negativa of great severity, 'No
59. This way of thinking has been developed by T.F. Torrance,
and the notion of 'inner logic,' as it is expressed in
the temporal ontology of the Church Dogmatics, is subject
to critical examination in the following pages of this
work.
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road to the eternal meaning of the created world has ever
existed, save the road of negation.*60 St. Paul*s
♦redemption that is in Christ Jesus' is 'the dissolution of
history in history, the destruction of the structure of
events within their own structure, the end of time in the
order of time.*0"1" Jesus Christ is 'THE possibility which
f\0
possesses all the marks of impossibility'D and which proclaims
the coming end in the 'disclosing...the timeless, necessary
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reality in the longitude of time.' The temporal order is
annihilated in the face of the eternal God and nowhere is
this more clearly illustrated than in the pneumatology of
Romans. The Holy Spirit provides 'faith with content which
is not a thing in time; if it were such a thing, it would be
nothing but a void and a negation.'0Zf The overwhelming
theological impetus is from this consuming eternity,
•We know already what this duality in God means. We
know that it involves no equilibrium, but that it is
the eternal victory of election over rejection, of
love over hate, of life over death. But this victory
is hidden from us in every moment of time.'
(Romans, p. 347)
The diastasis of time and eternity is the victorious
factor for it is with reference to this relation in dialectic
and divine incognito that the theological structure in
Romans is understood as a whole, 'The relation of the Church
60. Romans, p. 87.
61. Op.cit., p. 103.
62. Ibid.
63. Op.cit., p. 116.
64. Op.cit., p. 157.
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to its theme is the relation between time and eternity,
65
between men and God.' The relation of time and eternity
is, in the first.instance, that of diastasis, a radical
drawing apart, 'the distance, the separation, between God's
66
ways and man's ways.' Secondly it is dialectical, it is
the temporal equivalent of the identity of the divine incog¬
nito posited in Jesus Christ. In a passage of considerable
importance for Barth's doctrine of time as a whole this
dialectic is presented succinctly:
•Between the past and the future - between the time -
there is a "Moment" that is no moment in time. This
"Moment" is the eternal Moment - the Now - when the
past and the future stand still, when the former
ceases its going and the latter its coming.*
(Romans, p. 497;
The determination of the total theological realisation
of the doctrine of justification by diastasis and dialectic
places the ontological burden upon assertion, the divine fiat
of justification and righteousness in eternity as opposed to
human sinful existence in the sphere of time and finitude.
In 'the absolute "Moment", the greedy dialectic of time and
Cj~7
eternity,• the diastasis is overcome by faith in the hope
65. Ob.cit., p. 396.
66. T.F. Torrance, op.cit., p. 49.
67. Romans, p. 530. 'The theme of theology is grace, the
absolute "Moment", the greedy dialectic of time and
eternity.' Some indication of the pivotal importance of
this nexus is given by Jenson who says,
'If one went through the Commentary on Romans and re¬
placed the tangential intersection of time and eternity
with the story narrated by the second article of the
Apostle's Creed, he would obtain the theology of the
Church Dogmatics.* Op.cit., p. 71.
A crude but dramatic summary; needless to say the actual
temporal transformation of Barth's thought is rather more
complex than this might suggest. See below.
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of final eschatological realisation of the Kingdom of God
by Jesus Christ, 'the enactor of death.' The juxtaposition
of time and its antithesis, eternity, predominates despite
the dialectic in faith and as such this radical and unmed-
iated diastasis rules out any basis of the relation of the
two arms of this category in creation and Christology. A
Christological relation is posited but is explicated
exhaustively in terms of the diastasis and the dialectic.
The philosophical tool has proved to be a double-edged sword
for in slicing away human pretension before God it reduces
the basis of revelation to a series of points in time which
shelter and disguise eternity under the divine incognito.
The truth of this argument is confirmed in the sub¬
sequent thought of Barth which is to be outlined very briefly.
The transition in Barth's thought is apparent in his inter¬
mediate work, two examples of which will be referred to:
The Resurrection of the Dead, a commentary on I Corinthians
published in 1924, and the abandoned Christian Dogmatics"^ of
1927. In The Resurrection of the Dead there remains the
a »
crisis of finite and infinite in the qualitative dialectic
of time and eternity, but the new question of ontology is
raised. By 'ontology' in this context is meant the problem
of relating the being of the created order to that of God out¬
side the bare antithesis characteristic of Barth's thought so
far. The question of 'basis' arises and thus the being of
the temporal order.
68. The Resurrection of the Dead, tr. H.J. Stenny, London, 1933.
69. Christliche Dogmatik im Entwurf, Die Lehre vom Worte
Gottes. Prolegomena zur christlichen Dogmatik. MUnchen.
1927.
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'And when he (i.e., St. Paul) speaks of history and
of time end, he is only speaking of the end of
history and the end of time. But once more of its
end understood thus fundamentally, thus plainly,
of a reality so radically superior to all happening
and temporality, that in speaking of the finiteness
of history and the finiteness of time, he is also
speaking of that upon which all time and all
happening is based. The end of history must be for
him synonymous with the pre-history, the limits of
all and every time and thus necessarily the origin
of time.*
(The Resurrection of the Dead, p. 110)
Barth also implicitly criticises the tendency of
eternity to annihilate time,
'But he will also be removed from the other temptation
to confuse eternity with a great annihilation, and to
make of the end of history an annihilation of history.
That would in fact, not be real eternity, not even the
eternity of God, which dissolves time into eternity
instead of marking it as infinite.'
(The Resurrection of the Dead, p. Ill)
Such statements reveal a change of emphasis and a movement
towards a fuller notion of divine transcendence and of the
ontology of the divine-human relation. There is a reali¬
sation that simple antithesis, diastasis and dialectic are
inadequate as a basis (as opposed to the consequent expression)
of theological insight. It is necessary that the knowledge
that 'God's eternity sets a limit to the endlessness of the
70
world, time, things and men must be made fruitful.' In
the Christian Dogmatics of 1927 Barth began to develop the
emancipation of theology from extraneous factors by an in¬
creasingly exclusive concentration upon the Word of God as
the source of the objective reality of God encountering man in
event. The Christian Dogmatics was not totally successful
70. Ibid., p. 111.
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because Barth failed, in the eyes of his critics, to purge
existential and philosophical elements from a dogmatics
which was ostensibly purified. T.F. Torrance reviews this
transition in Barth's thought and in the following quotation
he grasps with precision this positive movement.
'Moreover, it had become perfectly clear to him that
the dialectical rejection of mysticism and dogmatism
was not enough - the theology of the Word required
positive doctrinal articulation adequate to the
positive truth of the Word of God and yet appropriate
to its nature as event and grace.'
(Karl Barth; Early Theology, p. 106)
This, the reader will remember, was achieved by the discovery
and exposition of Anselm's ratio veritatte, but it is not
enough to grasp the progress Barth sought and which he
secures in the Church Dogmatics proper,
'The way forward must come from a concentration upon
Christology, upon the Word made flesh, for therein
there opened up the possibility of a dogmatics
genuinely bound up with a form taken from the Word
rather than from contemporary and temporal philoso¬
phies. .. .with the concentration upon the Incarnation
of the Word, upon Jesus Christ, God and Man in one
Person, dialectical thinking had to fall away and
positive thinking had to take its place. ^'Dogmatic
thinking is from end to end thinking kktoc tov
Xpwtoy , or it is not dogmatic thinking at all'.'
(Karl Barth:Early Theology, pp. 106-7)
There were many influences upon the development of
Barth's thought and indeed many facets of that development
itself. In this first chapter some particularly relevant
themes in this early history of Barth's thought have been
isolated and considered in the context of the history of the
problem of time in German idealism traced from Kant. Such
prolegomena have served to set the readers mind thinking upon
those crucial problems which remain important throughout this
study of the doctrine of time and eternity in the Church
Dogmatics. In conclusion the contents of this chapter will
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be briefly recapitulated and then the scene be set for the
Church Dogmatics, Barth's magnum opus.
After some general introductory comments upon Barth' s
work reference was made to his reaction to Kant as both the
limiter and liberator of theological activity and its frame
of reference. Within the epistemological sphere of
•biblical theology' it proved possible for Barth to ground
his theology upon the integrated theological epistemology and
ontology of Anselm. After noting Ronald Gregor Smith's
astute assessment of the nature of Barth's great constructive
work attention was focussed upon the idealist tradition and
its main source, the work of Kant, subsequently mediated
through Hegel. (The work of Schelling and Fichte was
ignored, for whilst being relevant to the development of the
idealist tradition it did not pertain directly to the central
issues in this chapter.) Kant's agnosticism was briefly out¬
lined and then Hegel's resolution of the antimonies in
synthesis was examined in the context of Trendelenburg and
Kierkegaard's attack upon the 'System*. Finally Barth's
Epistle to the Romans was analysed as the product of a mind
largely influenced by Kierkegaard's notion of diastasis but
which nevertheless was intended to express an immediate and
profound theological truth, that of Justification by faith
alone. This work presaged a movement towards Christology
and was not an aberration repaired in later thought, but a
stage on the way to a dogmatics of which both the ontology
and epistemology were to share the identical fons et origo,
the Word of God revealed in the God-man Jesus Christ.
The argument of the first chapter of this thesis has
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not been strictly chronological or merely expository. On
the contrary it has combined discursive exposition and
historical narrative. It has been more in the form of an
overture than purely objective exegesis of the work of Barth.
In it certain fundamental concepts and problems have been
exposed and in the following pages a full examination and
analysis of the dogmatic fulfilment promised in the early
dialectical work will be provided along the lines indicated
in the Introduction of this Essay. Earth* s doctrine of time
is intimately bound up with his deepest theological ambitions.
Indeed there is an unparalleled integration of theological
achievement and temporal structure even in the early work.
The Church Dogmatics is therefore of potential fascination
for both the theologian and the philosopher and an attempt
is to be made in the ensuing study to' do justice to both Barth* s
theological method and the legitimate insights of philosophy.
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CHAPTER II
THE WORD OF GOD, THE TRINITY, AND THE PROBLEM OF TIME
IN THE CHURCH DOGMATICS
The thought of Karl Barth is deeply theological, both
in Romans and, as will become increasingly apparent, in the
Church Dogmatics. It is necessary to emphasise this element
in Barth's work because the integrated and organic nature
and structure of the Church Dogmatics are the expression of
a coherent theological vision, which is theologically con¬
ditioned at all quarters. There is a systematic purging of
alien factors in both method and execution of a theological
programme which makes for extreme difficulty for the mind
unprepared to think of God on what Barth conceives to be God's
own terms, in revelation and comprehension. Thus it is not
a mere truism to speak of Barth's theology as theologically
conditioned but directs the reader's attention to the
formidable internal cohesion of his thought which exists
within the framework of divine grace and condescension. In
Romans the judgement of God, the eternal One, silences the
voice of man and the assertion of human reality including that
of time. In the Church Dogmatics the grace of God in Jesus
Christ is revealed on the basis of God's intra-trinitarian act
from eternity, in the concrete expressions of creation,
Incarnation, reconciliation and the final eschatological con¬
summation, realised in hope by the powerful presence of the
Holy Spirit, the manifestation of God's freedom. Following,
with caution, the insight implicit in H. Vogel's comment1
1. H. VUgel, VerkUndigung und Forschung, 1951, p. 122. Cited
by G.C. Berkouwer, Triumph of Grace, p. 49.
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that in the first phase of Barth's theological development
the emphasis falls on grace in the .judgment, while the later
development showed that he was more concerned to manifest
grace in the judgment, it will be possible to see the
massive elaboration of the latter. E. Jilngel has truly-
said of Barth,
'Barth denkt als Theologe. Dieser trivial anmutende
Satz verliert alle Trivialitat, wenn man bedenkt,
dass fur Barth 'his Theologe denken" nichts anderes
als "konsequent und ausschliesslich als Theologe
denken" heissen kann.•
(Gottes Sein ist im Werden, p. 9)
Jungel explores this 'consequence' and 'exclusiveness'
in relation to God's being in his highly condensed 'para¬
phrase', showing the way in which Barth develops a doctrine
of God's being in which the hermeneutical circle is grounded
upon the ontological circle. 'God's being is in becoming*
is the 'ontological localisation of God's being...in an
attempt to think theologically in how far God is the living
2
God'. Jungel's approach, which is in essence the provision
of a schematic synthesis of the core and immediate impli¬
cations of the doctrine of the divine being-in-act, remains
of direct relevance, but of supplementary value, to this thesis.
It will be referred to and some of its insights exploited but
2. E. Jungel, Gottes Sein ist im Werden (2. Auflage),
J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tubingen, 1966. My study of
this important book has been expedited by access to a
draft translation by Horton Harris. Its main theme as far
as this thesis is concerned (that is the concept of God's
being-in-becoming) will be examined in Chapter III below.
3. 'Temporal* is used in the following chapter to mean 'to do
with the aspect or category of time'. Later it will
denote a specific concept of time. In this chapter there
is merely the broadly understood axis of time and eter¬
nity. Both are 'temporal' in ways to be specified.
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the direction of Jungel's synthesis remains different to
that adopted below, which works within a wider historical
perspective. Jungel has cast light on a neglected area of
Barth's thought and contributed to the fuller appreciation
of his achievement which even now is partial, distorted,
and incomplete in non-German circles. In the following
chapters the temporal aspects of Barth's theological theory
of time will be expounded. This demands a synthesis and
analysis of the first two volumes of the Church Dogmatics
as the foundation of Barth's thought.^
Before embarking on the initial stages of this
examination of the fundamental dogmas of the Trinity and
Christology and the consequent doctrine of eternity it is
necessary to locate that feature of the evolution of Barth's
thought, traced to its developed stage in Chapter I, which
gave him the basis of a theological hermeneutic. Reference
is made of course to his theological epistemology which is
stated in its full form in the doctrine of the Word of God
5
and of the Knowledge of God. It was earlier seen that this
formulation was based upon a thorough-going mutuality of
6
epistemology and ontology recovered from Anselm. Jungel
4. Thus Chapter II is directed at CD 1/1, Chapter III at CD
II/l, Chapter IV at CD II/2 and Chapter V at CD 1/2,
IV/lff. On this basis the second half of this thesis
explores the consequences of the primary theological
concepts of the doctrines of God and Christ in creation
and theological anthropology regarded from the standpoint
of time. Thus the latter chapters will centre largely
upon CD III.
5. In CD 1/1 and II/l respectively. The latter will be con¬
sidered in the opening part of Chapter III in a brief
consideration of the role of 'analogy' in the establish¬
ment of Barth's doctrine of eternity.
6. See above, Ch. I.
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explores (in a manner and with results relevant to later
stages in this study) the integration of the 'hermeneutical'
and 'ontological circles' and the ultimate unity in God of
his primary and secondary objectivity- which escapes the
false division often effectively made between the Deus
revelatus and the Deus abscondltus. More important
this fundamental integration is grounded upon a dynamic unity
of constituent parts, if the unity of act and being may be
so termed. The basic postulates of the Church Dogmatics in
the doctrines of the Word of God and the Trinity realised in
the framework of analogia fidei, provide, in conjunction with
Christology, the foundations of the theory of time expressed
in this work. This is in both eternity in God's being, and
also in time as a feature of the true natural theology
7
implicit in revelation.
Dogmatics does not begin with speculation or 'proof'
after the manner of traditional natural theology. On the
contrary,
' Dogmatics as an inquiry presupposes the ascertain-
ability by man of the proper content of Christian
language about God. It makes this presupposition
because it believes, in the Church and with the Church,
in Jesus Christ, as the revealing and reconciling
approach of God to man. Language about God has the
proper content, when it conforms to thg essence of
the Church, i.evto Jesus^ Christ .... €lTe JJfO<j>r\TL°<v
Trjv <kvcK\oykv 7-fc UPTeouS (Rom. 12,6.).'' ' ^ (CD 1/1, p. 11)
Barth's theological theory of time in the Church Dogmatics
is the temporal enabling of such an understanding of the
present reality of the dogmatic task. To demonstrate this
it is necessary to 'prove', after the manner of the Anselmic
7. The question of how revealed and natural knowledge impinge
upon one another is central in this thesis. See below,
Chapters IX, X and XI.
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•proof', how it is possible for God to be for man now, in
Jesus Christ, the 'essence' of the Church. Behind this
primary utterance there therefore lies a theory of God's
being in its temporal aspect. The emphasis upon the
actual divine presupposition underlying any true knowledge
of God has decisive and immediate consequences for the
dogmatic task and its appropriate method. 'Dogmatics exists
only as the theologia crucis - that is, in the act of
obedience which is certain in faith but for that very reason
humble, which is always thrown back on the start and always
O
opening up afresh.' In consequence dogmatic theology has,
therefore, a dynamic basis over against the traditional
Roman conception of dogmatics as the combination, repetition
and transcription of 'truths of revelation' to be found in
Q
the 'deposit of faith'. Such is Barth's polemic which
might well undergo modification in the light of recent
developments, but these are irrelevant to this point. Any
dogmatics which does not take its cue from the very nature
of revelation itself is less than it should be. Indeed
biblicism fails even as does the Roman approach for 'in
dogmatics it can never be a question of the mere combination,
repetition, and summarising of Biblical doctrine'.10 The
dogmatic task is truly contemporary because God in Christ
is contemporary, he i_s the 'essence of the Church' now. As
Barth indicates that dogmatics must investigate the 'possi¬
bility' which informs the 'reality' of God, so in this study
8. CD 1/1, p. 15.
9. Ibid.
10. Qp.cit.. p. lb.
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the reality of the temporal 'now1, implicit in the possi¬
bility of the dogmatic task itself, must be stated and
analysed. Barth argues, '...dogmatics as such does not
inquire what the Apostles and Prophets have said, but what
we ourselves must say "on the basis of the Apostles and
Prophets".
Dogmatics cannot, according to Barth, take place out¬
side the area of faith ('the determination of human action
by the essence of the Church, that is by Jesus Christ*)
for it is itself only possible as an act of faith 'in the
determination of human action by listening, and as obedience
1^5
towards Jesus Christ.' Because it is not man's will
that determines faith but the 'gracious approach of Cod to
man, the free personal presence of Jesus Christ in man's
In¬
action' dogmatics as an act of faith is dependent upon God.
Thus from the first both the method and goal of dogmatics is
theologically conditioned as to its present possibility and
reality by a direct dependence upon God. Such a reality
making dogmatics possible demands an understanding of the
nature of the presence of God which is at the least recurrent,
and more ambitiously perhaps conceivable in trans-temporal
terms. This is the elementary exposition of the dogmatic
task which is made possible by the actual gracious condes¬
cension of God in Jesus Christ, as present in the Church,
11. Ibid.
12. Op.cit., p. 18.
13. Ibid.
14. Op.cit.. p. 19.
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for dogmatics 'depends from time to time upon God and not
upon us, whether our hearing is real hearing, our obedience
real obedience, whether our dogmatics is blessed and
hallowed as knowledge of the proper content of Christian
15
language, or is idle speculation.' This and the follow¬
ing sort of expression gave rise in early criticism of
Earth to accusations of 'occasionalism'. Barth argues that
dogmatics can only take place 'by trust in the absolutely un¬
controllable presence-on-the-spot of the ground both of its
reality and of its knowledge, upon Godi s promised revelation
to the Church and upon the power of the faith that grasps the
1 fi
promise*. In the enlarged context provided by the
doctrine of the Word of God, developed later in CD 1/1,
J. Hamer was to see in Barth's need of gracious divine inter¬
vention a spasmodic doctrine of the divine being, an
17
•occasionalism'. The general superficiality of Earner's
criticism becomes apparent in the face of full development
of Barth's doctrine of God. His argument directs attention,
however, to a potential danger in this conception of
dogmatics as a venture of faith, made in direct response to
18
the 'free personal presence of Jesus Christ.' In response
to this implicit challenge enlargement of the theological
circle must take place and the core of the doctrine of the
Word of God be exposed in its temporal aspect.
The purpose of the 'Dogmatic Prolegomena' is to secure
15. Ibid.
16. Op.cit.. p. 23-
17. J. Hamer, Karl Barth. London, 1962, pp. 33-5.
52
the unique basis of Christian theological knowledge,a
reality ultimately made possible by a distinctive theory
of time implicit in the doctrine of God that is to be
examined. The whole theological 'possibility', the whole
theological rationale of revelation rests upon 'the pre¬
supposition of evangelical faith,* which is 'the fundamental
19
transcendence of all human possibilities.• Barth dis¬
tinguishes his position from that he conceives of as the
Roman Catholic doctrine of analogia entis by emphasis upon
•an objective principle of knowledge' which cannot be trans¬
formed into a 'continuously present relation between God and
20
man.' This highly distinctive 'personal act of divine
21
approach' is quite basic to the whole Church Dogmatics for
without it dogmatics would not be possible.
'The remaining possibility - on the presupposition of
evangelical faith - of making dogmatic knowledge com¬
prehensible is to draw a line on the left by
renouncing the presupposition for the essence of the
Church, on the right by renouncing the presupposition
of a continuously present inherence of the essence of
the Church in a creaturely form, in an "es gibt." On
the left we say: the essence of the Church is actus
purus, divine action beginning with itself, the
source and means of its own insight, therefore action
unpredictable on an anthropological basis. On the
right we say: the essence of the Church is actus purus,
free action, not a continuously present relation; *
grace is an event of personal approach, not a trans¬
ferred tangible state of soul neither the pre¬
cedence of an anthropological possibility nor the
subsequence of a reality in the Church can be con¬
sidered as the point from which to contemplate and
to understand the path to dogmatic knowledge, but
solely the present instant in which Jesus Christ Him¬
self speaks and is heard, when the light divine is
created in our hearts.*
(CD 1/1, pp. 44-5)




So Barth indicates the primal reality underlying the
Christian Church and thus the very possibility of dogmatics.
At this point his theology seeks to secure an utter dis¬
tinctiveness in its critical reference to the Word of God
and freedom from anthropology and ontology. The adequacy
of Earth's conception does not impinge directly upon this
thesis as a doctrine of revelation but solely as the starting-
point of the theological theory of time. There is of course
in Barth's position an implicit reaction to attacks made on
the Christian Dogmatics of 1927 which still relied, in the
eyes of critics, upon 'phenomenological* and 'existential*
22
elements. The most important feature of Barth's argument
is the fusion of so-called 'dialectic' and 'analogy' that
characterises the first chapter of 'The Doctrine of the Word
of God.' The place of time is at the centre of this
intrusion of divine reality into the worldly order, and this
reality is of grace, in sacramental proclamation which is
known in the 'acknowledgement* of faith.
'Real proclamation thus means the Word of God preached,
and the Word of God preached means in this first and
outmost circle, man's language about God on the basis
of an indication by God Himself fundamentally trans¬
cending all human causation, and so devoid of all
human basis, merely occurring as a fact and requiring
to be acknowledged.•
(CD, 1/1, p. 101)
Barth then proceeds to specify the nature of this
'object of proclamation' which insofar as 'it is really pro¬
claimed ceases to be the object of human perception.' Indeed
22. There is a useful account of this in James D. Smart,
The Divided Mind of Modern Theology, Philadelphia, 1967,
esp. Chapter X.
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God's Word preached means,
'...man's language about God on the basis of God's
self-objectification which is neither present nor
predictable nor relatable to any design, but is
real solely in the freedom of His grace, in virtue
of which from time to time He wills to the object of
this language, and is so according to His own good
pleasure.'
(CD 1/1, p. 103)
Barth uses the Christological analogy: 'As Christ
became true man and also remains true man to all eternity,
so real proclamation becomes an event on the level of all
23
other events.' At the outset three factors must be noted.
First, the conceptual terminology used to describe the
relation of the divine event with and in the order of human
events is dialectical, in that it is ambiguous and affirms
both aspects. Second, God as creator of humanity posits the
human element for 'God is the subject from whom the human
24
action must acquire its new, true name.' In the doctrine
of the Word of God as the foundation of real proclamation
there lies an indication of the deeper truth of the Christ¬
ological assumptio carnls. Third, this event of real
proclamation is realised in grace, in a movement which will
be traced to its source in God's act from eternity. These
three facets of Barth's understanding of divine event in
and with the human event apply equally to the temporal
dimension. The 'Written Word of God' is for Barth standing
proof that God is not a timeless foundation, 'temporarily
25
hidden but peacefully abiding', open to a Neoplatonic
recollection or anamnesis. God's relation to the Church is
23. CD 1/1, p. 105.
24. Op.cit., p. 106.
25. Op.cit., p. 112.
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positive and eatresses the proper tension of transcendence
and immanence as the basis of the Church*s preaching.
'The homecoming to her own being, on the ground of
which alone she actually ventures to proclaim, of
course means for her the reversion to her proper
being, but to her being which transcends herself,
to Jesus Christ her heavenly head, whom she confronts
as His earthly body, bound to Him as such, and yet
distinct from Him, who possesses the Church in Him¬
self, but not the Church in herself, between whom
and her there is no reversible, interchangeable
relationship, as certainly as the relationship of
master and servant is not reversible. He is
immanent in her only because He transcends her.
That is the fact which makes her recollection of God's
past revelation different from one of reflection
upon an essential ground timelessly her own; it hath
pleased God to be her God, otherwise than in pure
immanence.'
(CD 1/1, p. 113)
The canon as the recollection of past events intro¬
duces another fundamental element into the structure of
Barth's argument as soon from the standpoint of time. On the
one hand proclamation of the Word of God is a present event,
yet, on the other, it is bound to the record of past events.
There is thus the way of analogia fidei (developed on the
basis of Anselm) which operates in a contemporary dogmatic
method but which must not become detached from the past
represented in the record of the written Word of God. 'The
Bible is the concrete medium by which the Church recalls God's
revelation in the past, is called to expect revelation in
the future, and is thereby challenged, empowered, and guided
Oh\
to proclaim' but it is not in itself revelation, because
when it is heard as God's Word it 'attests' (bezeugt) the
past revelation. The Bible inescapably directs the Church
26. Op.cit., p. 125.
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to history and certain events and resists any tendencies
towards a timeless a-historical anamnesis.
The third and ultimate form of the Word of God is
the 'God with us', who has happened in Jesus Christ, at a
point in history. In the language of dialectic, Barth
asserts the irreducible primal fact of the 'fulness of time.'
By quoting Barth's words at length, it proves possible to
establish several of the most crucial temporal themes in
the Church Dogmatics. The temporal dialectic is used to
illustrate the happening of the 'God with us.*
'In the midst of human history and as a fragment of
this history, but, of course, not as fragments of
this history usually happen, i.e., without any need
of continuation or completion, without pointing
beyond itself, without primarily striving for a
distant goal, insusceptible of exegesis or of any,
even the slightest addition or subtraction, incapable
of changing its form, but in the midstream of be¬
coming, being moved only by itself, in mid-ocean of
the unsettled, changeable, and self-changing, the
fixed event, the fulness of time.*
(CD 1/1, p. 130)
Barth develops this notion of the 'fixed event' in a
reference to the Protevangelium of James. A temporal hiatus
occurs allegedly at the birth of Jesus, a moment in which
history and time are frozen which provides a unique and
final punctuation of history. The equation Barth then
makes, 'This fulness of time, which is identical with Jesus
Christ,' is a nodal point in the Church Dogmatics. It is a
•pure event in relation to which everything else is not yet
27
an event or has ceased to be one.' This 'Deus dixit, to
which there are no analogies' is the 'invisible-visible
27. Op.cit.. p. 131.
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centre' of the Bible to be understood from its own, not the
human, viewpoint. Barth's allusion to the New Testament
Apocrypha is not intended to give the impression that the
moment of the Incarnation implied a suspension of the
temporal order, on the contrary, he is seeking to emphasise
the uniqueness of 'fulfilled time', that is of moments of
OO
time which bear revelation, 'the unveiling of the veiled.'
The thread of continuity between the unique events and time
of* revelation, and the 'now' (vOv ) of revelation is not
that of mere temporality, that is to say a succession of
events or even a substratum immanent in the historical order,
but the continuity of transcendence, the being of God himself.
So Barth begins to develop what will prove to be the most
theologically self-conscious doctrine of time in the history
of Christian theology. By 'theologically self-conscious,'
is meant a doctrine of time thought out on thoroughly
theological principles. The historical order is bisected
by the birth of Christ, there is the 'mid-point of time' but
the continuance of revelation demands (if fidelity to true
transcendence is to be preserved) a theological theory of
the repeated events of revelation. The temporal recurrence
of revelation cannot be understood from the aspect of the
mundane temporal order. By corollary with the Bible, the
29
Word of God, 'giving itself to be understood,' as the
temporal aspect of revelation has likewise to be understood
from that standpoint. Given the identity of Jesus Christ
and the Word of God as the content of revelation then all the
28. Op.cit.. p. 133.
29. Op.cit.. p. 131.
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answers to theological questions, including that of time,
can only be in the explication of that Word itself. It is
this indication that leads the reader to the Trinity as the
living basis of the temporal continuity of revelation. This
can be seen in Barth's argument.
•Thus we must think of every state of revelation as
a process of revelation, that is, as conditioned by
the very act of revelation; of every happening in
which revelation takes place as connected with what
in this act happens once for all; of all fulfilled
time as fulfilled by the fulness of this time. But
revelation itself is connected with nothing different
or higher or earlier than itself. Revelation as such
is not relative. Revelation in fact does not differ
from the Person of Jesus Christ, and again does not
differ from the reconciliation that took place in
Him. To say revelation is to say, "The Word became
flesh."...if we mean by the word "revelation" "the
Word became flesh and dwelt among us", then we are
asserting something that is to be grounded only with¬
in the Trinity; namely, by the will of the Father,
by the mission of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, by
the eternal decree of the Triune God, i.e. not other¬
wise than as knowledge of God from God, as knowledge
of the Light in the Light.'
(CD 1/1, p. 134)
Having spoken of the three 'forms' of the Word of God
30
Barth proceeds to examine its 'content', as 'spiritual',
31 32
as 'fulfilled reality', as 'purposiveness' or 'address*
and finally as the 'promise of Himself as the content of
33
man's future'. More significantly for the purposes of
this study is Barth's first allusion to the relation of God
to his act; in this case the relation of his language to
his act. There is in fact no distinction between them for
30. Op.cit., p. 151.
31* Op.cit., p. 155.
32. Op.cit., p. 158.
33. Op.cit., p. 161.
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Barth as 'The Word needs no supplementing by the act. The
~*\L
Word of God is itself the act of God.Barth asserts
the positive characteristics of the Word that are based upon
negation. The spirituality of the Word is 'spirituality
as distinguished from naturalness, corporeality, from any
^55
physical event.This affirmation and denial is coupled
with the assertion that, 'also there is no Word of God with-
^56
out a physical event.' Preaching, the man Jesus Christ,
the Church and the Word of God are in all their forms 'also
natural and corporeal' because 'without that it would not
be the Word of God directed to us men as spiritual-natural
beings, really coming to us in the way in which we are real.^
Preaching and sacrament share this irreducible duality of
reality, for the 'physical' is far from being an irrelevant
accessory to the fact of revelation, but is a condition of
its accessibility in principle. 'The Word of God is also
natural or corporeal, because in the creaturely sphere which
it enters as the Word to us men there is nothing spiritual
which is not also natural or corporeal.' In second place,
God's Word as 'fulfilled reality* has a 'perfectly definite,
objective content': for Barth it is 'fulfilled reality*
"58
not the 'formal possibility of divine speech'. Again as
•address' and 'promise' Barth is stressing the originality,
3^* Op.cit., p. 163.
35* Op.cit., p. 151.
36. Ibid.
37. Op.cit.. p. 153.
38. Op.cit., p. 155.
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and yet the immediacy of the Word of God, as the Word of the
Lord who meets man, 'through time as the End of all time,
as the hidden Lord of all times'.-^
The fact of the Word in its * spirituality' and its
inevitable accompaniment by a 'physical event' can only be
understood in the context of revelation, the mutuality of
veiling and unveiling, as has been seen. As noted above
the conception of God's act is introduced at this juncture
and the notable integration of act and being, that Barth
effects in the Church Dogmatics, emerges in its initial form.
Barth refers to the Hebrew prophetic use of hayah (happen)
and to Luther's Christ who 'effecteth all by a Word' and
then expounds the distinction of the 'mere word' and an
40
'act'. This latter distinction must be noted carefully,
for later the integration of act and being will have an
indispensable role in the foundations of the doctrine of God
and the over-arching concept of eternity that binds the
theological structure of the Church Dogmatics into one
dynamic whole. Barth does not develop this basis here but
spells out the consequences of the identity of Word and
act in the three forms of the Word of God. First, however,
41
the distinction of Word and act is argued as follows.
39. Op.cit., p. 162.
40. Op.cit., p. 169.
41. Barth*s argument bears affinities to R. Bultmann's in his
essay 'What Does it Mean to Speak of God?' in Faith and
Understanding, SCM, 1969. Bultmann likewise stresses the
all-determination of God's word-act, though with an
emphasis upon existence in faith, rather than Barth*s
'an alteration and an absolute alteration of the world'.
61
•The difference between Word and act is that a mere
word is the self-utterance of a person. An act is,
over and above that, a relative alteration in the
environment which proceeds from it. A mere word is
passive. An act is, over and above that, an active
participation in history. But for the Word of God
these distinctions do not hold. For it is precisely
as a mere word that it is an act. Nay, as a mere
word it is the divine Person, the Person of the Lord
of history, whose self-utterance as such is an
alteration and an absolute alteration of the world,
whose passio in history is as such an actio. What
God does m speaking, pretty much, of course, like
what He says, is insusceptible of general determination,
either by reproduction or anticipation. We can only
point to the concretissima among the acts attested in
the Bible, which are also to be expected of God in
the future.'
(CD 1/1, p. 164)
The Word-act of God is therefore a unique phenomenon,
as its intrinsic unity transcends the conventional distinction
42
of mere word and act. Its consequences are important for
the concept of time. Earlier Earner's criticism of an
alleged 'occasionalism' pointed an apparent flaw in Earth's
understanding of the relation of the manifestation of the
43
divine being in the 'free personal presence of Jesus Christ',
to historical human existence, a presence 'which may from
time to time be given or else refused'. In reply to this,
it was apparent that Barth maintains the temporal continuity
and unity of revelation by theological means, for,
'To understand the Bible would mean, from beginning to
end and from verse to verse, to understand how every¬
thing in it is related to that as to its invisible-
visible centre. But because that is the point, we
shall have to say that we are not in a position to
42. The distinction of word and act has of course undergone
much criticism in contemporary philosophy as in the work
of J.L. Austin, and in the philosophy of religion by
D.D. Evans, The Logic of Self-Involvement, London, 1963,
in which he follows many insights of J.L. Austin.
43. CD 1/1, p. 19.
62
understand the Bible from our own standpoint. It can
only be the case of the Bible giving itself to be
understood, of us being brought to listen to the Bible
as God's Word....as the human words of the Bible are
the carriers of the eternal word, i.e. according as
they are intended from this centre in turn to intend
this centre in all they say. By itself being
revelation at that time and in that way, the Bible
founds the Church, it makes proclamation necessary
and possible. The unity of the revelation guarantees
the unity of the Biblical witness, in spite of and
within its utter multiplicity, in fact contradictori-
ness. The unity of the Bible guarantees the unity
of the Church, in spite of and within the variety
in the measure of faith, in which the Bible becomes
revelation to this man or that, and to this man or
that to-day or to-morrow. But the unity of the
Church thus founded guarantees the unity of the
proclamation.'
(CD 1/1, p. 131)
This somewhat involved statement
in the inner unity of revelation
Word of God is grounded upon the
is given concrete fulfilment
itself. The unity of the
integration into identity,
of act and being. Barth spells out this unity in the
passage 'God's Language as God's Act'.^ In examining
later in this chapter the doctrine of the Trinity, and then
further, in the next, the act and the eternity of God,
penetration is made towards the inner ontological core of
the Church Dogmatics, the ultimate foundation of this unity.
Barth asserts that 'God's word is God's act means
first its contingent contemporaneousness' (seine kontingente
Gleichzeitigkeit).^ Once more a crucial concept is intro¬
duced into Barth's doctrine of time, for throughout the
Church Dogmatics runs the theme of the unity in temporal
44. Op.cit., pp. 162-184.
45. Barth's use of this term reflects the etymology of
'con-temporaneousness*, a kind of 'temporal together¬
ness' which will become clear in the theological
exposition of this chapter and later in this thesis.
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diversity of the inner theological basis of revelation.
What exactly does Barth mean by 'contingent contemporaneous¬
ness'? Barth argues that there are the times of the
•direct, original utterance of God Himself in His revelation,
the time of Jesus Christ',^ of prophecy and of apostolate,
of the rise of the canon and of course of the Church. The
unity, that is the temporal relation of these 'times', is not
achieved by the dissolution of their distinctiveness into
mere human history, 'i.e. merely by assessing the variety of
Aft
the periods and their human contents as such', but by
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stressing our 'togetherness with Christ'.' Barth argues,
with some ingenuity, that the variety of xhe 'times', of
what might well be termed 'Christian history', are greater
than those in history outside the judgment of the Church.
'The Church of the present, however historically she
may feel and think,... speaks the last word as heiress
and interpretress of history, and, without the Word of
God in the serious sense of the term, stands solitary
by herself and pointed in on herself. If we insist
that the concept of the Word of God means precisely
that the Church does not stand solitary by herself
and pointed in on herself, then we must abide by the
orderly distinction between the times, and the contem¬
poraneousness of present-day proclamation with
Scripture and with revelation can certainly not be
regarded as a thing to be introduced to us by levelling
up this distinction, by incorporating Scripture and
revelation in the life of humanity. It can only be
regarded as an expression of the fact that the Word of
God is itself God's act.'
(CD 1/1, pp. 167-8)
46. That is in Barth's theological exegesis of the so-called
Boethian concept of eternity.
47. CD 1/1, p. 164.
48. Op.cit.. p. 165.
^9. Op.cit., p. 167.
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Barth is concerned to argue his position against that
of Lessing. This study has, therefore, to interpret his
argument in order to show how it is that the basis in
revelation unites history to provide 'contingent contem¬
poraneousness*, and yet that this 'unity', is not the
abrogation of diversity, but its fulfilment. Anyone who
imposes a simplistic reduction of temporal difference to
unity, upon Barth*s doctrine of 'contingent contemporaneous¬
ness', is deceiving himself. It is Barth's unending struggle
to do justice to both temporal diversity and final unity
which informs his doctrine of time and eternity throughout
the Church Dogmatics. There is no simple, quasi-mystical
de-temporalization of, for example, the relation of the
Biblical witnesses to Jesus Christ (and by extension of the
Church to him through the intervening ages) as might be found
in the sermons of Meister Eckhart. Here time is but the
manifestation of the ephemeral and eternity God's 'real
50
Now-moment*. In his account of the temporal bond of the
Word of God Barth is concerned to assert and maintain a unity,
but not a 'timeless', or de-temporalizing unity. He is
therefore seeking to expunge any mystical (as with Eckhart
and Boehme), or 'Platonic', abrogation of time and the
historical succession of events. Precisely by his positing
of the 'act of God', as the basis of this living basis of
50. 'God the Father and the Son have nothing to do with time.
Generation is not in time, but at the end and limit of
time.' Sermon by Eckhart quoted in Mysticism: Christian
and Buddhist, London, 1957, by D.T. Suzuki. Suzuki's
interpretation of Christianity is specifically 'timeless'
and Kantian and is directed against any notion of
incarnation in time.
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unity in the Word of God, Barth hopes to escape the constant
threat of a Platonic dissolution of time, evident in the
thought of so many Christian accounts of 'eternity*. Final
judgment on the success of this venture must come later, but
Barth's initial presentation of this positive doctrine of
temporal unity-in-diversity underlies his polemic against
Lessing in the passage under examination.
The key to the solution of the hermeneutical problem
of the contemporaneity of the Word of God is that 'something
happens which in spite of all interpretative skill cannot be
51
brought about by interpretative skill'. Barth refers to
the act of God himself in his Word,
'...election, revelation, calling, setting apart,
new birth - clear concepts which so to speak, shatter
the immanence of the historical connection from within,
so far as God Himself is the subject of the action
indicated in them, so far as God's "good pleasure"
( evdoKtoc Matt. 11,26; Gal. 1,15; Eph. 1,8) as an
altogether external truth first creates and then
posits the altogether inner truth as such and by the
free action described in these concepts; apart from
all historical connections, though these undeniably
exist, in these connections but not through them...we
can only regard them as signifying free acts of God in
the sense of the Biblical authors, or we do not under¬
stand them at all. They assert that without the
removal of the difference the time of Christ is made
contemporary with the time of the prophets and the
apostles by the free act of God.*
(CD 1/1, p. 168)
This last sentence is most important for the -unity of the
different temporal loci is secured by reference to the act
of God in his Word:
'The Word of God in its quite different time area,
with its quite different time-content compared with
the Word .of revelation, now reverts to its orderly
51. CD 1/1, p. 168.
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position; it is now described as the Word of the
prophets and the apostles, and as such, as the witness
to Christ and in its subordination to the Word of
Christ, it simultaneously utters the Word of Christ
Himself.*
(CD 1/1, p. 169)
This affords a decisive clue as to what Barth means by the
phrase, 'contingent contemporaneity'. He is in fact
astonishingly precise, for what he is striving to achieve is
both the retention of the contingency of the historical
events, to which he makes reference, and their 'temporal
togetherness'. He is not imploding the temporary distinction
of events, by reduction to the simple unity of a divine 'How',
but achieving a unity on the basis, the dynamic ground, of
the act of God. This of course makes it crucial to know
what Barth means by an 'act of God' and how it is to be
understood in temporal categories. It is exclusively by
reference to Jesus Christ (who is, as will be seen, the
reality of God's act) and the Trinity, that the trans-temporal
unity and thus the hermeneutical interconnection of
proclaimed, written and revealed Word, is achieved. The
need for deeper investigation of the 'possibility', which
underlies this 'reality', becomes pressing.
'Proclamation is only possible in this relation of
understanding, just as prophecy and the apostolate
only existed in a definite relation of understanding.
But in this relation proclamation of the Word of God
is achieved not through the individual components of
this relation or the sum of them, and therefore,
e.g., neither through philological acuteness nor
through the most talented and refined feel of the
author, but purely and simply through the power of the
Biblical Word itself, which now makes a place for it¬
self in a quite different period and becomes the
content of this period, because in proclamation the
stage is not held by Paul the religious personality,
but by Paul the apostle of Jesus Christ, and in him
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by Jesus Christ Himself. Because the Word of God
in this act in this step from revelation to Scripture
and to Church proclamation, i.e. in the full, strict
distinction of times, it is one, it is contemporaneous
(Heb.13).
(CD 1/1, p. 169)
Barth asserts a twofold contingency, in the 'there and
then' of the original relation of revelation and Holy
Scripture and in the 'here and now* of the man who hears God
speak. There is no clash or interaction of 'necessary* and
'contingent* truths. God's Word in act is a contingent truth
precisely because it is an act. Barth stresses the particu¬
larity of the Word of God and in doing prepares the ground
for a radical innovatory exposition of the doctrine of God.
•The problem of the Wrord of God consists in the fact
that to this particular man to-day through the pro¬
clamation of this particular man by means of this
particular Bible this particular manifestation of God
is imparted, that a particular illic et tunc becomes
a particular hie et nunc. The problem of the Word of
God is thus from time to time a perfectly definite,
once-for-all, peculiar problem, and of this problem
we must say that it is solved by the Word of God it¬
self, spoken by the mouth of God, being contempor¬
aneous illic et nunc and (i.e. exactly as spoken
illic et tunc) hie et nunc.'
CCD 1/1, p. 170)
It has been necessary to attend carefully to Barth's
actual arguments, rather than offering a mere summary, because
of the precision and care with which he is preparing the ground
for the theological explanation which constitutes the
'possibility' of the 'reality' of the Word of God in its
threefold form. In concluding this initial stage of the
examination of his treatment of time, as it features in the
doctrine of the Word of God, an outline of the further
elements will suffice. Barth continues in specifically
theological terms to expound the meaning of God's Word is
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God's act as 'power to rule' (that is as Lordship), and
as 'decision'. Again themes are introduced in passing
which are to "become extremely important, such as, for
example, the inclusion of God's potentiality in his
actuality and the 'choice' of God in his self-positing in the
humanity of Christ. Barth defends at all points the free¬
dom of God in his Word, which is 'uncreated reality, identi¬
cal with God Himself, therefore not universally present and
52
fixable, nor possibly so*. For the purposes of this
chapter it is crucial to note the importance of the Word of
God as God's act, as 'a decision to which the hidden reality
of the relation as subsisting between Jesus Christ and Peter,
Jesus Christ and Judas assuredly and adequately corresponds,
but which above all is justified in itself as the divine
55
decision'. ^
One major unifying theme in Barth's initial exposition
of the doctrine of the Word of God and the Trinity is the
interface of these as 'reality', and as 'possibility*,
54
respectively. God's Word, as an 'uncreated reality', is
a 'Mysterium', that is, 'the veiling of God in which He meets
us by actually unveiling Himself to us.' Revelation is
therefore utterly worldly, and supremely so in the incarnation,
•which means entry into this worldliness.* The dialectic
52. Op.cit., p. 180.
53. Op.cit.. p. 182.
54. Op.cit., p. 181.
55. Op.cit.. p. 188.
56. Op.cit.. p. 192.
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of direct-indirect duality corresponds to an epistemological
57
dialectic of faith, as 'responsible witness' and as
'acknowledgement* of the revelation of God."^ On the basis
of the divine initiative,
'...acknowledgement of the Y/ord of God must mean
letting oneself continually be led, continually being
in movement from the experience felt at one time, from
the thought grasped at one time, to the opposite
experience and thought, because having the Word of God
always consists of a simultaneous hearing of the one
in the other and the other in the one. In this move¬
ment, which cannot be brought to rest in any synthesis,
a man acknowledges the mystery of the Word of God and
he has Christian experience.'
(CD 1/1, p. 237)
There is now a complex of dialectical movement in both
the ontology of the Y/ord of God and in the epistemology of
faith which had displaced the dialectic of antitheses. The
impulse towards the resolution of this complex comes from
the Word of God and is expressed in the powerful doctrine of
analogia fidei. The use of 'analogy' in the Church Dogmatics
59
is extensive, and highly important. Barth's general
exposition of the 'reality' of the Word of God and the
'possibility' of the Trinity is informed, at the outset, by
an 'analogy'.
•...the doctrine of the Word of God in its threefold
form is itself the sole analogy to the doctrine which
will fundamentally occupy us in unfolding the concept
of revelation; the doctrine of the three-in-oneness
of God. •
(CD 1/1, p. 136)
57. Op.cit.. p. 214.
56. Op.cit.. p. 236.
59. The term 'analogia fidei' has been used in a number of
related contexts in this chapter to denote in general
terms God's own gracious confirmation of language about
him. A short and specific account of this important
theme will appear at the beginning of Chapter III.
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The triplicity of revealed, written and proclaimed Word
correspond to the names of the divine •Persons': Father,
Son and Holy Spirit. Barth attempts to use what he
conceives to be the intrinsic structure of the Word of God
to direct attention to its dynamic possibility, the Trinity.
By this he has established a formal and a material starting-
point for his examination of the Trinity, in that,
'The analysis of this fact (that God reveals Himself)
as such can be nothing else than the explanation of
what, in dogmatics of all ages, has played its
distinctive part under the name of the doctrine of
the divine Trinity.'
(CD 1/1, p. 335)
In this statement of the important temporal impli¬
cations of the doctrine of the Word of God, it has been seen,
in general terms, how Barth develops his dogmatic method on
the basis of the theological structures ostensibly revealed
in his exposition. In other words, theology proper cannot
be divorced from actual knowledge of God, for man, 'knows by
being known of God'00 and 'The knowability of the Word of God
therefore really stands or falls with the act of reality
knowing it, which is withdrawn from our disposal*.it is,
therefore, on the basis of what has actually been revealed,
and revealed in God's Word, that inquiry into the 'possibility'
becomes a duty and a feasible undertaking. Having established
this 'reality' in the opening pages of this chapter, it is now
possible to turn with Barth to examine the temporal structure
of the inner possibility of the statement, 'God reveals
60. CD 1/1, p. 280.
61. Op.cit., p. 257.
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Himself', the trinitarian foundation of the 'presence of
63
the Word of God between the times'.
'It is the doctrine of the Trinity which fundamentally
distinguishes the Christian doctrine of God - it is
it, therefore, also, which marks off the Christian
concept of revelation as Christian, in the face of
all other possible doctrines of God and concepts of
revelation.•
(CD 1/1, p. 346)
With this categorical statement Barth commences his
exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity. In the early
stages of his argument Barth stresses the identity of God's
64
Word with God himself and the consequent assertion, that
KJod's revelation has its reality and truth wholly and in
every respect - i.e. ontically and noetically - within
65
itself'. In other words the fact that it is God who is
revealed in his word means that there is no need to look else¬
where for him, for in revelation 'reposes and lives the
fulness of the original being of the Word of God, existent in
66
itself.' The statement 'God reveals Himself as Lord' is
to be regarded as an 'analytical judgment*. By this Barth
apparently means that this statement is self-referring and
explicable within its own bounds. Thus 'To act as Lord
67
means to act as God in His revelation acts on man*. The
revelation of God is a novum, an original reality, uncreated
being, not a derived or dependent entity.
62. Op.cit.. p. 334.
63. Ibid.
64. Op.cit.. p. 349.
65. Op.cit.. p. 350.
66. Op.cit., p. 351.
67. Op.cit.. p. 332.
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•Lordship is present in revelation, just because its
reality and truth are so utterly grounded in itself,
because it need be actualised and legitimated in
no other way than by the fact of its occurrence,
because it is not in any relation to anything else,
but is revelation by its own agency, because it is
the self-contained novum we spoke of. Lordship
means freedom.'
(CD 1/1, p. 352)
The conclusion Barth derives from his 'analytical judgment1
is that 'Godhead in the Bible means freedom, ontic and
68
noetic independence.* This stress upon the independence,
freedom and integrity of the Godhead is most significant, for
all that follows by way of exposition is to be understood
within this context (including the temporal aspects of the
doctrines of God and the Trinity). There is in the Biblical
doctrine of revelation an 'indication of the doctrine of the
6Q
Trinity', based upon the historicity of revelation, in the
sense that the divine self-veiling is each time a 'quite
70
special event, and as such incomparable and irrepeatable'.
The unique, yet concrete, historical acts of God, known by
man in the acknowledgment of faith, are the 'problem', with
which the doctrine of the Trinity is occupied.
Barth repudiates the Augustinian notion of vestigium
trinitatis (i.e. traces of the Trinity present and
apprehensible in the created world even apart from Biblical
71
revelation' ) because it endangers the revealed (as opposed
to immanent or mythical) basis of the doctrine of the Trinity.
68. Ibid.
69. Op.cit.. p. 383.
Op.cit.. p. 375.
71. Op.cit., p. 385.
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By this rejection Barth defends his theological foundations
from 'alien1 factors derived from the patterns of human
psychology or the cosmos, which are all open to attack. In
conformity with the fundamental impulse of his thought,
traceable from Anselm. Barth argues that, 'revelation will
72
not submit to illustration but only to interpretation'.
The greatest danger is that of mythological interpretation,
for, 'we can only venture an indication that the root of the
doctrine of the Trinity lies in revelation and only in
revelation, if it is not forthwith to be the doctrine of
another, alien god, of one of the gods, the man-gods of this
73
world, if it is not to be a myth*. In concluding this
section, we concentrate our focus upon what Barth conceives
to be the real basis and origin of revelation, where he
inverts the notion of vestigium trlnltatis and posits a real
vestigium trinitatis in creatura. This inversion, directly
analogous to that of analogia fidel. is an unambiguous guide
as to how and where the doctrine of eternity and of time is
to be found, that is within the domain of revelation and its
dynamic core the doctrine of the Trinity.
•There is, of course, and with this we conclude, a
real vestigium trinitatis in creatura, an illustration
of revelation, but it we have neither to discover nor
to validate ourselves. According to our understanding
of it as the real right meaning of the vestigia doctrine,
it consists of the form which God Himself in His
revelation has assumed in our language, world, and
humanity. What we hear when with our human ears and
concepts we listen to God's revelation, what we
apprehend in Scripture (and can apprehend as men),
what the proclamation of the Word actually is in our
72. Op.cit.. p. 396.
73« Op.cit.. p. 398.
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life, is triply one voice of the Father, the Son,
and the Spirit. In this way God is present for us
in His revelation. In this way He manifestly
creates Himself a vestigium of Himself and so of His
three-in-oneness. We add nothing to that, but say
the same thing when we say that God for us is there
in the threefold form of His Word, in His revelation,
in Holy Scripture, in proclamation.*
(CD 1/1, p. 399)
By this exclusive adherence to the single root of the
Trinity Barth renders even more explicit the limits within
which revelation may be understood. Thus the parameters
within which his theological theory of time will function are
also emerging from Barth's exposition. It is within the
context of divine precedence that it is possible to comprehend
temporal and mundane consequence. In this overall pattern,
referred to under the general title of analogia fidei, the
source and paradigm of all analogy is the Word of God in its
various forms and realisations. In the light of this
further specification of the range and nature of revelation,
Barth's continued exposition of the Trinity may be examined.
Through this, progress is made towards the inner core of the
doctrine of God in God's being-in-act, that is, in his eternity.
Throughout the second chapter of this study Barth* s
ever-increasing concentration upon the most fundamental, yet
mysterious doctrine, of the Trinity has been traced from the
reality of the Word of God, in its threefold form, to its
basis and possibility in the antecedent divine essence. In
the doctrine of God is to be found that temporal aspect of
divine existence called 'eternity'. As Barth admits of no
arbitrary distinction of 'form' and 'content' it is proper to
follow the impulse of his thought and grasp the dynamic nature
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of the trinitarian divine being, which exists in and from
eternity, before drawing out from this the exact nature, in
temporal terms, of this aspect of the divine being. Eternity
is not a static attribute but the living temporal sphere of
the Godhead, expressed in the 'perfections' of God. Thus
in Chapter III below the detailed exposition of the being of
God in act and the doctrine of eternity as a 'perfection' will
be undertaken within the context of the basic structure of
Barth's Church Dogmatics, which is theologically grounded upon
the Trinity.^ In obedience to these considerations the
exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity will continue in
such a way as to convey the overall structure and content of
this 'possibility', whilst highlighting the eternal, and
those features which are to remain of decisive importance.
Only by such a continuing exposition can the integrated and
unfolding freedom of Barth's thought be represented without
alien and distorting strictures and categories being imposed.
The integration of the inner trinitarian distinction,
and the revealed Subject encountered in faith, achieved in
Barth's threefold exposition of God's Three-in-Oneness, is
truly remarkable. As with all great creative work to
attempt to tear it apart, is to risk destruction, because
Barth has, in this instance, expressed with subtle skill the
living interdependence of the various factors in his argument.
74. The problem of attribution is consequent upon the overall
structure of the Church Dogmatics and is to be understood
within this theological framework not under a separate
head.
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At the outset, therefore, the inseparability of divine
existence and divine relation is established.
•The God who reveals Himself according to Scripture
is One in three of His own modes of existence, which
consist in their mutual relationships, Father, Son and
Holy Spirit. In this way He is the Lord, i.e. the
Thou who meets God*s I and unites it to Himself as
the indissoluble Subject, and who actually thus and
thereby becomes manifest to him as his God.•
(CD 1/1, p. 400)
Barth is primarily concerned to prove that, far from
threatening the unity of God, the three-in-oneness
establishes it. The doctrine of the Trinity is (as has been
seen in the exposition of the Word of God) an •explanatory
confirmation' of the revealed name Yahweh-Kyrios, that of
•an unique entity, of a single, unique Wilier and Doer, whom
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Scripture designates as God*. So Barth identifies Being
and the One who wills and acts and thus*.on this basis bridges
the gulf existing between the ontological thinking of the
Fathers and the revealing God of the Bible.
•We may unhesitatingly equate the concept of the
lordship of God, with which we found the whole
Biblical concept of revelation to be related, with
what in the language of the ancient Church is called
the essence of God, the deitas or divinitas, the
divine o-dai'oc , essentia, natura, or substantia. The
essence of God is the being of God qua divine being.
The essence of God is the godhead of God.'
(CD 1/1, p. 401)
This of course, following the pattern of Earth1s
thought, will be of central importance in the following
chapters. The unity of the essence of God consists in the
75. CD 1/1, p. 400.
76. This integration of •being* and 'act1 is most signifi¬
cant in the Church Dogmatics and its influence upon the
problem of time will be traced through the major
doctrines that Barth exposits.
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threeness of the 'Persons'. The .distinct names of Father,
Son and Holy Spirit indicate three Persons, one in essence.
In the threefold repetition God is one. The doctrine of the
repetitio aeternitatis in aetemitate in the Trinity speci¬
fically confirms the knowledge of the unity of God. This is
of course a unity (following Hilary) unbound by the limi¬
tations of singularity and isolation. The distinction in the
essence of God and its 'arrangement' (dispositio or oeconomia)
77
is of the three 'modes of being* in God. This latter term
Earth prefers to that of 'person', with its overtone of
•personality' and the Boethian-Thomist notion of 'single
yo
rational individual essence', because it allows of an
account of the three-in-oneness of God which safeguards the
integrity of God in his acts.
'For whether it be a case of the inner content of the
outer form of the essence of God, all that can be
said may and must ultimately be said in like manner
of Father, Son, and Spirit. There is no attribute,
no act of God, which would not in like manner be the
attribute, the act of the Father, the Son, and the
Spirit. Of course, knowledge of the revelation of God
means knowledge of various attributes which we cannot
reduce to a single denominator, by which we can also
thereafter make clear God's existence as Father, Son
and Spirit. But just because it is of the essence of
the revealing God to possess such and such attributes,
in His essence they are also indistinguishably one,
and not to be apportioned ontologically to Father,
Son and Spirit.'
(CD 1/1, pp. 415-6)
Barth illustrates the ontological mutuality of act and
attribute with reference to Luther's exposition of the story
of the baptism of Jesus. In this Father, Son and Spirit act
in confirmation of the principle, opera trinitatis ad extra
77. CDI/1, p. 407.
78. Qp.cit., p. 409.
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sunt indivisa. The unity of the revealed God 'stands
QO
apart from everything that may otherwise be termed unity'
and this realisation stems from obedience to the axiom, non
sermoni res, sed rei sermo sub.jectus est, made in the face
of the mystery of the Trinity. In,'taking rational trouble
over this mystery', as theology must do, Barth maps out the
bounds of this mystery. The divine Persons exist in
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'perichoresis(circumincessio, passing into one another)'
and by this insight, inherited from John of Damascus, the
dynamic living unity of the divine being is further explicated,
insofar as this is possible. It asserts that,'the divine
modes of existence condition and permeate one another
mutually with such perfection that one is as invariably in
op
the other two as the other two are in the one'. So Barth
seeks to safeguard the oneness of God, both inwardly and
outwardly.
to the involution and compilation of the three
modes of existence in the essence of God there
corresponds most completely their involution and con¬
volution (Ineinander und Miteinander) in His operation.
....As surely as Scripture is meant to be read in its
context as the witness to God's revelation, as surely
as e.g. Good Friday, Easter, and Pentecost merely
unite in asserting what they should assert, so surely
we must declare that all God's operation, as we are
bound to conceive it on the basis of His revelation,
is a single act, occurring simultaneously and unitedly
in all His three modes of existence. Of creation,
past revelation and reconciliation, to the redemption
to come it holds good, that He who acts here is the
Father and the Son and the Spirit. And of all
perfections to be asserted in view of this action by
God it holds good, that they are as much the perfections
of the Father as of the Son, or of the Spirit.'
(CD 1/1, p. 430)
79. Op.cit.. p. 416.
80. Op.cit., p. 421.
81. Op.cit., p. 425.
82. Ibid.
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By the doctrine of appropriations (attributions,
assignments), interpreted radically by Barth on the basis
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of Luther, and by means of an analogical relation of in¬
conceivable, eternal distinctions in God to those
distinctions manifested in revelation, Barth builds the
foundations in his doctrine of God, of the distinction of
eternity and time, that is to be seen, in turn, exemplified
and explicated in the doctrines of election, incarnation and
creation. In the doctrines of perichoresis and appropriation,
Barth prepares the way for the fully trinitarian operation of
God in his * single act' in these doctrines, through which
runs the structural theme of eternity and time. The doctrine
of the Trinity declares that, 'It is He who according to the
witness of Scripture exists, speaks, and acts as Father, Son,
and Spirit, in self-veiling and self-unveiling and self-
impartation, in holiness, mercy and love, it is this and no
OA
other, who is God*. God can be 'our God, because He is
equal to Himself in all His modes of existence, is one and
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the same Lord'. On this basis Barth begins the elaboration
of the huge axis which is to be at the centre of interest in
this thesis. The axis of antecedence and consequence,
eternity and time, and so on, relies from the beginning upon
the doctrine of God, and the unity in mutual, triple
integrity of the modes of the divine Being, Father, Son and
Holy Spirit. Barth argues as follows: 'And this Lord can
be our God, He can meet us and unite us to Himself, because
83. Op.cit.. p. 429.
84. Op.cit.. p. 439.
Op.cit., p. 440.
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He is God. in these three modes of existence as Father, Son,
and Spirit, because creation, reconciliation, redemption,
the entire being, language, and action in which He wills to
be our God, is grounded and typified in His own essence, in
His Godness itself'.8b Herein lies the 'possibility1 of the
'reality* of the Word of God, witnessed to in Scripture,
Q'7
where 'the problem of the doctrine of the Trinity is set'.
The final major section of the first half-volume of the
Church Dogmatics is a statement of the doctrine of the divine
'modes', or Persons, of Father, Son and Holy Spirit, in the
context of divine antecedence. What God is in himself (i.e.
in Barth's words what is 'grounded and typified in His own
88 \
essence' ) he is towards and for us. 'The one God reveals
Himself according to Scripture as the Creator, that is, as
the Lord of our existence. As such He is God our Father,
because as the Father of God the Son He is so antecedently in
89
Himself'. Having established the unity of God in his
90
'single act' of the three Persons in their fundamental being,
Earth continues with an exposition of their distinct functions.
There is a threefold parallel exposition of each Person,
which, whilst sharing in the pattern of antecedence and con¬
sequence, gives to each a distinct role in the act of
revelation, but one related intrinsically to the others.




89* Op.cit., p. 441.
90. Op.cit.. p. 430.
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relation of eternity and time, and to those aspects of the
function of each Person which will have significance for
91
this distinction at later stages in this study.
In a manner consistent with the foregoing exposition,
Earth's understanding of the Persons is undertaken from the
standpoint of God's revelation of himself as Lord.
'And this Lord can "be our God, He can meet us and
unite us to Himself, because He is God in these three
modes of existence as Father, Son, and Spirit, because
creation, reconciliation, redemption, the entire
being, language, and action in which he wills to be
our God, is grounded and typified in His own essence,
in His Godness itself. As Father, Son, and Spirit
God is, so to speak, ours in advance.*
(CD 1/1, p. 440)
At once it must be said that Earth's insight is informed by
Christology. In dealing 'as the Lord with man', God is not
a being belonging to the kind and order of man and is not
thus subject to human lordship, nor indeed is he aloof, 'as
a being who exists and remains for Himself in His own kind
92
and order'. V/hat he becomes is finally the concern of
Christology, but at this Juncture the Lordship of God is
understood in the functional reciprocity of Father, Son and
Holy Spirit. Barth begins his exposition with an allusion
to Harnack. The 'true and real divinity' is, in the first
instance, ascribable to the Father, in the face of the 'true
and real man', Jesus Christ. Thus, 'The essence of the
Divinity ascribed to Jesus is to make clear, impart, and
91. In fact attention is concentrated upon the Persons of
Father and Son. The relation of the Holy Spirit to the
problem of time will arise later in passing.
92. CD 1/1, p. 441.
93. Op.cit.. p. 442.
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carry out who God the Father, God in the proper sense is,
94
and what He wills and does for man, to represent this man*.
Unlike Harnack, however, Barth immediately stresses that 'He
whom Jesus reveals as the Father is known absolutely in the
95
death of man, at the end of his existence'. ^ The Cross and
resurrection dispose of any simple optimism, for God, 'wills
96
death in order to lead our life through to eternal life'.
In the light of this death and rebirth, prototypically
enacted in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ,
God the Father is revealed as Creator. The analogy of
'fatherhood' is broken and re-formed on the basis of the
'Fatherhood' of God. Barth thus realises doctrines of
revelation and the Trinity in the actual life and death of
Jesus Christ. At the very heart of this the crucifixion
and resurrection are the turning-points, the foci of his
theology.
'God our Father means God our Creator....And it should
now have become clear that it is "in Christ," as "the
Father of Jesus Christ," that God means our Creator.
It is not a general truth, knowable antecedently or
to be acquired by our own powers; it is the truth of
revelation that God is our Creator. Only by what
we otherwise know as the relation of father and son
being broken through by the Word of Christ the
Crucified and Risen, only through its being interpreted
by this Word, i.e., in this case through its acquiring
from this Word a meaning which on its own merits it
could not have - only so do we come in sight of what
Creation means. But in that way we can come in sight
of it. The "Father of Jesus Christ," who according to
the witness of Scripture is manifest in Jesus, His
servant, possesses the attributes of a "Lord of our
existence." The witness concerning Him leads us to
the place where the miracle of creation can come into
94. Op.cit., p. 443.
95. Op.cit., p. 445.
96. Op.cit., p. 446.
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view. It attests the holy God, the God who alone
is God, the free God. It is this witness that we
now have to understand by means of the fundamental
positions of the doctrine of the Trinity.*
(CD 1/1, p. 447)
97It is, therefore, within the 'self-enclosed circle'
of the doctrine of the Trinity that the truth that God is
Creator is known, as in the act of God, in his Fatherhood of
Jesus Christ, the new life is brought out of death. It is a
•truth of revelation', not a 'general truth'. This assertion
is another factor of great importance, because the whole
catena of temporal doctrines must be understood in relation
to the central revelatory events. The ontology of human
existence is bound up with the 'Lordship' of God, which means,
according to Barth, that 'our existence is held by Him, and
only by Him, over the abyss of non-existence.... It is real,
98
so far as He wills and posits it a real existence'. Our
existence, Barth argues, is 'our will and ability to live
99
in its (our existence's) limitations'. This set of
assertions introduces a potential ambiguity into Earth's
thought, for 'existence' and 'reality' exist for man outside
of faith, but it is only in faith, that is in the face of
God's Lordship, that our existence is 'real so far as He
wills and posits it a real existence'. At a very early
stage in this study it must be asked if this argument does
not put non-theological existence in a problematic position.
Again this theme of ambiguity will recur in considering the
problem of time in the Church Dogmatics.
97. Qp.cit., p. 436.
98. Qp.cit., p. 446.
99. Ibid.
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The closest parallel between the accounts that Barth
gives of the Persons of the Trinity lies in their mutual,
eternal status. God can reveal himself as the Father of
Jesus Christ, his Son, 'because He is Himself the Father in
Himself, because Fatherhood is an eternal mode of existence
of the divine essence'.There is an 'inner possibility'
in God of his eternal Fatherhood. In the light of this
there is a three stage realisation of fatherhood which shows
clearly the structure of knowing and of reality in the
dynamic structure of 'analogia fidei'.
•God alone, as He whom He is by Himself, i.e. as the
eternal Father of the eternal Son, is properly and
adequately to be called Father. From the power and
dignity of this alone proper name of Father, there
flows by grace and for faith the improper - not, of
course, therefore untrue, but really improper - name
of Father for God as the Creator, and from this again
the naming of the original intra-creaturely relation,
the thing which is called fatherhood in heaven and on
earth (Eph. 3»15); this too to be regarded as a
true but improper appellation, dependent upon the
power and dignity of the intra-trinitarian name of
Father for God.•
(CD 1/1, p. 451)
In the same mutuality of Father and Son 'Jesus is the
revelation of the Father, and the revelation of the Father
is Jesus'. The divinity of Jesus Christ is eternal
divinity; that is 'when we assert that the Son come to us,
the Word spoken to us, is antecedently the Son or Word of
God per se. we thereby assert practically nothing else than
simply the statement about the divinity of Christ is to be
101
regarded not as a derivative, but as a fundamental statement'.
100. Op.cit.. p. 448.
101. Op.cit.. p. 475.
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Barth argues without compromise for the antecedence of
102
Christ, this 'antecedently in himself', which refers to
his existence 'exactly as He posits and knows Himself from
105
eternity and in eternity', not to a supposedly untheolo-
gical, metaphysical speculation. Those who take their cue
from Melancthon's emphasis upon the beneficia Christi are
mistaken for, 'The Reformers never dreamt of letting Christ-
ology resolve or dissolve into a doctrine of the beneficia
104
Christi', and they posit a similarly speculative notion
of Christ 'for us', which is a total, not merely a partial
loss. The only way that grace and the divine freedom are
preserved is precisely by adherence to the divinity of Christ.
This is contained most significantly in the so-called Symb.
Nicaeno-Constantinopolitanum. In Barth's exposition of the
second article there is to be found his first substantial
allusion to the nature of eternity itself. In this passage
there is much of importance for the subsequent chapters of
this thesis as will be seen.
Jesus is the 'one Lord' and 'his lordship for us in
his revelation has no beginning and no end, it breaks over
us with the unheard-of and incomparable fall of eternal truth
and reality itself, it cannot be realised or inferred from
any standpoint whatsoever, knowledge of it begins with the
105
acknowledgment of it'. In second place, he is 'the only-
102. Op.cit., p. 476.
103. Ibid.
104. Op.cit., p. 480.
105. Op.cit., pp. 485-6.
86
1 O
begotten* 00 and, thirdly, he is *begotten of the Father
107
before all time*. The distinction Barth draws here
along the lines of orthodox thought, between Jesus, who
]QQ
♦does not signify but (who) is God Himself', and all
other reality, is quite fundamental to the Church Dogmatics.
This assertion must be defended consistently if the dis¬
tinction of creation and re-creation (in Christ) is to be
preserved. Barth argues that the phrase 'before all time*
is not to be interpreted as excluding time. Indeed the
phrase itself leads to the time-honoured puzzle of attempting
to speak of 'before' time. Barth wants to show that 'before
all time' excludes neither the 'there and then' of revelation
nor the 'here and now' in which it becomes revelation for man
in the present.
'It does not exclude, it includes time (concretely,
this time, the time of revelation); and so with
history. But this very fact that time (time of our
time, the sinful creature's time and history - which
is also the time and history of revelation) is
included in a divine "before all time," - this does
not go without saying, this is a grace, a mystery, a
foundation to be recognised in the fear of God.'
(CD 1/1, pp. 487-8)
Barth argues with great care at this point and it is
therefore necessary to examine his thought in some detail.
The Lordship of God is not explicable in terms of a meta¬
physics, but is a pronouncement about God who exists as
Revealer and Reconciler, and who pre-exists 'for us' in the
spheres explicated by the theology of the divinity of Christ,
106. Op.cit.. p. 486.
107. Op.cit.. p. 487.
108. Ibid.
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and the incarnation, respectively. In the context of the
•inclusion' of time, that is, the times of revelation
(concrete time) and 'time of our time',1^ there is the
becoming-man of the Son of God, whose eternity is that of
the Father, as he was 'begotten by the Father before all
time'. Earlier in this chapter the dialectical concept of
the interaction of eternity and time was referred to, where
Barth states the temporal implications of 'The Revealed Word
of God'.110 This was the * Deus dixit' without analogies,
the 'being moved only by itself, in mid-ocean of the unsettled,
changeable, and self-changing, the fixed event, the fulness
of time...which is identical with Jesus Christ'.111 The
terminology apparent in the whole passage alluded to above
112
is reminiscent of the dialectic of Romans, for Barth
1°9. Ibid.
H°. Op.cit., pp. 130ff.
111. Op.cit.. pp. 130-1.
112. 'This is what is meant by - knowing the time. Between
the past and the future - between the times- there is a
"Moment" that is no moment in time. This "Moment" is
the eternal Moment - the Now - when the past and the
future stand still, when the former ceases its going
and the latter its coming... - this is the secret of
time which is made known in the "moment" of revelation,
in that eternal "Moment" which always is, and yet is
not. Time, then, is irreversible; and of this the
irrevocable hurrying away of the past and the relentless
approach of the future are a parable. But a parable of
it also is the completely hidden, unobservable,
intangible present which lies "between" the times.
Facing, as it does, each moment in time is a parable
of the eternal "Moment". Every moment in time bears
within it the unborn secret of revelation, and every
moment can be thus qualified - This do knowing the
time.* Romans, p. 497.
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appears to juxtapose a timeless eternity ('incapable of
changing its form...the fixed event') and a temporal flux
('mid-stream of becoming,...mid-ocean of the unsettled,
changeable, and self-changing'). In Romans, 'Between the
past and the future - between the times there is a "Moment"
113
that is no moment in time' but this intrusion of the
eternal is tangential, and, like the geometrical point or
line, a heuristic construction. The 'parable' of the
'Moment' is 'the completely Ridden, unobservable, intangible
present which lies between the times'."'""'"^ Barth's use of
115
dialectical language in the passage cited cannot be under¬
stood in the same way as in Romans, for,*"God is with us" has
happened'. God has encountered time, but not in the
annihilating timelessness of the 'greedy dialectic' and
krisis. The dialectic of antitheses and the eschatological
consummation in death has now become the dialectic of grace
in the veiledness and unveiledness of revelation, in the
worldliness of divinity. The 'absolutely marked events in
time' are 'events within the created world'. The reality
underlying Barth's language presupposes the incarnation of
Jesus Christ, the Word has become flesh, and, therefore, has
become time.
'"Begotten by the Father before all time" means, did
not come into being in time as such, did not come into
being in an event within the created world. The Son
of God's becoming man and recognition of him in his
humanity as the Son of God by other men, are, although
absolutely marked events in time, events within the
created world. But this marked nature which they have
113. Romans, p. 497.
H4. Ibid.
115. CD 1/1, p. 130.
89
does not itself originate and proceed from time.
Otherwise they would only be relatively marked events,
of which there are many others of the kind. Just
because they have divine power, because the power of
the temporal is here the power of the eternal, the
power of the immanence of God here the power of His
transcendence, the Subject of it must be regarded as
existing before all time, as the eternal Subject, as
eternal as God Himself, himself as eternal as God.
Jesus Christ does not first become the Son of God by
being for us. He becomes so as the eternal Son of
the eternal Father.'
(CD 1/1, pp. 488-9)
The 'absolutely marked (i.e. distinguished) events in
time' (schlechterdings ausgezeichnete Ereignisse) are moments
in which the eternal 'enters' time. This is thus a
theological interpretation of the eternal-temporal encounter,
where the 'power' of the eternal God is identified, in the
act of revelation, with the power of his immanence. The One
who has been from eternity, jjs in time. The nature of the
•before' and 'after' is not a simple temporal precedence and
subsequence because it underlies the events of revelation.
Both time and eternity are the categories which structure
this encounter, that can now be seen as the culmination of
a theological development. This development is Barth's
drive from the reality of revelation in the threefold Word of
God, to its actual dynamic possibility in the Trinity. The
explication of the specific nature of this axis, as it is
realised in the mutual interconnection of eternity and time,
is the goal of this thesis. It can now be seen that the
dialectic of antitheses of Romans gave place to a dialectic
underlaid by a new conjunction of transcendence and immanence.
The most fundamental primary fact of the incarnation reveals
the finality of the eternal God's involvement, his condes¬
cension in self-identity with man. So the eternal enters
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time and time is Marked*, 'distinguished* by the imprint
of the veiled and unveiled God. In this chapter our
argument has penetrated towards the core of the Church
Dogmatics, that is the characterisation of God's eternity,
his true divinity in triune modal majesty which is the
source and possibility of that movement God makes to reveal
himself in his Word.
There remains much of interest and importance in the
Prolegomena of the Church Dogmatics as regards both Son and
Holy Spirit. To these this study will return at later
116
stages. At this juncture the goal of this chapter has
been achieved. In conclusion, recapitulation shows that the
path of these reflections leads to the threshold of Barth's
doctrine of God and thus to a full explication and analysis
of his doctrine of time and eternity. Through the eyes of
Jttngel the inner integrity of Barth's theological hermeneutic
was revealed. Following a different path of analysis it was
seen that the reality of the Word of God, the presupposition
of 'the ascertainability by man of the proper content of
117
Christian language about God', was dependent upon the grace
of God, made known by God himself, in the actual ability of
God to give himself to man. This identity of Giver with Gift
is possible in his trinitarian being, the 'self-enclosed
circle', which in the mystery of the incarnation demonstrates
the all-sufficiency of God's loving and reciprocal self-
sufficiency. At the core of this is the encounter of
eternity and time, the theme and subject of this thesis.
116. Cf. ChaptersVff.
117. CD 1/1, p. 11.
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CHAPTER III
ACT, ANALOGY AND PERFECTION
In the first chapter of this study the ontological
gulf of the nineteenth century was presented as the over-
ridingly significant factor conditioning, in overall terms,
Barth's 'positivism' of revelation and revealed reality.
Then in Chapter II the initial steps in the development of
the theological ontology of the Church Dogmatics was examined.
The 'reality' of the Word of God was seen to be the gift of
divine grace, instantiated by God on the basis of the
•possibility' of the Trinity. Eternity as the mode of God's
being-in-act impinges upon time in the 'marked time' of
revelation. In this context it is possible to see that
eternity, as the mode of God's being in trinitarian unity
and reciprocity, has potentially an extremely important part
to play in the inner structure and dynamic of the Church
Dogmatics. In fact it is quite crucial to the whole content
and fabric of this work. The axis of eternity and time -
understood as the interaction of divine and created being,
the divinity and the humanity of Christ, and so on - is of
pervasive importance. This is because only if the reality
of both is maintained throughout, does the theology of Karl
Barth transcend a reduction to one or the other. Thus
R.W. Jenson can argue that Barth's theology in Romans is
'the perfected historicizing of platonic religion',1 and the
doctrine of God in the Church Dogmatics, as trinitarian dogma,
1. God after God, p. 27.
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'becomes...a new proposal for the post and anti-religious
p
understanding of God'. Indeed for Jenson, Earth has re¬
discovered the Father's insight into the nature of the
Christian religion; that it is, because of the Incarnation,
'a religion about an historical, temporal event' • In a
quite contrary way H. Zahrnt sees the same development in
Earth's thought as a movement towards architectonic insanity,
a radical de-temporalisation of theology produced by a
11
religious genius 'to madness near allied'.
'The same Barth who in his struggle against natural
theology, with its general concept of the divine,
emphasises so strongly the concrete and historical
figure of Jesus Christ, makes use of Jesus Christ
in his analogical thought as a universal and supra-
temporal principle which can reveal to him the
reality of the whole universe - with the result
that the reality of the universe evaporates.*
(The Question of God, p. 106)
This, it hardly need be emphasised, is a most serious
charge. The mirror-image opposites of the critiques of
Jenson and Zahrnt point to what must, at the very least, be
an ambiguity in Earth's thought, for the former sees a
•historicizing' of revelation and the latter an 'eternali-
sation'. 'The basing of the events of salvation upon a time¬
less event in the perfect tense results for Barth in an irre-
5
parable loss of concrete historical reality.' So Zahrnt
fZ
strikes his blows: Barth's 'monism* is 'close to Hegel* and
2. Op.cit., p. 97.
3. Op.cit.. p. 19.
The Question of God, Protestant Theology in the Twentieth
Century. Collins. 1969. p. 105. '
5. Op.cit.. p. 113.
6. Op.cit.. p. 114.
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his doctrine of election is the mere out-working of the pre-
7
existence of Christ, not the event of the incarnation. In
short 'there is virtually no theology with so little action,
A
because all the action has taken place in eternity'.
Clearly here 'event', 'reality' and time are central concepts,
appearing under a number of guises. There is little point
in lingering over individual treatment of these objections,
for the problems they raise will underlie the following
exposition and analysis. Again Jenson's critique, which is
vigorous?polemical and highly individual, must remain in the
background. In the light of the basic general analytical
approaches introduced in Chapter I, under the headings of
ontology and epistemology, it will prove illuminating to
penetrate Barth's explication of the axis of eternity and
time through a series of studies of major features of the
Church Dogmatics. Thus if ontology and epistemology are
broadly paired with being, as being-in-act (that is as the
theological explanation of 'event') and analogy (as the
realisation of man's knowledge of theological reality)
respectively, then it is apparent that the title of this
chapter directs attention to a most fundamental set of
problems in the Church Dogmatics. This will become clear
in the following analysis of the axis of eternity and time
as it functions at the heart of the interface of the
doctrines of the knowledge and being of God in CD II/l.
7. Op.cit.. p. 112.
Op«cit.. p. 113-
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Having achieved this explication of the theological structure
and the inner logic of Earth's argument, it will then prove
possible to proceed to an analysis of the concept of
eternity under the heading 'Act and Eternity*. Again, the
second stage of this examination of Earth's doctrine of
divine being will pay careful attention to CD II/l, where
eternity is presented as a divine perfection, not in abstracto.
but on the basis of the foregoing. This initial twofold
study will carry this critique of the doctrine of eternity
and time in the theology of Barth to the heart of his
theological ontology in the doctrine of God's being, that
is in eternity. Judgement upon the temporality and reality
of the theology of the Church Dogmatics must begin with an
analysis of God's being because this is where Barth begins.
To check, however, any fears that this means adopting any
sacrificium intellectus, the following may be noted. First,
this path of analysis is extremely demanding, but it follows,
and does not impose, trends that exist in Barth's thought.
Second, by assessing exactly what Barth means by 'eternity*
and 'time' in strictly temporal (as opposed to theological)
terms it will prove possible to test the 'reality' of the
ontology of uncreated and created being, God and universe.
It is not possible to draw apart arbitrarily these themes,
but by highlighting the exact nature and content of Barth's
temporal concepts and language, within an understanding of
the theological structure as a whole, the basis of the answers
to many questions applicable to the Church Dogmatics will be
exposed. It is the task of this thesis to attempt to build
such a foundation.
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Professor T.F. Torrance has argued that,
•Karl Barth's dogmatics is to be appreciated as a
gigantic attempt to overcome the dualisms that beset
medieval and Protestant theologies, and to think
into each other the being of God in his acts and the
acts of God in his being, in a thoroughgoing inte¬
gration of the ontic and the dynamic, and then in
the light of the inner organic connections that come
to view, and the fundamental grammar of God's self-
revelation as Lord, to interpret the whole of
Christian theology by setting it more squarely upon
its proper foundations.'
('Newton, Einstein and Scientific Theology',pp.247-8)
This is not a * Christomonism' or a reduction, but what
Torrance has called a 'recovery of ontology'. The fundamental
issue that faces the student of Barth is whether this
'recovery' presages a consequent 'loss' or diminution else¬
where in the total scheme of reality. Following now the
pattern of antecedence and consequence, reality and possibility,
the exploration of the central doctrine of God's being-in-act
will now begin.
'God is actually known in the Church' and it is through
Q
his Word that 'God is actually known and will be known again'.
Barth takes up once more the stance that he learned from
Anselm of Canterbury. This position has been noted in both
preceding chapters of this thesis. The occurrence of the
Word is not to be doubted, and any calling in question must
be from within the Word of God itself. It is inadmissable
to ask whether God is known or in fact knowable: 'Where God
is known He is also in some way or other knowable'.10 In
consequence, 'Where the actuality exists there is also the
9. CD II/l, p. 4.
10. Qp.cit.. p. 5.
96
11
corresponding possibility1. This set of mutually related
statements constitutes one of the fundamental presuppositions
of the Church Dogmatics. Out of the assertion in God's
Word of the reality of God flow the possibilities of Earth's
•theo-logic'. It follows, ipso facto, that questions
concerning the knowledge of God are in concreto and
a posteriori, and not in abstracto and a priori. Once more,
Barth neatly inverts the received meanings of these terms
... • I'd :
as understood in traditional philosophy of religion. Whether
this is right or acceptable is beside the point for what is
of crucial importance is that there is no source of reality
in a true theology outside of this framework. 'Reality,*
is a term now bearing a considerable burden and it must be
clarified. Barth is everywhere concerned to deny talk
about 'being' as a generalised concept denoting the category
shared by all existent entities. In fact Barth directs his
argument against the hypostatisation of being, and he is
always asserting the concrete contingency of that which is
actual, of that which is. For Barth, 'the only legitimate
and meaningful questions in this context are: how far is God
12
known? and how far is God knowable?'
'Just as the reality of the WTord of God in Jesus
Christ bears its possibility within itself, as does
also the reality of the Holy Spirit, by whom the
Word of God comes to man, so too the possibility of
the knowledge of God and therefore the knowability
of God cannot be questioned in vacuo. or by means
of a general criterion of knowledge delimiting the
knowledge of God from without, but only from within
this real knowledge itself. Therefore it is quite




this question is already decided by the only
legitimate and meaningful questioning which arises
in this connexion.'
(CD II/l, p. 5)
This argument is of decisive importance, for it poses
a further question as to how it is that the reality of God,
and knowledge of that reality, can impinge upon a reality
external to that of revelation. Barth's answer appears to
be that it cannot, except insofar as that 'reality' is
produced from within the discrete sphere of revelation. In
other words, given the exclusive source of revelation,
emphasised in both the doctrine of the Word of God and the
theological epistemology of CD II/l, then what can be the
ontological status of non-theological reality? There are,
as will be seen, no simple solutions to this problem. The
ontological root of theological reality is eternity and not
a doctrine of being, in, for example, static terms of
'substance'. Thus it is that the interaction of eternity
and time affords a touchstone for testing the nature of both
theological and non-theological reality. In fact this axis
is an extremely sensitive instrument, for the truth of
Christian theology is critically bound up with this
distinction. Different aspects of this argument will be
developed as the presentation of the role and nature of
Barth's doctrine of eternity and time proceeds in relation
to the Church Dogmatics. This adumbration indicates the
direction in which Barth's reliance upon a single, exclusive
presupposition is to guide these reflections. In very simple
and preliminary terms the reader must a& if the 'borderlands'
of theological explication which inevitably impinge upon non-
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theological reality are a form of 1logical construction1
and an ontology of inferred entities, or alternatively,
actually correspond to, and correlate, divine and non-divine
reality. This fundamental quest arises out of a deep and
pervasive ambiguity in Earth's thought, the roots of which
are being exposed. To do Earth's great work justice will
involve us in a long and arduous task of exposition and
analysis.
Earth asserts the positive knowledge of God, and, in
doing so, he offers trenchant and sustained criticism of
putative, but illusory rival attempts to sustain a distinct
natural knowledge of God. His exposition also provides an
informative survey of the theological landscape that is to
be traversed, undertaken from the epistemological standpoint.
All this serves to clear away any possible obstacles to a
total appreciation of the act of God as the realisation of
revelation. 'True knowledge of God is not and cannot be
l*
attacked; it is without anxiety and without doubt'. J So
Earth posits the knowledge coming from 'the real and original
constraint by the Word' and which we cannot approach. In
dynamic mutuality, God objectifies himself in his Word and
'by the Holy Spirit He makes the human subject accessible to
Himself, capable of considering and conceiving Himself as
object'.1Z| God is known in faith and not in 'timeless and
15
non-objective seeing and hearing' as in Augustine's
13* .SisLiJiiiJi* t P* f *
14. •, p. 10.
15. Op.cit.. p. 11.
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encounter with timeless Wisdom recounted in the 'beautiful
16
but also most dangerous passages in the Confessions'.
Faith is the 'total positive relationship of man to the God
who gives Himself to be known in His Word. It is man's
act of turning to God, of opening up his life to Him and
17
of surrendering to Him*. The very particularity and
distinctness of God's objectivity is manifested, as 'faith in
TO
God occurs by way of separation'. God makes himself known
and in doing so 'sanctifies Himself, i.e., makes Himself known
iq
as distinct from all other objects*. There are two
immediate consequences of this act of divine self-objectifi-
cation. First, God has a knowledge of himself (his 'primary
objectivity') and, second, he makes himself known and knowable
to us (his 'secondary objectivity'). As a result, 'God is
objectively immediate to Himself, but to us He is objectively
20
mediate*. This last conclusion leads to an important
correlation in the doctrine of the knowledge of God with the
modified temporal dialectic noted at the end of Chapter II.
There it was argued that 'marked time* bore, in some (as yet
unspecified) way, the imprint of eternity. Barth now begins
his exposition of the 'indirect knowledge' of God. This
characterisation of the interaction of creaturely reality and
God is most significant for it reveals the theological ration¬
ale which is to underlie much temporal language used in the
16. Op.cit.. pp. 10-11.
17. Op.cit., p. 12.
18. Op.cit., p. 15.
19. Ibid.
20. Op.cit.. p. 16.
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area of revelation.
•In the encounter the reality of this piece of (man's)
environment does not cease to be a definite,
creaturely reality, and therefore it does not become
identical with God, but it represents God. That is
to say, it represents God in so far as it is deter¬
mined, made and used by God as His clothing, temple,
or sign; in so far as it is peculiarly a work of
God, which above and beyond its own existence (which
is God's work, of course) may and must serve to attest
the objectivity of God and therefore to make knowledge
of God possible and necessary.'
(CD II/l, p. 17)
The supreme exemplification of the indirect knowledge
of God is in the God-manhood of Jesus Christ. It is in 'the
whole world of His work and sign', that is, 'in the witness
of the Scriptures, in the visibility of the Church, in the
audibility of preaching, in the operation of the sacraments',
as well as in Jesus Christ himself, that the infrangible bond
of primary and secondary objectivity is rendered concrete.
The dualism of a revealed and a hidden God is prevented by
the unity of act and being underlying the distinction of
objectivities.
'It is and remains God's free grace when he is object
for us in His primary and secondary objectivity. He
always gives Himself to be known so as to be known by
us in this giving, which is always a bestowal, always
a free action. How could it be His objectivity if
this were not so? How could He be our Creator,
Reconciler and Redeemer, how could He be the living
Lord, if it were not so, and if His being for us were
ever to be separated from His activity, so that a
direction of man to God's being could exist that was
grounded in something other than his being directed by
God's activity? Faith stands or falls with the fact
of man being directed by God's action, by the action
of His being as the living God.'
(CD II/l, p. 22)
The inner key to the meaning of God in primary
objectivity is God's eternal triune being. God is 'Lord
21
of the event which we call the knowledge of God*. It is
21• Op.cit., p. 67.
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the nature of this event in the doctrine of God which concerns
this study, for it underlies not only the whole exposition
of the knowledge of God but also the inner temporal continuity
which is needed as the counterweight to Barth's constant stress
upon the sheer freedom of God. The whole fabric of his
exposition ultimately refers inwards from the event of
revelation to the act of God in his being, although in reality
there is no real distinction. 'Grace is the majesty, the
freedom, the undeservedness, the unexpectedness, the newness,
the arbitrariness, in which the relationship to God and there¬
fore the possibility of knowing Him is opened up to man by
22
God Himself.' The utter exclusivity of revelation in grace
therefore precludes, as has been shown, other bases of
knowledge of God, including recourse to analogy. There is
no analogy that man possesses, 'on the basis of which the
2.'5
nature and being of God can be accessible to us*, J with
regard to God as Lord, Creator, Reconciler or Redeemer. This
parallels Barth's arguments earlier with regard to the
Trinity. The polemic against analogia entis is well-trodden
ground, both as regards the Roman response to this attack and
criticism of Barth's own notions. As H. Bouillard points
out, the target of Barth's criticisms was not in fact St.
Thomas, but his successors, and of course E. Przywara. In
fact Barth's plan of action is perfectly consistent with that
impulse observed early on in Romans, in which he denied the
whole cosmos any right to justify itself before God. Indeed
22. Op.clt.. p. 74.
23. Op.clt.. p. 75.
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•no flesh may glory in itself* in the Church Dogmatics.
Even the response of man to God and his 'readiness' is 'in
the reality of Jesus Christ alone*.^ The ambiguity of
reality is again evident in this paring away of accretions,
which whilst undertaken from the Christological and soterio-
logical standpoint, cannot but have overall ontological
consequences.
'Man never at all exists in himself. And the Christian
man is the very last to try to cling to existing in
himself. Man exists in Jesus Christ and in Him alone.
The being and nature of man in and for themselves as
independent bearers of an independent predicate, have,
by the revelation of Jesus Christ, become an
abstraction which can be destined only to disappear.*
(CD II/l, p. 149)
In effect, grace is consuming nature, as the Pauline
understanding of Christian existence is interpreted in full
ontological and epistemological terms. Even more radically
Barth argues that 'The vitality of natural theology is the
25
vitality of man as Bach'. Is the conclusion that Barth
then draws the 'holy boldness' of the writer of Romans with
his purging and annihilation of man, exulting in glittering
theological rhetoric, or is it to be taken in all seriousness
in the fuller sense indicated above?
•On the contrary, the presupposed independent existence
of a man as such is an illusion. It is a powerful,
illuminating and (if we want to leave out Jesus Christ)
unconquerable illusion.•
(CD II/l, p. 165)
The explanation of this extraordinarily uncompromising
theological insight is, of course, to be understood in
24. Op.cit., p. 149.
25. Qp.clt.. p. 165.
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relation to, and in consequence of, the events surrounding
the Person of Jesus Christ. This is the theological
rationale, but as will be seen, the elimination and re-
assertion of the human on the basis of an act of God, has
certain difficulties. The identification of God with, and
in man in Jesus Christ, and the representation of God to man
in the veiledness (which is God's unveiling in him) manifest
transcendence in utter indirectness. In relation to time
the distinction of time and eternity must undergo a parallel
resolution. The events alluded to in the following quotation
in this introduction to the primal doctrine of God's being-in-
act express the explicit and visible concrete particularities
of God's intervention in Jesus Christ. The irreversible
events of revelation and salvation have taken place. In and
'behind' them is God's 'single act' in his triunity in unity.
It is to this we must penetrate.
•The event of Good Friday and Easter Day would have
to be wiped out, the eternal event between the Father
and the Son, the work of the Holy Spirit as the
temporal form of this eternal event, would have to be
arrested, faith as our relationship to this event,
realised by the Holy Spirit, would have to be annulled,
and the Church, as the unity of faith realised by the
same Holy Spirit, would have to be shattered, if even
for a single moment man could and should again exist
as such independently....*
(CD II/l, p. 165)
The bond of the primary and secondary objectivity of
God and of God's own work in creating the readiness of man's
receptivity, underlies all the apparent activity of God in
Jesus Christ (the 'essence of the Church') as the enactor of
the covenant and creation as well as the creator of knowledge
of himself. Such knowledge of God is 'only an event enclosed
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in the mystery of the divine Trinity'. This event is the
dynamic and is, according to Barth, the only manifestation
of the knowledge of God. It is to this 'act' and to "the
being of God to which we now turn, having seen its constitu¬
tive significance for the Church Dogmatics.
Barth has stripped away any basis of human knowledge
of God accumulable on the ground of 'analogla entis*. For
the purposes of this thesis it is Barth's positive assertions
which are of most significance. He begins his explication
of the divine nature (this term is used purely informally here)
with the positing of the circulus veritatis, the theological
circle. The divine reality of the circulus veritatis Dei is
Jesus Christ himself, for 'we let the place of our knowledge
of God be that in which God's temptation and God's comfort
have come to pass for us and from which the temptation and
27
comfort of faith come to us'.
'In Him who is time God and true man it is true that
in His time revelation God gives to man a part in the
truth of His knowing, and therefore gives to man's
knowing similarity with His own and therefore truth.
On the basis of the grace of the incarnation, on the
basis of the acceptance and assumption of man into
unity of being with God as it has taken place in Jesus
Christ, all this has become truth in this man, in the
humanity of Jesus Christ. The eternal Father knows
the eternal Son, and the eternal Son knows the
eternal Father. But the eternal Son is not only the
eternal God. In the unity fulfilled by the grace of
the incarnation, He is also this man Jesus of Nazareth.
It is not our knowledge of God, but the knowledge which
is and will be present in this man Jesus, that we have
described in our description of its reality, its
possibility, and now finally its limits.'
(CD II/l, p. 253)
26. Qp.cit.. p. 181.
27. Qp.cit., p. 252.
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The dynamic of theological knowledge is from Jesus
Christ's own resurrection and exaltation, 'We must believe
OQ
with the risen Christ', and not merely 'in* him, confident
in the knowledge that 'In Him are hidden all the treasures
of wisdom and knowledge* (Col. 2,3). Behind and beneath
29
this standpoint, which is 'in the sphere of Jesus Christ',
30
there is the 'God who is in the act of His revelation'. In
the foregoing pages Barth's account of the 'fulfilment, the
possibility and the limits of our knowledge of God' has been
very briefly outlined because in particular these limits
have an important part to play in the doctrines of time and
eternity. Barth's main concern in the latter half of this
part-volume is to show how this central insight into the
being of God in freedom conditions the positive affirmation
of the divine perfections; one of which is eternity and thus
the antecedent divine pole of the axis at the very centre of
this study.
The fundamental integration of being and act which
underlies the Church Dogmatics is a doctrine of being but
only as a doctrine of the being of God. God's being is not
'beyond being' but God's own particular being, which as will
be seen is in his act. The most basic statement of God's
51
being is 'that God is who He is in His act of revelation'.
God declares his reality in the act of his revelation, both
28. Ibid.
29. Op.cit., p. 254.
30. Op.cit.. p. 257.
31. Qp.cit., p. 262.
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his reality for us and 'at the same time His own, inner,
proper reality, behind which and above which there is no
other'•^
What is God's act? This is a crucial question, for
an understanding of this 'act' will determine the temporal
concepts employed in this area. Barth argues as follows:
'If we follow the path indicated, our first
declaration must be the affirmation that in God's
revelation, which is the content of His Word, we
have in fact to do with His act. And first, this
means generally - with an event, with a happening.
But as such this is an event which is in no sense to
be transcended. It is not, therefore, an event which
has merely happened and is now a past fact of history.
God's revelation is, of course, this as well. But it
is also an event happening in the present, here and now.
Again, it is not this in such a way that it exhausts
itself in the momentary movement from the past to the
present, that is, in our to-day. But it is also an
event that took place once for all, and an accomplished
fact. And it is also future - the event which lies
completely and wholly in front of us, which has not yet
happened, but which simply comes upon us. Again, this
happens without detriment to its historical complete¬
ness and its full contemporaneity. On the contrary,
it is in its historical completeness and its full
contemporaneity that it is truly future. "Jesus
Christ the same yesterday and to-day and for ever"
(Heb. 13*8). This is something which cannot be
transcended or surpassed or dispensed with. What is
concerned is always the birth, death and resurrection
of Jesus Christ, always His justification of faith,
always His lordship in the Church, always His coming
again, and therefore Himself as our hope. We can
only abandon revelation, and with it God's Word, if we
are to dispense with it. With it we stand, no, we
move necessarily in the circle of its event or, in
biblical terms, in the circle of the life of the
people of Israel. And in this very event God is who
He is. God is He who in this event is subject, pre¬
dicate and object; the revealer, the act of revelation,
the revealed; Father, Son and Holy Spirit. God is the
Lord active in this event. We say "active" in this
event, and therefore for our salvation and for His
glory, but in any case active. Seeking and finding
God in His revelation, we cannot escape the action of
32. Ibid.
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God for a God who is not active. This is not only
because we ourselves cannot, but because there is no
surpassing or bypassing at all of the divine action,
because a transcendence of His action is nonsense. We
are dealing with the being of God: but with regard
to the being of God, the word "event" or "act" is
final, and cannot be surpassed or compromised. To
its very deepest depths God's Godhead consists in the
fact that it is an event - not any event, not events
in general, but the event of His action, in which we
have a share in God's revelation.'
(CD II/l, pp. 262-3)
There is in this characterisation of the divine act a
certain temporal elasticity. Clearly ordinary assumptions
are stretched and indeed broken. God's act is an 'event,...
a happening*. This event cannot be 'transcended' in histori¬
cal terms, that is left behind as a past fact of history. At
this point the ambiguity of Barth's doctrine of act is apparent,
as it was indeed in his doctrine of revelation and the
knowledge of God. God's act (which is his revelation) is
a past fact of history but it is also 'an event happening in
33
the present, here and now'. God's act happens, has
happened and indeed will happen; but it is each of the
three, without abrogation of any, its being an 'accomplished
fact*. The adherence to both 'historical completeness' and
•full contemporaneity* is extremely important in Barth's
exposition. Without it his account would slide on the one
hand into secularity (the theology of secularity takes up
this horn of the Barthian dilemma) or, on the other, it would
move into an eternalisation. The contrasting critiques of
Jenson and Zahrnt represent such conflicting resolutions,
which are more truly to be seen as reductions. Again as
will be seen the impulse in this assertion of both the
33. Ibid.
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historical!ty of God's act and its 'full contemporaneity*
is provided by Barth's concept of eternity, which stresses
this mutuality of contingency and what will be called
^4
'temporal transcendence'. As noted earlier Barth uses
the concept of 'contingent contemporaneousness' to provide
the continuity of revelation over against discrete
'happenings' of the Word of God in the history of the Bible
and the Church. The ground of this is now found in the
doctrine of God as predicted earlier. Its inner clue will
be seen in the doctrine of eternity. The very stability of
Barth's theology in the Church Dogmatics depends upon the
inner tension expressed in these conceptions. This is the
fulcrum around which the axis of eternity and time as the
encounter of divine and human life is to turn. It is
possible to advance an illuminating critique of Barth's
thought from the standpoint of time, for as has been shown,
we are thrust into the heart of the Church Dogmatics and also
into consideration of the most essential factors affecting
the truth and possibility of Christian theological claims.
The act of God cannot be transcended or by-passed,
God is, and is therefore to be found in his act. The
diversity implied by the need for any such evasion is over¬
come by the Word of God in his own act. As noted earlier
the three modes of God's Person are active in this event,
but now Barth is to explicate the nature of the act, in
which God, as 'subject, predicate and object; the revealer,
34. Cf. CD 1/1, p. I64ff.
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the act of revelation, the revealed; Father, Son and Holy
Spirit1^ is mutually to participate. The ambiguity of
Barth's thought results from the inherent strain upon any
language which is to be used to convey the distinct, and
different, realities of God and man, God and cosmos. In
purely theological terms Barth is describing the 'life'
that is God's being, for 'Only the Living is God'. Again
it must be remembered that Barth is not engaged in architec¬
tonic extravagance, but in giving theological understanding
to such fundamental New Testament insights as Hebrews 13.8,
'Jesus Christ the same yesterday and to-day and forever*.
Whereas it may prove true that Barth*s account enters
difficulty in conceptual and linguistic terms, it must be
granted at the outset that he strives constantly to reflect
the direction taken by the Old and New Testaments in respect
of eternity and time. Besides this, it must be remembered
that in speaking of the living God, of the essence of God,
'we are concerned with an act which utterly surpasses
the whole of the actuality that we have come to know
as act, and compared with which all that we have
come to know as act is no act at all, because as act
it can be transcended.'
(CD II/l, p. 263)
In his critique of the theology of crisis (that is
of the Barth of the Christian Dogmatics, of 'Schicksal und
Idee in der Theologie' and the first volume of the Church
Dogmatics) Bonhoeffer advances a notable analysis of what
came to be regarded as Barth's actualism. Bonhoeffer sees
35. CD II/l, p. 263.
36. Ibid.
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in 'Schicksal und Idee* a pattern of act and consequent
dialectic that is again to be found in CD II/l. He
maintained that in the light of the assertion that 'God
reveals himself only in acts freely initiated by himself',^
and that God creates the hearing and belief in man as an
act of God in grace, that then this results in an acute de-
temporalisation of God's being. Because God's being is
solely act, and is consequently in man only as act not only
is rational conceptualising of such acts, ex post facto,
bound to fail, but more significantly as regards the Church
Dogmatics this act is outside time. Bonhoeffer's argument
in the following passage applies to work earlier than that
at present being considered in this study, but to parallel
works in terms of content.
'It follows that although Barth has no hesitation in
making use of temporal categories (moment, here and
now, before, after, etc.) his use of the act must not
be regarded as temporal. The freedom of God and the
act of belief are essentially supratemporal; if
Barth nevertheless stresses the act which, recurrently
"beginning at the beginning", is at all times free,
so that there can be no inference from one act to the
next, we must understand that he is endeavouring to
translate the transcendental concept of the act into
terms of the geschichtlich.
(Act and Being, p. 82)
Because Barth further denies the capax inflniti of any
•historical' moment the empirical action of man points to
God, and not to the actual faith and obedience of man himself.
Now the important aspect of this characterisation of Barth
for this thesis is the accusation of a non-temporal act in
God and the purely parabolic use of temporal language to
describe such acts. Bonhoeffer wrote in 1931 and refers to
37. Act and Being. Collins, 1962, p. 82.
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the works cited above, which do not include the later
volumes of the Church Dogmatics following CD I. Barth
reflects Bonhoeffer's analysis in CD II/l inasmuch as act
precedes a dialectical exposition of the event of God's
act and of events or happenings in nature or human history.
Where Barth and Bonhoeffer'S account of the 'early' Barth
differ is in the former's insistent use of temporal language
and ultimately in his direct contrast and relation of eter¬
nity and time which is to be temporally understood.
Bonhoeffer has been canonised as the saint of secular
theology (whether mistakenly is not relevant here) and part
of this may be attributable to his trenchant criticism of
Barth, which certainly sees in him a danger of a dissolution
of time into a reborn idealist transcendence. It seems to
the writer of this thesis that Barth is out to posit and
sustain a consistent double-aspect theory of the relation of
eternity and time in the light of the incarnation. Because
of this fundamentally orthodox impulse in his thought there
may indeed be great strains in the exposition of God's being
in act, but he is striving nevertheless to maintain the two
realities in intimate relation.
Bonhoeffer's conclusion is negative and presages his
move towards a totally concrete form of revelation without
any metaphysical 'danglers'. 'The whole situation impels
one to ask whether a formalistic understanding of God's
freedom in contingent revelation, conceived wholly in terms
■2Q
of the act, is really the proper groundwork for theology.'^
38. Qp.cit.. p. 90.
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Given the duality of God in himself and God in revelation,
Bonhoeffer unequivocally chooses the latter.
'In revelation it is a question less of God's freedom
on the far side from us, i.e. his eternal isolation
and aseity, than of his forth-proceeding, .his given
Word, his bond in which he has bound himself, of !his
freedom as it is most strongly attested in his having
freely bound himself to historical man, having placed
himself at man's disposal. God is not free of man
but for man. Christ is the Word of his freedom. God
is there, which is to say: not in the eternal non-
objectivity but (looking ahead for a moment) "haveable",
graspable in his Word within the Church. Here a
substantial comes to supplant the formal understanding
of God's freedom. If it should prove itself, it will
suggest a redirection of our attention from revelation
seen in terms of the act towards ontological ideas.*
(Act and Being, pp. 90-91)
Barth provides precisely such an integrated doctrine
of act in being and being in act demanded by Bonhoeffer's
critique in the Christological and trinitarian synthesis of
the Church Dogmatics. This goes far towards meeting
Bonhoeffer's criticisms by means of an unprecedented theolo¬
gical integration of the dichotomy of the Deus in se and the
Deus revelatus characteristic of post-Reformation Protestant
dualism. Few have fully appreciated this aspect of Barth*s
achievement which is informed and structured by the doctrine
of time and eternity. Barth continues his exposition as
noted above with a reassertion of dialectic, that is of
'dialectical transcendence'. Again an extensive quotation of
Barth is given for in this passage he struggles with the
intrinsic ambivalence of the likeness and unlikeness of God's
act to all other actuality.
'But we must be more precise. When on the basis of
His revelation we always understand God as event, as
act and as life, we have not in any way identified
Him with a sum or content of event, act, or life
generally. We can never expect to know generally
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what event or act or life is, in order from that
point to conclude and assert that God is He to
whom this is all proper in an unimaginable and
incomprehensible fulness and completeness. When we
know God as event, act and life, we have to admit
that generally and apart from Him we do not know
what this is. So then, when we know God as event,
act and life, He is definitely something different
- to be distinguished from what we are accustomed
to understand by these views and concepts. God's
revelation is a particular event, not identical with
the sum, nor identical with any of the content of
other existing happenings either in nature or in
human history. It is a definite happening within
general happening: so definite that, while it takes
part in this happening, it also contradicts it, and
can only be seen and comprehended together with it
in its contradiction, without the possibility of a
synthesis, apart from the synthesis proclaimed and
already fulfilled in itself. So, too, the action
of God that takes place in revelation is a particular
action, different from any other happening, even in
contradiction to it. Actus purus is not sufficient
as a description of God. To it there must be added
at least "et singularis." The fact that in God the
source, reconciliation and goal of all other
happenings are together real and discernible, is
another matter, which as such is only true in the
separation of this action from every other happening.
God is also the One who is event, act and life in His
own way, as distinct from everything that He is not
Himself, even though at the same time He is its
source, reconciliation and goal. God is not merely
differentiated from all other actuality as actuality
generally and as such, or as its essence and principle,
so that, while He is differentiated from all other
actuality, He is still connected to it - and the idea
is both immanent in the phenomenon and transcendent to
it. He is, of course, differentiated from it in this
way too. His work in the creation and preservation
of the world can also up to a point - but only up to
a point - be described in this way. But the particu¬
larity of His working and therefore His being as God
is not exhausted by this dialectical transcendence
which, however strictly it may be understood, must
always be understood with equal strictness as
immanence. On the contrary, without prejudice to
and yet without dependence upon His relationship to
what is event, act and life outside Him, God is in
Himself free event, free act and free life.'
(CD II/l, p. 264)
There are, in this passage, the themes we have noted
in the course of this study which are characteristic of the
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Church Dogmatics as a whole. Barth's argument is readily
understandable on the basis of the foregoing doctrines of
revelation in directness and indirectness and the mutuality
of immanence and transcendence. In the doctrine of
eternity is specified that relation of 'definite happening'
and 'general happening' alluded to here. Elements of this
account are now developed in depth. The distinction of
divine and non-divine happening is not a dualism of nature and
grace, soul and body, and so on. The unspecifiable
relation of divine with non-divine being must be approached
from the standpoint of the being of God. 'The divine being
must be allowed to transcend both spirit and nature, yet
also to overlap and comprehend both, as attested in His
40
revelation according to the testimony of Holy Scripture.'
Barth moves from a consideration of event to enquire into
the event and life of God. Following Barth's lead, there
follows a brief exposition of his doctrine of God which will
precede an eventual return to consideration of the perfection
of eternity in the context of the dynamic and positive doc¬
trine of attribution. The dialectic in the relation of the
'event of revelation' to its 'natural, bodily, outward and
41
visible component' must rest till then, for it is in the
specified relation of eternity and time that this mysterious
identity and distinction is given clarity and resolution.
Barth's ostensibly non-metaphysical ontology of God
begins with a denial of the 'purely spiritual' interpretation
39. CD II/l, p. 265.
40. Op.cit., p. 266.
41. Op.cit., p. 265.
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of the divine being. This is the first stage in a
positive exposition directly polemically against the
depersonalising tendencies of the Hegelian doctrine of
absolute spirit, applied in the theological sphere of the
Trinity. For Barth the 'particularity of the divine event,
act and life is the particularity of the being of a person'. ^
What Barth terms 'the world of nature and sense' is strictly
subordinate to the 'peak of all happening in revelation',
which is God's address, as an I to a thou, and 'the whole
content of the happening' in the Word becoming flesh. The
fundamental postulate of God's being is the assertion of his
being in act. The corollary of this is its revelation as
being which is self-moved, in contradistinction to being in
/i /1
both 'nature' and 'spirit'. Against Hegel, God's being
is not merely hypostatised self-movement but 'It is His
executed decision - executed once for all in eternity, and
anew in every second of our time, and therefore in such a
way that it confronts what is not divine being, not as a
mere possibility, but always as a self-contained, self-
containing reality'. ^ God is the divine person. The
divine person is distinguished from other persons by the fact
that God's being is 'absolutely its own, conscious, willed
46
and executed decision*, whereas man can only falsely and




45. Op.cit.. p. 271.
46. Ibid.
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person is being in act then it follows that God is the true
being of a person. 'Being in its own, conscious, willed and
executed decision, and therefore personal being, is the being
of God in the nature of the Father and the Son and the Holy
Spirit.'^ The person of God is prior to all other persons
and personhood. So Barth concludes his exposition of God's
being as actus purus et slngularis, which is therefore 'real
i 48person'.
God's being whilst independent is not indifferent,
subsisting in a holy isolation. Without necessity or
constraint from outside of himself God loves in an 'overflow
49
of His essence'. God's love is concerned with the creation
of 'fellowship for its own sake* and is unrelated to worth
50
on the part of the loved. Moreover, 'God's loving is an
end in itself* for 'All the purposes that are willed and
achieved in Him are contained and explained in this end, and
51
therefore in this loving in itself and as such'. God
'loves to eternity', and is 'necessary' as the 'being, the
52
essence and the nature of God'. God's grace is grounded
in fact; according to Barth, 'it takes place in the whole
55
intervention of the divine action and being'.This 'event'
47. Ibid.
48. Op.cit.. p. 272.
49. Op.cit.. p. 273.
50. Op.cit.. pp. 276, 278.
51. Op.cit., p. 279.
52. Op.cit., p. 280.
53. Op.cit., p. 281.
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of God's love is final and is the theological bedrock upon
which our spade turns: 'We cannot go back behind this
^ /1
event'. God's loving is his being in time and in eter¬
nity; for '"God is" means "God loves'".Barth there¬
fore relates act, being, love and person in a theological
exposition of the being of God. The actual and crucial
focal point of this is,
•The One, the person, whom we really know as a human
person, is the person of Jesus Christ, and even this
is in fact the person of God the Son, in which
humanity, without being or having itself a person is
caught up into fellowship with the personality of God.
This one man is therefore the being of God making it¬
self known to us as the One who loves.*
(CD II/l, p. 286)
Barth thus combines the gift of humanity to man as a
person, with the act of the incarnation, so that in coming
to be a person in Christ the love of God is made known.
Indeed Barth points forward to the Christological resolution
of the categories of divine and human existence. This series
of statements demonstrates how far it is that he has moved
from the dialectic of antitheses of Romans towards what is
now found to be a dialectic implicit in the revelation of
God's being and its possibility. In the context of an
opposition of 'absolute' and 'personality' Barth argues as
follows.
'No: the (to us) inexplicable paradox of the nature
of God is the fact that He is primarily and properly
all that our terms seek to mean, and yet of them¬
selves cannot mean, that He has revealed Himself to
us in His original and proper being, thus remaining
incomprehensible to us even in His revelation, yet
allowing and commanding us to put our concepts into
54. Ibid.
55. Op.cit., p. 283-
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the service of knowledge of Him, blessing our
obedience, being truly known by us within our limits.
It is the paradox of the combination of two for us
irreconcilable concepts. Recognising the true,
divine paradox, we shall not see together or put to¬
gether God's personal-ness in the way that we are
often forced to do, with and without logical contra¬
dictions, when we describe created realities, but
we shall hold to the fact that God has revealed
Himself to us as He who is, that is as the One who
loves and therefore as One-person.'
(CD II/l, p. 287)
Barth effectively builds the divine side of the move¬
ment which finds its fulfilment in the subsequent Christolo-
5h
gical exposition that will feature later in this thesis.
Barth concludes his analysis of God's being as 'He who lives
57
and loves is being in freedom'. His freedom is such that
'He is the one, original and authentic person through whose
creative power and will alone all other persons are and are
CO
sustained'. The lordship of God thus culminated in the
freedom of God offers the key to Barth's understanding of
transcendence which will underlie the positive account of the
perfections of God and thus eternity. The weight of Barth's
exposition now shifts from the distinction of being represented
59
in dialectic to the 'biblical idea of God', guaranteed by
God's aseity or 'independentia' considered as the 'positive
aspect of God's freedom to exist in Himself*. This conception
of transcendence is the final stage in the initial description
of the being of God in act which is the foundation of the
56. Cf. Chapters VII & VIII.
57. CD IIA, P. 301.
58. Ibid.
59. Op.cit., p. 302.
60. Ibid.
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ensuing doctrine of attribution to be considered in the
third and concluding part of this chapter. Barth notes
the Protestant scholastic failure to grasp the positive
aspect of God's aseity shown in its almost exclusive
emphasis upon the negative aspect of God's freedom from all
external conditions. The doctrine of being in act which
has been examined above, constitutes the basis of what is
to follow. The circulus veritatis is the dynamic spring¬
board of the overall scheme that ensues as it is to be
explored in the doctrines of eternity, election and the
incarnation itself. Later, at the very end of this chapter
we shall return to this theme, relating Barth's understanding
of transcendence and infinity to a study of the doctrine of
eternity that follows in Chapter IV. It is in the context
of Barth's concepts of divine absoluteness and transcendence
that the problem of finitude and infinitude and the response
in the doctrine of eternity may best be set. Suspending the
immediate discussion that has been developed above, concerning
the interpretation and statement of the doctrine of being in
act in the Church Dogmatics, the goal of eternity may now be
approached through Barth's positive exposition of the divine
perfections.
Barth's doctrine of attribution begins with the fact
of God's love in his freedom which is his perfect being. God's
being is 'itself perfection and so the standard of all
£"1
perfection' without any lack or deficiency. God is there-
61. Op.cit., p. 322.
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fore both perfection and plenitude. At the outset Barth
vigorously asserts the unity of God in the multiplicity of
his perfections, 'The one perfection of God, His loving in
freedom, is lived out by Him, and therefore identical with a
62
multitude of various and distinct types of perfection'.
In a direct parallel with the doctrine of the Trinity in
unity Barth asserts the 'perfections of the life of the One
who loves in freedom, 'Since God is Father, Son and Holy
Ghost, i.e., loves in freedom, every perfection exists
6"5
essentially in Him'. God is not known apart from his
perfections and the perfections are not known apart from God.
This realism is grounded upon the identity of God with his
revelation; and to 'attest this biblical unity of the Lord
with His glory is the business of the divine perfections'.
That is, God does not acquire his glory, the glory of his
perfections, in relation to us, thus opening his being to
•punctual or linear' interpretation (reminiscent of the
danger of 'occasionalism') or indeed become a 'collection of
mighty potencies'. On the contrary the perfections of God
are dynamically co-existent and consubstantial.
•The attributes or perfections of God are as it were
the letters of the divine Word. It becomes a Word
only through the sequence and unity of these letters.
But again, it is only in this sequence and unity that
the letters can constitute the Word. In the same way
the doctrine of God's perfections consists at every
point only in the development and confirmation of the
doctrine of His being. We can in fact only continue
to say that He is the One who loves in freedom. Yet
in the doctrine of God's perfections there must be
this development and confirmation of the doctrine of
His being. It must therefore tread this path.'
(CD II/l, p. 327)
62. Ibid.
63. Op.cit., p. 323.
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Barth strikes out once more in an integrated account
which is set against the dualism of a doctrine of pure being
distinct from the divine attributes. This exposition is a
♦continual recognition and confirmation of the plenitude and
f\l±
richness of this one being of God*. In the assertion of
the multiplicity in unity of God Barth strives to overcome
a whole series of problems characteristic of the western
tradition, as, for example, manifested in the tension of
nominalism and realism. As we have seen Barth is concerned
to understand 'the attributes of God as those of His special
being itself and therefore of His life, of His love in
freedom*.^ The dialectic of self-disclosure (*God is for
us fully revealed and fully concealed' ) and its corollary
in human knowing and not knowing is not transcended but in¬
trinsic; for 'God's reality is of such a character that the
one exists with the other, in the other, alongside of and
after the other, an eternal simultaneity and successiveness'.^7
This dialectic corresponds to the unity and distinction in
God's own being between his love and his freedom. From this
is derived the distinction in God's perfections between those
of divine love and those of divine freedom. So Barth inte¬
grates the traditional distinction of attributa incommuni-
cabilia and attributa communicabilia under the overall dia¬
lectic, which in turn overcomes the dangerous tendency to
separate attributes on the basis of the via eminentiaeand the
64. Op.cit.. p. 371.
65. Op.cit., p. 337.
66. Op.cit.. p. 341.
67. Op.cit.. p. 343.
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via negationis. Barth's new assertion of dialectic in the
knowledge of God's perfections is a 'very special dialectic
68
of the revelation and being of God*. What Barth sets out
to achieve is the thorough-going pre-empting of the separation
of God's being in general from his triune being, of his being
outwards and in himself, and of an impersonal absolute and
personal loving nature. This is to be achieved by the
revelation of the God who is in his perfections.
'In God's revelation the disclosure of God is in fact
the first and last, the origin and end, of the ways
of God. God's revelation is first and last a Gospel,
glad tidings, the word and deed of divine grace. Not
without concealment, for in His revelation God shows
Himself to be the secret of all secrets; not without
the revelation of His omnipotence and eternity, of
His hidden majesty; not without the Gospel becoming
for us Law and judgment; not without exposing our
sin and helplessness, our distance from God and there¬
fore the transcendence of God over all that He Him¬
self is not....Only as God reveals Himself does He
also conceal Himself. Only as God speaks and acts
do His omnipotence and eternity become real to us.
Only as He gives Himself to us as the One who loves
does He withdraw from us in His holy freedom.'
(CD II/l, p. 349)
God's attributes (including that of eternity) are not
divided even if they are in a special sense distinct. They
are unified in the act of God who loves in his freedom, un¬
conditioned yet conditioning all else. He is (and as has
been seen this is a dynamic 'is') in his majesty, omnipotence,
and eternity. The scholastic appearance of Barth*s
exposition has a deeply positive cast as it is built upon
the foundations that have been developed in the doctrines of
the Y/ord of God and the Trinity. The first set of divine
perfections (those of the divine loving) are the grace and
68. Op. clt., p. 348.
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holiness, the mercy and righteousness and the patience and
wisdom of God. They do not concern the main theme of this
chapter, hut point to the essential nature of a God whose
perfections are revealed in his attitude to man's intransi¬
gence and hostility. The ground of God"s moral attributes
is the basis of his gracious revelation and continuing provi¬
dence and this consists in his Moving*. It is in regard
to the perfections of the divine freedom that we finally draw
close to our goal the eternity of God in its theological
context.
Barth's statement of the perfections of the divine
freedom is extremely important as a prelude to his doctrine
of eternity, which is to be considered at some length in
Chapter IV. Upon the basis of this theological exposition
it will be possible to set the analysis of 'God's time', that
is eternity, in a fuller perspective. As is now apparent
setting out this context is no easy task for Barth*s thought
is both extensive and complex and beyond this open to varied
interpretation. In the passage leading up to the discussion
of eternity itself it is necessary to concentrate attention
upon the problem of finitude and infinitude. The stance of
Barth's doctrine of divine perfections vis h vis this anti¬
thesis gives insight into the ontological status of the
doctrine of eternity. In turn this will cast light upon the
whole structure of the axis of time and eternity in the
Church Dogmatics.
Barth makes the assertion of God's unity the basic
proposition of the doctrine of God's freedom. This unity
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is to be understood as both uniqueness (singularitas), and
simplicity (simpllcitas). The latter is most important for
this study, for in it Barth lays down a postulate of
significance for the resolution of temporal distinction in
eternity within the unity of the divine being.
•Being simple in the sense described, God is incom¬
parably free, sovereign and majestic. In this quality
of simplicity (i.e. At no time or place,...is He
divided or divisible) are rooted, fixed and included
all other attributes of His majesty: His constancy
and eternity, His omnipresence, omnipotence and glory.
Nothing can affect Him, or be far from Him, or contra¬
dict or withstand Him. because in Himself there is no
separation, distance, contradiction or opposition. He
is Lord in every relationship, because He is the Lord
of Himself,unconditionally one as Father, Son and Holy
Spirit, and in the whole real wealth of His being.
For every distinction of His being and working is
simply a repetition and corroboration of the one
being and, in the one being, of all that He was from
eternity and therefore from all time, and of all that
He will be in eternity and therefore for all time.*
(CD II/l, p. 445)
The temporal aspect of the divine being must not contra¬
dict this perfection of divine simplicity. In fact this
simplicity distinguishes world and God most effectively for
God does not divide himself in 'effluences, emanations,
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effusions or irruptions of God into the world'. In neither
creation nor incarnation does God mix or identify himself
with the world. What is this simplicity which distinguishes
uncreated from created being? Not surprisingly God's
unity is quite unique and exemplary in the sense that his
simplicity is absolutely simple, whereas all else is merely
relatively simple. Although Barth's doctrine of attribution
has aspects reminiscent of exeraplarism, and certainly, as has
69. Op.cit.. p. 446.
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been seen, exhibits the pattern of divine antecedence in
plenitude and perfection, his actualist doctrine of God's
being informs this structure in a remarkable way. Constantly
the tendency towards abstraction is resisted with vigour as
even the unity of God is regarded as a dynamic attribute, or
as Barth prefers a perfection.
•We understand the concept of the unity of God in the
first instance as a designation of His freedom, of His
being as it is self-grounded and therefore absolutely
superior to every other being. When we say that God
is one, unique and simple, we mean something different
from when we ascribe unity to any other quantity.
^jiything else to which we can ascribe unity is one side by
side with one or many others which are comparable with it
and belong with it to a species. It is one instance
in a genus. It is, therefore, only relatively unique.
But God is an instance outside every genus. God is,
therefore, absolutely unique, in a way that is itself
unique and cannot be denoted by any concept....Every¬
thing else is only relatively simple. But God is
simple without the least possibility of either internal
or external composition. God is completely in¬
dividual. He is absolutely simple.'
(CD II/1, p. 447)
Parallel with other parts of his exposition Barth
argues that God's simplicity and freedom from complexity is
not an absolutised notion of man, but a revelation of God's
love. In the choice of man in the two-fold election of
God, God's uniqueness is made known, 'It is in this event
as such that the love of God reveals itself and acts with
an incomparability to which the only appropriate response
70
is the confession of God's uniqueness*. Contrary to the
theology of Neoplatonism and apophaticism Barth argues in
positive terms that 'In Scripture the utterly simple is
"simply" God Himself in the actuality, the superior might,
70. Op.cit., p. 451.
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the constancy, the obviousness, or even more simply, the
factuality, in which He is present as God and deals as God
71
with the creature, with man*. Barth notably avoids the
♦logical and mathematical reflections' of the orthodox dog¬
matics. It is on the basis of God's unity and simplicity
that Barth argues for his omnipresence and with this move this
study is brought into the sphere of divine spatiality, and,
following this, the problem of eternity and time. It is
at this juncture that many new issues emerge concerning the
nature of Barth's affirmation of the spatiality and
temporality of God.
Barth's argument is from within the circulus veritatis
and consists of the presentation of a series of interlocking
and mutually valid statements.
•Because and as God is one, unique and simple, He is
for this reason omnipresent. Omnipresence is
certainly a determination of the freedom of God. It
is the sovereignty in which, as the One He is,
existing and acting in the way that corresponds to
His essence, He is present to everything else, to
everything that is not Himself but is distinct from
Himself. It is the sovereignty on the basis of which
everything that exists cannot exist without Him, but
only with Him, possessing its own presence only on
the presupposition of His presence.
(CD II/l, p. 4ol)
This is based, as has been seen, upon the doctrine of
God's act in his being. From, and upon this foundation, buth
the critical and the constructive aspects of the doctrine of
eternity and time are derived. In consequence:
'...eternity in itself and as such is to be understood
as a determination of the divine freedom. Like the
unity and constancy of God, it primarily denotes the
absolute sovereignty and majesty of God in itself and
71. Op.cit.. p. 457
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as such, as demonstrated in the inward and outward
activity of His divine being and operative in His
love as His the eternal love. God's love requires
and possesses eternity both inwards and outwards for
the sake of its divinity, its freedom. Correspondingly
it requires, creates and therefore possesses in its
outward relations what we call time. Time is the
form of creation in virtue of which it is definitely
fitted to be a theatre for the acts of divine freedom.*
(CD II/l, pp. 464-465)
The nub of Barth's doctrine of eternity is presented here in¬
sofar as it is an expression of the divine freedom, and thus
of the fundamental theological ontology of the Church Dogmatics.
On this basis Barth is able to secure his doctrine of
eternity in a truly theological starting-point and, therefore,
to distinguish it from the traditional association of
omnipresence and eternity with infinity. As Barth has
remarked earlier God's being lies outside the dialectic of
72
finite-infinite limitations and this has consequences spelt
out at this later point in his exposition.
The eternity of God is classified as a perfection of
the divine freedom and we commence our analysis proper with
Barth's highly illuminating distinction, between his own,
and the traditional doctrine, of God's omnipresence and
75
eternity. In this excursus some of the most characteristic
features of Barth's theology of time and eternity are exposed
in the way that he conceives the relation of omnipresence and
eternity to space and time. Barth attacks the parallelism
between omnipresence and eternity apparent in the Loci of
J. Gerhard and taken up in Kantian thought. It is this
scheme, which understands space and time as 'the limits within
72. Op.cit., pp. 188-9.
75. Op.cit., pp. 464-468.
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which we exist and within which the world exists for us' and
the eternal and omnipresent God as 'the supreme principle of
existence and the universe, which is not itself bound by
*7 i
these limits and conditions, but posits and embraces them',
that does not represent 'a true outworking of the Christian
knowledge of God' but an account based upon the problems
raised by the created world and human existence.
In Barth's previous argument God's omnipresence is
presented as:
'a determination of His love, insofar as God is not
only One, unique and simple, but as such is present
to Himself and therefore present to everything which
by Him is outside Him'.
(CD II/l, p. 464)
Eternity is to be understood primarily as a determin¬
ation of the divine freedom' as qualified by His love and,
•Like the unity and constancy of God, it primarily
denotes the absolute sovereignty and majesty of God
in itself and as such, as demonstrated in the inward
and outward activity of His divine being and operative
in His love as His, the eternal love. God's love
requires and possesses eternity both inwards and out¬
wards for the sake of its divinity, its freedom.
Correspondingly it requires, creates and therefore
possesses in its outward relations what we call time.
Time is the form of creation in virtue of which it is
definitely fitted to be a theatre for the acts of
divine freedom.'
(CD II/l, pp. 464-5)
On the basis of this active divine being, Barth dis¬
tinguishes eternity from the temporal creation; for if
creation were eternal (as God is) then God would be bound to
his creation and not its free and sovereign Lord. There is,
according to Barth, as a consequence of his analysis of the
divine perfections, no direct parallel between omnipresence
74. Op.clt., p. 464.
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and eternity (as between eternity and time in Kantian thought)
but a more profound unity in the divine essence, as edu¬
cated in God's freedom and love. Thus Barth understands
the problem of eternity as a dynamic perfection of God not
as a static attribute, a negation of the temporal, character¬
istic of the dualism and apophaticisra of scholastic theology.
Barth then proceeds to question the notion of infinity
used in older theology to denote the eternity of God. This
notion is generated out of negation and human limitation as
'It speaks of the non-finiteness, the non-limitedness or
non-limitableness, and therefore the timelessness and non-
75
spatiality of God'. * Time and space, timelessness and the
non-spatial exist within the reality distinct from God and
their relations must not be confused with the relationship
between man and God. Thus God truly transcends the anti-
thesis of finite and infinite which characterises the world
and human existence. This antithesis was synthesised in
the dialectic of Hegel and then destroyed in the criticism
of Feuerbach. In fact God could in his essence be both
finite and infinite for:
•The infinity which as a concept stands in antithesis
to finitude, and therefore to this extent the isolated
concept of infinity, is quite insufficient to describe
what God is in relation to space and time. God's
"infinity", if we want to use this expression, is
true infinity because it does not involve any contra¬
diction that is finitude as well. For there is no
reason why God in His essence should not be finite in
the same perfect way as He is infinite.... If we call
God infinite, measureless, limitless, spaceless and
timeless, this does not mean that we will try to
exclude, deny or even question that He is the One who
in His whole action posits beginning and end, measure
and limit, space and time.'
(CD II/l, p. 476)
75. Op.cit., p. 465-
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Firstly, according to Barth's argument, 'God does not
do anything which in His own way He does not have and is not
7f\
in Himself'. Secondly, how could a God bound by the
strictures of a negative infinity be 'the Lord, the Creator,
77
Reconciler and Redeemer?* Thirdly, according to Barth:
'God is certainly infinite, i.e. He has no basis which
is not Himself, no goal which is not Himself and no
standard or law which is not Himself. But He is also
finite - without destroying, but in His infinity - in
the fact that as love He is His own basis, goal,
standard and law. It is in this way - and not in
that abstract infinity - that God is eternal and
omnipresent.•
(CD II/l, p. 468)
The dialectical tension of finite and infinite is a
totally inadequate vehicle for comprehending divinity, and
when it is imposed, prevents precisely that freedom of God
;which is realised in his incarnation in Jesus Christ and in
the true dialectic of transcendence and immanence understood
from the standpoint of grace. In summary, Barth argues that
God is not bound to space and time as the forms and limits of
creation. God's infinity is (as are all his attributes,
according to Barth) his own, divine, infinitude which places
him outside the confinement of the mutual antitheses of
finite and infinite, time and timelessness, spatiality and
non-spatiality. Thus it is that God's 'infinity* is a
'perfection* which does not imply the exclusion of finitude.
On the contrary, the denial of finitude to God implied by
the assertions that he is 'infinite, measureless, limitless,
*7Q
spaceless and timeless' does not prevent him from being the




'One who in His whole action posits beginning and end,
79
measure and limit space and time'. Barth's question that
follows finds its answer in the total response of the Church
Dogmatics expressed in the combined structure of a dogmatics
which synthesises, as will be seen, both biblical concepts
and notions inherited from philosophical theology which are
dynamically reinterpreted. Barth asks, 'If He did not do
this (remain 'infinite' yet posit finitude) but was absolutely
infinity as tne older theology presupposed, how could He be
God, love living in freedom, the Lord, the Creator, Reconciler
80
and Redeemer?' Infinity in respect of God must therefore
be understood in this special sense (which comprises finitude
and infinitude) not as a general concept under which
omnipresence and eternity may be subsumed. For Barth, 'God
is certainly infinite, i.e., He has no basis which is not
Himself and no standard or law which is not Himself. But He
is also finite - without destroying, but in His infinity -
in the fact that as love He is His own basis, goal standard
and law. It is in this way - and not in that abstract
infinity - that God is eternal and omnipresent'.
In this, the first of two fundamental chapters on the
basis and nature of Karl Barth's doctrine of eternity, we
have seen how his thought is open to diverse interpretation,
as was instanced by Jenson and Zahrnt. Taking up a hint
offered by T.F. Torrance our attention was concentrated upon
the doctrine of divine being underlying and informing the
79. Ibid., p. 468.
80. Ibid.
81. Op.cit., p. 4b8.
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Church Dogmatics. God is the source of his own reality for
us and is therefore his own interpreter. Natural theology
in its vicious form is but the machination of man as he
understands himself falsely outside of Jesus Christ. Thus the
repudiation of natural theology directs attention to Christ
and the real basis of anthropology. The inner dynamic of
this is God's act which expresses, in nuce, the tension of
event in God and event in time. This in turn as 'full
contemporaneity' directed us towards the doctrine of eternity
as the explication of this temporal elasticity. Reference
was made to Bonhoeffer's critique of Barth in Act and Being
and it is suggested that in fact Barth goes far in securing
both act and ontology without severance of God as he is in
himself and God as he is in revelation. The 'event' of
God's love is final and is realised in Jesus Christ; there
op
can be no dichotomy or gulf in this 'paradox of combination'.
It is upon this unique and prototypical act that Barth bases
his doctrine of the divine perfections. 'The doctrine of
God's perfections consists at every point only in the develop-
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ment and confirmation of the doctrine of His being.' The
circulus veritatis is the ground of Barth's argument and the
foregoing exposition of this has served as a context to our
detailed examination of the doctrine of eternity which is to
follow. There can be no compromise in terms of either
epistemological or ontological source when it is a matter of
God's infinity and thus his eternity. So Barth establishes
82. Op.cit., p. 287.
83. Op.cit., p. 327.
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his foundations and grounds them upon the ontology of God, not
the human ratiocination of the immanent dialectic of anti¬
theses. This inner structure is inevitable and pervasive
in the Church Dogmatics. The tensions ostensibly resolved
in it are most clearly manifested in the doctrine of eternity




Barth's doctrine of eternity is the temporal explana¬
tion of the consistently developed doctrine of the divine
perfections, which is everywhere the fulfilment and
realisation of the dynamic divine being. Thus Barth argues,
with regard to the perfections most closely allied to
eternity in this study, 'by constancy we denote first the
perfect freedom of God and by omnipotence the perfect love
in which He is free'.1 The freedom of God is, as has been
seen, intimately bound up with this exposition and is grounded
upon the unique and determinative act of God that was
analysed in Chapter III. Once more it is necessary, as
with spatiality, to break free from pre-conceived notions
by invocation of this essentially dynamic and non-static
theological ontology.
•The one, omnipresent God remains the One He is.
This is His constancy. It is not in conflict with
His freedom and His love. On the contrary, both
His freedom and His love are divine for the very
reason that they are the freedom and love of the One
who is constant in Himself: from whose freedom no¬
thing else is ever under any circumstances to be
expected but that again and again He will be Himself
and demonstrate and confirm Himself as such,...The
constancy of God is not, therefore, in conflict
with the life of God either. The one omnipresent
God is the living God. But as the living God, He
is not Himself subject to or capable of any alter¬
ation, and does not cease to be Himself. His life
is not only the origin of all created change, but is
in itself the fulness of difference, movement, will,
decision, action, degeneration and rejuvenation. But
He lives it in eternal self-repetition and self-
affirmation. As His inner life and His life in all
1. CD II/1, p. 490.
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that is, it will never sever itself from Him, turn
against Him, or possess a form or operation alien to
Him. In all its forms and operations it will be
His life.*
(CD II/l, pp. 491-2)
It would be most interesting but strictly irrelevant
to our purposes to trace Earth1s assertion of this renewed
understanding of divine constancy and omnipotence in any¬
thing but a bare outline, for as the above quotation has
shown, it is the fulness of the divine being and its
resolution of the apparently incompatible, that is of major
concern to us. This resolution of tensions is of prime
importance in the doctrine of eternity and its corollate,
time. It is towards this crucial area that this study will
now move by means of a brief description of the immediate
context of this doctrine, which has already been explored
at length with regard to its most basic theological
foundations.
God's own vitality is expressed and confirmed in his
positing and maintenance of a reality distinct from himself.
The proof (this word must be treated with circumspection) of
God's constant vitality is his 'real history', the 'history
of the reconciliation and revelation accomplished by Him, by
p
which He leads the world to a future redemption*. This
history is of central significance in the Church Dogmatics
for,
'It is this very history which reveals in what sense
He is the Creator and Lord of the world and in what
way the world is actually posited by His free love,
in what way it is really in Him by Him. For the
beginning and end and quintessence of this history,
at all events on the one hand, is always that the
2* Op.clt., p. 502.
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created world is by God, that it never escapes His
control by reason of its own reality or autonomy,
but that it is wholly and utterly under His domain
and in His hand. And on the other hand, it is
also that this world is in God, which means that
in its reality, which is distinct from the divine
reality, it is always upheld by God, that it never
falls out of His hands in this reality and autonomy.
This is so because He never ceases to act in His
connexion with it, giving Himself wholly in love to
this connexion, without detriment to His freedom.
So far from contradicting Himself God confirms Him¬
self as the Creator of the world by having a special
history with it in His work of reconciliation and
revelation.*
(CD II/l, p. 503)
This insight is of decisive importance, for in the above
quotation is to be seen the parad igmatic role of the
history of God's acts, which demonstrates the act of God's
love in his freedom. Knowledge of the original relation in
the time of God's 'general speaking' is lost and restored
only by the 'special work' of the God of Holy Scripture,
for 'God so surpasses Himself in this new work that it is
only here that He can really be known, as it were retro-
spectively, as God the Creator*. The core of this
history is Jesus Christ, 'the meaning and secret of the
history of salvation',^ and so the 'general truth' of God's
Lordship and work of creation is made known as a result
of free and active grace revealed supremely, and in an
ultimate sense exclusively, in Jesus Christ.
Once more Barth's consistent repudiation of
abstraction is to be noted as he repeatedly asserts the
actuality of the divine attributes as they are manifested
3* Ob.cit., p. 507.
4. Ibid.
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in revelation and Holy Scripture. Such perfections as
Barth develops, are the legitimate constructions made on the
basis of what is perceived to be God's act in history. They
are not the imported abstractions of protestant scholasticism
which are in turn the inheritance of an alien tradition of
Neoplatonic origins. Barth specifically rejects Schleier-
macher's identification of omnipotence and omnicausality
which had lost the distinctive freedom of God's act. This
freedom is again safeguarded in Earth's thought by the
doctrine of eternity, as will be seen. The significance of
the distinction is perhaps most clearly developed in the
doctrine of election and the divine decree, which is open to
mechanistic interpretations when understood in a causally
determined do ctrine of predestination. Ail these critical
comments, which feature at length in the latter parts of CD
11/1j serve to compel the reader to appreciate ever more
fully Barth's primary insight that has characterised his
thought from the outset, 'All Christian knowledge of God has
5
its source in the revelation of God'. In the light of this
Barth*s exposition is suitably modified and reveals that
indirectness so apparent in the overall structure of his
thought. In more precise terms the fundamental postulate
that has been traced through Barth* s thought is that the
'two statements "God knows" and "God wills"' describe the
•one total essence of God*.° This means that the whole
theological spectrum is derived from this one shaft of
5. Op.cit.. p. 545.
Op.cit., p. 549.
138
light, which undergoes refraction and reveals, comprised
within itself, the diversity of theological colours. Put
more precisely, the dogmatic impulse in the doctrine of
God provides the substance of all theological assertions,
as it is realised in the act of God, that is in the life,
death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, the Word of God
from eternity.
Barth draws a direct parallel between God* s knowledge
and his omnipotence. The latter is founded upon his willing,
which is positive and ontological; 'God's willing something
can therefore mean that He loves, affirms and confirms it,
that He creates, upholds and promotes it out of the fulness
7
of His life'. Barth's further characterisation of this
is in the ascription of foreknowledge to God, conceived in
terms which lead directly to a consideration of eternity as
the temporal enabling of such a flexible and unfettered
notion of oraescientia. It is necessary to note his exact
words, for the whole structure and theological possibility
of the Church Dogmatics rests, as is becoming apparent, upon
this central and indeed pivotal concept of eternity.
'God's knowledge does not consist only in His knowing
all things before they are and have been, in His
actually knowing them when they are still future.
It does, of course, consist in this. But the
decisive thing is that God and therefore His knowledge
of all things is what it is in temporal superiority
to all things and eternal independence of all things....
It is not that God knows everything because it is, but
that it is because He knows it. For primarily, in
the basis and origin of its being, everything does
not exist in itself but in God, in His knowledge of its
possibility and its actuality. Thus the "fore" in the
divine foreknowledge denotes the absolute priority and
superiority of God Himself to every possible existence
7. Op.cit., p. 556.
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distinct from His own, His dignity as the Creator of
being and as the Lord and master of non-being....
Everything that exists outside Him does so because
it exists first and eternally in Him in His knowledge.
It is for this reason that His knowledge is not
actually tied to the distinction between past, present
and future being. For this reason, too, all things
in all ages are foreknown by God from all eternity,
or, put in temporal terms, always - no less and no
differently in their future than in their present and
past.1
(CD II/l, pp. 558-9)
The 'temporal superiority' denotes what is termed in
this study 'temporal transcendence', and the pattern of
eternal antecedence that is clearly displayed in the above
passage is to have a central place in the exposition of
election, incarnation and Christology, as well as of eternity
itself. Corresponding to the eternal Lordship of God is
the revelation of his power which is in time. Indeed
knowledge of this is dependent upon the fact that 'God has
a definite location in history distinct from other places,
a concrete temporal centre from which God knows and wills
O
and from which he exercises His power in all ages*. The
temporal transcendence of God's omniscience is bound
irrevocably to time in a special way. The temporal
corollate of the eternal being of God is God's own temporal
being. As will be seen, the 'dialectic of grace' is now
exemplified in the divine tension of eternity and time
within God, for God is, as will be seen, both eternal and
temporal: God's time is eternity.
•It is the existence of this place which marks out
and characterises the testimony of the Bible to the
omnipotence of the personal God as testimony to the
3. p. bOA*.
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true and living God....But just because it is
aware of this as personal omnipotence, it ascribes
a concrete temporal centre to it, and it always
points and refers back to this centre, to a definite
place, from which God exercises His power in all
other places too, in the strength of the knowing
arid willing which proceeds from this place. It is
from this centre that He loves the world. For He
Himself is this centre. This centre is His
omnipotent Word by which He created and governs and
upholds the world, withstands its rebellion and
restores it to Himself, not only calling it back from
all sides, but omnipotently bringing it back to peace
with Himself.*
(CD II/l, pp. 604-5)
The focus of the biblical testimony is upon Jesus
Christ, 'the One who is born in His own time as the fulfill¬
ment of all time, the crucified and risen Son of God and
Q
Son of Man'. The Logos of God, as Lord of the Exodus
and Lord of the consummation of the Church, lies at the
centre of Barth's doctrine of time and eternity. As has
been noted in our opening chapters Barth's theological in¬
spiration is always the self-giving and self-existent God
as he unfolds his being in revelation. The being of God
in eternity is at once the power-base of the Church Dogmatics
and the nodal-point of the reconciliation of the dialectic
of antitheses implicit in our conception of time. From
the outset of Barth's exposition of eternity (to which we now
turn) these considerations are central and of crucial
importance.
In the exposition of eternity, The Eternity and Glory
of God, Barth comes to terms with the most troublesome
aspects of the doctrine of eternity by adopting and
developing the Boethian concept of eternity, in the context of
a dynamic exposition of the divine perfections and the being
9. Op.cit., p. 605.
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of God. Thus:
•God's eternity, like his unity and constancy, is a
quality of His freedom. It is the sovereignty and
majesty of His love in so far as this has and is it¬
self pure duration. The being is eternal in whose
duration beginning, succession and end are not
three but one, not separate as a first, a second and
a third occasion, but one simultaneous occasion as
beginning, middle and end. Eternity is the
simultaneity of beginning, middle and end, and to that
extent it is pure duration. Eternity is God in the
sense in which in Himself and in all things God is
simultaneous, i.e. beginning and middle as well as
end, without separation, distance or contradiction.
Eternity is not, therefore, time, although time is
certainly God's creation or, more correctly, a form
of His creation. Time is distinguished from
eternity by the fact that in it beginning, middle
and end are distinct and even opposed as past, present
and future. Eternity is just the duration which is
lacking to time, as can be seen clearly at the middle
point of time, in the temporal present and in its
relationship to the past and to the future. Eternity
has and is the duration which is lacking to time. It
has and is simultaneity.'
(CD II/l, p. 608)
The above sets the scene for the study of Karl Barth's
doctrine of eternity as it is to be found in the section on
The Eternity and Glory of God. This passage is of considerable
complexity because in it Barth attempts to reconcile within
one synthesis the highly diverse and a priori incompatible
elements which have afflicted theological thought about this
central problem. Besides this misconceptions abound in
this area and great care must be exercised in distinguishing
these themes and questions so as to show what Barth says
without prejudgement or distortion. There are, therefore,
the following questions to be taken into account. First,
what is Barth really attempting in this account of eternity?
Second, in what way do biblical words for eternity relate
to his argument? Third, what are the major influences
upon Barth in historical terms? Fourth and finally, given
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the linguistic, philosophical and theological factors, in
what sense can Barth,' s doctrine of eternity be understood as
a success or failure?
In the quotation given above several points emerge.
The 'biblical' theme of God's freedom, sovereignty and
majesty is to be married with the notion of 'pure duration'
characteristic of the Augustinian, and ultimately 'Platonic'
tradition, originating in Parmenides10 and taken up by
Plato,11 Plotinus,12 Augustine,1-^ Boethius1Zf and Thomas
"J "I A
Aquinas. 5 W. Kneale clearly traces this line of thought
17 18
in his articles and again F.H. Brabant ' and E. Bevan
10. Cf. Fragment 8, 'Neither was nor will be; it is all
simultaneously one.' R.W. Jenson gives considerable
attention to Parmenides in relation to Barth's early
theology in God after God, but his outlook and conclusions
differ from those informing the present study.
11. Cf. Plato's sophisticated discussion of the One and the
many in the Parmenides besides the highly influential
passage of the Timaeus 37d.
12 • Enneads. In the third Ennead Plotinus defines eternity
as 'such a life possesses everything as present, not this
at one time and afterwards another... that which neither
was nor will be, but alone is, stable, possessing its
being, total and full...a life infinite because it is all,
nothing of which is consumed...all things at once...It
now possesses that which it ought to be'. It will be
obvious in the following chapter that Barth's conception
of eternity has distinct affinities with this notion of
simultaneity. It is the theological context and actual
function of eternity in the Church Dogmatics that con¬
stitutes its defence when interpreted in its Boethian
form in a dynamic theological ontology.
13. Augustine's Confessions, Bk. XI, and City of God, Bk. XI
are most relevant to this study.
14. The Consolations of Philosophy, Bk. V, Ch. b, contains
the famous passage stating the influential 'nunc stans'.
15. References are made to the Summas as and when relevant.
16. W. Kheale, 'Time and Eternity in Theology', P.A.S.. 1961,
pp. 87-108; cf. also M. Kneale, 'Eternity and Sempiter-
nity', P.A.S.. 1968, pp. 223-228.
17. Time and Eternity in Christian Thought, Bampton Lectures,
1936.
18. Symbolism and Belief, Gifford Lectures, 1933-4; cf.
lectures on 'Time'.
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explore the central notion which is specifically repudiated
19
by 0. Cullmann in Christ and Time. We will now examine
Earth's statement in the light of this tendency towards
synthesis in which he overtly embraces the Boethian concept
of eternity, the 'Interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta
possessio', as the basis of his exposition, which is to be
made within the dynamic context of the divine freedom.
The term 'pure duration' denotes 'one simultaneous
20
occasion as beginning, middle and end', and this concept
rests upon the apparently paradoxical assertion that God* s
eternity is such that, 'in Himself and in all things God is
simultaneous, i.e., beginning, middle as well as end, without
21
separation, distance or contradiction'. Time itself is
'a form of creation'; it is 'distinguished from eternity by
the fact that in it beginning, middle and end are distinct
22
and even opposed as past present and future'. There is
therefore no simple opposition or direct negation between
time and eternity but a more complex relation; for 'eternity
27)
is just the duration which is lacking to time*. Eternity
is of great significance for time, in fact its role is
constitutive and vital, for, as we shall see, 'Time can have
24
nothing to do with God', and, consequently, with eternity'.
19. Christ and Time, London, 1962, cf. pp. 61-68.






Thus although Barth maintains that first it is necessary
to understand this distinction between time and eternity
as a 'clear antithesis', it is apparent that this is, in
fact, only a one way exclusion when it is rightly understood
in the light of his doctrine of God as a whole.
In the first excursus in this section of the Church
Dogmatics on eternity, Barth attempts to draw a direct
parallel between the concept of eternity implicit in the
quotations he makes from Augustine, Anselm, and Polanus, and
that in the Bible, with its basis in the Old Testament and
its exploit''in the New. In Barth's words,
'"Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever
thou hadst formed the earth and the world, even
from everlasting to everlasting to everlasting thou
art God" (Ps. 90,2). The final duplication, "from
everlasting to everlasting," which is so common in
both Old and New Testaments, may be regarded as
particularly significant. It can be taken to mean
from duration to duration, that is, in pure duration.
That is how God exists in distinction from us who
exist from one time to another, but never in pure
duration.•
(CD II/l, p. 609)
This 'can be taken to mean' in fact spells out a
fundamental and methodological identity in Barth's mind
between the dogmatic formulae he is to utilise and the
biblical concepts hinted at in Is. 43; Ps. 90; 2 Pet. 3,8;
Ps. 102. At this point the critiques of 0. Cullmann and
25
J. Barr press in upon Barth and so some consideration
must be given to the linguistic and semantic problems that
affect the creation of a 'biblical theology'. In reality
Barth's conception of dogmatic theology is so structured as
25. Cf. Biblical Words for Time. London, 1969, and The
Semantics of Biblical Language, London, 1961.
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to avoid the charges made by Barr, given the weighty
theological hermeneutic of the Church Dogmatics, paraphrased,
26
for example, in the work of JQngel.
The critiques of Cullmann and Barr impinge upon the
Church Dogmatics in relation to the literalism or, as it
has been termed by T.F. Torrance, the 'nominalism1 of a
theological theory of language bound by the limitations of a
resolution of semantics into syntactics. Cullmann argues
that the biblical concept of time is governed by a contrast
of endless duration over against the limited time of human
and worldly existence. Any deviation into 'philosophical'
notions, advancing a 'qualitative* as opposed to a
'quantitative* distinction of time and eternity is inadmiss-
able. Barth relapses into such a deviation by retaining
27
'alien* philosophical elements. Barr argues against
Cullmann that he relies upon a faulty methodology, in that
po
along with J. Marsh and J.A.T. Robinson he generates a
•biblical concept' on the basis of word usage. This is
generalised and used in the construction of a theology that
makes little reference to the actual context of use, of the
individual words so utilised. As we have seen Cullmann
and Barth disagree about the relation of time and eternity,
for, in effect, Cullmann denies the possibility of real
temporal transcendence in terms of divine freedom in the
classical but dynamic sense, maintained by Barth in his
26. Cf. Gottes Sein ist im Werden and Chapter II of this
thesis.
27. Biblical Words for Time, p. 180ff.
28. The Fulness of Time, London, 1952, is the target of
Barr's most pungent attacks.
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doctrine of eternity. What is even more significant is
that Barth is outside the lexical stocks fallacy on the
admission of Barr, who states that, 'Theological treatments
of time which make no attempt to take a lexical structure as
their basis already exist, and exist among theologians who
would certainly claim to be observing biblical authority in
29
the highest degree'. In reality Barth is striving to
adumbrate the 'Christo-logic' and "theologic' which he
understands to be the foundation of true dogmatic theology.
Its prime goal is semantic reference and not a nominalism of
biblical semantics resolved into syntactics.
In accordance with his realism, a probing beyond the
dictates and limitations, set by the histories of 'concepts*
in biblical thought, Barth is able to use both biblical and
philosophical concepts in an open-ended and not a closed
manner. Hence Barth draws together biblical language, the
'from everlasting to everlasting', and the idea of 'pure
duration'. These cannot be directly equated on the basis
of the exact extension and connotations of their meaning,
but they can be used together in the context of analogia
fldei and the doctrine of God. Such terms do not exhaust
the concept of God's eternity, but are instrumental in an
exposition, which is, in figurative language open upwards,
for from God himself comes the depth and the validation of
theological concepts, including that of eternity. Barth
works with a freedom which, on his own terms, allows him to
identify theologically (that is as grounded in God) biblical
29. Biblical V/ords for Time, p. 143n.
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language and a dogmatic formula which crystallises the
impulse of theological thought. Whilst this is what Barth
is in fact doing we might still criticise the results in
terms of their biblical fidelity and theological adequacy.
The study of Old Testament languages, and thus the
crucial words ultimately standing for 'eternity' in contem¬
porary theology, was largely inspired by the rise of
philology as a scientific discipline in the nineteenth
"50
century. The work of C. von Orelli was determinative in
the dispute that has surrounded biblical words for time.
Perhaps one of the most balanced studies of these words is
31
given by H. Wheeler Robinson who followed von Orelli with
regard to the^most important word 'olam; and the subsidiary
words *adh and negafr, which are used to denote a remoteness
of time that tended towards* transcendence in subsequent
religious experience. This developed into a difference of
temporal quality which became involved in later times with
the consummation of history in eschatology. All parties
tend to agree (Barr, Wheeler Robinson, Boman and their pre¬
decessor von Orelli) that the Hebrew time-consciousness is
based upon the concrete events of the natural world as well
as God's involvement directly in time (in his actions and in
the scheme of promise and fulfilment). The growth of
eschatological hopes on the grounds of earthly disappointment
30. Die hobraischen Synonyma der Zeit und Ewigkeit genetisch
und snrachvergleichend dargestellt, Leipzig, 1871.
31. Inspiration and Revelation in the Old Testament, O.U.P.,
1946, p. 119. Chapter VIII is most relevant, entitled
•Time and Eternity'.
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(as in Daniel), the influence of the so-called 'un-Hebraic*
thought of Qohelet in the Wisdom literature, and the
Hellenising of the LXX translation with regard to the
understanding of the concepts of time and eternity, are
specialist matters in themselves. They serve at this point
in our analysis of Earth's Church Dogmatics to remind us that
as Barr rightly argues, theological conclusions should rest
upon the proposition and context of meaning not the putative
'biblical concept' attached to a particular word. In fact
Earth's thoroughly actualised doctrine of eternity and time
is a true reflection of the concrete and historical character
of Hebrew thought. Few of Barth's critics seem to have
realised this which is the result of his consistent efforts
to maintain and assert temporal transcendence in and through
historical acts and events. The breadth of his vision is
so great as to comprise both the traditional emphasis upon
transcendence in dogmatic theology as well as the concrete
historicity of the central facts of the Christian faith. As
was stated at the beginning of this chapter the focus of the
biblical testimony, and of Barth's reflections thereupon, is
Jesus Christ. Whilst this emphasis is certainly present,
the fundamental problem of the 'historical' and the 'temporal'
still remains, as is apparent in the following chapters of
this thesis.
As we have argued Barth identifies the biblical and
dogmatic themes of God's freedom and pure duration, for, 'In
this duration God is free'. He here inaugurates a theme of
importance which must be borne in mind with a view to making
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some final assessment of his work. In this alliance of
theology and philosophy within dogmatics there is, as will
become apparent with regard to the problem of time itself,
an incipient theological imperialism which perhaps oversteps
the limits Barth set for himself. Judgment of this must
await the completion of a full perspective on his work.
■zo
God's freedom to be constant and thus worthy of our faith
and trust is permitted by the fact that 'time has no power
over Him' and 'As the One who endures He has all power over
33
time'. God's eternity is not, therefore, unmoved and
remote in its transcendence, but is motivated and rendered
dynamic by his love, which allows God to 'exalt something
else to share His eternity'. Eternity is thus the 'principle
of the divine unity, uniqueness and simplicity' and a 'final
i 34
word concerning the divine freedom. As noted earlier the
freedom of God depends upon his ability to bind himself to
creation, not upon his being bound to creation by the
relations and limitations of space and time. Therefore in
consequence:
'Time - which is in a sense the special creation of
the "eternal" God - is the formal principle of His
free activity outwards. Eternity is the principle
of His freedom inwards. As the eternal One God is
the One who is unique and one with Himself. He is
also present to Himself and therefore omnipresent.
Again, as the eternal One God is constant, and He
is also the One who omnipotently knows and wills.'
(CD II/l, p. 609)
Barth has decisively established the freedom of God in




an eternity which is ostensibly not subject to the limit¬
ations, fragmentation, and division characteristic of time.
Immediately there arises the implicit problem of how in
reality this God, in his eternity and distinction from the
human realm of existence, relates himself to man. Prima
facie for Earth, God's freedom is the necessary condition
of his presence to man, for only in such freedom can he
both be himself and be 'utterly present to man' and thus have
'complete power over him in his own person'.^ We have
examined the dynamic pulse of Earth's doctrine of eternity
which is the 'biblical' aspect of God's relational perfection
and the movement from eternity in creation and reconciliation,
that is 'presenced' in a unique way by means of the Boethian
notion of temporal simultaneity. Before we pass to a
consideration of this factor and of Earth's historical
antecedents there is a highly important aspect of doctrine
of eternity that we must note. This reveals the basis of
the relation of theological and philosophical categories in
his thought, and, moreover, a tension between his avowed
intention and an actual tendency in his theology. In the
following quotation the most fundamental categories of
philosophy and theology are juxtaposed and the priority of
•eternity' over 'being' is established. This priority has
consequences which conflict with the assumption that theology
36
and philosophy have mutual independence and autonomy.
35. Op.cit., pp. 609-10.
36. This thesis is concerned precisely with the relation of
fundamental and interrelated philosophical and theological
issues in the Church Dogmatics. The point of greatest
(Contd.
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eternity is the source of the deity of God insofar
as this consists in His freedom, independence and
lordship. At the very place at which later theology
fell under the influence of Greek philosophy and made
the concept of being predominant, the Bible speaks of
the eternal God. According to the Bible it is not
being as such, but that which endures, duration it¬
self, which is the divine...Eternity is before and
after, above and below being. Being does not
include eternity, but eternity includes being. The
genuineness of being is examined and weighed and
measured and tested by eternity. It is being or
non-being according to its relation to eternity.
God Himself is eternal, and for that reason and in
that way He is.*
(CD II/l, p. 609)
It is of course precisely Barth's renewal of theo¬
logical ontology which informs his stand against notions of
'self-subsistent being', which are fundamentally static.
This contrast is between God's true being, which is being-in-
act and his act in Jesus Christ, and being qua being, as a
universal genus, comprising both being qua God, and being qua
man and cosmos. The dynamism of Barth's position is con¬
veyed by his assertion that 'Being does not include eternity,
but eternity includes being'. This, as has been shown in
the course of this thesis, is the prime burden of the theolo¬
gical ontology of the Church Dogmatics.
'This means that it is a poor and short-sighted view
to understand God's eternity only from the standpoint
that it is the negation of time. That it is duration
without separation between beginning, succession and
end is true only against the background of the
decisive and positive characteristic that as true
duration, the duration of God Himself is the beginning,
Contd.) tension is reached when the theological impulse
is used, as will become apparent later, as the exclusive
source of veridical knowledge and reality leading to
inevitable conflicts with other sources in human
experience, as mediated through philosophical and
ontological argumentation.
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succession and end. That it does not possess
beginning, succession and end is true only to the
extent that it is not "possessed", qualified,
dominated, and separated by them as by a general
principle of being foreign to itself. Insofar as it
is itself the sovereign God it does also possess
beginning, succession and end. These are grounded
and made possible and limited in it as true duration.
It decides and conditions all beginning succession
and end. It controls them. It is itself that which
begins in all beginnings, continues in all successions
and ends in all endings. Without it nothing is or
begins or follows or ends. In it and from it, in
and from eternity everything is which is, including
all beginning, succession and end. To that extent
it is and has itself beginning, succession, and end.•
(CD II/l, p. 610)
True duration, the primary characteristic of eternity,
is not merely the negation of time, that is a 'duration
without separation between beginning, succession and end',
but more positively, 'the duration of God Himself is the
57
beginning, succession and end*. Earth is positing, a reality
beyond all categories and at the same time advancing beyond
the limits of the normally intelligible use of language.
True duration, eternity, is God himself and as such it is not
subject to 'any general principle of being foreign to itself',
for, as the sovereign God, eternity is itself able to
58
'possess beginning, succession and end.' The language of
59
•possession' would be deemed 'figurative' by Cullmann yet
for Earth this assymetrical use of the distinction of
beginning, succession and end, and the 'separation* of time
in relation to God, is absolutely vital in his extension of
the power and sovereignty of God to all that could lie in
37. CD II/l, p. 610.
38. Ibid.
39. Christ and Time, p. 63.
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time, yet without subjecting God to time. This has been
the aim of those theologians of the Augustinian tradition,
who have sought to relate time and eternity in such a way
as to express the omniscience and omnipotence of God in
the contingent temporal order without dissolution of the
qualities of either. The theological ontology which under¬
lies and inspires Barth's conceptual apparatus and distinc¬
tions can scarcely be over-emphasised at this juncture. This
has been demonstrated by the indispensability of these
notions to the fulfilment of the dogmatic structure which
has been developed at length on the basis of the doctrine
of God.
The fundamental theological impulse underlying these
developments does not of course entirely free Barth from
difficulties, some of which feature below. Eternity is
the prototype of time, pre-existent in God, but its very
perfection consists in the abrogation of that feature most
characteristic of the time order as normally experienced.
In short this is the irreversibility of the time order and
the distinction of past, present and future. As is remarked
later by Barth, eternity is bound neither by irreversibility
nor the separation of temporal past, present and future
seen here A®
Much might well be said about this distinction between
eternity and time. One comment is, however, particularly
40. Cf. Chapter VI below and CD 1/2, p. 53, 'the Lord...
before whom the irreversiBTlity of time is not for
one moment an irreversible position.*
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relevant and this exposes the tendency of this conception
towards a 'timeless* understanding of God's temporal
41
existence. In The Nature of Existence, J.M.E. McTaggart
attacked the idealist contrast of what he called the 'A
series' of earlier and later moments and the 'B series* of
past present and future moments. McTaggart rejected this
distinction, but Barth's attitude is curiously ambivalent.
He strives to defend the unity in 'pure duration', of God's
time, yet also to preserve the historicity and temporality
of God's acts 'from eternity'. God has a past, but he is
•simple' and thus not alienated from his past acts or his
future events. Barth appears to use a distinction
parallel to that rejected as inadmissable by McTaggart. It
could be argued, as did Wittgenstein, that such a juxta¬
position of temporal orders is a blatant example of deception
by the surface analogies of temporal and non-temporal
42
expressions. This, however, would be an extremely super¬
ficial criticism to make of Barth as a theologian for,
despite the idealist and Hegelian origins and use of the
41. The Nature of Existence, Cambridge, 1927, Vol. II, Bk. V,
Ch. 33• This passage, and corresponding articles in
Mind, led to extensive discussion of McTaggart's
arguments, cf. The Philosophy of Time, London, 1968,
edited by R.M. Gale in which some of this discussion is
collected. I have used McTaggart merely to clarify the
implications of Barth's concepts at this point.
42. Philosophical Investigations. Blackwell, 1968, cf. I, 90.
The sort of distinction Wittgenstein draws in I, 664
between 'depth' and 'surface grammars' has a certain
suggestive affinity with that in Barth's thought between
the 'theologic' of the dogmatic impulse and the apparent
inadequacy of the temporal locutions employed to charac¬
terise the contrast and relation of eternity and time.
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distinction, it can plausibly be argued that it is an
apposite and defensible conceptual vehicle for a profound
theological contrast. The implications of this contrast
are extensive despite pleas in its defence from the dogmatic
standpoint.
The positive function of the interacting and inter¬
related concepts of eternity and time is extremely important
and is present at each theological encounter of divine and
human reality. In Barth*s theological creativity his
originality is demonstrated with regard to time by his
exposure of the inadequate exploitation of the nunc stans
in theology, precisely by providing a fuller and more
consistent account that escapes the confusion of eternity
and being. His thoroughgoing repudiation of analogla entis
correlates with the polemic that is initially directed
against Thomas Aquinas' use of the nunc stans. This is
apparently vitiated by the failure to make an adequate
distinction between the eternity of God and the being of
other existents.
It is in accordance with the Bible, Barth claims,
that the positive notion of eternity is prior in importance
to the 'abstract qualification of eternity as non-tempor-
45
ality'. This positive eternity is not mere 'naive,
Semitic realism' (as with Cullraann?) but the definite
ascription to God of years and days described as 'eternal*.
For Barth, 'By the terms 'olam and ocliov the Bible under¬
stands a space of time fixed by God, and eternity is generally
43. CD II/l, p. 610.
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ascribed to God under the categories of beginning,
44
succession and end*. In confirmation of our account we
see Barth argue as follows:
•The biblical writers do not hesitate to speak of
God*s years and days, or to describe these as
eternal. In God actual years and days are
enumerated before numbers existed and when He did
not need them. Years and days could not exist if
this were not the case, if, without being bound to
them, God were not their beginning, succession and
end, and did not possess them in Himself. This
positive quality of eternity is finely expressed in
the definition of Boethius which is classic for the
whole Middle Ages: Aeternitas est interminabilis
vitae tota simul et perfects possessio (De consol.
phil. V, 6). This goes farther and deeper thanthe
statements of Augustine and Anselm, which are far
too occupied with the confrontation between eternity
and time. It is surprising that although later
this statement of Boethius was constantly quoted as
authoritative it was never properly exploited.•
(CD II/l, pp. 610-611)
It is precisely such a 'proper exploitation' that Barth
sets out to provide in the ensuing pages of the Church
Dogmatics and which is realised in his doctrine of eternity
and its correlate, time.
Central to Barth's concept of eternity is the juxta¬
position of the nunc stans, 'the "now", the total and
simultaneous present (my emphasis) of His life',^ and the
notion of possessio vitae. 'the total, simultaneous
possession of unlimited life1. This juxtaposition reflects
the duality explicit in the merely negative 'now', an 'un-
moving, persistent present* and its contrary, in the 'fluid,
fleeting present, which can be understood only as a
46
mathematical point' of human experience. The positive
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Op,cit,, p. 611.
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concept of the possessio vitae is not a party to this
duality for it is unrelated to the fluere of transient
time and the nunc of our own problematic time. Eternity
is indeed qualitatively different to time for it transcends
time and that far from being the mere negation of time
eternity is the pattern for time. Barth develops at this
point the systematic motif of prefigure and consequent
figure into his understanding of eternity and time. The
inclusive, positive and primary concept of eternity compre¬
hends but does not annihilate time, for it possesses the
unbroken and durational 'virtues' of time, but not the
fragmentary and divisive 'vices' that afflict time. God's
eternity is not utterly unlike time, but time is unlike
eternity, in that it is part and parcel of the dialectic of
finite and infinite temporal categories and the fleeting and
unsatisfying present of human experience. Eternity is not
in its primary, real nature negation of time and thus the
product of immanent speculation, but is the positing of the
knowledge of God.
•God's eternity is itself beginning, succession and
end. To this extent it also has them, not
conditioned by them but itself conditioning as
beginning, succession and end. It has them actively,
not passively, not from another being or from time,
but from itself and therefore in itself. God is
both the prototype and the foreordination of all
being, and therefore also the prototype and fore¬
ordination of time. God has time because and as
He has eternity. Thus He does not first have it on
the basis of creation, which is also, of course the
creation of time. He does have time for us, the time
of revelation, the time of Jesus Christ, and there¬
fore the time of His patience, our lifetime, time for
repentance and faith. But it is really He Himself
who has time for us. He Himself is time for us.
For His revelation as Jesus Christ is really God
Himself'
(CD II/l, p. 612)
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The importance of the above set of statements for the
theology of eternity and time in the Church Dogmatics can
scarcely be exaggerated for they contain the essence of
what is to follow, stated in nuce. In this synthesis
Barth is clearly poised to overcome the traditional problem
of timelessness and eternity by a skilful fusion of a
dynamic and positive interpretation of the Boethian concept
of eternity with a similarly dynamic 'Augustinian' structure
47
reminiscent of archetypes. In case the reader should
doubt Barth's originality, we may immediately note that he
exploits the two insights we have drawn out here in
precisely the way their originators did not. The positive
aspects of the Boethian concept of eternity are taken from
the original preoccupation with the Aristotelian discussion
of future contingent statements and transformed by the
impulse of Barth's movement towards positive perfections in
his doctrine of God into an * inclusive* theory of eternity,
beyond the realm of being qua existents in Thomas Aquinas1
utilisation of the nunc stans. Likewise Barth energizes
the prototypical and quasi-Augustinian structure of his
doctrine by the movement implicit in his theology from the
eternal God to man. Time is not merely the 'moving image
48
of eternity*; for although modelled in a special way on
the prototype of eternity it is in itself the medium of
47; There is here a pattern of thought similar to that of
Polanus' distinction of 'archtypal' and 'ectypal* theology.
48. Plato, Timaeus 37d. Barth's theological unlikeness to
the 'Platonic' relation of 'forms' to sensed reality is
obvious in this chapter. There is, despite this, a
pattern of 'prototype' and type which retains a
structure analogous to that implicitly criticised by
the pervasive actualism and ontological recovery dis¬
played in 3arth's work.
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God's being and revelation. In this way it is to undergo
affirmation and not negation in the life and death of
Jesus Christ.
In his doctrine of eternity Barth*s temporal notions
owe much to Augustine's Confessions, in particular Chapter
XI. He also makes specific and unmistakeable allusions to
Boethius and we have investigated this obvious parallel.
Augustine's concept of eternity, whilst anticipating in many
respects (notably in the 'sublimity of an ever-present
eternity'^) that of Boethius, reveals some of the implicit
aspects of Barth's doctrine of eternity and time. To be
noted at this stage is Augustine's emphasis upon the creation
of time with the world, the 'fleeting present' of his
analysis of time and above all the thoroughly problematic
nature of time and the utterly futile nature of any
theological structure based upon the time of human existence.
We shall return to Augustine in considering Barth's account
50
of the incarnation at a later stage in this thesis but his
influence upon the latter*s concept of eternity is so far
implicit even if not acknowledged, as with the Boethian
formula. The structure of the remainder of this section
of the Church Dogmatics being presently examined is, however,
strongly reminiscent of the Confessions, as will be seen.
Barth*s own exposition now develops upon truly
dogmatic lines as the inner core of his doctrine of eternity
becomes the nodal point of a series of related doctrines.
God 'includes' time in his duration as his unity and
49. Confessions, Bk. XI, Ch. xiii, Par. 16.
50. Cf. Chapter VI below.
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constancy •include* multiplicity and movement respectively.
•...God does not first create multiplicity and
movement, but He is one and simple, He is constant,
in such a way that all multiplicity and movement
have their prototype and pre-existence in Himself.
Time, too, pre-exists in this way in Him, in His
eternity, as His creation, i.e., with space, the
form of His creation. The form of creation is
the being of God for a reality distinct from Himself.
But the formcf God*s being for us and our world is
space and time.1
(CD II/l, p. 612)
As the theological movement in Barth's thought is from
God to man, so the traditional arguments of natural theology
and causality of Aristotelian inspiration are pre-empted.
The difficulties of attributing to and positing time of a
God who is unlike us in his nature are raised by a process
of retrospective qualification in the via negativa. via
eminentiae and the complexities of analogia entis of the
tradition of Thomas Aquinas and Cajetan. Barth character¬
istically works from the basis of revelation in God and
derives from this reservoir the structure and content of
his doctrine. Thus:
'If God in Himself is the living God, this prototype,
too, (i.e., His eternity in regard to time) is in
Himself identical with His eternity. The fact He
is the enduring God, , duration itself, does not prevent
God from being origin, movement, and goal in and for
Himself. What distinguishes eternity from time is
the fact that there is in Him no opposition or
competition or conflict, but peace between origin,
movement and goal, between present, past and future,
between "not yet", "now" and "no more", between rest
and movement, potentiality and actuality, whither
and whence, here and there, this and that. In Him
all these things are simul, held together by the
omnipotence of His knowing and willing, a totality
without gap or rift, free from the threat of death
under which time, our time, stands. It is not the
case then, that in eternity all these distinctions
do not exist.•
(CD II/l, p. 612)
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By these extensive quotations we have sought to show
how Barth postulates an extremely powerful doctrine of
eternity and that this doctrine is the basis of his under¬
standing of time in the Church Dogmatics. In turn his
understanding of time as fallen and thus defective time is
very similar to that of Augustine in the Confessions.
'Eternity simply lacks the fleeting nature of the present,
51
the separation between before and after' is a formulation
directly reflecting the tenor of Augustine's analysis of
52
time that 'The present has no space*. This formula has
had a definitive influence upon the history of philosophy
as well as theology. Eternity is the negation of time
only insofar as eternity does not share the negative and
vicious characteristics of time. Eternity is the ultimate
yardstick by which we measure the nature of time and not
the reverse, for time is 'absolutely presupposed* in
eternity:
'Eternity is the negation of time only because and to
the extent that it is first and foremost God's time
and therefore real time, in the same way as God's
omnipresence is not simply the negation of our space,
but first and foremost is positively God's space and
therefore real space.'
(CD II/l, p. 613)
In consequence the problem of faith and revelation is
not the escape from time into eternity or timelessness but
the intrusion of real time into the imperfection of our
human time. In this context Barth explicates his concept
of sempiternity, the temporal, and as we have seen, the
51. CD II/l, p. 613.
52. Confessions, Book XI, Ch. xvi, Par. 20.
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positive aspect of his doctrine of eternity. As this
theme is absolutely fundamental to all that follows in
regard to time in the Church Dogmatics we must, at the risk
of tedium, take great care to provide a full statement of
what has already proved lengthy and detailed. Barth now
proceeds to explore the implications of his primary thesis
concerning God's eternity, that is his own time which is
'real duration, real beginning, continuation and ending'.
This 'real duration' exists in an 'imperfect and
intrinsically unintelligible way, yet with relative reality
in the form of created time, as the form of our existence and
our world' because it 'has its basis (in its relativity and also
in its reality) in the decree of the will of God in creation and
. 54
providence'. This series of assertions means that we
experience created time as our time. This is important
because later on we shall see how revelation comes in its
own time yet remains, if the New Testament is to be taken
seriously, an eschatological 'hope', given by the Spirit,
an 'earnest' of tilings to come. We are certain, as a
matter of common experience, of this time of 'our existence
and our world', but in what way this 'real time' can relate
to our own time and act as its fulfilment is a matter of
some importance which can only be answered adequately as
we probe into the temporal elements of Barth's Christology
and pneumatology. At the outset of our study we find,
according to Barth, that:
53. CD II/l, p. 613.
54. Ibid.
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'The presupposition of this basis in God Himself is
His eternity. As the eternal One who as such has
and Himself is absolutely real time, He gives us
the relatively but in this way genuinely real time
proper to us. As the eternal One He is present
personally at every point of our time. As the
eternal One it is He who surrounds our time and
miles it with all that it contains.'
(CD II/l, p. 613)
Having established this basic notion of perfect 'real
time' Barth proceeds, as in the case of 'pure duration' and
'from everlasting to everlasting*, to draw a direct parallel
between the dogmatic formula and biblical evidence for it.
The 'eternal One...who surrounds our time and rules all it
contains' is the God of whom it can be said 'My times are in
thy hands' (Ps. 31,15) in a sense which is 'to be taken
55
literally'. ^ Having once more drawn a parallel, Barth again
proceeds to qualify his own understanding of the co-existence
of time and eternity as they impinge directly apart from
any trinitarian, Christological or pneumatological consider¬
ations. Once more the question of ontological priority
is raised. In this relation, as before, there is the one
way implication which we now examine.
The relation of time and eternity has been illustrated
(e.g. in Protestant scholasticism) by such images as the
unmoved tree by the flowing river or the Pole Star in the
zenith of the night-sky, but these are totally inadequate
in face of the dynamic creative activity of God, who cannot
be understood as a static pole in the eternity-time relation.
As Barth maintains:
'For God is the Creator and Lord of our time, and
therefore eternity is the tota simul et perfecta
55. Ibid.
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possessio vitae, and co-exists with time and all it
contains with a superiority which a tree cannot
have over the river or the Pole Star over the vault
of heaven or the ocean over the continent. Conse¬
quently the statement that God co-exists with our
time cannot he reversed as is possible with elements
in the illustrations.'
(CD II/l, p. 614)
God's existence has intrinsic and overriding priority.
Thus by his dogmatic ontology Barth establishes the one-way
relation of God to time, but not the opposite, that time
may co-e±ist with eternity. Such an assertion is question¬
able on the level of mere language and the mutual entailment
of temporal concepts, but for Barth this is an ontological
priority. Some of the philosophical difficulties with
regard to Barth's thought have been raised above. But
whilst reminding ourselves that this is again the matter of
the dynamic 'contrapuntal' relation, of time and eternity
we may grasp Barth's position from the polemic that follows.
This is directed against Roman Catholic theology (in this
instance the work of the dogmatician F. Diekamp) which
supports an 'equilibrium between the being of God and the
being of creatures', allowing both that the eternal God may
co-exist with time and also that time may co-exist with
eternity. Although this charge might be sustained against
Diekamp it is doubtful if the same could be held against
Thomas Aquinas. It is in itself notable that Barth attacks
the former and not the latter. Aquinas' distinction of
time and eternity is bound up with the presence and absence
of movement and change in relation to the (in Barth's view
56. Op.cit., p. 614.
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inadequately exploited) Boethian eternity of the simultaneous
57
whole- In fact the objection put to Diekamp could not be
easily argued against Aquinas because his account of the
distinction is clearly Aristotelian and bears a close
58
relation to arguments in the Metaphysics of Aristotle.
The contrast of permanent and changeable being is central
and forms the basis of the explicit assertion (against Earth1s
criticism of Diekarap) that 'eternity is not the same as the
59
now of time*. It remains to be asked if there is not a
dangerous ambiguity involved in this contrast of temporal
and ontological categories, in that both Diekamp and Aquinas
rest upon the hypostatisation of 'being'. As regards Roman
Catholic theology Barth's objections are not a matter of mere
definition but raise fundamental ontological problems and
expose a deep-seated contrast in theological method and
priority of being exposed at length in this thesis.
The great strength of Barth's synthesis is that whilst
it is on the one hand Augustinian, prototypical and Boethian
it is on the other 'biblical' and 'dynamic'. It does not
share in the Augustinian conception of 'ideas in the mind of
God', as in Augustine's term 'eternal truths', or Aquinas'
statement that 'the divine essence contains in itself the
excellences of all beings, not indeed by way of composition,
but by way of perfection'.00 This issues forth in the
traditional problem of how their multiplicity is compatible
with God's simplicity and unity. Barth overcomes this in
57. Cf. S. theol. I, qu. 10,art.4.
58. Book Lambda, esp. 1071b ff.
59. S. theol. I, qu.10,art.4, reply to objection 3.
60. C.gent. I, Ch. 54.
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the first instance by the unity of God in his act and his
being. In other words the tension of time and eternity is
not set in the context of pure exemplarism. On the contrary
this tension and movement of thought we have characterised
as prototypical is set in the very centre, not on the
periphery of the doctrine of God. The doctrine of eternity
and the relation of eternity and time are not a mere addenda
to dogmatics but lie at the heart of Earth's thought. The
Church Dogmatics is grounded upon a systematic exposition of
the indivisible unity in duality of divine act and being
which is implicit in the following quotation further demon¬
strating the theological integration of the thought of Barth.
The difficulty that is to be found in stating Barth's
work in concise analysis arises not from prolixity or
obscurity but from the extraordinary integration of his
thought. In this quotation we see not only the underlying
union of act and being in the interaction of his grace and
creation but also the outflow of other doctrines from this
centre.
'From the fact that God's eternity in its eternal Now
embraces and contains all parts of time and all things
in itself simultaneously and at one moment, we cannot
deduce the general truth that things are present to
God either in physical reality or even in intention
in a nunc aeternitatis and therefore from eternity.
God knows them and wills them. In this way they are
certainly present to Him from eternity, enclosed in
the Now of eternity even before their existence and
without it. But they have their existence and also
their co-existence with God only in the positive act
of the divine creation, which can only be understood
in its character as an act of divine grace if we
refrain from finding a partner for God's eternity in
the co-existence of the result of this act, in the
co-existence of the creature.'
(CD II/l, p. ol4)
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We have now come full circle in our study of Earth* s
doctrine of eternity as a necessary prelude to the
analysis of his understanding of time. We began with the
axis of reality and possibility in the Word of God and the
Trinity, and further explored the expression this finds in
the act and in the perfections of God in his freedom and
lordship. Barth now returns to the root of eternal life
in the mutuality of the Trinity, that mode of existence alien
to all abstraction. God is 'eternally* Father, Son and Holy
Spirit and,
*It is this "all", this God who is the eternal God....
For this "all" is pure duration, free from all the
fleetingness and the separation we call time, the
nunc aeternitatis which cannot come into being or
pass away, which is conditioned by no distinctions,
which is not disturbed and interrupted but established
and confirmed in its unity by its trinity, by the
inner movement of the begetting of the Father, the
being begotten of the Son and the procession of the
Spirit from both. Yet in it there is order and
succession. The unity is in movement....God has and
is Himself time, and the extent to which this is so,
is necessarily made clear to us in His essence as the
triune God. This is His time, the absolutely real
time, the form of the divine being in its triunity,
the beginning and ending which do not mean the
limitation of Him who begins and ends, a juxtaposition
which does not mean any exclusion, a movement which
does not signify the passing away of anything, a
succession which in itself is also beginning and end.*
(CD II/l, p. 615)
In this extensive quotation Barth expresses the identity
of the 'pure duration* of eternity with *the absolutely real
£-1
time' that is *the form of the divine being in its triunity*.
By this he grounds the exposition of the positive nunc stans
in the trinitarian base of the theology of the Church
Dogmatics. The divisionless pure duration of beginning,
61. CD II/l, p. 615.
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succession and end is truly real in the modal relations of
the Trinity. The time of God is concrete in his intra-
trinitarian reciprocity and it is this life which is extended
towards man in creation and reconciliation. The giving of
eternity to time is its fulfilment, as was seen earlier in
the exposition of the Revealed Word of God^2 and the 'fulness
of time which is identical with Jesus Christ'. Christology
is therefore central to revelation but consequent upon the
doctrine of the Trinity in the order of theological priority.
Correspondingly the thorough-going implantation of eternity
in time in Christ is essential. In the incarnation of the
Word of God:
•The fact that the Word became flesh undoubtedly means
that, without ceasing to be eternity, in its very
power as eternity, eternity became time. Yes, it
became time. What happens in Jesus Christ is not
simply that God gives us time, our created time, as
the form of our own existence and world, as is the
case in creation and in the whole ruling of the wrorld
by God as its Lord. In Jesus Christ it comes about
that God takes time to Himself, that He Himself, the
eternal One, becomes temporal, that He is present
for us in the form of our own existence and our own
world, not simply embracing our time and ruling it,
but submitting Himself to it, and permitting creasted
time to become and be the form of His eternity.'
(CD II/l, p. 616)
God is finally proved not to be timeless in Jesus
Christ, who in reconciling had to assume our being and,
therefore, had to 'take time* in order to conceal and reveal
His eternal being in it. This was not achieved through a
kenosis but through a display of the 'true and fullest power
of deity...in the fact that it has such power over itself and
its creature that it can become one with it without detriment




to itself'. Jesus Christ appeared in the historical
passage of time and then departed, and his return is now
hoped for. There is therefore a 'before' and 'after', a
•not yet' and a 'no more' with regard to the incarnation.
We shall explore and map the consequences of this bilateral
movement of God to man in Christ and reconciling return in
its temporal consequences, in the following chapters. It
now remains to us to note how Barth continues and concludes
his exposition of the perfection of the eternity of God in
a continued polemic against •timelessness' and the
corresponding danger of God becoming a pious fantasy in the
religious imagination.
In the remainder of this section of the Church Dogmatics
Barth explores the positive yet distinct role of eternity in
pre-, supra-, and post-temporality, as the outlook peculiar
h/i
to the Bible. Thus he argues that much depends on this.
Only if God 'was, is and is to be' in relation to creation,
reconciliation and redemption can the Christian message avoid
becoming myth or dream; for 'Without God's complete tempor¬
ality the content of the Christian message has no shape'.
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Its proclamation is only an 'inarticulate mumbling'. ^ The
threefold form of God's temporality vis 5. vis our temporal
order is the 'positive relationship to time' of eternity.
Indeed,
•What is certain is that God and eternity must be
understood as the element which surrounds time on
all sides and therefore includes its dimensions. It




is the element which is able to comprehend time,
to create it and control.*
(CD II/l, p. 619)
The concepts of pre-, supra-, and post-temporality
put God's existence in relation to man's existence in terms
of absolute precedence, full contemporaneity and final
consequence. First of all God's pre-temporality, 'the #ure
time of the Father and the Son in the fellowship of the Holy
66
Spirit*, precedes our existence and the existence of all
things. Second, God's supra-temporality is the 'accompani¬
ment of our time by His eternity, of the height in which He
67
has His glory, to which our peace may correspond'. Third,
God in his post-temporality may judge the totality of the
time process, for it is in the bosom of his eternity 'like a
child in the arms of its mother'. It is crucial to note
that in this threefold relationship God's eternity remains
undivided for 'God endures in His pure and perpetual duration
68
as we have our confused and fleeting duration'. Time is
separated from its own beginning and end in the normal course
of events, but in being accompanied by eternity it is not
69
'separated from its beginning and end in God's eternity',
as it is 'the divine life which bears time', 'preserves' and
'keeps' time. The question concerns the resolution of
this antimony of time and eternity as to whether in fact
the tension remains an antithesis and diastasis or whether,
on the other hand, there is a monistic resolution in either
66. Op.cit., p. 622.
67. Op.cit., p. 624.
68. Op.cit.. p. 623.
69. Ibid.
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direction. We shall thus examine this synthesis that
Barth appears to effect as we proceed in our exposition and
analysis of the Church Dogmatics.
Barth examines in passing the historical over-
emphases that have taken place with regard to the threefold
temporality of God. As can now be seen, he is setting out
to provide an analysis of eternity and time which avoids
all the excesses of Protestant scholasticism with its pre¬
occupation with the pre-temporality of election, Enlightenment
theology* s preoccupation with the present concerns of man,
and Liberal Protestantism's reversal in radical eschatology.
Thus Barth enters into self-criticism of the understanding
of time and eternity he propounded in the Epistle to the
Romans which, as was seen in Chapter I of this thesis, con¬
sisted in confrontation of time by eternity in *the moment
which confronts all moments in time as the eternal "transcen-
70
dental meaning" of all moments in time*. Barth there
•missed (in reference to Romans 13,llff•).•.the teleology
71
that it ascribes to time as it moves towards a real end'.
In other words, the naked confrontation and 'greedy dialectic'
of time and eternity allowed no basis for Christology or
creation and thus for no real eschaton and parousia. The
marked contrast between what has Just been examined and the
early thought of Barth is only understandable in terms of a
rediscovery of the fundamental possibilities of conditioning
and synthesis provided by the insights, and most importantly,
70* Op.cit.. p. 635.
71. Ibid.
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the ontology of classical and orthodox protestant,
trinitarian and Christological dogma, realised through the
theological epistemology of Anselm.
On the basis of the dynamic Trinity and the axis of
reality and possibility expressed in the doctrine of
analogia fidei Barth organises a systematic integration of
dogmatic and biblical theology around a 'proper exploitation*
of the Boethian notion of the 'nunc stans*. It is now
clearly seen that Barth*s doctrine of time cannot be divorced
from its theological foundations. In the opening pages of
this chapter Barth asserted the constancy and omnipotence
of the living God whose life is 'not only the origin of all
created change, but is itself the fulness of difference,
movement, will, decision, action, degeneration and rejuven-
72
ation'. This theological primacy is the outcome of the
dogmatic foundations explored at length in earlier chapters.
The inner logic of the doctrine of God dictated by his love
and freedom demands a concept of eternity which stands in
judgment upon any abstractions generated from within the
framework of an immanent dialectic. Barth's excursus on
God's foreknowledge shows eternity to be temporal trans¬
cendence; the perfect unity of God is not to be broken by
the succession of past present and future. This theological
unity is, however, not vouchsafed to a remote, timeless God
but is witnessed to in Holy Scripture, for God's act in
Jesus Christ is the 'fulfilment of all time' in time and
72. Qp.cit.. pp. 491-2.
73« Op.cit., p. 603.
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history. Thus it is that the touchstone of Barth*s
theology is Christ and Christology, and it is in this
area that the reality and formal structures of eternity and




In Chapter III we saw how Barth's concept of eternity-
is of fundamental importance to the dynamic and 'kinematic'
ground of God in the Trinity and revelation. The primary
expression of God in revelation is in the election of Jesus
Christ and the final realisation of this movement is in the
resurrection. In this chapter we will therefore examine
Barth's doctrine of predestination or, as he prefers to
call it, election, as a preliminary to our study of the
incarnation and Christology from the standpoint of time.
Thus in relation to this first aspect of the revelation of
God in Jesus Christ stated primarily in CD II/2 we find
Barth's account of the inclusive movement of God towards man,
eternity towards time. In the incarnation and Christology
there is the explication of this in terms of the divine and
human natures of Christ in the encounter and union of time
and eternity. By approaching these themes in this way a
continuity is preserved in our exposition as we expose a
point of relation in the thought of Barth and in any
theology, which is of vital import. We wish to penetrate
into the axis (stated with succinctness by Barth in
relation to Calvin and Thomas Aquinas) which we will use as
an interpretative instrument in the following analysis.
'Where the parting of the ways comes is in the
question of the relationship between predestination
and Christology. Is there any continuity between
the two? Is there a continuity between the
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Christological centre and telos of the temporal
work of God which was so clearly recognised by the
older theologians, and the eternal presupposing of
that work in the divine election which was no less
clearly recognised by them? Is there the con¬
tinuity which would mean necessarily the expounding
of predestination in the light of Christology and
the understanding of Jesus Christ as the substance
of predestination. If the witness of divine reve¬
lation is rightly received, is it possible to
understand the eternal presupposing of God's
temporal work in the light of the central point in
that work?'
(CD II/2, p. 149)
It is precisely such a question we shall put to
Barth's doctrines of predestination and Christ in asking
whether the concept of time governing the eternal status
of the former, allows the full temporal realisation
implicit in the latter, demanded in the dogma that 'The Word
became flesh and dwelt among us' (John 1:14). In other
words, does the elected One from eternity really enter time
and having done so in the incarnation, does Barth's use of
the doctrine of the divinity and the humanity of Christ
express a true unity and duality of eternity and time thus
preserving the validity of both, and, therefore, the
soteriological possibilities of the life and death of Jesus
Christ? To this end we will now state Barth's doctrine of
election from the standpoint of the problem of time and
attempt to isolate the primary difficulties facing Barth's
account.
The theology of Barth in the Church Dogmatics has been
likened to a series of concentric circles all of which contain
within them one point, and, furthermore, his style has been
described as a constant spiralling around his subject-matter.
Nowhere is this truer than in the temporal structure of
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Barth's thought. Here we move from the doctrine of
eternity per se. the realm of trinitarian reciprocity and
the perfection of God's freedom and lordship, to the
decision of God in Jesus Christ and his election from
eternity. We thus introduce a new layer of temporal
complexity, the first we must add,of several. In this context
we find that the decision of God in Jesus Christ is the
basis of Christology and thus of soteriology and redemption.
The doctrine of election begins with Jesus Christ for:
'Theology must begin with Jesus Christ, and not with
general principles, however better, or, at any rate,
more relevant and illuminating, they may appear to
be: as though He were a continuation of the knowledge
and Word of God, and not its root and origin, not
indeed the very Word of God itself. Theology must
also end with Him, and not with supposedly self-
evident general conclusions from what is particularly
enclosed and disclosed in Him...'
(CD II/2, p. 4)
Given that in Jesus Christ there dwells the fulness
of the Godhead bodily (Col. 2:9) then a doctrine of God must
be fully Christian and not a generalised abstraction. In the
One in whom such a 'dwelling' exists God has made a decision
and thus:
'Jesus Christ is indeed God in His movement towards
man, or, more exactly, in His movement towards the
people represented in the one man Jesus of Nazareth,
in His covenant with this people, in His being and
activity amongst and towards this people. Jesus
Christ is the decision of God in favour of this
attitude or relation. He is Himself the relation.*
(CD II/2, p. 7)
Jesus Christ is central and primary for both our know¬
ledge of God and our reconciliation with him in this movement.
The soteriological and epistemological possibility opened for
man in Jesus Christ depends upon 'primal history* in which
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the relation of God and man is established (whether it is re¬
established is another question) in the interaction of God
and Jesus Christ in eternity. This is in conformity with
the structure characteristic of Barth of divine priority and
of all else being secondary to this.
'Everything that comes from God takes place "in Jesus
Christ", i.e., in the establishment of the covenant
which, in the union of His Son with Jesus of Nazareth,
God has instituted and maintains and directs between
Himself and His people, the people consisting of
those who belong to Him, who have become His in this
One. *
(CD II/2, p. 7)
This covenant is established in primal history and this
is 'played out' in eternity, and because the 'history between
¥
God and the world* takes place 'in the interests of the
primal history', it is secondary. The same is true of the
human race for,
'The partner of God...is neither "man" as an idea,
nor "humanity" nor indeed a large or small total of
individual men. It is the one man Jesus and the
people represented in Him. Only secondarily, and
for His sake, is it "man" and "humanity" and the
whole remaining cosmos.*
(CD II/2, p. 8)
The words of Professor D.M. MacKinnon are apposite,
for Barth through Christological categories, overthrows, or
rather transcends, the contradictions of the Augustinian
tradition which postulates a concrete number of the elect
over against the reprobate. The election of man is pre-
temporal because the election of Christ is effected in
•primal history'. This is concisely summarised on page 76
of Volume 11:2 of the Church Dogmatics where we are assured
that the God whose attributes we have examined previously
is the electing and elected God:
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•...we maintain of God that in Himself, in the
primal and basic decision in which He wills to be
and actually is God, in the mystery of what takes
place from and to all eternity within Himself,
within His triune being, God is none other than the
One who in His Son or Word elects Himself, and in
and with Himself elects His people.1
(CD II/2, p. 76)
The God whose perfections in and from eternity we have
examined earlier is the God whose being and perfections are
fulfilled and realised in the election of grace. In this
the love and freedom of God are exercised in 'the choice
which God makes in His grace, thus making this movement, and
in instituting, maintaining and directing this covenant'."1"
As we are concerned with the temporal structure that is
involved in Earth's thought at this point we do not propose
to enter into the architectonic detail of Barth's exposition
but to establish the exact status of the stages of his
thought on election. Thus nothing in the first place can
precede God's grace, 'whether in eternity or time, whether
2
from the beginning or in the process of development*. 'The
election of grace is the sum of the Gospel' and from this
standpoint the work of Augustine, Luther, Zwingli and Calvin
is criticised as it puts the two categories of election and
rejection together as species within the same genus of pre¬
destination. Barth on the other hand argues that the election
of grace is 'the choice of God which, preceding all His other
choices, is fulfilled in the eternal willing of the man Jesus
and of the people represented in Him', for this is the
1. CD II/2, p. 9.
2* Op.cit., p. 11.
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'primal and basic act of God'. In other words we cannot
probe or speculate in any way beyond the eternal choice of
God that has in fact already been made in God's act. Christ
is quite literally fundamental to election (not merely
instrumental) and effects an election of those predestinated
to salvation as in the tradition of Augustine and Calvinism.
What exactly is the temporal status of primal history?
Earth rejects the causal theory of predestination (as
presented in the Reformed Doctrine of Predestination by
L. Boettner) in which God's eternal will is manifested
through a determinism of absolute divine sovereignty. This
scheme is readily understandable in terms of a primary and
secondary causality in which primacy is accorded to the
eternal will of God so that 'everything that happens does so
exactly as God has prescribed'. Secondary causes appear in
the more Aristotelian doctrines of predestination in respect
of human willing giving a place to human freedom in the face
of determinism. Earth in his own doctrine (which pre-empts
the traditional doctrine as we have seen asserts) argues that
the eternal decision to elect Jesus Christ and to elect man
in solidarity with him is realised in time. In this thought
we have once more the pattern of eternal antecedence and
temporal consequence and in election the bridge is built
between the two.
'Jesus Christ. It is in this name that we discern
the divine decision in favour of the movement towards
this people, the self-determination of God (i.e. in
eternity, understood as prior to temporal realisation)
....And in this name we may now discern the divine
decision as an event in human history and therefore
as the substance of all the preceding history of
Israel and the hope of all the succeeding history of
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the Church. What happened was this, that under
this name God Himself became man, that He became this
particular man, and as such the Representative of the
whole people that hastens towards this man and derives
from Him. What happened was this, that under this
name God Himself realised in time, and therefore as
an object of human perception, the self-giving of
Himself as the Covenant-partner of the people deter¬
mined by Him from and to all eternity.'
(CD II/2, p. 53)
It is clear that at this point Earth is arguing for the
mutual reality of both the eternal decision made in 'primal
history* and the concrete particularity and historicity of
the revelation of God which is associated with the history of
Israel and the incarnation itself. The question that
emerges is whether the pre-temporal decision of God in
election (which is consummated in eternity and in 'primal
history*) need in fact rely for its basis upon the historical
man Jesus Christ. Can Barth truly preserve the integrity of
eternity and time in this doctrine? In short does this
concept imply what has been called an 'inverted analogia
entis* ? Do we have here the initial steps in the formulation
of a Christology in which the God-became-man is, despite
Barth's protestations, a 'timeless principle of temporality'
in God?
It is contended that a priori the notion of 'primal
history* poses a problem, because in eternity where this is
•played out', there is the 'perfect presence' of God which
is pre-, supra- and post-temporal, whereas the election of
God depends upon the actual historicity of the incarnation.
In other words could the incarnation really be the decisive
event it is purported to be in the New Testament if it is
consummated in primal history? Does Barth's scheme survive
in the eternity-to-time movement of the life, death and
resurrection of Jesus Christ? It seems that this question
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can only be finally answered by the analysis of Earth's
Christology of divinity and humanity in its temporal aspect.
Indeed beyond this immediate analysis other questions with
regard to time become pressing which can only be answered
on the basis of this study. For example, the relation of
the time of God, as both eternity and the time of the man
Jesus Christ, to extra-theological understandings of time
will arise in the context of a contrast of created, 'fallen1
time and the time implicit in revelation. There is, more¬
over the role of the Holy Spirit as the freedom of God to
be present to the creation and realise the relation of the
creation to himself which has an important relation to time
and the fulfilment of creation.
At this juncture it is necessary to formulate and bear
in mind the question as to whether the scheme of antecedence
and consequence is compatible with the historicity of the
incarnation and the unity of the truly divine and truly human
in Jesus Christ. In correspondence with these problems
and the emergent structure we shall proceed as follows.
First, in this chapter we shall continue our investigation
of the doctrines of election and the resurrection. Second,
we shall pursue the Christological question in Chapters VI,
VII and VIII. Third, we shall examine time in its overall
multiplex complexity in the final Chapters IX, X and XI.
In this way we shall continue our own movement following the
structure of the Church Dogmatics from eternity, by way of
the relation of time and eternity, to time, and from time to
its conclusion in the Eschaton.
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Before we turn once more to Earth* s doctrine of
election let us crystallise our objection. The election
of Jesus Christ is consummated if not actually realised in
•primal history', that is in eternity. Eternity does not
admit of division although it does, according to Barth,
contain beginning, middle and end. There is thus no real
distinction of past present and future as the essence of
eternity in the nunc stans and without division there is no
'before and after'. If the incarnation is historical and
temporal and its significance is gained from a victory, a
life and a death in time of an unrepeatable nature, then the
words, *It is finished!' imply an absolute discontinuity in
the temporal order. They refer to an event the importance
of which is determined precisely by the fact that a change
has taken place which is irreversible, unique and particular.
Given the eternity of election and the strange temporal
notions implied by such phrases as, 'the Lamb of God slain
from the foundation of the world', then there is a congruence
of Christology, soteriology and predestination in eternal
terms, but a problem, a discontinuity, with regard to its
concrete historicity and temporality. Barth has to ensure
that his Christology can contain or rather honour this dis¬
continuity in unity in the incarnation and ensure that it does
in fact take place in time itself. It was noted in the
previous chapter that Barth's resolution of the contrasting
temporal orders in eternity and time rests upon the ontolo-
gical integrity of his doctrine of God but that linguistic
3. Rev. 13»8.
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problems remained despite this. The ultimate theological
solution is to be found in Christology. In brief the
dogmatic exploration and relation of Christian dogmatic
concepts in regard to the problem of time is complex and
stretches the term employed, but more seriously, there
appears to be an unresolved dialectic at this point existing
between the eternal ground and actuality of election, and
its temporal realisation in incarnation and Christology.
We shall have to decide whether the concept of eternity
Barth elaborates (which appears sufficient to satisfy the
demands made in a doctrine of eternity) is in fact adequate
in relation to the temporal structure of Christology and
the incarnation. Is Barth caught in a nominalism with
regard to eternity despite his ontological power? Barth
seems to cut the normal concept of time in half as we have
seen, and by what could be a dangerous ambiguity, he puts
the continuity (without division) on the side of eternity
and the division (without continuity) on the side of time.
This may as we shall see in our study create a dialectic
despite the immense ontological grounding of the Church
Dogmatics. Cullmann*s argument that an * alien* strand of
philosophical thought infects the Church Dogmatics may be true
in the sense that on a linguistic level Barth has possibly
not found a conceptual tool of enough strength and flexibility
to bear the weight of the real discontinuity of time and
eternity. Cullmann*s answer is quite inadequate as we have
noted earlier for he scarcely raises Christological and
soteriological questions except upon what may be regarded as
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a one dimensional plane in terms of duration.^ As Barth's
concept of eternity and time stands it is not, a priori, free
of a dialectic, a tension of incompatibles that originates in
the language of eternity and which is exposed in the
encounter of eternity and time. This conflicts with Barth's
avowed intention to give priority to revelation in the context
of the interaction of real time and real eternity. There
emerges from Barth's thought despite and contrary to his
intentions a dialectic and a choice. The possible alter¬
natives are, as instanced in the theology following Barth,
whether to eternalise theology or, alternatively, to
temporalise and thus secularise theological assertions.
The ambiguity in Barth's thought which is reflected
5
in the contrasting interpretations of Jenson and Zahrnt-^ is
a complex phenomenon that has resisted any easy resolution of
simple reduction. In pursuing the central themes of the
Church Dogmatics from the standpoint of the encounter of
eternity and time it is in the incarnation and in Christology
that the real proving ground of Barth's theology will be
found. Barth has stressed the ultimate and constitutive
4. Cf. H. Kung's comments in Justification on the indispensa-
bility of consideration of Christ's pre-existence in
Christology. By contrast this hardly features in
Cullmann's Christ and Time where he accuses Barth of con¬
fusing time with the 'division of time' (p. 75) • The
themes that stir in this chapter increasingly reveal the
iipmense differences that exist between Cullmann and Barth.
Kung is one of the few writers to grasp the importance of
the interaction of eternity and time in dogmatic theology
(cf. p. 274 of Justlfication) and his comments in the
Excursus (op.cit., pp. 272-288) on 'The Redeemer in God's
Eternity' reveal an unusual grasp of the issues that
emerge in the theology of time.
5. Cf. the opening pages of Chapter III above.
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status of eternity. We have also noted the implicit
conceptual and linguistic difficulties analysed in reviewing
the overall structure and nature of Barth1s doctrines of
time and eternity. Nov/, however, a further problem appears
because in the process of developing his doctrine of pre¬
destination Barth begins to shift the primacy from eternity
and the scheme which has so far confronted us, to the person
and work of Christ himself. The weight of emphasis shifts
from the foundations alluded to above onto the particularity
of Jesus Christ as the movement from the primal history of
eternity is realised in time. By this we literally mean
rendered in re in time for it is already in re with respect
to eternity, as the election of man is concluded in Jesus
Christ, who is the elect One of God. We must ask of Earth*s
Christology whether it can bear this weight and how it
reflects the intrinsic duality in unity and in distinction
of eternity and time and of the divinity and humanity of
Jesus Christ.
•It is in the utter particularity of His activity, and
therefore of His volition, and to that extent of His
self-determined being that He is the electing God.
He is so at the one point upon which Scripture con¬
centrates our attention and thoughts. He is so in
that He is the Lord and Shepherd of His people. He
is so in Jesus Christ, in His only-begotten Son, and
therefore from all eternity in Himself. To put it
the other way round: if we would know who God is,
and what is the meaning and purpose of His election,
and in what respect He is the electing God then we
must look away from all others, and excluding all
side glances or secondary thoughts, we must look only
upon and to the name of Jesus Christ, and the existence
and history of the people enclosed within Him. We
must look only upon the divine mystery of this name
and this history, of this Head and this body.'
(CD II/2, p. 54)
It is the juxtaposition of historical particularity and
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the •inclusion1 of the 'history of the people* in Christ
that presents difficulties if we are really aware of the
tension of time and eternity. Barth continues Ms
exposition with an emphasis upon the double movement of
election in that:
*It is the name of Jesus which, according to the
divine self-revelation, forms the focus at which the
two decisive beams of the truth forced upon us con¬
verge and unite: on the one hand the electing God
and on the other the elected man. It is to this
name, then, that all Christian teaching of this truth
must look, from this name that it must derive, and to
this name it must always strive. Like all Christian
teaching, it must always testify to this name. On
the way before us we must never allow this name to
fade or to be blurred in favour of abstract pre¬
suppositions concerning God or man, or of the abstract
consequences of such abstract presuppositions. We
can advance on this way only if in conformity with
our attempted survey we confirm and develop the pre¬
suppositions which in respect of the divine election
are contained in the name of Jesus Christ.*
(CD II/2, p. 58)
Our attention is drawn from the eternal basis of
election as it is realised in history and directed towards
the man Jesus Christ. Are we to consider the eternal basis
of election, its pre-temporal consummation in 'primal history',
as the primary nodal point in our theological ontology or, as
Barth now claims, its realisation in the temporal life and
death of the man Jesus Christ? As we become aware of a
certain problem in reconciling the two then we then locate
an intrinsic tension in the Church Dogmatics. This reflects
difficulties in the related concepts of time and eternity
which originate in their mutual derivation from the original
and problematic Augustinian conception of time, understood
as the fleeting present over against God's perfect presence.
Barth has of course transformed this notion by his creative
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and dynamic synthesis in a theological ontology but later in
this study we shall note his difficulties in accounting for
the actual discontinuity between 'real* time and human frag¬
mented time. In this chapter it is possible to appreciate
the theological continuity of Barth's account of the election
of God and the resurrection grounded upon the act of God.
This emerges more clearly when we see that although the
notions' of time implied by the terminology and logic of
Barth's concept of time and eternity may create difficulties,
the structure and impulse of his thought may in reality
transcend these limitations.
The Lutheran resolution of the problem of time in pre¬
destination attracts Barth, for 'God's consideration of the
£
work of Christ in time' belongs on this view to 'the divine
decree of election itself, so certain is it that that decree
is identical with God's eternal resolution to provide
salvation for man in that work'. (Barth quotes J. Gerhard
the Lutheran scholastic). Barth seeks to exploit the
7
Lutheran insight' by effecting a synthesis of the Christolo-
gical basis of the Lutherans with the Reformed emphasis upon
free grace, and beyond this to enter into the realisation
that 'we have to do not only with elected man but with the
Q
electing, the truly and freely electing God.' Thus al¬
though there are indeed some historical precedents of Barth's
doctrine, notably in Athanasius, and even seeds sown in the
6. CD II/2, p. 71.
7. Op.cit.. p. 75.
8. Ibid.
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work of Calvin, the originality of his work consists pre¬
cisely in a systematic fusion of the eternal thrust of God
in election, that is the election of Jesus Christ who 'In
the beginning was the Word* (John 1:1) with the Word who
•became flesh' (John 1:14). At the very core of Earth's
thought he strives to retain this unification of eternal
ground and temporal realisation, expressed in the doctrine
of the two natures from which all soteriological possibilities
flow. It is of the utmost importance that the incipient
dialectic of time and eternity is somehow contained and
overcome in the related areas of Christology and soteriology.
Earth states the following in which he allows the
doctrine of election to unfold out of the dilemma implicit
in his presuppositions which we have briefly analysed.
♦We can advance on this way (faithfulness to the name
of Jesus Christ in theology) only if in conformity
with our attempted survey we confirm and develop the
presuppositions which in respect of the divine
election are contained in the name of Jesus Christ.
In the measure that we hold fast to this principle,
we shall find ourselves on solid ground as we advance
into this as every other sphere of dogmatic enquiry
and presentation.'
(CD II/2, pp. 59-61)
Barth is indeed faithful to this self-directive for he
proceeds in conformity with his initial postulates, which
contain the problems outlined above and which are not
resolved within the doctrine of election, precisely because
of this fidelity. Insofar as God's works are done 'in time,
they rest upon the eternal decision of God by which time is
a
founded and governed'. Grace precedes creation for:
9. Op.cit., p. 99.
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♦In the beginning, before time and space as we know
them, before creation, before there was any reality
distinct from God which could be the object of the
love of God or the setting for His act of freedom,
God anticipated and determined within Himself (in the
power of His love and freedom, of His knowing and
willing) that the goal and meaning of all His
dealings with the as yet non-existent universe should
be the fact that in His Son He would be gracious
towards man, uniting Himself with him. In the
beginning it was the choice of the Father Himself to
establish this covenant with man by giving up His Son
for him, that He Himself might become man in the ful¬
filment of His grace. In the beginning it was the
choice of the Son to be obedient to grace, and there¬
fore to offer up Himself and to become man in order
that this covenant might be made a reality.*
(CD II/2, p. 101)
Besides this the grace and election of God precede
creation for:
*In the beginning it was the resolve of the Holy
Spirit that the unity of God, of the Father and Son
should not be disturbed or rent by this covenant with
man, but it should be made the more glorious, the
deity of God, the divinity of His love and freedom,
being confirmed and demonstrated by this offering of
the Father and this self-offering of the Son. This
choice was in the beginning. As the subject and
object of this choice, Jesus Christ was in the
beginning.*
(CD II/2, p. 102)
Barth makes creation and covenant inseparable
corollates and both have as their central point Jesus Christ,
who was at the *beginning of God*s dealings with a reality
which is distinct from Himself* ."^ Jesus Christ is both
elector and elected, very God and very man."^ The close
interrelation of these factors makes it imperative that they
are understood from the standpoint of their fundamental
unity. This unity from the temporal aspect is the unity of
Op«cit., p. 102.
11. Op.cit.t p. 103.
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the doctrine of eternity understood as God's act in Jesus
Christ, the eternal decision of God. Berth's overriding
concern is to perceive the continuity between predestination
and Christology for without this the eternal work and
temporal event fall apart. In our next chapter we shall
proceed on the basis of election as the presupposition of
Christology. It is this further relationship of divinity
and humanity as expressed in the problem of eternity and time
that will be our chief concern, for in this resolution we
encounter one of the major cornerstones of the Church Dogmatics.
Before, however, we can move towards a consideration
of Christology and the problem of time itself we must sketch
out very briefly the shape of the doctrine of eternity with
regard to predestination. Barth's own assessment of the
relation of time and eternity is determined by the intrusion
of the eternal election into time in the concrete particular¬
ity of Jesus Christ. In Volume 11:2 of the Church Dogmatics
Barth elaborates his doctrine of election in the election
and the rejection of God Himself in Jesus Christ from
12
eternity. This decision is fully trinitarian in that
'All God's willing is primarily a determination of the love
of the Father and the Son in the fellowship of the Holy
Ghost'. The primal determination of God is towards man
who is 'the outward cause and object of this overflowing of
the divine glory'.1Z* As a consequence of this foreordination
•man exists in the beginning of all things, in the decree of
12. Op.cit., p. 167.
13. Op.cit., p. 169.
14. Ibid.
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God with God1. Whether this implies the existence of
humanity in God prior to the incarnation is again a question
of fundamental importance in relation to Christology.
Clearly such a position would correlate v/ith Earth's
insistence upon the ultimate priority of the eternal (and all
that is implied by the eternal) over time. In the election
and rejection of Jesus Christ sin is overcome and, therefore,
'In Jesus Christ we can see and know this sphere of evil
as something which has already been overcome...which has
been destroyed by the positive will of God's overflowing
16
glory'. In contradistinction to this destruction is the
constitution of the new future for:
♦In the eternal election of the one man Jesus of
Nazareth, God, merciful in His judgement, appoints
for man a gracious end and a new gracious beginning.
He makes him die in order that he may truly live.
He makes him pass in order that he may acquire a
real future.•
(CD II/2, p. 259)
This future is bound up with the overall temporal
structure of the Church Dogmatics, and particularly concerns
eschatology. We may see at this point that the incursion of
election, that is of the elected One into time, is determin¬
ative and totally significant. At the very core of Barth's
doctrine of election there is what we will term the need
for 'noetic realisation', as:
•The witness of the community of God to every
individual man consists in this: that this choice
of the godless man is void; that he belongs
eternally to Jesus Christ and therefore is not
rejected, but elected by God in Jesus Christ; that
15. Ibid.
16. Op.cit., p. 172.
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the rejection which he deserves on account of his
perverse choice is borne and cancelled by Jesus
Christ; and that he is appointed to eternal life
with God on the basis of the righteous, divine
decision.*
(CD II/2, p. 306)
By 'noetic realisation* we mean that the completeness
of election is such that we do not add to some unspecified
or indeed specified number of the elect; there is no
individual *new creation' but the response to and entry into
that which is already accomplished in Jesus Christ from
eternity. In the following passage the corresponding
transcendence that this implies is made very clear. The man
who rejects Christ turns his back on his 'proper' life and in
17
effect embraces the void life of the godless man. On the
other hand those who hear and believe the promise of their
election realise in their affirmation the completedness of
the election of man made in Jesus Christ. This passage
endorses our understanding of election as grounded in eternity,
but renders even more acute the problem as to how this is to
be thought of as bound up in the concrete history of the
life and death of Jesus Christ.
'The fact that (men) are elect does not transcend only
their hearing and faith, or the promise addressed to
them as such, or the existence of the community which
brings it to them. Transcending their own being, it
also transcends the being of everything which God has
created and which is distinct from Himself, with the
exception of the one man, Jesus of Nazareth. They are
elected by the will and decree of the triune God.
They are therefore elected on the far side of their
life, and hearing, and faith, and the community, and
the promise delivered by it, in the origin and object
of the promise, in the Word of God which willed to
become and did actually become flesh, and only in Him.
Election is the eternal basis, the eternal anterior
reality, the eternal presupposition of the existence
17. Op.cit.. p. 322
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of those who may live as the elect. It is identical
with the fact that the elect Jesus Christ elected
them also, and that this happened to and not in their
human nature and its possibilities, t£ and not in
their human history and its development, as is
correspondingly true also of their rejection.*
(CD II/2, p. 321)
Barth argues that men's 'special calling simply dis¬
closes and confirms the fact that they already are the
TO
elect' and this is extended in the 'rejection borne eternally
and therefore for all time by Jesus Christ in the power of
19
divine self-giving' which means that the 'rejected man'
20
only exists as the 'object of the divine non-willing'.
Thus on all quarters primacy is given to the eternal in
election yet this is actualised in a divine decree (which
Barth conceives Christologically) that is really and most
truly realised in Jesus Christ for:
'We have interpreted the concept of the divine
decree-according to the rule that God is no other
than the One who reveals Himself - by the main
articles of Christology: the unity and difference
of the divine and human nature, the humiliation and
the exaltation, the prophetic, high-priestly and
kingly office of Jesus Christ. We have understood
Jesus Christ as the one Elector and Elect (in whom
the many are elect), and again as the one Rejector
and (in whom the many are not rejected).
(CD II/2, p. 325)
What indeed can be made of this as regards the
problem of time? We have indicated our projected examinations
of Christology and of time itself which we shall enter into
in later chapters, but at this point and to continue this
Chapter, we now turn to Barth's own approach to Ms problem
which is summarised on pages 181-188 of Volume 11:2 of the
18. Op.clt., p. 341.
19. Op.cit., p. 450.
20. Ibid.
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Church Dogmatics. How in Barth*s eyes is eternity in the
election of Jesus Christ related to time as theatre of human
activity? In answering this question it is first necessary
to see how Barth conceives of the divine decree of election.
Divine predestination is a 'living act' not a decree made
and then rigidly worked out from a divine act of will made
21
solely in the distant past.
•We can only understand and describe it as an act
because in itself it is solely and entirely an act....
We can view it as whole only as we view the living
person of Jesus Christ....as an event which in its
entirety is as such the will of God and encloses as
such man and the will and decision of man and the
autonomous existence of man. This divine will in
its entirely was in the beginning with God. This
divine act of will is predestination.'
(CD II/2, p. 181)
The key to Earth*s doctrine of predestination is that
it is 'the divine act of will itself and not an abstraction
22
from or fixed and static result of it'. From this stand¬
point he is able to criticise the traditional position which
appears to him to be an anthropomorphism based upon the human
notion of a decree in law. Thus on this latter view there
was only one occasion on which 'God willed, in the pre-
temprral eternity when the decree was conceived and
2^5
established* and as a result:
'The living quality of this action is something
perfeeturn, belonging to the eternal past. It is
not an action, an electing and deciding, which is
still continued in time. God's living action in the
21. Op.cit., p. 180. Barth summarises what we have been
saying in CD IV/2, pp. 344-345, where the history of the
'closed circle' prefigures the incarnation. The triune
life of God is the basis of the election and covenant.
22. Op.cit.. p. 181.
23. Ibid.
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present consists only in the execution of this decree,
the fulfilment of an election and decision already
made. For us then, who exist in time, the living
God is perceptible and meaningful and active only in
the execution and fulfilment of His predestination,
not in predestination itself. What we may see in
predestination itself and as such is in some degree
the monument of the living God, of the God who is
meaningful and active in practice. In it God is for
us no longer the living God. He surrendered this
quality by translating it into act. In His work in
time He is the living God for us only to the extent
that He is no longer the living God in that pre-
temporal eternity. His speech and activity in the
temporal present are only an echo of the note which
was struck in His eternal decree.'
(CD II/2, p. 181)
The radical conclusion that Barth draws concerning
the traditional position is that 'God was' for,' in time He
predestinates no longer'.2^ It is in this way that the
seeds of Deism are sown because God is no longer the electing
and deciding God. In other words by an absolute decree
made from eternity God ties his own hands vis 5. vis the
present time and has rendered himself superfluous to the
outworking of salvation. Barth argues that as the decree
is a 1living decree' so both the freedom and the constancy
of God may be preserved by the radical understanding of the
living will of God that he propounds. On page 183 we find
that once more at the centre of Earth's thought is his
doctrine of eternity. We remember in our previous Chapter
how Barth criticised the Reformation for its undue emphasis
upon the 'pre-temporality' of God and at this point,
consistent with this insight, he remoulds the doctrine of
election in accordance with the pre-, supra- and post-
24* Op.cit., p. 182.
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temporality of God. In conformity with God's supreme
actualism, his being as actus purus. he 'Before time and
above time and at every moment...is the predestinating God,
positing this beginning of all things with Himself, willing
and ordaining, electing and deciding, pledging and
committing'. As a result 'The predestination of God is un-
25
changed and unchangeably God's activity'. In Barth's
understanding of election predestination ceases to be an
apologia for God's absence but becomes the means of his
presence in time. Nowhere is the essence of Barth's
actualism more clearly revealed for God _is in his activity;
and all his activities demonstrate that his being is neither
pii
isolated nor static.
Although we have demonstrated in turn Barth's self-
consistency in that his doctrine of God's act structures his
ontology of God we have not come much closer to understanding
how it is that eternity and time relate other than upon the
level of sheer assertion. Again Barth's ontology of God,
as being in act, conditions his doctrine of election. We
are presented with the contemporaneousness of God in
accordance with the pre-, supra- and post-temporality of God
in his dynamic eternity. The question that now confronts
us is whether this contemporaneousness is truly contingent
contemporaneity. We acknowledge that in Barth's words,
'praedestinatio. like creatio and reconclliatio. like vocatio,
nustificatio. sanctificatio and glorificatio, describe a
27
divine activity' and is thus an 'eternal happening' for they
25. Op.cit.. p. 183.
26. Op.cit., p. 184.
27. Ibid.
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have in theological terms the mechanism of contemporaneity-
provided by the eternal foundation of being in act and thus
by the 'perfect presence'. If this can allow election and
the whole scheme of divine activity to be present to us in
terms of its own inner logic or rationale then how does
Barth conceive of the actual relation that must exist
between time arid eternity? With this question we come to
the goal at which we have directed our efforts in the opening
chapters of this thesis. In stating Earth's response we
will set out our problem jbr the following chapters on the
incarnation and Christology.
We began this Chapter with an allusion to the question
of the relation of predestination and the incarnation which
is of fundamental importance as it points to the relation
that must exist between the temporal and Christological
work of God and its eternal presupposition in divine
election. We have noted how the reconciliation of God and
man in Jesus Christ takes place in 'primal history', in
accordance with Barth's scheme of divine antecedence and
temporal consequence. This is ambiguous, for is the priority
of God over man temporal or in a deep sense ontological?
It is temporal in that grace (and thus 'primal history')
'precedes' everything and 'the eternal willing of the man
Jesus and of all the people represented in Him' is 'the
choice of God preceding all other choices'. It is, therefore,
on the one hand an ontological priority but is also, on the
other hand bound up with the peculiarities of the concept of
eternity, in the distinction between duration and division.
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We argued that this distinction, which maintains duration
without division as the temporal attribute of eternity (and
the reverse for time) conflicted with the ineradicable
division of time implicit in the life, death and resurrection
of Jesus Christ and the unrepeatable before* and 'after*
that this involves. As long as the terms are dictated by
revelation then we see in the doctrine of election eternity
brought into time in the 'concreteness', the 'particularity'
and the eventhood of the being of God that is manifested in
the 'living decree* of divine election. In other words
election as the contemporaneous and actual will of God is
spelt out in terms of the doctrine of eternity we explored
in Chapter IV, that is as the pre-, supra- and post-temporal¬
ity of God.
Barth's doctrine of predestination is congruent with
his overall theological stance and is radically structured
by his concept of eternity. This lends credibility to our
basic assertion in this thesis that Barth's understanding of
eternity (and thus time) is informed and motivated by the
putative ontological recovery that is the most striking
feature of the theology of the Church Dogmatics. In
concluding this chapter Barth's account of predestination
as a divine activity will be recapitulated in nuce, as the
act and activity of God, in conjunction with the account
given of the resurrection, most clearly stated in CD IV/1.
In this comparison it is possible to examine Barth's
resolution of the two aspects which displayed an apparent
tension in his thought as it is expressed in the doctrine
of election. The act of God in eternity and election is
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matched by the act of God in time, the resurrection. In the
foregoing pages many questions have been raised concerning
this incipient tension; and whilst it will prove possible to
resolve this fully on5.y by the study of the incarnation and
Christology which is to follow, the immediate contrast to be
presented is both illuminating and indeed exposes an important
and intrinsic aspect of the Church Dogmatics.
Election is not static, 'This history, encounter and
decision between God and man was in the beginning with God,
OO
and is identical neither with the one nor the other'. Thus
'primal history' prototypically prefigures and parallels
history as the 'secret' of world history. Eternal predesti¬
nation is made manifest in the history of salvation, not
29
hidden in an 'inaccessibly distant past eternity'. There
is, according to Barth, no separation of the temporal and the
eternal and, as has been seen earlier in Chapter IV, such a
separation would deny the theological constitution of the
relation. Predestination as the presupposition of
revelation is both hidden and revealed for,
'it is an act of divine life in the spirit, an act
which affects us, an act which occurs in the very
midst of time no less than in that far distant pre-
temporal eternity. It is the present secret, and
in the history of salvation the revealed secret, of
the whole history, encounter and decision between
God and man. It takes place in time. It is revealed,
and yet it still remains a secret, and is recognisable
recognised as such. It takes place in the proclamation
of God's Word. It takes place in the foundation and
existence and guidance of Israel and the Church. It
takes place in the calling, justification, sanctifi-
cation and glorification of man. It takes place in
our awakening to faith and hope and love. What
28. Op.cit., p. 185.
29. Ibid.
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else are these things but the movement of the
eternally electing God, the God who exercises His
free love in the beginning?'
(CD II/2, p. 186)
On this basis the 'predestination which we know in
the person and work of Jesus Christ is undoubtedly event,
30
the history, encounter and decision between God and man'.
The ambivalence of Barth's position is intrinsic and
methodologically deliberate; Jesus Christ is both a
concrete person and the decision of the eternally living God.
The temporal basis of this lies in the doctrine of the pre-,
supra- and post-temporality of eternity which in turn is
built upon the doctrine of God* s dynamic being. In the
resurrection and the forty days God is revealed unequivocally.
•For the first community founded by this event, the
event of Easter Day and the resurrection appearances
during the forty days were the mediation, the
infallible mediation as unequivocally disclosed in
a new act of God, of the perception that God was in
Christ (2 Cor. 5,19), that is, that in the man Jesus,
God Himself was at work, speaking and acting and
suffering and going to His death, and that He acted
as, and proved Himself, the one and true God, not in
spite of this end, but on this very way into the far
country which He went to the bitter end, in this His
most profound humiliation, at the place where an
utter end was made of this man.'
(CD IV/1, p. 301)
The fulfilment of eternity is in time; such is the extent
of divine condescension in the incarnation culminating in
the resurrection. The end and goal of predestination is
achieved in the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. In
the following passage Barth presents the resurrection as the
completion of the incarnation. Eternity is realised in time
when the boundary is broken and temporal transcendence is
30. Op.cit., p. 187.
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established in the 'forty days'.
•The resurrection of Jesus Christ tells us...that as
the Crucified "He lives and reigns to all eternity"
(Luther), that as the One who was, having been
buried, He is not of the past, He did not continue
to be enclosed in the limits of time between His
birth and death, but as the One who was in this time
He became and is the Lord of all time, eternal as God
Himself is eternal, and therefore present in all
time. But the fact that He has risen to die no more,
to be taken from the dominion of death (Rom. 6,9),
carries with it the fact that His living and speaking
and acting, His being on the way from Jordan to
Golgotha, His being as the One who suffered and died,
became and is as such His eternal being and therefore
His present-day being every day of our time. That
which took place on the third day after lifted up the
whole of what took place before in all its particul¬
arity (not in spite of but because of its particularity)
into something that took place once and for all. It
is in the power of the event of the third day that the
event of the first day - as something that happened
there and then - is not something which belongs to the
past, which can be present only by recollection,
tradition and proclamation, but is as such a present
event, the event which fills and determines the whole
present.'
(CD IV/1, p. 313)
The resurrection is the completion and realisation of
the doctrine of time in the Church Dogmatics inasmuch as God's
act in time makes time the vehicle of eternity as the triumph
over the brokenness and limitation of a single life. This
one life has become the eternal life of the 'present event',
the 'Lord of all time', the One who is 'eternal as God Him-
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self is eternal, and therefore present in all time*. In
this way Barth unites his theology on the basis of Jesus
Christ, and as he is God so he is God's act supremely when
raised from the dead. He breaks the bonds of time,
restoring in terms of Barth's doctrine of eternity, the
original time of creation. It was noted earlier that
31. CD IV/1, p. 313
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Christian theology is irreducibly temporal in that the
death and resurrection of Jesus Christ is an irreversible
historical event which took place in time. This Barth
realises as he argues for the unity of the act of God in the
death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, the Son of God,
•...who was put to death for our transgressions, but
who now lives for our Justification as the guarantor
and giver of our life, having been raised from the
dead in our mortal flesh. It is a unity which is
securely grounded. It is the unity of an irrever¬
sible sequence. It is a unity which is established
teleologically. Jesus Christ as attested in Holy
Scripture is the One who exists in this unity.1
(CD IV/1, p. 346)
In this contrast of the impulse of predestination and
its fulfilment in the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ
eternity and time meet and are transformed in the mutuality
of the incarnation. In this brief comparison our exposition
has been in effect short-circuited for there is much ground
to be trodden before it will be possible to complete this
study. What is apparent is the inner theological integrity
of the concepts of eternity and time Barth is exploiting in
attempting to do Justice to the complexity of the temporal
structure of Christian theology. In this chapter we have
but sketched Barth's doctrine of the resurrection, but
sufficient has been said to show that the pattern of tempor¬
ality in eternity (and thus in 'primal history'), the
succession of past, present and future without division or
limitation which informs the act of God in election, is
fulfilled in the resurrection. Here the act of God in Jesus
Christ's triumph over death is the breaking of the limitation
of time, as divided into irrecoverable past and distant future
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by the order of 'before and after'• This presupposes the
incarnation to which our attention is about to turn but it
is now possible to appreciate how Barth has unified the
extremities of the event of Jesus Christ in terms of his
overall, and we would assert crucial and structurally funda¬
mental doctrine of eternity and time.
As observed above the extremities of Barth's
resolution of the tension of eternity and time have been
isolated. Both predestination (or election) and the
resurrection have an explicit temporal basis which is grounded
upon the doctrine of the act and event of God. This is in
turn explicated in terms of the contrast of eternity and
time as it was expounded in Chapter IV. It is therefore
possible to see the unity of Barth's overall theological
stance in that election and resurrection are interrelated and
mutually fulfilling. Jesus Christ as the subject of both is
as always central to Barth's theological reflection, not in
abstracto but on the profound but concrete ontological basis
explored in Chapters II, III and IV. We now turn to the
areas of incarnation and Christology in which eternity and
time interact in the veiledness of the events of revelation.
In this context Barth resolves the antithesis of eternity
and time in the provisional yet universally valid unity of
the God-man. The central theses of the Church Dogmatics
can now be understood in the context that has been elaborated
in the opening chapters of this study. A fundamental
ontology is the basis of the events and activity of the incar¬
nation of Jesus Christ in time, which is willed by God in





The problem of time in the theology of the Church
Dogmatics is both pervasive and complex. This much we
have learnt from Barth. If we respond with serious attention
to the primal themes of his theology we can see how his
doctrine of eternity and time expresses the fundamental
structures of his thought and is an integrated, not an
extraneous item, upon Earth's theological agenda. Thus
Barth offers a contrast to Augustine who, in De Trinitate,1
2
struggles with the timelessness of Neoplatonism. Barth
brings in his actualistic doctrine of God the two aspects of
incarnation and atonement into infrangible interconnection.
We are not therefore faced with static categories in a
dialectic of the two natures, human and divine, corresponding
to time and eternity, but an active and creative unity and
distinction. We have seen how in Barth*s thought he seeks
to overcome timelessness by his trinitarian doctrine of
eternity and how in election God acts from eternity, an
eternity which is in fact not the negation of tiipe but its
fulfilment. We cannot pretend this is without difficulties
because in essence the terms and concepts he employs cannot
perhaps bear the full weight of theological inspiration set
upon them.
1. Tr. On the Trinity, A.W. Haddon, Edinburgh, 1873.
2. Cf. Le temps et l'eternite chez Plotin et St. Augustin
by J. Guitton, 2nd Ed. Paris, 1955.
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At this juncture an ocean of material confronts us
and could overwhelm the student of Barth when he considers
the place of time in creation, Christology, reconciliation
and eschatology. In our previous chapters we have followed
the intrinsic structure of Barth's thought and inner logic
of the movement from the living freedom of God's trinitarian
eternity in CD 1/1 and II/l to the election of Jesus Christ.
That is from eternity and 'primal history' to the resurrection
as we find them set out in CD II/2. We have looked in
detail at Barth's doctrine of eternity and found certain
difficulties both in logical and theological terms which we
will explore further in our overall analysis of Barth's
theological theory of time. Having seen the movement
of God from eternity we may now turn to examine Barth's
account of the actual entry of God into time in the incar¬
nation, the veritable focal point of Barth's theology. We
shall undertake this task in two interconnected steps in
response to the pattern of Barth*s thought. First we shall
examine the incarnation of Jesus Christ, the entry of
eternity into time, and, second, we shall trace out the
implications of the incarnation in Christology. This inter¬
related reality of Christology and soteriology finds its
root in the treatment of the incarnation in CD 1/2 and its
explication in soteriological development in CD IV. There
is a sharp discontinuity in the doctrine of time in the
Church Dogmatics which is made by the resurrection. The
most extensive passage on time in this work concerns the
temporal consequences of this event for theological anthropo¬
logy. We will therefore explore the sequence of created and
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post-resurrection time in later chapters on 'Man in his
Time' because theological anthropology as it directly
concerns us (that is in existential terras) is posterior
to the understanding of time and eternity implicit in the
life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, the proto¬
typical man. If v/e are to be faithful to Barth then we
move from that which is ontologically and epistemologically
prior, to that which is secondary, in the overall context
of analogia fidei and the actual reality of the incarnation,
the resurrection and the corresponding possibility of faith.
Incarnation and reconciliation in the total arena of
Christology must precede the realisation of the fact of
creation in the mind of faith. We Justify our procedure
in the words of Barth before we state and analyse the
fundamental theological axis of incarnation and reconciliation
in its temporal dimension.
'The insight that man owes his existence and form,
together with all (i.e. including the temporal
dimension) reality distinct from God, to God's
creation, is achieved only in the reception and
answer of the divine self-witness, that is, only
in faith in Jesus Christ, i.e. in the knowledge of
the unity of Creator and creature actualised in Him,
and in the life mediated in the present mediated by
Him, under the right and in the experience of the
goodness of the Creator towards His creature.'
(CD IIl/l,p.3)
In view of this we shall later draw together the in¬
sights of CD 1/2 on the incarnation and those of CD IV on
reconciliation as they concern the problem of time so as
to reveal the temporal basis of Earth's thinking in this area.
3. Allusion is made to the resurrection at the end of
Chapter V above and to its consequences in Chapters IX,
X and XI on the theological anthropology of time.
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This will also set the theological scene for our analysis
of man in time as the creation of God.
The possibility of faith rests upon the reality of
the Word made flesh and in this faith we recover our know¬
ledge of creation. Thus the ontology of the incarnation
underlies our epistemology of faith. The incarnation is
the starting point of revelation and Jesus Christ is, in
Barth's understanding, the fullness of God in the history
of this contingent and particular man. Owing to the oneness
of being and act in incarnation - a unity of incarnation and
redemption - we have to approach the problem of christology
(of the two natures: human and divine) as a factor within
this soteriological activity and not as a mere encounter of
abstracted 'natures'. Nevertheless wre are bound to explore
the temporal implications of this problem so as to expose
the relation between the time of revelation in Jesus Christ
and the time experienced by man and expressed in his
thought, both theological and philosophical.
As we have noted we cannot divorce the incarnation
from the saving activity of God which it embodies. At the
outset of Earth's account of the incarnation itself in
CD 1/2 the problem of time emerges in such a way as to cast
light on the whole status of his theological account of
4
time. In this passage we become once more aware of the
strength and weakness of Barth's theology in that whilst
the key to all reality lies in revelation and in its priority,
the corollary of this is the danger of isolation and possible
4. CD 1/2, pp. 45-101.
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illusion. This is one point at which the revealed and the
natural reality enter into close proximity and so in
analysing this we cast light not merely upon the problem of
time but upon the relation of the theology of the Church
Dogmatics to philosophy and thus to any form of natural
theology or theological anthropology generated upon the
basis of human experience and understanding of time. What
follows immediately is a critical examination of Barth's
doctrine of time as it is developed in the Incarnation in
relation to contrasting insights of 0. Cullmann and St.
Augustine. This will reflect those issues we have outlined
above, both in the contemporary context of Christ and Time
and also in the major emphases of patristic thought. It
will become apparent that it is in relation to the theolo¬
gical and christological ontology of the fathers that Barth
must be understood. Thus whilst we draw negative contrasts
with Cullmann and Augustine in our initial consideration of
the incarnation, we draw on the contrary a positive parallel
between Barth and Athanasius in the major sections on
5
christology and the dynamic understanding of incarnation as
the fulfilment of redemption. This is achieved through the
mutual activity of the divine and human natures of Christ
and their correlates, eternity and time.
Once more in his exposition Barth asserts reality over
possibility as the incarnate One is the concrete expression
of God's freedom. This is fully consistent with his
exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity. Barth separates
5. That is in Chapters VII and VIII below.
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the incarnation as an answer to the question: 'How does
the encounter of His revelation with man become real in the
freedom of God?,J from Christology as the doctrine of the
person and work of Christ, which pertains to the doctrine
of reconciliation. We will respect this distinction, inso¬
far as we find it illuminating, but conflate the dual
aspects, inasmuch as we are to understand the dynamic unity
of soteriology and Christology in the Church Dogmatics as a
systematic even if chronologically developed whole. We are
thus granting a unity of vision to Barth even if this (not
unnaturally) underwent a progressive realisation during its
development. Once more we cannot ignore Barth's creative
encounter with Anselm which has much influenced his method¬
ology and epistemology. The fact of the incarnation
7
precedes interpretation and therefore,
'credo ut intelligam means that in view of the fact
that in faith God's objective truth has met and
mastered me, I am determined under the instruction
of this truth alone to give an account of the
encounter in thought and speech.•
(CD 1/2, p.9)
It is in the light of this that we must understand the
'simple' fact of the 'simple reality of God' as he is
revealed in Jesus Christ in his own time, that is to say,
'God's time'. On the following page we encounter a sketch
of 'revealed reality' and this will now be quoted in full
because it demonstrates the integral nature of Barth's
doctrine of time with his understanding of revelation. This
6. CD 1/2, p. 3.
7. Op.cit., p. 7.
8. Op.cit., p. 11.
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is the basis of his exposition and explication of the God-
man Jesus Christ.
'The simplicity of revealed reality is not that of a
repeated or general event, like that of an event
formulated in the law of causality. It is the
simplicity of a definite, temporally limited, un-
repeated and quite unrepeatable event. According to
the prophecy and recollection of Holy Scripture,
there is an authentic witness and legitimate proclama¬
tion of this event. In this way other, earlier or
later, times are given to participation in this event.
Finally this event is to be understood both in
principle and in fact as future, as the end of all
time. In other words, Jesus Christ who has come is
also the One who is yet to come. But there is no
anticipation or repetition of this event. The
reality of revelation is not a determination of all
history or of a part or section of the whole of history.
It is history, this very definite history, which has
not happened before and will never happen again, which
happened once for all, not once in every age or once
in many, but quite literally once for all. Before
Christ there was an age o'f prophecy about Him, and
after Christ an age of witness about Him, but that
before and after are governed by relation to the name
of Jesus as the midpoint of time. Thus the real
temporal pre-existence of Jesus Christ in prophecy
and His real temporal post-existence in witness are
identical with this once-for-all existence of His as
the midpoint of time. The midpoint of time - which,
after all, belongs to time - is the fulfilment of time.
That is what distinguishes it from all other times.
That is what it has in common with the end (and from
this point of view, with the beginning) of all time.'
(CD 1/2, p. 12)
This passage is crucial for in it in nuce are the
diverse seeds of conflict which were indicated earlier in
our thesis for, at the very least, the strange contrast of
duration and division is apparent. This contrast is on a
•linear' basis and it once more obliges us to place this
account in relation to Cullmann. At this point Barth is
making a decisive and unmistakeable assertion of the division
of time by the once-for-all event of Jesus Christ into a
'before' and an 'after'. We have previously noted the
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trenchant criticism of Barth offered by Cullmann. It is
now possible to see how Barth asserts the 'midpoint of time',
as indeed does Cullmann; but clearly Barth affirms a very
great deal more,as has been apparent in our examination of
the doctrine of eternity in the Church Dogmatics* As the
following comments make clear, Barth prefigures Cullmann
who excises the former's surplus 'Platonic' materials that
in his view generate a 'qualitative*, rather than a purely
linear or 'quantitative' distinction between time and eternity.
The methodological contrast between Barth and Cullmann is so
great that direct comparison is difficult. In earlier
chapters, however, an antithesis of time and eternity in
linguistic and conceptual terms was apparent and this
represents part of Barth's desire to overcome the incipient
•timelessness' of a transcendent eternity which enters time,
fulfilling and upholding it. In the characterisation of
Cullmann that is now made it is possible to see the affinities
that exist, yet also the obvious fact that Barth is
attempting theological thought in a different dimension to
the former. In this the contrast between the 'semantic
generalisation* of New Testament words into concepts of
universal theological application made by Cullmann and the
a
contrasting profound 'commentary on the text'^ offered by
Barth in the Church Dogmatics stands out clearly.
According to Cullmann there is in the New Testament a
continuous time-process embracing past, present and future
which takes the form of an ascending time-line. This is a
9. Op.cit., p. 13.
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•straight', as opposed to a 'cyclical* and Greek meta¬
physical conception of time in which salvation is found
through participation in a 'timeless beyond'. There
remains without a doubt in Cullmann's mind the threat of
radical ahistoricity with regard to Barth, as the dialectic
of the eternal and temporal has yet to be resolved. Cullmann
resolves the dilemma by eliminating transcendence, in the
sense of putting eternity and time in parallel as finite
(limited) and infinite (unlimited) duration. Barth,in
asserting and defending the trinitarian basis of his dogmatics
and thus the power and sovereign freedom of God, is bound to
assert a temporal transcendence. Thus in his Christology
and initially in his account of the incarnation Barth is
faced with the extreme contrast of the One who inhabits
eternity, entering time. In this the transition is made
between the divisionless duration of eternity with its 'past,
present and future' and the determinative division of time
effected in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ.
Whereas Barth and Cullmann both, therefore, share an
interest in the importance and overwhelming decisiveness of
the 'midpoint', the latter exhausts the significance of the
New Testament view of time as he interprets it into these
categories. Cullmann argues that examination of the words
C '
, vuv , , and crr\Li£f>ov shows that the New Testament
concentrates the qualities of temporal factuality and 'once-
for-allness' upon the events of the mid-point of time. The
highly fruitful (or perhaps also at times deceptive?) dis¬
tinction between , as the 'fulfilled' or significant
time of divine representing mundane
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durational time complements the further dichotomy that
Cullmann explicitly elaborates between history and 'salvation
history', that is between 'Historie' and 'Geschichte'. Time
becomes charged with the overtones ofN when the events
of redemption take place. The duality between limited time
periods and the undefined incalculable duration to be under¬
stood as eternity, is, according to Cullmann, irreducibly
characteristic of the New Testament. Elsewhere in this
study it has been noted how Barth cannot accept such a
striving after the infinite,10 as this represents immanent
speculation,not the nature of the true God known only through
revelation. In Cullmann's view there is no 'qualitative'
distinction between time and eternity manifested in time,
but the juxtaposition in eschatological terms of this
'present age' (o£/o?v or evecrrco^ ) and the 'coming age*
(or'cbv . The contrast is not between temporality and
timelessness but of time over against unending time, and
between the age of fallenness and the coming age in which
the evil powers have been conquered by the 'midpoint'. In
consequence Cullmann interprets the New Testament redemptive
drama as comprising three 'times': the entire unending
extension of 'eternity'; the limited time between creation
and the commencement of the eschatological consummation; and
time periods limited in one direction (that is time periods
limited in one direction, before creation and after the end
of the present age).
The question which arises with regard to Barth is
10. Cf. Chapter III, n. 81 in reference to CD II/l, p. 467.
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the following. Is the •raid-point' really truly temporal,
does it in fact determine our time or is it a theological
construction emanating from the revelatory basis of •God's
time* in eternity? If the mid-point is not truly temporal
then the whole structure and content of Barth* s Church
Dogmatics is an ahistorical ideological illusion.11 If it
is truly historical then how can the transcendent enter time
without irredeemable loss and capitulation on the part of
the eternal and glorious God? This is the series of
implicit questions which Barth attempts to answer,but which
Cullmann precludes by his reductive approach undertaken from
the standpoint of the theological presuppositions governing
his New Testament exegesis and apparent biblicism. The
questions raised demand the patristic response and a unified
approach in theological thinking that Barth attempts to
provide, and in examining his thought we must bear in mind
the scale and nature of his undertaking. We may not in the
final count allow the complete autonomy of Barth*s theological
method because the problem of time necessarily puts the
theological categories in relation to the non-theological
categories. Thus the links of any incipient chain of total
theological self-sufficiency may be broken when eternity
encounters time in the incarnation, life, death, and
resurrection of Jesus Christ.
Having made this excursion we may now return to our
exposition of Barth•s thought having clarified, by reference
11. That is if it is to avoid becoming a •d^oam*, a word
H. Bouillard uses (in The Knowledge of God, Herder, 1968,
p. 61) which in his opinion characterises a theology
entirely freed from philosophical reflection.
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to Cullmann, some of the major issues that face a theologian
who in Christology is to do justice to the encounter of
time and eternity, postulated in the event of Jesus Christ.
Basic to the New Testament witness, according to Earth, is
the 'name of Jesus Christ itself* and secondary to this are
statements about the divinity and the humanity of his so-
called *natures*. Thus the basis of Christology and
Christian faith is not a set of generalisations or
abstractions but *the name of Jesus Christ, or of the
12
simple, once-for-all reality indicated by this name*. In
consequence the ^objective reality of revelation' is given,
and is not a reconstruction or inference. Thus in corres¬
pondence with his overall theological priority it is,
*From the reality of Jesus Christ we gather that
revelation is possible on God's side, that God is
free for us, in such a way that His Word by becoming
Man at the same time is and remains what He is, the
true and eternal God, the same as He is in Himself
at the Father* s right hand for ever and ever. The
kenosis, passion, humiliation which He takes upon
Himself by becoming man, signifies no loss in divine
majesty but, considered in the light of its goal,
actually its triumph. We may and must, of codrse,
speak of a veiling of the divine majesty. By becoming
flesh the Word enters the hiddenness, the 'servant
form', which in respect of the knowability of God
undoubtedly signifies an 'external!sation' (kenosis)
compared with the 'divine form' in which God knows
Himself, in which the Father knows the Son and the
Son the Father. It is in this veiling - which after
all is a veiling in a form familiar to man - that the
Majesty can meet man and so far make knowledge of
itself possible through men. But it may also fail
of recognition in this its 'servant form*. Its
actual exposure to this failure to be recognised is
the •externalisation* which the Word allows to befall
itself in becoming flesh. Knowledge of it becomes
real to men only in virtue of a special unveiling
through Jesus' resurrection from the dead, or through
all the sayings and acts of His life so far as they
were signs of His resurrection. Thus God's becoming
man means undoubtedly in the first instance that His
divinity becomes latent.'
(CD 1/2, pp. 37-8)
12. CD 1/2, p. 14.
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In this lengthy quotation there is laid out the ground¬
work of Earth's understanding of the incarnation as God in
his freedom retains his divinity whilst humbling himself in
Jesus Christ, for,
'By becoming flesh the Word is no less true and
entire God than He was previously in eternity in
Himself. Incarnation of the Word means neither
wholly nor in part any changing of the Word into
something else, but the becoming flesh of the Word
that remains the Word, the Wordness and the flesh-
ness of the Word simultaneously.'
(CD 1/2, p. 38)
In the reality of Jesus Christ, God's Son or Word has
become Man. 'He becomes what we ourselves are' and this is
•flesh*. 'Flesh' is or signifies humanity or man-ness but
most fundamentally 'finally and exclusively distinguishes
1"*
man as he stands before God', ^ Barth argues that it is
this humanity that the Son of God has assumed and that
'The act of the triune God in the reality of Jesus Christ is
that in this reality He was not only what He is in Himself
in eternity. He was also with us and among us. He was
14
also what we are. He was also flesh'. In Barth's own
summary we find in the incarnation that:
'We have thus spoken of the possibility of revelation,
and of that only, which is to be read off from its
its reality. Essentially this is the (only possible)
answer to the question: Cur Deus homo? and the
only legitimate fulfilment of the programme: Credo
ut intelligam.•
(CD 1/2, p. 44)
We once more note the systematic outworking of Barth's
fundamental motifs of divine priority, the freedom of God




terms and criteria. Once more entry is made into the
theological circle, for in taking •flesh* or human nature
Jesus Christ takes up that which is primarily defined as
position of man as he stands before God. Thus •flesh1 is
not an 'objective' (by this we mean universally intersub¬
jective, i.e. a shared reality) but is derived from and
defined in terms of criteria implicit in revelation. In
short this definition is consistent with Earth's rejection
15
of 'natural theology'. In turning to examine the problem
of time in the context of the incarnation we must bear in
mind this theologically based notion of 'humanity'; a
humanity which 'became different' from ours, 'for sin, man's
X
strife with God, could not find any place in Him'.
Having laid out the groundwork of Barth's initial
thought on the incarnation and noted how there is a system¬
atic integration of fundamental structure (which makes the
relation of eternity and time an aspect of the movement of
God towards man in Jesus Christ) a few comments upon
Augustine must be made. Barth's doctrine of eternity and
the corresponding theory of time enter a new dimension of
richness (in CD 1/2, God's Time and Our Time). In the
context of the initial Christological thought of The Incar¬
nation of the Word this will provide the basis of further
exploration of Christology in terms of reconciliation. The
15. This is of course a qualified rejection inasmuch as
Earth's Church Dogmatics is a massive re-assertion of
natural realities on a theological basis. T.F. Torrance
points to this neglected aspect of Barth's thought in
•Natural Theology in the Thought of Karl Barth',
Religious Studies, Vol. 6, pp. 121-135.
16. CD 1/2, p. 40.
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themes of importance multiply dramatically at this point,
although the underlying movement of Earth's thought on
eternity entering time remains in full correlation with his
fundamental theological postulates. Barth effects an
integration notably lacking in Augustine. This is despite
the fact that the former's limitations do perhaps owe some¬
thing of their origin to those same themes of impass bility
and timelessness that underlie the Augustine's comments in
De Trinitate. Barth does reflect Augustine's analysis of
time in his account of time and eternity in revelation and
thus the incarnation in CD 1/2, but he responds negatively
as well as positively, as we shall see. Before this, let
us note the similarities and differences between Barth, as
an Augustinian in terms of his Reformed heritage, and
Augustine as we find him in De Trinitate. To elaborate thi
relation in detail would require a thesis in itself and so
we confine ourselves to drawing out the more immediately
obvious factors, which set the originator of antithesis of
categories in the western tradition against the creator of
the most powerful christological synthesis since Athanasius.
One clue to Barth's attitude to the relation of time
and eternity (or rather the reverse in order of priority) is
given in Augustine's cryptic comment which he repeats twice
'The truth stands to faith in the same relation in
which eternity stands to that which has a beginning.•
(De Trinitate. Bk.IV,Ch.XIX,p.l34)
The eternal is prior to the temporal in both theolo¬
gians, but the context of thought differs greatly in respect
of the path to Truth, and thus in the nature of that Truth
itself. Augustine characterises the incarnation and the
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human response to Christ as follows:
'-the Truth itself, co-eternal with the Father, took
a beginning from earth, when the Son of God so came
as to become the Son of man, and to take to Himself
our faith, that He might thereby lead us on to His
own truth, who so undertook our mortality, as not to
lose His own eternity. For truth stands to faith
in the relation in which eternity stands to that
which has a beginning. Therefore, we must needs be
cleansed, that we may come to have such a beginning
as remains eternal, that we may not have one beginning
in faith, and another in truth. Neither could we
pass to things eternal from the beginning, unless we
were transferred, by the union of the eternal to our¬
selves through our own beginning, to His own eternity.'
(De Trinltate. Bk.IV,Ch.XIX,pp.134-5)
The priority of the eternal, the solidarity of men with
Christ, and the movement of God to man are present, but
underlying this is a doctrine of eternity which exhibits the
influence of Neo-platonism. 'Since truth remains immortal,
incorrupt, unchangeable. But true immortality, true
"I ry
incorruptibility, true unchangeableness, is eternity itself1.
Augustine's vision remains intrinsically 'static', because
although the mission of the Son of God is fully motivated
from eternity (as indeed it is in the thought of Barth) its
consequence is an overt negation of the temporal in the
interests of the eternal.
•Behold, then, why the Son of God was sent; nay,
rather behold what it is for the Son of God to be
sent. Whatever things they were which were wrought
in time, with a view to produce faith, whereby we
might be cleansed so as to contemplate truth, in
things that have a beginning, which have been put
forth from eternity, and are referred back to
eternity, these were either testimonies of this
mission, or they were the mission itself of the Son
of God.•
(De Trinltate. Bk.IV,Ch.XIX,p.l35)
17. De Trinitate. Bk.IV, Ch.XIX, p.135.
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In other words there is in Augustine (as in Barth)
a priority of the eternal. Whereas there is Movement'
in the incarnation (and thus the implication of temporality)
the changelessness of God apparent in the former's notion
of eternity once more raises the question of whether there
is ultimately a reduction of categories. Augustine in his
understanding of the path to be taken to knowledge of God
would imply a negation of time, despite the positive and
affirmative impulse implicit in the incarnation of the Son
of God. The goal achieved by the incarnation is the possi¬
bility of the appropriation of a way to the changelessness
of eternity. There is a fundamental conflict that emerges
between the doctrine of God and eternity in which he 'Who
fashions all things unchangeable, yet without any change
in Himself, and creates things temporal, yet without any
temporal movement in Himself', which calls us to 'purge our
1 ft
minds, to see ineffably that which is ineffable' and the
inescapable and intrinsic temporality of the incarnation.
In the incarnation Augustine argues that,
'when this fulness of time had come, "God sent His
Son, made of a woman", that is made in time, that
the Incarnate Word might appear to men; while it
was in that Wrord Himself, apart from time, at what
time this was to be done; for the order of times
is in the eternal wisdom of God without time.*
(De Trinitate. Bk.IV, Ch.XIX)
This short passage illustrates the Augustinian
dilemma of an atemporal God establishing himself in time
in the historical life, death and resurrection of Jesus
Christ. The dilemma may become acute once the doctrine of
18. Ibid.
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changelessness is embraced with vigour, as in the case of
Augustine. When, furthermore, we see the account of time
iq
Augustine offers elsewhere we have the groundwork of the
western antitheses, laid down in the conflict of the
Platonic tradition and realised in the tension and ultimate
triumph of the ideal over the real, the immutable over the
mutable, which is now irrevocably sharpened by the radical
historicity and temporality of the Christian incarnation.
In brief the Christian revelation depends upon the temporal
and denies any resolution of time in terms of a timeless
eternity or an ideal world. The task Barth faces is to
affirm the eternal and the temporal because God is presented
in Holy Scripture as acting from eternity and yet those same
writings demand the temporal consummation of that action on
the cross and in the resurrection of Jesus Christ. This may
appear an obvious point to make but it seems to us that
Barth attempts to embrace this dichotomy and it is, and has
been our task, to evaluate his account of the majesty of
God, who, from eternity, condescends to man in Jesus Christ
in his actual life and death in its manifest historicity and
temporality.
The preliminary studies undertaken for this thesis
indicate that it is this basic dilemma - to be detected so
clearly in the works of Augustine - that is decisive as
regards our assessment of the temporal aspects of Barth's
account of the incarnation. If we take the two wings of
Augustine's thought in his account of the incarnation in
19- Cf. De Civ. Bk.XI, and Conf. Bk. XI.
222
relation to a basically timeless doctrine of God, inherited
from Neoplatonism, and his analysis of time as ungraspable
then we can see two of the major problems that Barth is
constantly striving to overcome in the Church Dogmatics,
especially in the section to which we are about to turn in
1/2. We might regard Barth's work here as a notable move¬
ment in the process of 'doctrinal development', for he is
facing up to a series of antimonies which have re-emerged
repeatedly in the history of western theology (and philosophy)
and which as late as the nineteenth century afflicted
theological and philosophical effort, as we have shown in
our first chapter. Thus in his attempt to do justice to
John 1,14, 'the Word became flesh', Barth is engaged in an
appraisal of momentous proportions, the full dimensions of
which only become apparent when we begin to set his work in
its historical perspective. Thus it is one of the primal
assertions of this thesis that Barth's doctrine of time and
eternity is an extended commentary and a considered and
creative progression beyond the flawed foundations laid by
Augustine to the Western understanding of this problem. By
this we do not lessen the undoubted achievement of Augustine,
because his statement of the problem of time and eternity,
20
far from being 'naive', has remained without real answer
until Barth*s attempt to question the very basis of this
antimony. The problem is to assess whether Barth went far
20. Ronald Suter's verdict on Augustine's theory of time in
'Augustine on Time with Some Criticisms from
Wittgenstein', Rev. Int. de Phil., 1962, pp. 378-94.
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enough and, moreover, whether he took the right direction
in his constructive Christological synthesis.
In the foregoing sections we have seen how Cullmann
effectively eliminates the transcendent by rendering
eternity one-dimensional as the infinite, unbounded extension
of human time, and human time-scales, and how conversely
Augustine gives determinate weight to a timeless transcen¬
dence at the expense of the ultimate or irreducible reality
of time. Barth, we are to maintain, is to tread a path
between these extremes and is to be assessed in terms of
an attempted Christological resolution of these dichotomies.
The outworking of this Christological resolution in Barth's
doctrine of the Person and work of Christ in volume IV of
the Church Dogmatics will be traced in Chapters VII and
VIII of this thesis. Having made two short excursus so as
to provide ourselves with criteria of evaluation we are now
ready to analyse Paragraph 14 of CD 1/2, The Time of
Revelation and in particular God's Time and Our Time, its
first section. This will conclude our chapter on the
incarnation and open our way to a fuller assessment of
Earth's integrated Christology and soteriology.
Barth, as we have seen, asserts that the primary
meaning of the term 'flesh' denotes man's standing before
God and by this he defines humanity in relation to theolo¬
gical criteria, eliminating any abstraction or generalis¬
ation grounded upon immanent categories. The concept of
time as, in Kantian terms, a condition of any possible human
experience (that is to say in Kant's words a condition of
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'inner sense* as well as 'outer sense'), has an intrinsic
presuppositional role in all human experience. Thus as a
general category, as it is understood to manifest itself in
philosophical analysis, the concept of time is irreducible
even if difficult to specify. It is a truly basic concept
21
although a very puzzling one. It is not possible to
'cash out' temporal categories without great difficulties
22
(the work of J.J.C. Smart illustrates this) because reductive
accounts of time as movement or change, for example, or the
even more ruthless elimination of temporality in describing
the passage of time as arbitrary in its order of before and
after, manifest their inadequacies when compared with the
phenomenological analysis of time. In fact the analyses
of time offered by Augustine and Heidegger stand out in
stark contrast to positivist and reductive accounts of time.
Indeed it is these two accounts which Barth uses as the
point of departure for his own theory of time. Barth is
in potential difficulty here because whereas he offers
theological rationales for 'humanity' and 'being', in, as
we have seen, the categories 'flesh' and 'eternity' (which
pertain to the spheres of human experience and theological
reality, respectively) time is intrinsic to both areas.
The analogy of being is denied and analogia gratiae or
analogia fidei is made the ground-motive of revelation in
that divine, revealed reality is the source of our true
21. This begs many questions but in general terms I adopt
the 'paradigm-case argument' stance.
22. Cf. Philosophy and Scientific Realism. London, 1963,
Ch. VII, is an extreme example of a reductive account
of time.
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knowledge. Barth, as we see in what is to follow, argues
in an exactly similar way for time.
•If by the statement, "God reveals Himself" is meant
the revelation attested in Holy Scripture, it is a
statement about the occurrence of an event. That
means it also includes an assertion about a time
proper to revelation. If stated with reference to
this, it is equivalent to the statement, "God has
time for us". The time God has for us is just
this time of His revelation, the time that is real
in His revelation, revelation time. Moreover in
the interpretation of the concept of this time which
is now our task, we shall not have to take as a
basis any time concept gained independently of
revelation itself. If our consideration of the
question as to the time of revelation is serious,
we shall at once be aware (l) that we have no other
time than the time God has for us than the time of
His revelation. Thus we must let ourselves be told
what time is by revelation itself, and only then, and
with that reference, form our idea of revelation as
such. •
(CD 1/2, p. 45)
God*s being is eternity, this has been established
and now, according to Barth, 'God's revelation in the event
of the presence of Jesus Christ is God's time for us'.2-^
With this the theological circle is made so many more
degrees of arc complete, for God, from eternity, reveals
himself in his own time. This lengthy quotation must be
understood as the corollary of 'the simplicity of revealed
OI
reality' and the consistent expression of Barth's
postulates from which he systematically works out his
theological structure.
In the light of his assertion of the primacy of God's
time Barth subordinates 'the investigation here instituted
25
to the revelation attested in Holy Scripture'. He argues
23. CD 1/2, p. 45.
24. * D* 12.
25. Op.cit., p. 45.
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that, 'Theologically the only sensible way of putting and
answering the question as to the time of this revelation is
to assume the special concept of this special time*.'"
Now given the determined status of the time of revelation
we might expect this to remain a condition of, or factor,
within revelation itself. Y/hat is most important is that
Barth does not do this but uses the theological time he is
to develop as the basis of judgement of other theories of
27
time. In this important section he argues as follows,
•But incidentally and without prejudice we may also indicate
that time concepts gained otherwise are unsatisfactory, if
28
our concern is to understand the time of revelation*. The
proviso that Barth adds is intended to keep our attention
upon his positive exposition, but in offering judgement
Barth is about to move from the sphere of revelation into an
area of 'philosophy* in which his theory of time is to have
quasi-empirical consequences. By this is meant that the
theory of the 'special time' of revelation impinges upon
2Q
and in effect transcends the analyses of time offered by
26. Ibid.
27. Op.cit.. pp. 45-6.
28. Op.cit.. p. 45.
29. The impact of Barth's theological ontology in the in¬
carnation is of great importance. T.F. Torrance (art,
cit., p. 131) states the implications of the incarnation,
'Thus Barth's understanding of the Incarnation as the
Truth of God incarnate in space and time, encountering us
in space and time, encountering us objectively in Jesus
Christ, had the unavoidable effect of calling into
question any idea that the truth about God arises within
us'. In fact what becomes apparent is a calling into
question of any idea that the truth about the natural
world arises in us. This can be plausibly argued with
regard to time as in Chapters IX to XI of this thesis.
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Augustine, Heidegger and Kant. Whereas in other areas
the sovereignty of revelation lies over its own territory
and stands in judgement over others as, for example, when
the category 'flesh*, understood as the *man-before-Godness'
of man, has an overall supremacy over other human
categories as it is essentially 'unbound'. If the category
'flesh' is declared (in the sense we have specified) to be
the characteristic, even the defining attribute of humanity,
it remains a postulate of revelation. It would not be
possible to argue on Earth's presuppositions that because
man had an existential yearning after God, his experience
of God could prove its validity. Only revelation can
provide knowledge of God which is veridical. Other cosmic
or existential categories are not bound to 'flesh', because
flesh is not answerable to any determining criteria outside
those of revelation. By using the theological theory of
time as one which transcends other theories Barth, as we
shall see, cannot preserve the unboundness that 'flesh'
retains. There is not merely a one-way relationship of
the supremacy analogous to that of a genus to species, for
the nature of time as reflected in human experience and
thought, shows flaws and difficulties only to be answered
in the theology of time. Thus the utter distinctiveness
of 'flesh* and its determination by revelation alone
preserves it from an experiential and inferential basis in
human experience. This is not the case with time, for,
if it were, insuperable difficulties for Christian theology
would result. This argument will now be clarified and made
concrete in our exposition of the relevant passage of the
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Church Dogmatics.
There are two major elements worked out In this
passage. First, the elaboration of the theological and
revealed nature of God's time and, second, an implicit
dialectic between this and other non-revelatory notions
of time, which Barth attempts to resolve in relation to the
former pattern of thought. The clue to the solution that
Barth develops is to be found in the article Das Sein in der
Zeit of 1933 written by his brother Heinrich Barth.^ In
this the dialectic of antitheses is overcome on the basis
of a dynamic interpretation of eternity over against time.
The notion of 'Ewlge Zeit* is developed as the 'eternal
time* which is the 'Vergebung und die Erfullung*. the
'bestowal and the fulfilment' of time which is flawed and
transient in human experience. This is of course inspired
by Augustine's meditations in the Confessions. In the
Church Dogmatics Barth uses this insight afforded by Heinrich
Barth in a positive way. Augustine's analysis explicitly
argues on the level of the human experience of fleeting time
for a mental theory of past and future held in memory and
31
expectation. The implicit theory which is pointed out by
Heinrich Barth and exploited systematically by Karl Barth
is the radical application of the doctrine that:
•in the Eternal nothing passeth, but the whole is
present; whereas no time is all at once present:
and that all time past, is driven on by time to come,
30. CD 1/2, p. 45ff.
31. Barth's use of this pattern of argument is important later
in theological anthropology, cf. Chapter IXff.
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and all to come followeth upon the past; and all
past and to come, is created, and flows out of that
which is ever present.*
(Confessions, Bk.XI, Ch.13)
Augustine posits the following question which remains
basic but rhetorical:
•Who shall hold the heart of man, that it may stand
still, and see how eternity ever still-standing,
neither past nor to come, uttereth the times past
and to come? Can my hand do this, or the hand or
the hand of my mouth by speech bring about a thing
so great?*
(Confessions, Bk.XI, Ch.13)
The real answer is given later when Augustine finds
that the seat of duration, the constancy of the present, is
not to be found in time as he reflects upon it, but in the
One. In the following passage from the Confessions the
germ of Barth*s theological theory of time is apparent in
the healing of time that takes place in faith in the eternal
God. Besides this are to be seen the acute problems that
Barth immediately inherits from such an account. The God
of Augustine is the One whose 'years stand together', whose
•Today, is Eternity' and One who approached in faith may
provide the 'present' that is lost to man. In this passage
there is an intricate fusion of biblical and neoplatonic
thought underlying the pious utterance.
'But because Thy loving kindness is better than all
lives, behold, my life is but an distraction, and
Thy right hand upheld me, in my Lord the Son of man,
the Ilediator betwist Thee, The One, and us many,
many also through our manifold distractions amid
many things, that by Him I may apprehend in Whom I
have been apprehended, and may be re-collected from
my old conversation,to follow The One, forgetting
what is behind, and not distended but extended, not
to things which shall be and shall pass away, but
to those things which are before, not distractedly
but intently, I follow on for The prize of my
heavenly calling, where I may hear the voice of Thy
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praise, and contemplate Thy delights, neither to
come, nor to pass away....And Thou, 0 Lord, art
my comfort, my Father everlasting, but I have been
severed amid times, whose order I know not; and my
thoughts, even the inmost bowels of my soul, are
rent and mangled with tumultuous varieties, until I
flow together into Thee, purified and molten by the
fire of Thy love.'
(Confessions. Bk.XI, Ch.39)
We are now in very deep waters and must carefully
distinguish between what we conceive Barth to have done
and what he says his attitude is. This is by no means
easy to achieve but as in the early chapters of this thesis
we have to perceive the movement of thought underlying the
massive creative structure of the Church Dogmatics. The
statement that is offered here in a very brief compass is
merely intended to set out the less obvious aspects of
Augustine's thought on time. This is usually focussed
upon his analysis of fleeting time and the human inability
to isolate the present moment,and is a concern that is again
reflected in much later discussion which will pass once
more over Augustinian ground. We shall eventually turn to
examine Barth's account of Augustine which emphasises these
philosophical arguments and their manifest futility that
places them on a level with those of Kant and Heidegger.
The argument of Barth follows what has been called the
explicit view of Augustine whereas the structure of his
theological riposte follows the implicit answer the latter
provides.
Augustine,as we have seen above in Confessions Bk.XI,
provides a Platonic (that is Neoplatonic) exegesis of
biblical material in which the ephemeral character of life
contrasts with the One whose simple unity is the converse of
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'us many*. It is accurate to say that self-identity is
dependent upon God, 'that by Him I may apprehend in Whom I
32
have been apprehended'^ for without God my perception of
the present is impossible for it is stored in future
moments or receding into the past and thus apperception is
33
grounded upon 'my comfort, my Father everlasting'. ^ The
antitheses of One and many, 'manifold distractions' and
•those things which are before' and the 'divided self' ('I
have been severed between times') opposed to the perfect
continuity of 'until I flow together into Thee' are Neo-
platonist categories expressed through the biblical language
34
of 'Thy loving kindness', and so on. Within the thoughts
here expressed there lie elements of the so-called 'Boethian*
doctrine of eternity and in it there is the implication of
timelessness that the former has in its undeveloped form
(e.g. in the 'all things together and eternally' of Book XI,
Chapter 9). This tendency towards timelessness is manifest
in the antithesis of division in time and the ungraspable
present, and the eternity of a God of whom Augustine says:
'Nor dost Thou by time, precede time: else shouldest
Thou not precede all times. But Thou precedest all
things past, by the sublimity of an ever present
eternity; and surpassest all future because they
are future, and when they come, they shall be past;
but Thou art the same, and Thy years fail not. Thy
years neither come nor go; whereas ours both come
and go, that they may all come. Thy years stand
together, because they do stand; nor are departing
thrust out by the coming years, for they pass not
away; but ours shall all be, when they shall no
more be. Thy years are one day; and Thy day is




not daily, but To-day, seeing Thy today gives not
place unto tomorrow, for neither doth it replace
yesterday. Thy To-day, is Eternity;1
(Confessions, Bk.XI, Ch.16)
There is here a clear declaration of the freedom of
God from temporal limitations which could be interpreted
as timelessness in terms of the antithesis that exists
between this state and the time of human existence. What
we do have is the initial groundwork of Barth's doctrine
that God is not bound by temporal limitations, but is
their Creator. The passage quoted above must now be borne
in mind for Barth exploits this temporal transcendence in
the incarnation when he is to effect (as we have seen with
regard to the doctrine of election) a Christological and
trinitarian conditioning of the Augustinian tradition. It
would be possible to dwell at great length upon the relation
of Barth and Augustine but it is clear that the former is
concerned to eliminate the traces of Platonism in the basic
categories of the doctrine of God which are all too apparent
in the Confessions and elsewhere. Barth draws, as we
have become aware, the Trinity and Christology closely to¬
gether so as to render the life of God that of the Trinity
in eternity, and the decision of God towards man in his
election of Jesus Christ from eternity. Thus these are
not Christian afterthoughts adhering to a pre-existent set
of theological categories, as is the danger in Augustine's
Christology when it is seen from the standpoint of the
problem of eternity and time. There is an unresolved
tension in Barth's thought inherited from Augustine, yet
there are also the seeds of a positive and thorough develop-
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ment of this strand of thought. We shall now he able to
trace this constructive response and purgative reform as
it occurs in Barth's continued exposition of God* s Time and
our Time.for it is against such a background that his work
stands out as the most significant treatment of the problem
of time in modern theology, or even perhaps, in the whole
history of Christian theology. Although Augustine has
themes of timelessness in his doctrine of God he also has
those positive and creative elements which are to flower in
Barth. The latter in turn subjects the eternal and temporal
aspects of his doctrines of God and Christ to radical reform
in terms of their own fundamental postulates, thus liberating
them from what Cullmann has called 'alien presuppositions*.
Our task in this thesis is of course to probe and penetrate
the Church Dogmatics so as to assess Barth's degree of success
in this undertaking by continuing to expose the temporal
structure of his theology in full.
Having laid out our groundwork it is now possible to
return to Barth's exposition of the relation of philosophy
of time and the time of revelation. We have indicated
that we do not believe that what he has to say tells us
the whole truth but only the explicit aspect revealed in
his reaction to the Augustinian theory of mental time and the
Heideggerian notion of 'Zeitlichkeit'. Both Augustine and
Heidegger have, in Barth's view, thoroughly secular concepts
of time which are the products of human reflection, 'which
originate in the act of man's spirit'. For Barth,
35. CD 1/2, p. 46.
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•if we are to understand revelation time, time cannot
be regarded merely as the product of man's existence
interpreted as a distentio; it must be regarded as
a proper reality, as accessible to God as is human
existence. A time concept which denies this cannot
be of service to us.'
(CD 1/2, p. 46)
Besides this, according to Barth, both Augustine and
Heidegger regarded time 'definitively and conclusively as a
conditioned reality, conditioned by being a determination,
indeed a self-determination of man's existence as creature'.
Barth stresses those aspects of Augustine's thought which
are subjectivist and interprets his account of reality
entirely in the light of its being 'an act of man's animus'.
The kernel of Barth's critical argument does not at this
stage adequately take account of the potential of Augustine'
account of eternity in the Confessions that we quoted pre¬
viously, which culminates in the assertion that, 'Thy To-day
37
is Eternity'. In effect Barth reacts negatively to what
has been called the 'explicit' argument in Augustine's
subjectivism with regard to time, but, as it is one of the
overall goals of this thesis to demonstrate, he exploits the
'implicit' argument of Augustine in the dynamic doctrine of
eternity. In the Church Dogmatics Barth is providing an
extended and systematic elaboration of the Augustinian-
Boethian concept of eternity. This he is to do by constant
efforts to render the whole insight supremely objective and
truly temporal. The doctrine of eternity which is really
a concept of God's freedom over time is to triumph over both
36. Ibid.
37. Conf. Bk.XI, Ch.16.
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the intrinsic threat of timelessness in eternity Augustine
inherits from neoplatonisra and the subjective timelessness
of the fleeting ungraspable present. Thus the factor of
supereme value to Barth in Augustine is the temporal freedom
of God in eternity as it is elaborated in the Confessions.
Thus it is the dynamic basis of an eternity that can be the
fulfilment of time. In the Church Dogmatics Barth is to
render this temporality of eternity as fully temporal as
possible whilst retaining the transcendence of God's being
in eternity. There is thus a profound but not obvious
dialectical appreciation of, and yet confrontation between,
Barth and Augustine in the Church Dogmatics. As with Hegel
what he actually says is only an inadequate indication of
what is taking place in the inner recesses of this work. It
is not therefore possible to isolate any simple dependencies
of Barth upon others (for example Anselm or Athanasius) but,
as in his relation to Augustine in particular on the problem
of time, we must search for the traces of the wave that has
passed beyond previous waves and which has washed even
closer to the base of theological truth.
Barth begins his argument for revelation time by
denying that we can know time on the basis of its being
created by God. The 'Fall' is interposed and therefore
the time we pretend to know is produced by us, that is by
fallen men. Only revelation can enlighten us:
'If on the basis of God's Word being in this time of
ours we believe that God created time, this belief
does not sidetrack our time; yet we cannot in any
way identify our time with the time created by God.
Our time, the time we know and possess, is and
remains lost time, even when we believe that God is
the Creator of time. God-created time remains a
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time hidden and withdrawn from us. If God's
revelation has a time also, if God has time for us,
if we really (in a theologically relevant sense)
know and possess time, it must "be a different time,
a third time, created alongside our time and the
time originally created by God.*
(CD 1/2, p. 47)
It would be possible to make a number of more or
less sophisticated philosophical criticisms of this
argument for it raises hoary questions about knowing some¬
thing which we have no means of recognising (such as occur in
Plato*s Meno). These will be eschewed because in the terms
of his theology Barth postulates an epistemology of faith
inseparable from the ontology of the object of faith. One
problem is that although the primary reason for the con¬
finement of knowledge of 'real time' (that is God's revelation
time) stems from the overall understanding of revelation
that he employs, he justifies this on secondary grounds.
If in the light of the following quotation we are convinced
of the 'hiddenness' of time then there mUst be some analogy
between this flawed temporal existence and God's time in
revelation. Barth is ambiguous at this point for the new
time is 'different*, yet it is somehow related to our lost
time, for our experience of this latter, and our reflection
upon it, tells us how lost it indeed is. It has something
of the character of a negative sign of transcendence for we
are told:
'How hidden and withdrawn from is that first real
time which God created, and how problematic the
time actually is which we think we know and possess,
may be illustrated - once more incidentally and
without prejudice - by the three great difficulties
in the common concept of time, which continue to be
questions even when contrasted with the time concept
of an Augustine or a Heidegger.•
(CD 1/2, p. 47)
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These aporiae are of course: the problem of the un-
graspable present opposed to the past and future; the
Kantian antimony of the finite termination or infinite non-
termination of time; and the relation of time and eternity.
In fact all these problems occur in their theological guise
in the Church Dogmatics but Earth's assertion is that
revelation provides the answer in the categorical trans¬
formation of time by the introduction of a radically new
element into the situation. Revelation theology is able to
'assert the reality of time in face of and in spite of these
difficulties without the desire or ability to set them
aside'. The ambiguity in Barth's thought again shows in
that we can detect the 'lostness' of time by reflection upon
it (see the above quotation) but the theological solution
remains aloof insofar as it remains bound by the confines
of revelation. In other words is it 'empirical' in its
consequences, or 'objective* in the theological sense? Is
it the former as indicated by the place of aporiae. or is it
the latter and part of the sphere of revelation reality
alone? If it belongs to one or other then it must fail.
If the time of God's actions is not empirically in time
then the incarnation happened only in eternity or some
private time of God. If on the contrary it happens in
both, then can the incarnation be adequately expressed as an
aspect of God being in Christ reconciling the world to
himself? How does Barth's God really enter time and what
time does he enter? Can Barth unite time and eternity in
38. CD 1/2, p. 49.
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the incarnation and is the antithesis overcome, as it must
be, if the eternal God is to act in time in the life, death
and resurrection of Jesus Christ?
We must now drive along this line of investigation as
we continue to state Barth' s doctrine in which he responds
to our suspicions by the following defence. Our problem
is to decide if the assertion of the identity of God's time
and our time is merely an assertion (and if so, on what basis
it may be defended) or if this identity is an inference,
what train of argument underlies such a putative identity.
'But this different time is the new, the third time,
which arises and has its place because God reveals
Himself, because He is free for us, because He is
with us and amongst us, because in short, without
ceasing to be what He is, He also becomes what we
are. God's revelation is the event of Jesus Christ.
We do not understand it as God's revelation, if we
do not state unreservedly that it took place in "our"
time. But conversely, if we understand it as God's
revelation, we have to say that this revelation had
its own time; in this event it happened that whereas
we had our own time for ourselves as always, God had
time for us, His own time for us - time, in the most
positive sense, i.e. present with past and future,
fulfilled time with expectation and recollection of
its fulfilment, revelation time and the time of the
Old Testament and New Testament witness to revelation
- but withal, His own time, God's time; and there¬
fore real time.'
(CD 1/2, p. 49)
This must be judged in the light of Barth's statement
preceding that 'we can only believe in the creation of time
by God, as we believe in the creation itself, but we cannot
know it'. (This of course reflects a New Testament insight,
cf. Hebrews 11,13). The structure of Barth's position is
dictated firstly by the theological rationale of revelation
from the side of God's time in the event of God's revelation
in Jesus Christ, and secondly, by a negative inference from
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the problematic 'lost time' of human experience and
reflection. This connecting point has been laboured
because in the incarnation a concrete situation occurs which
is not entirely to be explained in relation to theological
criteria, but has what have been called quasi-empirical
consequences. Thus although revelation comes as a gift
39
to be acknowledged in being known it has, in its temporal
aspects, a role as the fulfilment of 'lost time', which
involves the 'healing' of this fragmented, fleeting, fallen
time.
'From the standpoint of revelation God has time for us.
This is positive time of present, with past and future,
which is 'fulfilled time' with the expectation and
recollection of its fulfilment characteristic of 'real time'.
God's time is 'His becoming present to us in Jesus Christ,
i.e., a present with a past behind it and a future in front
of it, like the temporal moments in the sequence of which we
40
exist ourselves'. Barth sets out in contrast to Romans
the implications of 'The Word became flesh' for the problem
of time, in defence of the claim that revelation is eternal
but not timeless.
•"The Word became flesh" also means "The Word became
time."' As revelation is the lifetime of a man then it is
also 'a section of what we call "historical time" or world
41
history and its prehistorical time'. , The dialectic of
time and eternity is resolved because in Jesus Christ they
39* This argument presupposes the material of Chapters II and
III, especially with regard to The Doctrine of the Word
of God in CD 1/1.
40. CD 1/2, pp. 49-50.
41. Op.cit.. p. 50.
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are in the one man, the Word become flesh, for,
'Revelation in the sense of Holy Scripture - this is
quite unambiguous in its proper form in the event of
Jesus Christ as well as in the two-fold witness -
is an eternal but not therefore a timeless reality.
It is also a temporal reality. So it is not a sort
of ideal, yet in itself timeless content of all or
some times. It does not remain transcendent over
time, it does not merely meet it at a point, but
it enters time; nay it assumes time; nay it
creates time for itself.'
(CD 1/2, p. 50)
In the first chapter of this thesis Barth's Cfaristolo-
gical realisation was briefly traced and in it was seen how
he abandoned the antitheses of Romans in favour of the
centrality of Christology which was to have priority and not
be subordinated under, or secondary to, other theologically
extraneous factors such as the dialectic of time and eternity.
Barth now refers to this, claiming that Romans did not do
justice to John 1:14, for in fact 'revelation has its time,
42
and only in and along with its time is it revelation' and
for this reason it cannot be found by abstraction made from
time to a timeless core. The intrinsic temporality of
revelation is emphatically present in the Old and New Testa¬
ment, where, for example, 'time data' are of great importance
in the dating of the incarnation of the Word. Indeed,
•Revelation is thus and not otherwise localised. In
the event of Jesus Christ, as in the various events
in anticipation and recollection, it is as genuinely
temporal and therefore as temporally determined and
limited as any other real events in this space of
ours.'
(CD 1/2, p. 51)
The exact relation of God's time in Jesus Christ with
the time into which it entered is not mere confrontation of
42. Ibid.
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categories but truly Christological and corresponds to the
Patristic insights Barth is to develop.
'...we must...go on to say that the time we mean
when we say Jesus Christ is not to be confused with
any other time. Just as man's existence became some¬
thing new and different altogether, because God's Son
assumed it and took it over into unity with his God-
existence, just as by the eternal Word becoming flesh
the flesh could not repeat Adam's sin, so time, by
becoming the time of Jesus Christ, although it belonged
to our time, the lost time, became a different, a
new time.1
(CD 1/2, p. 51)
In this way Barth is to amplify the parallel between
the redemption of the flesh wrought through the incarnation
and the time in and through which that redemption was brought
about. In revelation time we become contemporary with Jesus
Christ and the veiledness and unveiledness, characteristic
Ax
of revelation, applies no less to time. The victorious
assumption of the 'old time, our time*^ is consummated in
the resurrection as the commencement of the new aeon. In
consequence Barth argues that history is a predicate of
revelation, not revelation a predicate of history for,
'If we regard the presence of Jesus Christ as the
fulfilment of time, if we therefore say His time is
the light of new time in the midst of old time and
for the whole of old time, that cannot mean that we
are in a position to see through and regard any part
of this old time as new, fulfilled time.'
(CD 1/2, p. 58)
Only revelation can be revelation, for in 'fulfilled
time* God does as it actually pleases him to do in his free-
45
dom in time and history. In renewal God fulfils time
Op.clt., p. 55.
44. Op.cit.. p. 56; cf. also the end of Chapter V above.
45. Op. cit.. p. 60.
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(Barth alludes to Eph. I:9f.) and at the core of this
excursus we find the doctrine of eternity entering into
revelation as our time (time which is inaccessible to us and
the problematic source of aporiae) is the object of renewal
and transformation. This chapter, which has stated in some
detail the basis of Barth's treatment of the incarnation,
will conclude with a lengthy quotation from the Church
Dogmatics, in which he presents the undertaking of time by
eternity whereby this fulfilment comes about.
•...the special thing about the time of Jesus Christ
is that it is the time of the Lord of time. Compared
with our time it is mastered time and for that very
reason real, fulfilled time. Here the dilemma does
not arise between a present that disappears midway
between past and future, and a past and future that
dissolve for their part into a present. Here there
is a genuine present - and not now in spite of it
but just because of it, a genuine past and future.
The Word of God is. It is never "not yet" or "no
longer". It is not exposed to any becoming or,
therefore, to any passing away, or, therefore, to any
change. The same holds also of the Word of God
become flesh and therefore time. In every moment
of His temporal existence, and also at every previous
or subsequent to His temporal existence, in which He
becomes manifest as true God and true man and finds
faith and witness, Jesus Christ is the same. The Word
spoken from eternity raises the time into which it is
uttered (without dissolving it as time), up into His
eternity as now His own time, and gives it part in
the existence of God which is alone real, self-moved,
self-dependent, self-sufficient. It is spoken by
God, a perfect without peer (not in our time, but in
God's time created by the Word in the flesh, there is
a genuine, proper, indissoluble, primal perfect), and
for that reason there is coming into the world a
future without peer (for not in our time but rather in
this God's time created by the Word in the flesh there
is a genuine, proper, indissoluble, primal future).
And so it is a present that is not a present without
also being a genuine perfect; and a perfect and a
future, the mean of which constitutes a genuine in¬
destructible present. Yet it is not any present,
collapsing into a "not yet" or a "no longer" like
every present in our time. It is Deus praesens, who
always was and will always be and for that very
reason has a genuine before and after; in other words
the active Lord of time, who in His action creates and
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sustains His own time out of the wretched span of
this lost time of ours, the Lord before whom time
can have no legality of its own, before whom the
longest time is the shortest and the shortest the
longest, before whom the irreversibility of time is
not for one moment in an indestructible position.
This mastered, this fulfilled time is the time of
Jesus Christ.'
(CD 1/2, pp. 52-53)
In this passage we find that the 'perfect presence'
of eternity has entered time as its dynamic and renewing
basis. The incarnation is not a collision of inco patibles
but the recreative and restorative encounter of living
eternity, God in His freedom, love and power, and lost,
broken, human time. In the sections, The Time of Expectation
and The Time of Recollection which follow this passage we
have examined at length, Barth draws out the consequences of
this central underpinning and recreation of time in
revelation in relation to the central determination of the
Christ-event. 'The Old Testament is the witness to the
46
genuine expectation of revelation' and the New Testament is
likewise recollection of (that is the witness to) 'a together¬
ness of God and man, based on and consisting in a free
47
relating of God to man'. These developments and
consequences depend upon the foundations we have seen Barth
lay. The doctrine of eternity grounded in the life of God,
which is in fact, eternity as the characterisation of God's
existence, enters time as its 'fulfilment'. The recon¬
ciliation of God and man effected in the taking up of man's
flesh is directly paralleled in the assumption of time and
46. Op.cit.. p. 70.
47. Op.cit.. p. 103.
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its transformation and perfection. As in the case of human
flesh which was restored in the One willed by God in and
from eternity so it is with time.
In this chapter we have ranged far in setting out the
basis and examining the consequences of the Christological
resolution of time and eternity as set out in the initial
exposition it receives in Barth's treatment of the incarnation.
We have seen how Barth's account can be set apart from that
of Cullmann, and seen in relation to that of Augustine.
Above all we are aware that in the incarnation the One who
becomes temporal is the One who from eternity has enjoyed
the time of God, who was 'begotten not created' and who can
therefore bring about the healing of time as numanity searches
for it. The conflict of eternity and time is seen not as an
element that may condition or distort Christology but as a
vital facet of the Christological reconciliation itself, and
thus an intrinsic factor in the encounter of the eternal God
and human flesh in the life and death of Jesus Christ.
Barth's doctrine is the coherent correlate of the being of
God, the nature of revelation and the act of God from
eternity in Jesus Christ, for the problem of time and
t
eternity is worked out in and through these doctrines, not





In Chapter VI we saw how the incarnation is the in-
breaking of God's time in the 'simple, revealed reality* of
Jesus Christ. The 'midpoint* of time for Barth is both
the fulfilment of time and the realisation of eternity
('God's time') in time and history. In this Barth's
position differs markedly from that of Cullmann yet represents
a notable development from that held by Augustine. In this
chapter we will examine the temporal axes in the integrated
Christology-soteriology presented by the fundamental logic
of Volumes 1/2 and IV/1,2,3 (Part I) of the Church Dogmatics.
On the basis of an examination of the theological architect-
tonic evident in the doctrines of time and eternity we v/ill
then be able to proceed to a further study of the doctrines
of creation and ultimately theological anthropology.
The ground of the incarnation which is revealed by
the Holy Spirit in us and which is attested in Holy Scripture
is the Trinity, as *the God who, as Lord, is the Father from
whom it proceeds, the Son who fulfils it objectively (for
us) and the Holy Spirit who fulfils it subjectively (in us)'.1
As has been seen Barth is concerned in the earlier part of
his Christology to show how the reality and possibility of
2
revelation take place in the freedom of God. Following the
1. CD 1/2, p. 1.
2. , p* 3*
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order in Holy Scripture Barth has first asked about God
(and this thesis has followed his priority) on the basis
of his reality and this permits questions to be put as to
his possibility. Likewise the approach to Christology is
affected by the realisation that 'first we have to put the
■3
question of fact, and then the question of interpretation'.^
Barth argues more precisely in a way that must condition
this study of his work that,
'we must first understand the reality of Jesus
Christ as such, and then by reading from the tablet
of this reality, understand the possibility involved
in it, the freedom of God, established and maintained
in it, to reveal Himself in precisely this reality
and not otherwise, and so the unique possibility we
have to respect as divine necessity.'
(CD 1/2, pp. 7-8)
We have spoken of this 'simple reality' in our
previous chapters as the once-for-all event, the mid-point
of time which provides an affinity with Cullmann, and
irreversibly divides the time of history and human existence
into a 'before' and an 'after'. In the incarnation there
is not only this division of time but also its transformation
in the life of the God-man Jesus Christ. This transformation
which is the 'fulfilment' of time in the encounter of time
and eternity can only be understood in the context of Barth's
dynamic fusion of the unity of the two natures and the
reconciling life of Jesus Christ in a profoundly actualistic
doctrine of the Person and Work of Christ which is to be
understood in its totality as an act of God. It is this
moment in Barth's thought which must be captured for in it
he reflects the structure of the subject matter and provides
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a most striking union of theological form and content.
Barth lays great stress (that is not an exclusive but
an inclusive stress) upon the incarnation as the true and
utterly indispensable starting point of revelation and thus
of theology. This is made quite clear later on by Barth's
A
insistence upon the Christological determination of a
church dogmatics that becomes a possibility on the basis of
the reality of revelation posited in the early part of CD 1/2.
It is possible, so Barth argues, to make a series of inferen¬
ces from the reality of revelation which reveals God as
5
'Lord of eternity*. Primarily God's freedom is made known
to us in that 'God, whilst remaining God in Himself, becomes
C
in and among us*, in that 'He, that is His Son, becomes a
7
man', and that in consequence 'He can become cognisable by
Q
us by analogy with other forms known to us'. At this
juncture many problems intrinsic in Patristic theology and
Q
thus present in Earth's return to these categories become
pressing, especially as regards the ground of unity-identity
4. Op.cit.. p. 123.
5. Op.cit.. p. 29.
6. Op.cit., p. 31.
7. Op.cit., p. 33.
8. Op.cit.. p. 35.
9. This 'return' is of course a complex interpretation and
creative re-thinking of orthodox categories on the basis
of both patristic and later Protestant insight.
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in Jesus Christ. Barth's relation to Athanasius and.
Basil is important here. With regard to the former, for
example, Barth follows the Athanasian argument: God as
man, and therefore in consequence God is Jesus, Jesus is
God. This bases the identity upon an assumption of grace
not an identity by nature of God and man as such, an
affinity of being or analog!a entis. If Barth does not
ground the incarnation upon any such affinity of being
between God and man, the infinite and the finite, the eternal
and the temporal, then the basis must be found and stated,
for without this our search for the actual point of contact
of time and eternity in Barth' s theology will be frustrated.
The answer lies in the integration of Christology and
soteriology that Barth effects. In this the natures of
Christ, human and divine, are not left in isolation in the
mere assertion and laboured explanation of contiguity in
the man Jesus Christ but are the interacting aspects of God's
actual movement in grace in the assumption, and thus the
perfection, of human nature in the life, death and
resurrection of Jesus Christ. The Word and Son of God does
not present a problem in relation to His human nature in the
incarnation but a mystery explicable (insofar as it is open
to explanation) within the dynamic scheme of reconciliation,
a movement willed from eternity in God's own being. The
problem of time and eternity is in fact the arena or overall
context within which this contiguity of natures presents
itself, for what we might term the 'macro-theological' and
the 'micro-theological' are in infrangible inter-relation.
Thus what Barth presents as 'the Problem of Christology', the
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so-called 'two-natures1 is not a linguistic or conceptual
puzzle but the expression of the freedom and grace of God.
As a result Barth's initial elaborations in CD 1/2 and later
at greater length in CD IV are the exploration and careful
statement of the following, that:
'The mystery of the revelation of God in Jesus Christ
consists in the fact that the eternal Word of God chose,
sanctified and assumed human nature and existence into
oneness with Himself, in order thus, as very God and
very man, to become the Word of reconciliation spoken
by God to man. The sign of this mystery revealed in
the resurrection of Jesus Christ is the miracle of
His birth, that He was conceived by the Holy Ghost,
born of the Virgin Mary.'
(CD 1/2, p. 122)
In earlier chapters it was hinted that Barth might be
harbouring an eternity beyond being which might even be
termed a lapse into some kind of Gnostic or Neoplatonic
notion.10 Although this raises the problem of the
distinction of created and uncreated being, with regard to
the actual relation of time and eternity in the area of
Christology Barth's answer is unequivocal and decisive.
Again a further criticism of Barth might be that he reverts
to an inverted analogia entis in his Christology, but at the
outset he provides the beginning of a possible answer to
this charge. Such questions are strictly peripheral to
our main aim in exploring Barth's doctrine of time, but
reference to them will serve to illustrate the originality
and developmental power of his Christology as it conditions
the problem of time and eternity and structures his solution
of it. In Chapter VI the status of 'God's time' as it
10* Such thoughts are banished in the light of Barth's massive
and sustained assertion of the divine being as act and
eternity. We have sought to show the cruciality of this
for Barth's understanding of time.
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comes in Jesus Christ was examined in relation to a number
of factors both those raised by Barth himself and those
brought in additionally. This time is the reality of a
time implicit in and borne with revelation and as such it
is the 'reality' to which there corresponds a 'possibility*
which can now be analysed as an aspect of Barth's dynamic
(in the sense of actualistic) Christology. In effect by
following this order in Barth*s thought we have stated the
consequence, knowledge of which is a condition of ascertaining
and understanding the antecedent factors. The crucial
passage to which critical importance was attached in our
last chapter expresses, under the heading God's Time and Our
Time, this reality to which the Christology of 1/2 and IV
offers the interpretation or 'possibility'. In Chapter VI
we examined this initial statement of the putative reality
of 'God's time' and its immediate consequences in terms of
its entry into the historical process.
Barth puts the 'mystery of the revelation of God in
Jesus Christ' on the very highest level for the 'very God and
very man' is 'the sole point in which the New Testament
witness originates'.'1'1 If we are to be true to Barth's
theological method then the injunction he makes must be
obeyed in our study of the interaction of time and eternity:
•We do not look for some higher vantage point from which our
statement can derive its meaning, but we start from this
12
point itself'. This is to be pure theology, a theology
11. CD 1/2, p. 124.
12. Ibid.
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which is to be its own interpreter, because one which
fails to observe the •necessary connexion of all theological
statements with that of John 1,14' is prey to the 'devastating
15
inrush of natural theology'. In fact this absolute
distinction is difficult to maintain especially with regard
to time as has been argued in our last chapter. Then this
distinction was questioned whereas now it is to be granted
so as to allow entry in to the theological possibility under¬
lying the actual reality of the incarnation of the God-man
Jesus Christ, the Word become flesh. If we concede as
Barth would have us do that, 'Christ is the datum upon which
we can reflect and speak upon as the beginning of all
14
Christian thought' then this will condition our under¬
standing of the reconciliation of finite and infinite and
of time and eternity. In our last chapter finite and
infinite as speculative postulates remained immanent and the
product of human ratiocination for Barth,whereas time and
eternity must remain of primal significance in both the
overall structure and innermost content of the revelation of
God in Jesus Christ.
The task of Christology is to 'deal with the revelation
15
of God as a mystery'. This mystery of the One who is very
God and very man must be confronted and acknowledged. It is
irreducible mystery and cannot be explained in the concepts
or categories other than those derived from itself. So
13. Op.cit., p. 123.
14. Op.cit.. p. 129.
15. Op.cit.. p. 131.
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1
Barth judges the nineteenth century and signals a return
to the primitive Christology which did not commit this
error for it preserved the mystery that it detected and so
'for this reason we must emphatically take its side both
at the outset and in principle'. In these pages we have
taken our bearings and are now ready to exposit the primary
Christological axis of the Church Dogmatics as the structure
and functional organic theological whole which will, in its
overall nature, allow us to trace the relation of time and
eternity in the reconciliation of God and man that was
wrought for man in the man Jesus Christ. The consequences
of this chapter will be of fundamental and determinative
significance for our study as from this central, and as we
have seen Barth would argue, constitutive reality, the other
aspects of the problem of time in creation, pneumatology and
eschatology flow in response to this most crucial point.
Thus in our thesis we show that God's being in becoming, his
act from eternity is realised in Christology and that in
turn the reality of this revelation in Jesus Christ is the
necessary and perhaps even the sufficient condition and
foundation of the attendant realities. These are in turn
realised by the Spirit who is the freedom of God to be
present to the creation and to realise the relation of the
creation to Himself, bringing it to the fulness of its
creaturely purpose. We now turn to this primal fact of
Jesus Christ and its explication in Christology which in its
very existence instantiates the reconciliation of God and
16. Op»cit., p. 132.
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man, Creator and creation.
Jesus Christ is 'very God' which means 'the one, only,
17
true, eternal God' and he was made flesh 'in the entire
fulness of deity, which is also that of the Father and of
1 ft
the Holy Spirit*. As the Word shares in the triune being
of God so can he be the bearer of eternity, the 'fullness of
time', and the utterly legitimate expression of God's
freedom. The Word becoming flesh must be regarded as a
'new creation* and the free realisation towards men of a
19
love already 'free and unconstrained in God Himself'.
Most significantly the order 'very God and very man' is to
be maintained for 'even as incarnate He derives His being
to all eternity from the Father and from Himself and not
the flesh' and (following John of Damascus) 'The flesh is
mortal on its own account and quickening because of its
20
hypostatic union with the Word'. In the Virgin Birth
both the fact of divinity is established, 'He who was born
in time is the very same who in eternity is born of the
21
Father', and that of His solidarity with humanity for
22
'He became man, true and real man'. Barth in conforming
with the Patristic impulse is concerned to establish and
preserve both 'the mystery of revelation, the happening of
17. Ibid.
18. Op.clt., p. 133.
19. Op.cit., pp. 134-5.
20. Op.cit., p. 136.
21* Ob.cit., p. 138.
22. Op.cit., p. 147.
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the inconceivable fact that God is among and with us'^
implied by 'The Word became flesh* and the true humanity of
Jesus Christ which is undertaken by the Word. In the
following highly important passage lies the core of Earth's
thought,reflecting the Athanasian 'assumption of grace',for
in it we are not encountering a merely contingent or
accidental co-location of attributes but an act of God in
Christ, a becoming and movement of the Word.
'His becoming is not an event which in any sense
befalls Him, in which in any sense He is determined
from without by something else. If it includes in
itself His suffering, His veiling and humiliation
unto death - and it does include this in itself -
even so, as suffering, it is His will and work. It
is not composed of action and reaction. It is action
even in the suffering of reaction, the act of majesty
even as veiling. He did not become humbled but
humbled Himself. Accordingly we have to give a
closer explanation of the act peculiar to this miracle,
the incarnation of the Word. As the Word of God
becomes flesh He assumes or adopts or incorporates
human being into unity with His divine being, so that
this human being, as it comes into being, becomes as
a human being the being of the Word of God.*
(CD 1/2, p. 160)
The last sentence expresses this vital insight which
through the medium of the dynamic interaction of the two
natures (we use this word informally here) offers the
fusion of Christology and soteriology of which we shall
become increasingly aware. The fundamental unity of God and
man is hypostatic and that of the natures secondary to this.
That is to say the unity of Word and flesh is the primary
centre for Christology. In the theology of Reformed
scholasticism this meant that the 'unio naturart/mis decidedly
23* Op»cit.» p. 159•
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always regarded from the standpoint of the unlo personalis*.^
The central unity of God and man in Christ is 'the act of
25
the Logos in assuming human being'. Following the
Athanasian impulse Barth argues that Christ's manhood is
•only the predicate of His Godhead', that is 'only the
predicate, assumed in inconceivable condescension, of the Word
26
acting upon us, the Word who is the Lord'. The implications
of this position will be explored in the following chapter in
relation to the distinction of created and uncreated being,
comparing Barth, Athanasius and Origen. Indeed that which
is on occasion condemned in Barth, the centrality of Christ
in revelation in making God known and 'declaring' Him (in
correspondence with John I, 18 ) is
itself precisely an insight dependent upon taking with the
utmost seriousness Athanasius' arguments in, for example,
the Contra Gentes. Here the explicit distinction between
created and uncreated being is fundamental both to the
distinction of God and creation (a theme to which we will
turn in Chapter VIII) as well as the revelatory possibility
and actuality of the Person and work of Jesus Christ. This
can be appreciated in the following passage. In it,
Athanasius,who is reflecting upon Paul's argument in Romans
1,20, provides us with a key to Barth's thought (which
grasps with quite unparallelled vigour the essential unity
of the being and acts of the incarnate Word).
24. Op.clt.. p. 161.




'God, who is good and loves men and who cares for the
souls he has made, since he is by nature invisible
and incomprehensible, being above all created
being, and therefore the human race would fail to
attain knowledge of him in that they were made from
nothing while he was uncreated - for this reason God
so ordered creation through his Word that although
he is invisible by nature, yet he might be known to
men from his works.'
(Contra Gentes 35,Iff.; cf. 2,6)
Given the Fall and the loss of the image of God in
man, then this pattern of being made known in act is repeated
in Christology. For Athanasius the divinity of the man
Jesus Christ is demonstrated in His mighty works, whereas
Barth, in the Church Dogmatics radicalises this thesis
making the life and existence of Jesus Christ itself the
act of God. There is no direct deduction to be made from
Athanasius to Barth, for, as in the case of Augustine, Barth
as a truly original and re-creative theologian, embraces
and moves beyond the thought of his predecessors. What we
do see is a systematic development which transcends any
simplistic genetic derivation. Given, therefore, the
outright rejection of natural theology then God can only be
made known by His own acts, for creation can tell us nothing.
This absolute distinction between fallen creation (which
is unable to inform fallen man about God) and the new creation
in Jesus Christ is difficult to maintain with regard to time,
as was argued in Chapter VI. Whereas this distinction is
tenable with regard to flesh it breaks down vis & vis time.
This is in turn reflected in Barth's 'natural theology* of
fallen time which is imperfectly known in human experience
and speculation but which is 'fulfilled* by the perfect
presence of eternity or 'God's time' manifested in revelation.
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At this point the question of the relation of creation and
recreation arises once more for it is the status of
natural reality that becomes problematic,as will be seen.
It remains to say that there is in Barth's Christology a
creative development of the Athanasian distinction of created
and uncreated being, in which the latter can only reveal
itself to or in the former by its acts. In Christ this
pattern is crystallised for intractable flesh or humanity
becomes once more the vehicle of revelation in being the act
of God in the assumption of grace and in the Christological
outworkings implied by the reality of revelation.
In building the foundations of his Christology Barth
exploits the traditional categories of Patristic and ortho¬
dox (mainly Reformed) Christology but with an amazing degree
of vital reinterpretation. His starting point is, as has
been shown, the supreme loci of the union of God and man in
the Word become flesh. Other categories are subordinate to
this central point and therefore the relation of time and
eternity does not predominate and constitute an antithesis,
as in early thought of Barth (as we saw in Chapter I), but
is consequent upon the divinely-instantiated reconciliation
of the God-man Jesus Christ. The relation of God and man
in Christ is dynamic for, as we have seen in relation to
Athanasius, it is an active assumption of grace. This
positive bond is expressed through Barth's unrivalled re¬
habilitation of the seemingly obscure, but in fact crucial
doctrine of an- and enhypostasis. The being of God in act
is his being-in-becoming, which in revelation is his freedom
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to assume human nature by grace. This is therefore in¬
separable in Christ from the doctrine of the so-called
•two natures' in unity. From this standpoint dualism is
banished.
'But from the utter uniqueness of this unity follows
the statement, that God and Man are so related in
Jesus Christ, that He exists as Man so far and only
so far as He exists as God, i.e. in the mode of
existence of the eternal Word of God. What we
thereby express is a doctrine unanimously sponsored
by early theology in its entirety, that of the
anhypostasis and enhypostasis of the human nature of
Christ. Anhypostasis asserts the negative. Since
in virtue of the ly*v&ro i.e. in virtue of the
assuraptio, Christ's human nature has its existence -
the ancients said its subsistence - in the existence
of God, meaning in the mode of being (hypostasis,
"person") of the Word, it does not possess it in and
for itself, in abstracto. Apart from the divine
mode of being whose existence it acquires it has none
of its own; i.e., apart from its concrete existence
in God in the even^of the unio, it has no existence
of its own, it is otvifr;6o'wro<> Enhypostasis
asserts the positive. In virtue of the ey£v*ro
i.e., in virtue of the assumptio, the human nature
acquires existence (subsistence) in the existence of
God, meaning in the mode of being (hypostasis, "person")
of the Word. This divine mode of being gives it
existence in the event of the unio, and in this way
it has a concrete existence of its own, it is&/vif6(TT«rro$
...."The Word of God Himself became the mode of being
of the flesh" (Joh. Damascenus, Ekd. 3,2).*
(CD l727 P- 163)
The consequences of this fundamental doctrine are
highly significant for the theology of the Church Dogmatics
in general and,in particular,for the problem of time and
eternity in terras of a possible Christological resolution.
Christ's flesh has its existence 'through the Word and in
the Word who is God Himself acting as Revealer and
27
Reconciler'. As indeed Barth notes, Christ's personalitas
is not referring to 'personality' (that is in the sense of
27. Qp.cit.. p. 164.
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individualitas) but is 'existence or being'. This is the
ontological ground of his Christology and in this is
established the starting-point of our comprehension of the
temporal resolution.
•Understood in this its original sense, this particular
doctrine (i.e. an- and enhypostasis), abstruse in
appearance only, is particularly well adapted to make
it clear that the reality attested by Holy Scripture,
Jesus Christ, is the reality of a divine act of
Lordship which is unique and singular as compared with
all other events, and in this way to characterise it
as a reality held up to faith by revelation. It is
in virtue of the eternal Word that Jesus Christ
exists as a man of flesh and blood in our sphere, as
a man like us, as an historical phenomenon.'
(CD 1/2, pp. 164-5)
This rediscovery (it is nothing less) turns what might
be regarded as a theological linguistic archaism into the
basis of a theological ontology. The section Very God and
Very Man has an importance which can scarcely be exaggerated
in the Church Dogmatics for in it God's act and being coincide
in the very heart of revelation. The unity of Godhood and
manhood is established upon its own basis and therefore
according to its own unique criteria. This basis is the
'EyCveTo , the 'event of the incarnation of the Word' which
•has to be understood as a completed event, but is also as
29
a completed event'. God's being in the incarnation is
'in becoming' and in the doctrine of an- and enhypostasis
the absolute unity and strictly unique identity of being (to
be understood as the 'person' of Christ) and act (that is
his 'works') is secured,allowing its implications to be
developed at length.
28. Ibid.
29. Op.cit., p. 165.
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As we are concerned most of all to establish the
most elemental structure of the Church Dogmatics in relation
to Christology we must note at this juncture, but refrain
from digression into, the following problems. Firstly,
great care must be exercised with respect to Barth*s notion
of the divine *act* both in relation to the doctrine of God
per se and in Christology. In this fundamental identity we
find the fulfilment of the doctrine of God1s act. Secondly,
Barth*s use of the unio hypostatics as an interpretative
ontological principle might most interestingly be compared
with neo-Chalcedonian Christology, in particular that of
Maximus the Confessor who made extensive cosmological and
anthropological application of the concept of hypostasis.
This is a purely theological comparison for both assume
and assert the constitutive significance of this notion for
Christology; they do not question its relevance. Thirdly,
the issues raised by the interaction of •finite* and
'infinite* to which Barth alludes as regards Lutheran
Christology of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries could
be most profitably explored in comparing Barth* s response
(which is here inexplicit but nevertheless present) to the
nineteenth century 'kenotic controversy*.
These issues are to be passed by at this point because
Barth sets himself squarely upon the orthodox ground laid
down by Athanasius (De Inc. 17), Gregory of Nyssa (Or.Cat. 10),
and John of Damascus to name but three examples. The
incarnation does not on this account involve either a
reductive kenosis or the confinement of the infinite within
the finite bounds of individual humanity but the trinitarian
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conception of a graceful condescension. In the words of
John of Damascus:
•Without separating from the Father*s bosom, the Word
dwelt in the bosom of a holy virgin...thus in all and
over He was Himself, when He existed in the bosom of
the holy bearer of God.*
(Ekd. 3,7)
The miracle of the incarnation, an 'objective fact',
is the 'mystery1 of the hypostatic union and it is upon this
that the logic and ontology of Barth's Christology is built.
God does not negate or limit Himself in either a Hegelian or
a kenotic sense but fulfils His own will (which we have
seen is his from eternity, with all that implies) in the
unique, and uniquely apposite, manner posited by the incar¬
nation itself. In his exposition of the Virgin Birth
Barth establishes the thoroughly trinitarian activity in the
incarnation. This is undertaken in the light of his overall
theological postulates over against Brunner's 'biological
inquisitiveness'. The incarnation is both realised and
represented in recollection after the events of Easter by
the Holy Spirit who is:
'God Himself in His freedom exercised in revelation
to be present to His creature, even to dwell in Him
personally, and thereby to achieve his meeting with
Himself in His Word and by this achievement to make
it possible. Through the Holy Spirit and only
through the Holy Spirit can man be there for God,
be free for God's work on him, believe, be a
recipient of His revelation, the object of the divine
reconciliation.'
(CD 1/2, p. 198)
The implications of pneumatology for Barth's under¬
standing of time are most considerable and will be raised
explicitly in Chapter IX at a later stage in this thesis.
What concerns us here (and this is the significant conclusion
of this first section of this chapter upon which we will build)
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is that the relation of time and eternity is in corres¬
pondence with the unity of God and man achieved in the
incarnation itself. There is an 1identity1 of time and
eternity which is not simple but based upon this functional
and unique co-location of God and man in the unio hypostatica.
Barth, in referring with approval to Polanus* insight,
30
provides an explicit allusion which confirms our inferences:
•...the recognition...of the enhypostasis of the human
nature of Christ, namely, that He also exists as a man,
not in virtue of a possibility of existence proper to
his humanity, but solely in virtue of His divine
existence in the eternal mode of being of the Word or
Son of God. His existence in time is one and the
same as His eternal existence as the begotten of God
the Father.'
(CD 1/2, p. 193)
It is upon this basis that Barth may argue in the
context of both the incarnation and the Easter event that:
•Now it is no accident that for us the Virgin birth
is paralleled by the miracle of which the Easter
witness speaks, the miracle of the empty tomb. The
two miracles belong together. They constitute, as it
were,a single sign, the special function of which,
compared with other signs and wonders of the New
Testament witness, is to describe and mark out the
existence of Jesus Christ, amid the many other
existences in human history, as that human historical
existence in which God is Himself, God is alone, God
is directly the Subject, the temporal reality of
which is not only called forth, created, conditioned
and supported by the eternal reality of God, but is
identical with it.*
(CD 1/2, p. 183)
Within this organic and functionally integrated scheme
of events and theological interpretation (or, with more
fidelity to Barth's theological method, their explication)
the identity of time and eternity is asserted not as a mere
30. Cf. also CD III/2, pp. 51,66: •...but that it is His
very participation in the divine which is the basis of
His humanity*.
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contiguity of natures or attributes (or moreover as a
antithesis of finite and infinite) but as the direct
corollary and consequence of the Christological postulates
comprised in the unio hypostatics. In the vere Deus vere
homo of the incarnation that impulse of God1s freedom and
grace - which we have seen stems from 'primal history' and
God's eternity - fulfils itself in the humanity of Jesus
Christ that is given its ontological ground in the Word of
God's assumption of that flesh. Correspondingly the
'temporal reality' of this humanity, the basis of soterio-
logy as that with which man may enter into solidarity, is
'called forth, created, conditioned and supported by the
eternal reality of God' and above all 'is identical with it?.^
Thus the relation of time and eternity is truly Christolo¬
gical in the Church Dogmatics as it is implicit within the
unique identity of God and man in the incarnation. This
is a 'pure fact', a 'Novum' in Earth's view, which cannot be
deduced from other postulates or inferred from material out¬
side the reality of the Incarnation itself in its utter
singularity. The 'self-enclosed circle' of the events of
revelation bounded by the Virgin birth and the empty tomb
is the self-identification of God with man and of eternity
with time in a unique collusion which constitutes the basis
upon which we may unfold the theological architectonic of
Volume IV of the Church Dogmatics. In the first part of
this chapter the primary postulate of Barth's Christology
has been exposed. The pure reality which Barth asserted in
31. CD 1/2, p. 182.
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God's Time and Our Time has undergone an initial investi¬
gation and clarification.
As we have seen Barth establishes the absolute
primacy of Jesus Christ as the basis of Christology through
the assertion of the hypostatic unity of the divinity and
humanity, the ontological correlation of God and man. In
Volume IV the doctrine of reconciliation (Versohnung) is a
soteriological elaboration of the primary Christological
postulates of 1/2. In Barth's own estimation he has:
'..."actualised" the doctrine of the incarnation,
i.e., we have used the main traditional concepts,
unio, cornmunio and communicatio, as concentrically
related termsto describe one and the same ongoing
process. We have stated it all (including the
Chalcedonian definition, which is so important in
dogmatic history, and rightly became normative) in
the form of a denotation and description of a single
event. We have taken it that the reality of Jesus
Christ, which is the theme of Christology, is
identical with this event, and this event with the
reality of Jesus Christ.'
(CD IV/2, p. 105)
This representation of Jesus Christ 'as His being in
52
His act' is the consummation of the union Barth achieves
between his profound actualism (in both his doctrine of God
and Cnristology) and the whole-hearted adoption of patristic
theological ontology. In this Barth has absorbed positive
aspects of a traditional theological dichotomy and moved
beyond the antitheses of 'person' (ontology) and Vorks*
(actualism).^ The fulfilment of the covenant in the
atonement which is the central doctrine of Christian theology
32. CD IV/2, p. 105.
33. Here we see the fulfilment of T.F. Torrance's evaluation
of Barth quoted above at the beginning of Chapter III, p.95.
God's being is being thought into his acts and God's
acts into his being.
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rests upon this dynamic appropriation of the unique identity
of God and man in the unio hypostatics. The identity which
is to be understood as existing between eternity and time in
Jesus Christ is secondary to this initial unity and identity.
We will now state and analyse the role of this relation in
Volume IV which underlies the massive complexity of Barth's
exposition and only yields to thorough study based upon
provisional acceptance of his initial postulates and
systematically applied methodology.
Volume IV of the Church Dogmatics is massive in
conception and intricately detailed in execution. Because of
this the final section of this chapter will be concerned with
the basis of the unity of time and eternity exclusively. In
this volume Barth achieves the synthesis of the doctrine of
God elaborated in CD 1/1 and II/l and in the Christology of
CD 1/2. This is shown clearly by E. Jungel"^ and the
following exposition owes a debt to his insights which carry
critical understanding of the doctrine of God in the Church
Dogmatics as 'God's being in becoming*, to an unprecedented
level of difficulty and penetration.
The centre of the subject-matter of the Church's
dogmatics is in Barth's view, 'the covenant fulfilled in the
atonement'and the most general description of this
centre is 'God with us', that is,
'the description of an act of God, or better, of God
Himself in this act of His. It is a report, not
therefore a statement of fact on the basis of general
34. That is in Gottes Sein 1st im Werden, referred to above
in Chapters II and III. See relevant notes.
35. CD IV/1, p. 3.
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observation or consideration. God with us, or what
is meant by these three words, is not an object of
investigation or speculation. It is not a state,
but an event. God i_s, of course, and that in the
strictest originally and properly, so that everything
else which is, in a way which cannot be compared at
all with His being, can be so only through Him, only
in relation to Him, only from Him and to Him. Now
even when He is "with us", He is what He is and in
the way that He is; and all the power and truth of
His being "with us", is the power and truth of His
incomparable being which is proper to Him and to Him
alone, His being as God. He is both in His life in
eternity in Himself, and also in His life as Creator
in the time of the world created by Him; by and in
Himself, and also above and in this world, and
therefore according to the heart of the Christian
message with us men.*
(CD IV/1, p. 6)
This fundamental duality of the 'event', the 'act of
God' is 'an activity, both in eternity and in worldly time,
Both in Himself as Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and in His
relation to man and all creation'. This has its roots in
the doctrine of God as 'actus purus et singularis* in Barth's
"V7
radically dynamic account in CD II/l. Again the over¬
coming of the distinction of Deus revelatus and Deus
absconditus in the Church Dogmatics, as demonstrated by Jungel
has its foundations in the doctrine of God, its development
in the doctrine of election (CD II/2) but is expressed in
Christological terms in CD IV.
Barth's exposition of the relationship of eternity and
time and its expression in the fulfilment of time in Jesus
Christ is founded upon the unlo hypostatics .which is the
absolute, yet historically contingent mystery given in the
'simple reality' of God's revelation. That it is in fact
36. Qp.cit.. p. 7.
37. Cf. Chapter VI of CD II/l, The Reality of God and
Chapter III of this study.
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God who is 'with us1 is established by the assertion that
Jesus Christ is truly God in his Word, who from eternity
has a common history with man. This of course raises
the question as to how far Barth's Christology implies
the retrojection of a timeless principle of humanity into
God. In this thesis we shall reflect Barth's own
fidelity to the New Testament and the Fathers seen in
Christ's 'begottenness*, the keystone to understanding the
relation of creation and the incarnation in temporal terms.
Barth argues as follows:
'From all eternity God elected and determined that
He Himself would become man for us men. From all
eternity He determined that men would be those for
whom He is God: His fellow men. In willing this, in
willing Jesus Christ, He wills to be our God and He
wills that we should be His people. Ontologically,
therefore, the covenant of grace is already included
and grounded in Jesus Christ, in the human form and
content which God willed to give His Word from all
eternity. The order of cognition cannot be disobedient
to, but must follow, the actual order of things.'
(CD IV/1, p. 45)
The covenant of grace is the presupposition of the
atonement, the basis of the reconciliation of men to God
and the fulfilment of creation and its priority is secured
through God's own self-determination. This self-determin¬
ation is the soteriological counterpart of the primal
history of the election of the man Jesus Christ for in him
we do not merely encounter the Lord and Head of the Church,
the 'One who has saved us from death' who was 'born in time,
38
at His own time' but the One who is:
'"the first-born of all creation" (Col. 1,16) - the
first and eternal Word of God delivered and fulfilled
in time. As very God and very man He is the
38. CD IV/1, p. 48.
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concrete reality and actuality of the divine command
and promise, the content of the will of God which
exists prior to its fulfilment, the basis of the
whole project and actualisation of creation and the
whole process of divine providence from which all
created being and becoming comes.*
(CD IV/1, p. 48)
As we may now see that the divine pole of the God-man
Jesus Christ is essentially the identity spelt out in *that
Jesus Christ, very God and very man, born and living and
acting and suffering and conquering in time, is as such the
one eternal Word of God at the beginning of all things* and
that 'as the beginning of all things the presupposition of
the atonement is a single, self-sufficient, independent free
work of God in itself, which is not identical with the divine
work in creation or the divine creative will realised in
39
this work*. This axis of eternal will and temporal
work (these categories are not employed exclusively but
merely indicatively) is of decisive significance in relating
together Christology, the incarnation and creation, and in
therefore preparing the ground for analysis of man in the
context of creation, that is of 'Man in his Time*. The
basis for Barth's arguments at this juncture is as we have
seen not to be found in the immediate context but is the
product of his fundamental conception of God which has been
explicated at length from the temporal aspect.
The ultimate primacy of the eternal, that is of grace,
is such that man is confronted with the 'free covenant of
grace' which he may ^perceive and accept' only in the 'first
eternal Word of God as spoken to him in the atonement
59. Op.cit., p. 49.
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accomplished in time in Jesus Christ'.^0 The identity of
God and man in Jesus Christ is constitutive and orders our
understanding of the relation of God, grace and creation.
The incarnation is the touch-stone of Christian theology and
its theological possibility and rationale lies in the
doctrine of God and the Trinity and its fulfilment in the
realisation of Christology-soteriology. The axis of
covenant and atonement points therefore to the heart of the
matter, for given that 'this grace is truth, the first and
final truth behind which there is concealed no other or
different truth* then 'the presupposition of the atonement
revealed in the atonement* is the * first and eternal Word of
God as spoken to him in time*.^1 In consequence,
*The first and eternal Word of God, which underlies
and precedes the creative will and work as the
beginning of all things in God, means in fact Jesus
Christ. It is identical with the One who, very God
and very man, born and living and suffering and
conquering in time, accomplishes the atonement. It
is He alone who is the content and form of the
gracious thought and will and resolve of God in
relation to the world and man before ever these were
and as God willed and created them.*
(CD IV/1, p. 51)
In other words grace precedes creation and, contrary
to popular understanding, grace does not repair or merely
reconstitute 'nature' or the created order but lies at the
very heart of God's own being and will in Jesus Christ, the
dynamic self-interpretative Word of God whose being lies in
the 'inner basis and essence of God.Eternity and time
40# , p. 51*
41. Ibid.
42. Op.cit., p. 52.
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are the temporal counterparts of God's scheme of promise
and fulfilment wrought in the eternal Word of promise which
effects the atonement in time. This, priority of eternity
is not the cause of a distinction between time and eternity
which could lead to a dialectical tension or dualism because
the eternal Word cannot be conceived of apart from his
humanity. We may not abstract from 'the eternal Son of God
as He lived and died and rose again in time* so as to
postulate a oCtrxpKO^ , a second 'person' of the Trinity,
Ax
a so-called 'eternal Word of God in abstracto' The
44
important passage in which this quotation occurs again
calls our attention to Barth's doctrine of God and the Trinity.
As regards our main concerns with the problem of time, we
find that our conceptions of time are being stretched and
transformed far beyond any merely dialectical tension of
time and eternity. The truly theological and Christological
structure of Barth's thought is exposed which conditions and
indeed constitutes his doctrine of time.
This passage is worthy of examination for in it Barth
shows where exactly he is to place the balance, in
Christological terms, between eternity and time as temporal
counterparts of his theological integration of act and being.
Insofar as it points backwards to the doctrine of the Trinity
it refers us to that stage in this investigation of Barth's
understanding of the problem of time in which he discusses





as he himself posits himself in revelation. Barth
crystallises our present problem in the establishment of the
divinity of Jesus Christ without allowing him to become
reflected positively;thereby the peculiarly Lutheran and
Reformed distinction of Deus revelatus and Deus absconditus
is overcome. The focal point of Barth's gaze is upon what
God is seen to have actually established as a matter of
theological fact. For: 'According to the free and gracious
will of God the eternal Son of God is Jesus Christ as He
lived and died and rose again in time, and none other. He
is the decision of God in time, and yet according to what
U f)
took place in time the decision was made from all eternity'.
As in Earth's words, we cannot go back on this, let us then
look at what he achieves with this central and irreducible
fact of Jesus Christ, the decision of God in time, made from
eternity.
We recall at this point the apparent tension that
might exist in the Church Dogmatics between the act and will
of God in and from eternity and its temporal realisation in
the incarnation. This was initially considered in relation
to the contrasting concepts oftime employed which lead to a
a linguistic tension of 'duration* and 'division'. Having
left this superficial level to probe the theological
structures which dictate such linguistic formulae the
following related questions must inform assessment of the
45. Jtfngel has pointed to God's self-interpretation and
the resultant hermeneutical method.
In this the earlier foundations are
46. CD IV/1, p. 52
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passage we are to quote at length. How are we to under¬
stand the contingent yet absolute identity of the eternal
One with the One who became flesh and dwelt amongst us?
Given the intrinsic relation between the two expressed in
the unio hypostatics how are we to conceive the distinction
between the mutual indispensability (if it is such) of the
categories of eternal being-in-act and the temporal atone¬
ment? Such a broad question resolves itself into more
specific problems. How far is the temporality and humanity
to be conceived of as existing as an eternal timeless
principle in God as a counterweight to the Xoyoj, ico-ecpKo^ ?
What significance does the temporal activity of Jesus Christ
in the atonement wrought in time (that is our time and
history) have for understanding of his divinity? As a
corollary to this how is it possible for an act of grace of
pre-temporal status to be fulfilled in time and yet at the
same time have this eternal significance? Further to this,
in what way, other than as mere Christological assertion
does humanity secure its solidarity with Jesus Christ in the
atonement? More specifically, if man is already in such
solidarity what change took place in the atonement and what
change may be understood to happen upon conversion? All
these questions hang upon Barth*s answers given in his
basic exposition in the passage that is referred to in the
following paragraphs.
God reconciles man (that is the man Jesus Christ) to
himself in his will as from eternity and sets his seal
upon this in the atonement. Through the truly human flesh
of Jesus Christ and his activity in our time the eternal
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Son of God opens the atonement to man. Only through the
mysterious, miraculous and unique bond of the divinity and
humanity of Jesus Christ in the unio hypostatics can the
universality of God's will and the openness to humanity of
the incarnation and the atonement be posited and maintained.
This is the primal fact and ontological key to the Christology
and soteriology of the Church Dogmatics. In the passage that
follows there occurs the primary and central goal of the
impulse, the movement of which we have traced through the
thought of Barth. This movement of God from eternity to re¬
veal himself - rendered concrete in the election of Jesus
Christ in 'primal history* - has been followed out from its
basis in God's dynamic being in the doctrine of the Word of
God, through the doctrines of eternity and election, to the
incarnation (in Chapters II-VI of this thesis). In the
following statement Barth places the Christological core in
its place as the basis upon which God and man are open to
each other on the ontological foundations of the incarnation.
'But if Jesus Christ is the content and form of the
first and eternal Word of God, then that means
further that the beginning of all things, of the being
of all men and of the whole world, even the divine
willing of creation, is preceded by God's covenant
with man as its basis and purpose: His promise, in
which He binds and pledges Himself to man, and His
command by which He pledges and binds man to Himself.
At the beginning of all things in God there is the
Gospel and the Law, the gracious address of God and
the gracious claim of God, both directed to man, both
the one Word of the Deus pro nobis who is the one God
and beside whom there is no other. For Jesus Christ
- not an empty Logos, but Jesus Christ the incarnate
Word, the baby born in Bethlehem, the man put to death
at Golgotha and raised again in the garden of Joseph
of Aramathea, the man whose history this is - is the
unity of the two. He is both at one and the same time.
He is the promise and the command, the Gospel and the
Law, the address of God to man and the claim of God
upon man. That He is both as the Word of God spoken
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in His work, as the Word of God which has become work,
is something which belongs to Himself as the eternal
Son of God for Himself and prior to us. In this He
is the pre-existent Deus pro nobis. He alone is at
once and altogether very God and very man. To that
extent He alone is there at the beginning of all
things. As the basis and purpose of the covenant He
and He alone is the content of the eternal will of God
which precedes the whole being of man and of the
world. But that which He is for Himself and prior
to us He is with a view to us. He is, therefore, the
concrete reality and actuality of the promise and
command of God, the fulfilment of both, very God and
very man, in one person amongst us, as a fellow-man.
This first and eternal Word of God is not spoken in
the void, but addressed to us, Therefore the event of
the atonement is clearly His being for our sake, for
our salvation, for the restoration of our relationship
with God interrupted by sin. It is, therefore, this
relationship with God, grounded on God's relationship
with us, which in His person, that is so different and
yet directed to us and in its humanity so near to us
because perfectly identical with us, is revealed as
the basis of the atonement and made effective for us -
the pre-existent Deus pro nobis.*K
(CD lv/1, pp. 53-4)
It would be possible to question this passage in several
47
ways. Following Wingren the pretemporal location of Gospel
and Law 'at the beginning of all things in God' might well be
queried in relation to the alleged sin-interrupted relation¬
ship with God which is subsequently healed by the atonement.
Again the role of the Holy Spirit in this context might well
be examined and the adequacy of Earth's doctrine at this
point assessed. For our present purposes in positive terms
we note that Barth forges the links of his ontological chain
which, when understood through the categories of time and
eternity, form the inmost structure of the Church Dogmatics
47. Cf. G. Wingren, Creation and Law, Edinburgh, 1961, is a
trenchant attack upon Earth's alleged elision of the
distinction of 'Creation and Gospel', cf. pp. 13-14 etc.
This relates to our study inasmuch as we are investi¬
gating the structure of Barth's temporal distinctions
and the priorities implicit in traditional thinking
about this distinction.
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as an integrated account of God, Christ and creation. The
logic of Earth*s argument is indeed an 'ontologic* and it
runs as follows.
A divine-human reciprocity is established according
to the eternal (that is pre-temporal) will of God in the pre-
historical 'primal history' of election. This becomes
contingent and historical in the God-man Jesus Christ, who
bears in himself God's 'address* to us as well as his 'claim'
upon us. Jesus Christ is in himself the promise and the
command of God. In that he is vere Deus and vere homo he is
able to fulfil with perfection the promise of 'gospel* and
the command of 'Law'. The reconciliation of God and man is
open to us because his humanity is identical with our
humanity and on this basis our response has become a
possibility open to us for the covenant-promise has been
fulfilled in the atonement-life of Jesus Christ.
Barth proceeds to explicate the activity of the vere
Deus. vere homo in another highly important passage which we
again quote at length so as to grasp without misunderstanding
the precision of Earth's thought at this point, for the
relation of eternity and time rests upon a correct grasp of
this. The fulfilment of the covenant in the atonement
does not produce a merely static openness of being, but on
the basis cf the true dual identity, a living, dynamic work
establishes the way of reconciliation. The bridge is built
from God to man: we do not add stones but walk over it.
•He and He alone is very God and very man in a
temporal fulfilment of God's eternal will to be the
true God of man and to let the man who belongs to Him
become and be true man. Ultimately, therefore, Jesus
Christ alone is the content of the eternal will of God,
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the eternal covenant between God and man. He is this
as the Word of God to us and the work of God for us,
and therefore in a way quite different from and not
to be compared with anything we may become as
hearers of this Word and those for whose sake this
work is done. Yet in this difference, in the majesty
with which He confronts us, but does confront us, He
is the Word and work of the eternal covenant. In the
truth and power of this eternal Word and work He
speaks the Word and accomplishes the work of the
atonement in its temporal occurrence. And as we look
at this Word and work, and trust in it and build upon
it, we can be assured of the atonement which in it
has been made in time. And since Jesus Christ is
not only the subject but also the eternal and primary
basis of this act of atonement, this act is
definitively distinguished from all others. It
demands our unconditional recognition. It lays claim
to our regard. And we can have the certainty and
the joy and freedom of the faith that in spite of our
sin and all its consequences it has taken place once
and for all. All this depends on a right recognition
of the presupposition of the atonement in the counsel
of God, and especially on the fact that we perceive
and maintain the content and form of the eternal
divine counsel exactly as it is fulfilled and revealed
in time.•
(CD IV/1, p. 54)
God eternally wills to be the true God of man in his
covenant made in Jesus Christ, vere Deus, and to allow man to
become and to be true man in the atonement wrought in the
vere homo of that same Jesus Christ, who is in himself the
Word and work of God. Jesus Christ is, yet in the divine
condescension and glorification, he becomes in time, in the
accomplishment of the atonement. In this unique act of
atonement he is both subject and basis in a work of the Word
which has divine validity yet human fulfilment. As a
universal, but nevertheless contingent act it demands our
unconditional recognition. The significance of this being
and becoming-in-act is maintained by its origin in the
eternal will of God. Its relevance to man (that is to
ourselves) is upheld by the fact that it is true humanity
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that is reconciled to God in the atonement. As Barth
argues in the last sentence of this quotation, the balance
of eternity and time must be maintained for they are
mutually necessary. Neither the divine and, therefore,
eternal being of God in covenantal promise and intension-
ality nor the fulfilment in temporal action can be weakened.
Both must inter-subsist if the covenant is to be fulfilled
in the atonement on the basis of the God-man Jesus Christ
as the revelation of God. This identity which is unique,
yet of universal import, is manifested in the mutual, but
distinct equilibrium and interaction of the Goclhood and man¬
hood of Jesus Christ. It is the core of Barth*s Christology
from which flow the beneficia Christi and the architectonic
of divine movement in The Way of the Son of God and The Home¬
coming of the Son of Man. On the foundation of a truly
dynamic understanding of the unio hypostatica the being and
act of God are integrated in a Christology which is
soteriology, and in a soteriology which is wholly Christolo-
gical.
In this integration of Christology and soteriology
Barth has once more taken up and developed seeds of thought
latent in earlier theology. Here Barth refers particularly
to the Federal theology of Coccejus and the attempt to
historicise the activity and revelation of God. The notion
of the * covenant of grace* originating in Zwingli and Bullinger
and present in the two chapters of Calvin's Institutes II,
9-11 (Vhich are untouched by his doctrine of predestination")
forms the clue to Barth's reflections. In the degeneration
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of Protestant scholasticism an excessive tri-personalism
in God was expressed in the growth of the inter-trinitarian
pact1. This 'mythology' was matched by an attendant atrophy
in the 'covenant of grace*. On the one hand Barth's
emphasis on the unity of God is a protest against this
•mythology' (this is borne out by Jtlngel's interpretation of
his doctrine of the Trinity) and on the other his Christology
is the conscious rejection of the gulf that developed
between the doctrine of Christ and the temporal outworking
of the decretum absolutum of the eternal but distant God.
That is the alleged gulf between the nature of God in himself
and his revelation in Christ. In the context of the unity
of God (that is the revealed God i_s the hidden God) the
doctrine of reconciliation is to be developed.
In these two chapters an attempt has been made to
provide an account of Barth's understanding of the inter¬
action of eternity and time in the incarnation. At this
juncture the vast architectonic of his doctrine of recon¬
ciliation opens before the reader of the Church Dogmatics in
which the apparent paradoxes (a whole series of them) of
humiliation and exaltation are developed on the foundation
provided by the true God, true man, and actual God-manhood
of Jesus Christ. The basis which has been stated above is
most crucial to this study for in it can be seen the
consistent outworking of the fundamental theological postu¬
lates that have structured Barth's doctrines of God,
revelation and election. So as to complete our Christolo-
gical quest we now examine the nodal point of contact of
time and eternity which is a development of the relation that
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was noted in the first part of this chapter. Here eternity-
was seen to apprehend time in a manner commensurate with
the doctrine of the enhypostasls and anhypostasls of Jesus
Christ.
Earth reacts against kenotic theories and makes a full
statement of his own position which has "been apparent "before
in adumbration. This must be presented in some detail in
the concluding part of this chapter for it is only by means
of this that we may understand how Barth is to relate
finite and infinite categories. An understanding of the
antitheses of finite and infinite attributes in terms of
paradox and antimony or contradiction underlies the kenotic
position which Barth presents in brutal generalisation. In
the light of the contrast that Barth himself draws we will
be able to crystallise this encounter and so open a path
to an examination of the temporal implications of the
theological impulses that structure the Church Dogmatics.
How can God give himself and not in Barth's words,
'give himself away'? According to the kenotic theory we
have in the incarnation, 'what is noetically and logically
an absolute paradox, with what is ontically the fact of a
cleft or rift or gulf in God Himself, between His being and
essence in Himself and His activity and work as the Reconciler
. 48
of the world created by Him*. In direct contrast to this,
Barth, as we have seen, has been at all points concerned to
avoid the reading-back of dichotomies in being into God's
own being. The kenotic conclusion drawn without prevari¬
cation or equivocation postulates ^ust such a radical
48. CD IV/1, p. 184.
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dichotomy, for on this account:
'It therefore pleased Him in this latter, for the
redemption of the world, not to alter Himself, but
to deny the immutability of His being, His divine
nature, to be in discontinuity with Himself, to be
against Himself, to set Himself in self-contradiction.
In Himself He was still omnipresent, almighty,
eternal and glorious One, the All-Holy and All-
Righteous who could not be tempted. But at the
same time among us and for us He was quite different,
not omnipresent and eternal but limited in time and
space, not almighty but impotent, not glorious but
lowly, open to radical and total attack in respect
of His righteousness and holiness.'
(CD IV/1, p. 184)
This a determination of 'God against God', and although
Barth grants that no kenoticist would readily consent to
such a bald characterisation of his. position,this is its
logical reductio. The opposite is the only possible
alternative. Barth develops an account which is supremely
actualistic in the sense of being a functional interpre¬
tation of the relation of the so-called 'two natures', which,
as we have noted previously, is determined by the unity of
hypostases, and upon which the relation of other categories
depends.
•God gives Himself, but He does not give Himself away.
He does not give up being God in becoming a creature,
in becoming man. He does not cease to be God. He
does not come into conflict with Himself. He does
not sin when in unity with the man Jesus He mingles
with sinners and takes their place. And when He
dies in His unity with this man, death does not gain
any power for Him. He exists as God in the right¬
eousness and the life, the obedience and the re¬
surrection of this man. He makes His own the being
of man in contradiction against Him, but He does not
make common cause with it. He also makes His own
the being of man under the curse of this contradiction,
but in order to do away with it as He suffers it. He
acts as Lord over this contradiction even as He
subjects Himself to it. He frees the creature in
becoming a creature.'
(CD IV/1, p. 185)
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The priority of the dynamic union is not exclusive
but is certainly primary in Barth's thought. (Some,
notably N. Smart, would argue that Barth evades the more
•philosophical* issues of finite and infinite categories
and so on in his Christological resolution).^ It is only
in the light of the reconciliation initially wrought in Jesus
Christ, which is in and from eternity, that world and God
are reconciled 'in Him1. In virtue of his doctrine of God
with its great emphasis upon the divine freedom Barth embraces
the distance of world and God within the infinite potential
of the divine being revealed in Jesus Christ. H. Hartwell's
judgement is correct that in Barth's Church Dogmatics Jesus
50
Christ is the key to understanding the universe and man.
Once more we turn to the words of Barth for in them can be
seen the subordination of attributes of divinity (and the
categories of * finite' and 'infinite' into which they fall)
to the actual interaction of God and man declared in Jesus
Christ, the revelation of God. It is as always as a
corollary of the central reconciliation in Jesus Christ that
the relation of eternity and time is to be understood.
'We have to think after the following fashion. As
God was in Christ, far from being against Himself, or
at disunity with Himself, He has put into effect the
freedom of His divine love, the love in which He is
divinely free. He has therefore done and revealed
that which corresponds to His divine nature. His
immutability does not stand in the way of this. It
must not be denied, but this possibility is included
in His unalterable being. He is absolute, infinite,
exalted, active, impassible, transcendent, but in all
49. Article, 'Karl Barth' in the Encyclopaedia of Philosophy,
edited by Paul Edwards.
50. The Theology of Karl Barth: an Introduction. London,
1964, p. 9o.
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this He is the One who loves in freedom, the One who
is free in His love, and therefore not His own
prisoner. He is all this as the Lord, and in such
a way that He embraces the opposites of these
concepts even while He is superior to them. He is
all this as the Creator, who has created the world
as the reality distinct from Himself but willed and
affirmed by Him and therefore as His world, as the
world which belongs to Him, in relation to which He
can be God and act as God in an absolute way and
also a relative, in an infinite and also a finite,
in an exalted and also a lowly, in an active and
also a passive, in a transcendent and also an
immanent, and finally, in a divine and also a human -
indeed, in relation to which He Himself can become
worldly, making His own both its form, the forma servi,
and also its cause; and all without giving up His own
form, the forma Dei, and His own glory, but adopting
the form and cause of man into the most perfect
communion with his own, accepting solidarity with
the world.'
(CD IV/1, pp. 136-7)
As regards the problem of time the relation of
contrasts is consistent with this mutual realisation of the
forma servi and forma Dei in God's revelation in Jesus Christ.
Barth argues that, 'The eternity in which He Himself is true
time and the Creator of all time is revealed in the fact
that, although our time is that of sin and death, He can
enter it and Himself be temporal in it, yet without ceasing
51
to be eternal, able to be the Eternal in time'. This
resolution of the antithesis of eternity and time is
perfectly consistent with the presuppositions that we have
explored, stated and analysed at length. God's eternity
has been thought of as an integral factor in his nature and
being, not, as we have said before, an extraneous item on
the theological agenda for a doctrine of God. God's
eternity is not the contradiction or annihilation of time
but its fulfilment. God is both Creator and Reconciler
51. CD IV/1, pp. 187-8.
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through Jesus Christ. In entering into our time God
reconciles and fulfils it in the fullness of his eternity,
that is 'God's time1. This reconciliation is worked out
in and through Jesus Christ and so it is no surprise to us
that in his Christology Barth presents an understanding of
time which is the product of a fully consistent integration
of doctrines of God, as being-in-act and in triunity, of
eternity as the expression of God's power and freedom, and
of Christ as the unto hypostatica of vere Deus. vere homo.
The 'greedy dialectic' is resolved by a comprehensive
integration of Christian theology of great power, cohesion
and consistency. Thus if we call into question Barth's
understanding of time we must respond on an extended front
to the total scheme of his endeavour. Such criticisms as
that of Cullmann in respect of Barth having remnants of
•alien presuppositions' do not impinge upon the mere
definitions employed in his temporal language but upon the
total structure of his theology as we find it in the Church
Dogmatics. We have shown that to treat of time or
eternity apart from this total theological effort is strictly
meaningless if any respect is to be accorded to the purpose
of Barth's work and its execution. In conclusion we shall
summarise the contents of this chapter and indicate the
direction to be taken as we continue to explore and analyse
Barth*s theological doctrine of time.
In this chapter we began with an examination of the
assumption of grace and Barth's appropriation of the
classical doctrine of enhypostasis and anhypostasis as it is
to be found in Volume 1/2 of the Church Dogmatics. This was
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shown to he the basis of the dynamic and functionally
realised Christology of CD IV. The centrality of the
Christological resolution of the utter distinction, yet
unity in identity, of the God-man Jesus Christ as the basis
of the relation of eternity and time. Thus we saw how
the problem of time and eternity in the Church Dogmatics is
intrinsically and irreducibly theological in its form and
solution. Barth has taken with thorough-going seriousness
the insights of John 1/14 and Colossians II/9. The Word of
became flesh and dwelt among us in the fullness of the
Godhead. The central act of graceful condescension is
explicated along the radical lines foreseen only by Gregory
of Nyssa who stated 'that the descent to humility which took
place in the incarnation of the Word is not only not excluded
52
by the divine nature but signifies its greatest glory'.
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Creation is as we have seen consequent upon, rather than
temporally (or eternally) prior to the election of Jesus
Christ who is both the 'creative actualisation of being, yet
. 54
also and with it creaturely actualisation'. In this area
the problem of time becomes acute where creation and actual¬
isation are in direct proximity. The threads of theological
theory converge in the most considerable passage (in terms
of length if nothing else) on time in the Church Dogmatics.
Creation is the theological theme (related as always to the
revelation of God in Jesus Christ) which will lead us to an
analysis of Man in his Time.
52. Or.Cat., 24, quoted by Barth in CD IV/1, p. 192.





In this thesis we have pursued the impulse of Barth*s
thought in the Church Dogmatics in accordance with its
theological structure and movement. This meant that we
placed Christology as it is found in JCD 1/2 and CD IV before
our consideration of creation. Only in the light of
revelation, that is God's revelation in Jesus Christ, can we
come to a knowledge of our own creaturely existence. In
this chapter a new level of complexity is added to our investi¬
gation of the problem of time in its theological context
because as was seen in Chapter VII, the disjunction of un¬
created and created being is reflected in the distinction of
eternity and time made in the Christian affirmation of
creation. Thus we are to approach the problem of creation
in relation to the fundamental but contrasting impulses of
Origen and Athanasius. Having outlined and examined Barth's
doctrine of creation in this context we are then to turn to
Barth's exposition of Man in his Time, where the (fallen)
time of creation in which man exists is encountered by the
time of revelation, God's time, both in the history of
Jesus Christ and in the existence of man. Thus in the
second part of the chapter the threads we have followed in
this thesis are woven into a single cord. Whereas in
Christology the heart and pulse of Barth's Church Dogmatics
is to be found, the contents of the passage usually taken
as Earth's definitive statement on time (i.e. in III/2, Man
in his Time) is the product of what has gone before, not an
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isolated account which can be taken apart from the
dogmatic presuppositions that underlie it. Bearing this
in mind we now proceed to a statement of Barth's under¬
standing of creation and time, and of man as the subject
of creation and redemption in time.
'The insight that man owes his existence and form,
together with all the reality distinct from God, to
God's creation, is achieved only in the reception and
answer of the divine self-witness, that is only in
faith in Jesus Christ, i.e., in the knowledge of the
unity of Creator and creature actualised in Him, and
in the present mediated by Him, under the right and
in the experience of the goodness of the Creator
towards His creature.'
(CD III/l, p. 3)
Barth's understanding c£ creation cannot be divorced
from his doctrines of Christ and of God. Barth places
Christology and creation in close relation for 'creation is
the external basis of the covenant' and 'the covenant the
internal basis of creation'. The great initial crisis of
Christian theology with regard to creation was to distinguish
the being of God and that of the created order and at the
same time to preserve the divinity of the Son in the
eternity of his divine generation, whilst not infringing
upon the integrity of the doctrine of God. So as to
allow Barth's solutions to emerge a brief characterisation
of the patristic debate on creation will be given. This
will provide the criteria and norms by which the achievements
of Barth's supremely integrated theology may be judged.
The main emphasis of the Christian faith inimical to
the Greek mind was its doctrine of creation which denied the
eternity of the world and implied its creation ex nihilo.
Over against the Greek understanding of the eternal cosmos
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as being necessarily existent (for its non-existence was in¬
conceivable) the Christian belief in the creation of the
cosmos ex nihllo implied a two-fold contingency. First, the
cosmos could have not existed at all. Second, the Creator
could have not created. The creation had been brought into
existence and sustained by the sovereign will of God. The
radical transcendence of God in his trinitarian being could
not emerge into freedom until the Greek philosophical
hierarchy of divine being and self-disclosure in creative
and redemptive activity had been overcome. This difficulty
beset the Apologists who, in the words of Florovsky, 'could
not distinguish consistently between the categories of the
Divine "Being" and the Divine "Revelation" ad extra, in the
world'
If we compare the parts played by Origen and Athanasius
in this controversy over the ontology of God, Word and cosmos
then we may see how Barth once more strives towards an
articulation of the truth which penetrates into and beyond
the tensions and antitheses presented in Christian antiquity.
As we shall see Barth presents aspects of creation and
Christology which pertain to both Origen and Athanasius yet
he achieves a dynamic synthesis over against the contrast
between them and the actual confrontation evident in
theological history.
Origen argued that God could never become anything
that he has not always been for (in the words of Florovsky)
1. 'The Concept of Creation in St. Athanasius', Studia
Patristica, Volume 6, 1962, p. 38. In this fine article
G. Florovsky provides a highly relevant comparison of
Athanasius and Origen which I have used in the early part
of this chapter.
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'There is nothing simply "potential" in God's being, every-
p
thing being eternally actualised*. In consequence, so
Florovsky argues, Origen held that:
'God is always the Father of the Only Begotten, and
the Son is co-eternal with the Father: any other
assumption would have comprised the essential
immutability of the Divine Being. But God is always
the Creator and the Lord. Indeed, if God is Creator
at all - and it is an article of faith that He is
Lord and Creator - we must necessarily assume that He
had always been Creator and Lord. For, obviously,
God never "advances" toward what He had not been
before. For Origen this implied inevitably also an
eternal actualization of the world's existence, of
all those things over which God's might and Lordship
were exercised.'
(Florovsky, p. 39)
If God had been (following Origen's interpretation of
the Septuagint) from eternity this could only
\ s
be so if Toe loiVfoC had also existed from eternity. This
could allow no qualitative distinction between the being of
the Holy Trinity and the being of the world or between the
being of Christ and that of other creatures. In the eternal
actualisation of the world, temporal sequence, with its
traditional implication of change, was excluded. The world
must always be co-existent and therefore co-eternal with God.
This 'world' was the primordial world of spirits which
formed part of the one eternal hierarchical system of being
characteristic of Middle Platonism. Despite the apparent
monism of Origen's system with regard to the resolution of
the tension of eternity and time in favour of the former, he
nevertheless distinguished between the 'will* and 'being' of
God in relation to the generation of the Son. This safe¬
guarded the divine essence from division or separation, but
2. Art, cit., p. 39.
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in attributing both the generation of the Son and the
creation of the world to the will or counsel of the Father,
Origen placed the Son in the category of creatures. The
created order as a whole was not, however, contingent but
necessary in the sense of being eternally generated. Clearly
the problem of time and eternity is deeply enmeshed in this,
as we shall see when we compare Origen with Barth.
The tensions in Origen*s teaching were exploited by
the Arians, for he left but two options: either the eternity
of the world was to be rejected or the eternity of the Logos
was to be contested. If the world was temporal then the
eternity of the Logos was endangered and if Origen's
postulates were accepted the opponents of Arius could not deny
this temporality. God, in his 'unfathomable and incompre¬
hensible Being' was for Arius, Creator and the Logos a
privileged 'creature'. Only God could be truly in
Origen's primarily cosmological scheme.
Manifest flaws in the thought of Origen appeared
when it was exploited in Arian subordinationism for the
being of Creator, Christ and creature appeared at different
levels upon one extended hierarchy of being. The relation
of Father and Son was problematical and a wedge was driven
between them by the Arian arguments directed at the Origenist
position. Before we continue by stating Athanasius*
repudiation of this fundamental monism we must note one
danger which might threaten the stance adoptedty Barth.
Does Barth in his consistent and decisive emphasis upon the
movement of God from eternity in creation and reconciliation
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distinguish sufficiently between the being of God and that
of creation? Does he restrain sufficiently the impulse of
eternity to preserve the reality of time itself in the face
of his theology which is prima facie the most thoroughly
integrated Christology and potentially apocastatic doctrine
of Christ and creation since Origen*s synthesis? We must
retain these questions in mind when we now examine the
Athanasian reaction to Origen.
By direct contrast to Origen Athanasius held even in
his early theology to an 'ultimate and radical cleavage or
hiatus between the absolute Being of God and the contingent
existence of the world'.^ This distinction of created and
uncreated being is quite vital to the retention of the mutual,
but utterly distinct realities of God and the world which
must be correctly related, yet equally importantly distin¬
guished, without false disjunction or reductive synthesis.
Athanasius therefore asserted two modes of existence; the
being of God (eternal, immutable, 'immortal' and 'incorrupt-
able') and the flux of the cosmos (mutable, 'mortal*, liable
to change and 'corruption'). The existence of created
things was precarious but ordered and bound together by the
Logos. Athanasius rejected the doctrine of immanent
present in things for 'Creation stood only by the immediate
impact of the divine Logos'.^ The cosmos was created ex
nihilo by divine fiat and maintained in existence solely by
the Creator.
3» Art.cit.. p. 45.
4. Art.cit., p. 46.
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Despite the superficially 'Platonic* cast of
Athanasius' thought with regard to mortal man's partici¬
pation in the Logos, this Logos was in fact 'the Only-
begotten God', for, 'There was an absolute dissimilarity
between the Logos and the creatures'. The distinction of
the 'essence* and the 'power' of the Logos (inherited from
the Neoplatonic tradition and Clement of Alexandria) was
used by Athanasius to establish a thoroughly Christian onto¬
logy so as 'to discriminate strictly between the inner Being
of God and His creative and "providential" manifestation
5
ad extra, in the creaturely world'. By contrast in
; -Fcl
Origen there is an apoca'static impulse apparent in the unity
and the universality of the divine decree. Both the drive
to distinguish God's being in its sovereign primacy
characteristic of Athanasius, and the actualisation of God
in a unity of creation and redemption notable in Origen, are
present in the Church Dogmatics. Can Barth have both
elements or must one always triumph at the expense of the
other? In the thought of Athanasius the distinction of
uncreated and created being manifested in the radical
contingency of the cosmos and its dependence upon God is
quite decisive and is summed up as follows by Florovsky:
•The world owes its very existence to God's
sovereign will and goodness and stands, over the abyss
of its own nothingness and impotence, solely by His
quickening "Grace" - as it were sola gratia. But
the "Grace" abides in the world.'
(Florovsky, p. 47)
This summary of Athanasius could well be applied to
5. Art.cit., p. 47.
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Barth for in the latter's doctrine of creation the being of
God does not tend to annihilate or absorb creation but
affirms it in grace. Indeed the generality of the last
phrase in the quotation is rendered concrete in the embodi¬
ment of God's grace in Jesus Christ, the Word of God. At
the base of Athanasius' argument is the distinction of the
Father and the Logos, who are from eternity, and the
creation, which has a beginning and is derived. God's
being has an absolute priority over his action and will.
This ontological distinction has been inherited by the
Christian tradition and developed in both East and West. In
the West this has been in terms of the priority of the
doctrine of God and the tendency to allow Christology and
the doctrine of creation to grow apart. In the East the
distinction of 'essence' and 'energy' underwent systematic
development.
Earth's doctrine of God expresses, as we have seen, a
pervasive actualism for the being of God cannot be divorced
from his act.
•We are dealing with the being of God: but with regard
to the being of God, the word "event" or "act" is
final. and cannot be surpassed or compromised. To
its very depths God's Godhead consists in the fact
that it is an event - not any event, not events in
general, but the event of His action, in which we
have a share in God's revelation.'
(CD II/l, p. 263)
We must bear in mind this mutual realisation of act
and being in Barth's account for it offers a contrast, as
we shall see, with that of Athanasius. This has important
implications for Athanasius made a consistent distinction
in his doctrine of God between his essential (or ontological)
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attributes and those of his deeds or acts.
•God is what He is: Father, Son and Holy Spirit. It
is an ultimate reality, declared and manifested in
the Scriptures. But Creation is a deed of the divine
will, and this will is common to and identical in all
Three Persons of the One God. Thus God's Fatherhood
must necessarily precede His creatorship. The Son's
existence flows eternally from the very essence of
the Father, or, rather belongs to this "essence",
The world's existence, on the contrary, is, as it were,
"external" to this divine essence and is grounded only
in the Divine will. There is an element of contingency
in the exercise and disclosure of the creative will,
as much as His will reflects God's own essence and
character. On the other hand, there is, as it were,
an absolute necessity in the Trinitarian being of
God.»
(Florovsky, p. 49)
Does Barth's radical actualism elide this distinction,
which is not nominal but real (i.e. ontological) in the
thought of Athanasius? If Barth does actualise God's being
as utterly as he appears to do then what are the implications
of this? Does Barth's apparent attempt to overcome the
distinctive theological types offered by Origen and
Athanasius (in a creative fusion that goes beyond both) run
into problems when examined in the theological context we
are setting out? In other words what are the dangers and
what are the attractions implicit in Barth's theological
scheme of creation and God in relation to the central
doctrine of Christology?
Athanasius' thought drove towards an adequate and
final distinction of 'generation* and 'creation'; in
Florovsky's judgement his trinitarian vision and the
concept of creation belonged closely and organically together.
In the opinion of L. Bouyer, Athanasius, (in his Discourses
against the Arians) 'forces us to contemplate the Divine life
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in God Himself, before it is communicated to us'. The
priority of God is apparent in both Athanasius and Barth,
but does Barth's equally apparent adoption of an Origenist
and actualist stance lose in the final count the radical
and indispensable distinction of Creator and creation, as a
consequence of his understanding of the unity of being and
act in God? Does the ontological distinctness of Creator
and creation fall victim to a quasi-metaphysical formula?
The place of time in Barth's doctrine of creation will provide
a testing way of finding an answer to these questions.
Athanasius' distinction of 'generation' and 'creation'
was taken up by Cyril of Alexandria and through him found its
way into the Exposition of the Orthodox Faith by John of
Damascus who argued on the basis of this real and indeed
temporal discontinuity in the instantiation of being.
'For we hold that it is from Him, that is from the
Father's nature, that the Son is generated. And un¬
less we grant that the Son co-existed from the
beginning with the Father, by Whom He was begotten,
we introduce change into the Father's subsistence,
because, not being the Father, He subsequently became
the Father. For the creation, even though it
originated later, is nevertheless not derived from the
essence of God, but is brought into existence out of
nothing by His will and power, and change does not
touch God's nature.*
(De fide orth. 18, PG 94, 812-815)
According to Florovsky, Athanasius* deepest conviction
was that the distinction of being and acting in God (that is
between 'essence' and 'energy') is a 'genuine and ontological
distinction', and that 'Not only do we distinguish between
"Being" and "Will"; but it is not the same thing, even for
God, "to be" and "to act".'^ If it was found that Barth had
6. Art.cit., p. 57. Here we must ask how far in fact
Florovsky is correct in his assessment of Athanasius and
whether he does not overemphasise and harden the distinction
of being and act. The distinction of energeia and ousia
in God in Athanasius' thought is relevant here.
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in fact rejected this distinction would not the consequences
in fact match those errors against which Athanasius
originally formed his position? That is, if the distinction
of being and act in God was overcome would this not
endanger the discrete but nevertheless related ontologies
7
of God and creation?'
We now set out to examine Barthfs doctrine of
creation from the particular standpoint of time and eternity,
an issue which lies at the heart of this controversy. Follow¬
ing this we shall make some concluding comparative comments
before entering theological anthropology in our next
chapter.
As we saw in the opening paragraphs of this chapter
Barth asserts that creation is known by faith and is not
derived from natural knowledge or metaphysical postulates.
The creatureliness of the world is known only by acknowledge¬
ment of the revealed Word of God and, moreover, creation and
redemption are mutually related aspects of the covenantal
decree of God. In this sense both the subjective appre¬
hension and objective act of creation are related in their
Christological and trinitarian basis. In a structure of
formal similarity to that developed in the doctrines of
election and the incarnation the pattern of eternal ante¬
cedence and temporal consequence is established with the
most uncompromising rigour in the doctrine of creation.
Contrary to any causal notions thrown up by the human mind
7. The mutually realised doctrine of act and being has been
considered at length in our earlier chapters, especially
II and III. As has been seen this ontology is the most
fundamental unifying factor in the Church Dogmatics.
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Barth argues that:
•The God who created heaven and earth is God "the
Father", i.e., the Father of Jesus Christ, who as
such in eternal generation posits Himself in the
Son by the Holy Spirit, and is not therefore in any
sense posited from without or elsewhere. It is as
this eternal Father, determined in the act of His
free expression and therefore not from without but
from within, determining Himself in His Son by the
Holy Spirit and Himself positing everything else,
that He is also the Creator. And it is again as
this Eternal Father, and not in any other way, that
He reveals Himself as the Creator, i.e. in Jesus
Christ His Son by the Holy Ghost, in exact corres¬
pondence to the way in which He has inwardly resolved
and decided to be the Creator. As He cannot be the
Creator except as the Father, He is not known at all
unless He is known in this revelation of Himself.•
(CD III/l, pp. 11-12)
Barth does not assert creation as the pre-condition or
preliminary of Christology and reconciliation, for our
knowledge of the former is bound up with the latter. The
only real analogy is disclosed in the Fatherhood of God in
Jesus Christ which gives us the basis of an analogia fidei.
Barth repudiates any notion of a timeless relationship
•analogous to the internal cosmic relationships of cause
Q
and effect*. By contrast he posits the unique relation of
God and creation which is itself instantiated, maintained
and indeed revealed by God himself. This is perhaps the
fullest and most explicit use of analogia fidei in the Church
Dogmatics.
'In contrast to everything that we know of origination
and causation, creation denotes the divine action
which has a real analogy, a genuine point of compari¬
son, only in the inner begetting of the Son by the
Father, and therefore only in the inner life of God
Himself, and not at all in the life of the creature.
The historical secret of the creation is that outwith
His own reality God willed and brought into being a
correspondence to that which, as the constitutive
8. CD III/l, p. 13-
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act of His deity, forms the secret of His own
existence and being. This is the incomparable
perfect to which the creed looks back as the beginn¬
ing of heaven and earth. Thus creation does also
denote a relationship between God and the world,
i.e., the relationship of absolute superiority and
lordship on the one hand and of absolute dependence
on the other. Creation does not signify, however,
only a mythological or speculative intensification
of the concept of this relationship, but its pre¬
supposition and decisive meaning. That is,
creation speaks primarily of a basis which is beyond
this relationship and makes it possible; of a unique,
free creation of heaven and earth by the will and act
of God.1
(CD III/l, pp. 13-14)
Once more in this pattern of antecedence and conse¬
quence — interpreted by the credo ut intelligam - is at the
core of Barth* s thought and he combines the theological
currents that we have traced in this thesis in an extended
dogmatic exposition of Genesis I and II. The problem of
time is implicit in this account of creation in which the
theology of the Trinity, Christ, eternity and indeed time
are forged into an integrated doctrine. In the light of
the critical issues isolated in the first part of this
chapter we may explore the temporal structure of Barth*s
doctrine given that it is expressed through the dynamic
revelatory movement of analogia fidei. Jesus Christ is
the Word of God and as such has a noetic and an ontic role
in our knowledge of creation and in its original happening.
In Barth*s words, *Jesus Christ is the Word by which know¬
ledge of creation is mediated to us because He is the Word
by which God has fulfilled creation and continually maintains
Q
and rules it.'^ The further assertion that *Jesus Christ
9. Op.cit.. p. 28.
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is the key to the secret of creation* is grounded within
the temporal structure developed in the doctrine of
election which as we have seen is the basis of Christology.
Creation is the first in a series of works of God and
in containing in itself the beginning of time it lies outside
the range of historical observation. Given the importance
of analogia fidei and the access this affords to the true
meaning of creation,this agnosticism is far from disastrous
and it is further relieved by Barth*s interpretation of the
creation narratives as *saga' (which is 'essentially
aetiological, i.e., a poetic vision of the becoming that
underlies being').10 Creation as the first of God's works
in time is itself the 'external beginning' of 'all things
11
distinct from God', whereas the 'inner beginning* lies in
the eternal and determinate will of God. Creation is not
accidental or arbitrary in Barth*s vision but the external
temporal sign of that which is original (in a very full sense)
in God's eternal will and being in Trinity. Now,as
throughout the Church Dogmatics,our point of departure in
understanding is not immanent nor simply transcendent but
in the being of God in act, in his trinitarian existence
of inelnander and auselnander and in the Godmanhood of Jesus
Christ in and from eternity.
Creation has no 'external presupposition' for it
12
'follows immediately the eternal will of God'. God is
10. Op.cit.. p. 304.
11. Op.cit.. p. 43.
12. Ibid.
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'the First' but not a First Cause, for his act of
creation and continued sustenance of creation is the
concrete expression of his love and freedom and, moreover,
his continued faithfulness. Creation is in no way the
isolated act of God but has in view the 'institution,
13
preservation and consummation of the covenant of grace'.
In conformity with the structure of Earth's theological
priority we examine first the eternal starting-point of
the overall temporal structure.
'As the Father, God is in Himself the origin which
has no other (not even an eternal and divine) origin,
the source of the other eternal modes of existence of
the divine essence; and as Creator, in virtue of His
originative activity ad extra. He is the absolute
sovereign Lord of all that exists and is distinct
from Himself. As the Father, God procreates Him¬
self from eternity in His Son; and with His Son
He is also from eternity the origin of Himself in the
Holy Spirit; and as the Creator He posits the reality
to all the things that are distinct.'
(CD III/l, p. 49)
The indivisibility of God's acts in that the opera
trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa provides a key to the
eternal and thus the temporal unity of the dogmatic structure
of the Church Dogmatics. Not only are the works of the one
God united in their basis but the outward act and continuance
of creation is the apposite reflection of God's inner
reciprocity and relatedness. There is a 'worthiness' in
the fact that the 'eternal fellowship between Father and Son...
thus finds a correspondence in the very different but not
14
dissimilar fellowship between God and His creature'. Earth
13. Op.clt.. p. 44.
14. Op.clt., p. 50.
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is, however, more specific as he penetrates the logic of
this theological interconnection. In a quite direct
sense the creation exists for the sake of the Son of God.
We must at this point examine at length the words of Barth
because they offer a clue to understanding the vhole inner
balance of the Church Dogmatics. Great weight is given to
the eternal because in effect the temporal exists on behalf
of and for the sake of the eternal. Barth reverses the
priority of immanence in his theological structure at this
juncture in a way entirely consistent with what has gone
before in the Churcn Dogmatics. This is not without problems
and difficulties (as for example those raised by G. Wingren"^)
for Barth here carries his Christocentrism to its ultimate
point. In this passage we perceive the exact relation of
eternal creative and redemptive reciprocity in God to its
temporal actual!sation.
'...the expression Son or Word of God also indicates
the One who in the divine decree and will humbled
Himself already from eternity and therefore before
the creation of all things; who manifested and
eKercised His deity when he willed to become the Son
of Man, flesh, in order that in His person He should
bear and bear away the curse of sin for all men; and
who, because of His obedience even to the cross, was
to be exalted by God and thus to become, again in His
person, the bearer of the divine image for all men.
The connexion between Him and creation is obviously
even closer and more significant. In respect of
His Son who was to become man and the Bearer of
human sin, God loved man and man's whole world from
all eternity, even before it was created, and in and
in spite of its absolute lowliness and non-godliness,
indeed its anti-godliness. He created it because He
loved it in His Son who because of its transgressions
stood before Him eternally as the Rejected and
Crucified. And again, in respect of His Son who was
to become man and the Bearer of the divine image, God
15. Cf. once more Wingren's Creation and Law.
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attributed to man and his entire world from all
eternity, even before He created it, enough glory,
as a likeness of future glory, to cover and indeed
obliterate its misery, because He thought of it in
His own Son who, for its justification, stood
eternally before Him as the Elected and Resurrected.
If by the Son or Word of God we understand concretely
Jesus, the Christ, and therefore very God and very
man, we can see how far it was not only appropriate
and worthy but necessary that God should be the
Creator. If this was God's eternal counsel actual-
ised in the manger of Bethlehem, the cross of Calvary
and the tomb of Joseph of Arimathea, it was not merely
possible but essential for God to be the Creator. The
fact that God has regard to His Son - the Son of Man,
the Word made flesh - is the true and genuine basis
of creation. To be sure there was no other than
that of His own free love. But a genuine necessity
is constituted by the fact that from all eternity He
willed so to love the world, and did so love it, that
He gave His only begotten Son (Jn. 3,16).'
(CD III/l, pp. 50-51)
The priority of Christology in its fullest sense is
complete. Jesus Christ, the Word of God, pre-exists with
God as Reconciler and the dynamic initiative is in this
sphere prior to creation and thus to time. The corres¬
ponding exegesis of the New Testament (inspired by the
insights of Colossians I in conjunction with the key text of
John I) is intended to substantiate the Christological
priority of the passage above. The fullness of 'primal
history' (that category of pre-temporal 'history' first en¬
countered in the doctrine of election) is apparent.
The act of reconciliation worked out in Jesus Christ
in virtue of which man and world are reconciled to Gbd is
presented in its completeness as the basis upon which
creation takes place.
'To sum up, the New Testament passages in question say
that the creative wisdom and power of God were in the
beginning specifically the wisdom and power of Jesus
Christ. For in the first place He was the eternal
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Son and the Word of God, the whole of divine being
revealed and active in creation being His own eternal
being. Second, His existence as the Son of God the
Father was in some sense the inner divine analogy and
Justification of creation. Finally and supremely, He
was already in the eternal decree of God the Mediator;
the Bearer of our human nature; the Humiliated and
Exalted as the Bearer of our flesh; a creature and
precisely as such loved by God; and in this way the
motivating basis of creation. If God willed to give
His eternal Son this form and function, and if the
Son of God willed to obey His Father in this form and
function, this meant that God had to begin to act as
Creator, for there could be no restraining His will.
Hence, as these passages of the New Testament declare,
it is not only God the Father, but in particular the
Son Jesus Christ, who is propria vi et efficacia et
potentia the Creator of all things.*
(CD III/l, pp. 55-56)
Likewise the Holy Spirit 'makes the existence of the
creature as such possible, permitting it to exist, maintain¬
ing it in its existence, and forming the point of reference
of its existence. For it is He who in that counsel antici¬
pates and guarantees its reconciliation with God and
*1 fl
redemption by Him in the union of the Father and the Son.*
In this way Barth develops a thoroughly integrated trinitarian
doctrine of creation on the basis of it being the opus
indivisum totlus trinitatis. The prefiguring of creation
takes place in the eternal reconciliation of God and man
(i.e. 'flesh') in Jesus Christ. This positing of the
eternal reconciliation imposes a certain constraint of
creation upon God. God's freedom is freely to bind himself
to creation. In this creation the reconciliation wrought
in eternity is fulfilled in time by itself fulfilling time
in Jesus Christ, that is in his actual life, death and
resurrection. Jesus Christ is utterly central in Earth's
account of the eternal and temporal acts of God in recon¬
ciliation and creation. In this supreme and concrete
16. CD III/l, p. 56.
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expression of analogia fidei found in the pattern of eternal
priority and divine self-realisation in the trinitarian
reciprocity of God's being which is actualised in time
ad extra, we find the core of Earth's doctrine of creation.
The undoubted weight of eternal priority and indeed
the degree of fulfilment within the history of the Godhead
in eternity (putatively developed on the basis of New
Testament insights as well as in accordance with the dog¬
matic structure that has been analysed at length in this
thesis) is placed behind the act of creation. In creation
the eternal instantiates time; indeed, 'the aim of creation
is history'. Once this is said the nature and role of time
becomes highly important. The general theological scheme
gives way to the specific problems of contingent particularity
in the encounter of time and eternity in history. All the
difficulties concerning the reality of time itself now come
to a head in the light of this potentially overwhelming
doctrine of creation, from eternity.
In this context 'history' is:
'the history of the covenant of grace instituted by
God between Himself and man; the sequence of events
in which God concludes and executes this covenant
with man, carrying it to its goal, and thus validating
in the sphere of the creature that which from all
eternity He has determined in Himself; the sequence
of events for the sake of which God has in patience
with the creature and with its creation gives it
time - time which acquires content through these
events and which is finally to be "fulfilled" and
made ripe for its end by their conclusion. This
is from the theological standpoint the history.*
(CD III/l, p. 59)
This is quite categorically a form of 'salvation
history' although not a 'red thread' submerged in a secular
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history of religion but the history which •encloses* all
other history, for the covenant of grace is the theme of
history. In a real sense history is a derivation of
theological presuppositions and of the great presupposition,
God's movement in grace from eternity in Jesus Christ. We
find here the confirmation of what Barth stated in Volume
1/1 of the Church Dogmatics: that history is the predicate
of revelation, not revelation the predicate of history. In
other words history occurs as the concrete actualisation of
the inner self-determination of God. History and its context,
creation are the events and the arena of God's fulfilment of
his eternal purpose in Jesus Christ. It does not exist for
its own ends but so as to display the divine teleology of
temporal fulfilment of that which is determined from eternity.
The meaning of this 'fulfilment', the transformation that
takes place in revelation is nowhere more clearly seen than
in relation to the problem of time and history. In the
final chapters of this thesis it is the exact nature of this
fulfilment and the theological anthropology dictated by
Barth's doctrine of time that is to preoccupy us. At this
stage, however, the most significant passage that is to
concern us will allow us to answer some of the questions
raised at the outset of this chapter. The comments Barth
makes on time and creation will be related to what we know
of his total scheme and thus be made comparable to other
accounts of creation and the problems that arise therefrom.
In Earth's vision creation and providence are not
separate because the latter is the continuing realisation of
the former, a true creatio continue. In relation to
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creation and history Barth once more makes a concrete appli¬
cation of the so-called Boethian concept of eternity which
is both radical and dynamic in its significance for the
Church Dogmatics. Eternity is 'supreme and absolute time,
i.e. the immediate unity of present, past and future; of now,
once and then; of the centre, beginning and end; of move-
17
ment, origin and goal' which is the 'essence of God Himself'.
This temporal transcendence of eternity gives God and his
acts their place in relation to time and to history as their
origin and 'fulfilment*. By virtue of eternity 'creation
is not a timeless truth, even though time begins with it, and
extends to all times, and God is the Creator at every point
TO
in time'. The supra-temporality of eternity as the
intrinsic characteristic of God's active and creative being,
expressing ad extra the inner convenantal decision and re¬
conciling purpose of God, is the theological possibility of
creation. It is in these terms that wre must understand the
perennial theological problem (particularly remarkable in
the line of thought from Origen, through Maximus the
Confessor to Aquinas) of how the world may be understood to
co-exist with God.
In the light of this doctrine of eternity, as the
transcendent (yet immanently striving in grace) supra-
temporal creativity of God's being-in-act, Barth claims that,
'According to Scripture there are no timeless truths,
but all truths according to Scripture are specific
acts of God in which He unveils Himself; acts which
17. Op.cit.. p. 60.
-*-&• f^id. The deep parallelism in Barth* s thought effected
by the ontology of God's acts is apparent in the passage
quoted below.
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as such have an eternal character embracing all
times, but also a concretely temporal character.
As Jesus Christ Himself is eternal as God and stands
as Lord above all times, but is also concretely
temporal and in this way the real Lord of the world
and His community, so it is with creation. Those
who regard God's creation as an eternal but timeless
relation of the creature and its existence can
certainly boast of a very deep and pious conviction,
but they cannot believe it in the Christian and
biblical sense. For this timeless relation has
nothing whatever to do with God's decree of grace in
which God from all eternity has condescended to His
creature in His Son in order to exalt it to His Son;
nor with the acts in which God has accomplished this
decree according to the revelation of Himself. It
does not exclude the possibility that God may not yet
or no longer be gracious to man and the world. In
this timeless relation there is not yet or no longer
to be seen anything of His will to condescend to His
creature in order to exalt it to Himself. We could
only in some sense persuade ourselves on our own
responsibility that this relation exists, and then
give it a positive meaning, again on our responsibility.
That we can understand our creaturely existence as
such as the gift of divine grace depends - if "grace"
is not just to be a pious word - on the fact that its
creation and preservation is a concrete act of God and
therefore a historical reality fulfilling time. Then
and only then does our creaturely existence as such
already stand in connexion with the organising centre
of all God's acts, with the reality of Jesus Christ;
then and on^y then can we understand our existence
and nature as God's grace; then and only then can we
believe in our existence and nature as we believe in
Jesus Christ, as we believe in the triune God.'
(CD III/l, p. 61)
Creation and reconciliation, divine condescension and
exaltation and covenant and atonement all stand under the
banner of grace. Creaturely existence and the Christian
community find their true basis in the 'concrete act of God'
when they are acknowledged as the gift of grace. What Barth
terms 'the organising centre of God's acts,...the reality of
Jesus Christ* is quite crucial to the overall ontology of the
Church Dogmatics. The concept of eternity employed in the
Church Dogmatics is of absolutely central importance because
the duality of the foregoing statements (which are fundamental
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to the whole structure of Barth's theology) is grounded
upon the reality of God*s own temporality. Only by and
through this doctrine is the complete architectonic made
ontologically plausible. This duality in unity is made
possible by God's power to Instantiate time by virtue of his
potent eternity and it underlies the following fundamental
analogy for,- •as Jesus Christ is eternal as God and stands
as Lord above all times, but is also concretely temporal and
in this way the real Lord cf the world and His community, so
19
it is with creation1. The eternity of God that we
initially explicated in Chapter IV underlies both Christology
as we saw earlier and indeed creation as we now become aware.
In this way it becomes clear that the relation of time and
eternity in the theology of the Church Dogmatics is quite
basic to its overall conception and construction. It would
not be untrue to say that this axis is the structurally
unifying factor par excellence in both its crucial nodal
points and its extended implications, throughout the Church
Dogmatics. In fact as unifying theme its pervasiveness is
far more complete than others chosen by students of Barth
(such as 'the triumph of grace') for it comprises as we have
seen all aspects of reality both 'sacred' and 'secular' as
well as scientific. In the perspective of the Church
Dogmatics all is subject to the temporal structure that it
comprises and thus in the problem of time a key of universal
significance is forthcoming to Barth's theological endeavour
and its historical antecedents.
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Earth emphasises without flinching that the accounts
of creation in Genesis I and II are 'historical' in a special
sense. This special historicity is the 'pre-historical*
nature of creation indicated by the fact that 'God is the
only actively operative Subject of these events, and that they
20
include the beginning of time in which they also took place'.
As it is 'God's work and Word' that is involved in creation
and reconciliation and in the totality of the covenant there
is no opposition of timelessness and time. At this point
Barth initiates a polemic against an Augustinian Neoplatonic
metaphysics. The 'timelessness' against which Barth reacts
is the radical cancellation of time by the elimination of
flux, change and division in the name of the absolute unity
and utter simplicity of the divine nature. For Barth,
however, as we have seen, God's existence is 'historical* and
on this basis God affirms himself in creation and does not
set up an alien force and reality which constitutes the
antithesis of his own being.
•Even the basis of creation in God's eternal decree is
not a non-historical pre-truth, for this eternal pre-
truth obviously has a historical character in the
bosom of eternity. Not even the pure eternal being
of God as such is non-historical pre-truth, for being
triune it is not non-historical but historical even
in its eternity.*
(CD III/l, p. 66)
The purpose of creation is history and history is to
consist in the accomplishment of a series of histories of
the revelation, representation and communication of God's
grace to man for 'creation as history fashions the world as
21
a sphere for man who is to be a participant in this grace*.
20. Op.cit., p. 64.
21. Op.cit., p. 67.
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What of course underlies the pre-history of the accounts of
creation in the coming into being of the world as the theatre
of God1s acts is the dynamic and creative theory of eternity,
which Barth has exploited throughout the Church Dogmatics and
which we studied in some detail in Chapter IV. It is this
qualitative discontinuity yet affirmation and flilfilment of
time by eternity which as we saw was an 'alien presupposition'
in the eyes of Cullmann and indeed posed linguistic problems.
This understanding of the relation of eternity and time
despite these apparent difficulties is absolutely fundamental
and intrinsic to the Church Dogmatics. Here, as in the
doctrines of God and the Trinity as well as Christology,
this concept of eternity is the organic expression of Barth's
most basic theological impulses. As we have observed
previously this concept is no extraneous item upon the
theological agenda but an irreducible and essential element
in the thought of Barth.
If eternity has its own 'history' and creation is the
transition into the history of God's will and purposes in
the covenant then what is it that distinguishes time from
eternity? There is no straight antithesis of time and
eternity such as we found in Augustine but two contrasting
thrusts in Barth*s thought. First, 'time, in contra¬
distinction to eternity, is the form of existence of the
creature'. Second, 'eternity is not merely the negation
of time'. The first of these facets forms the subject-
matter of 'Man in his Time' and our next chapter. The second
concerns the actual interaction of eternity and time. Given
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that eternity is not merely the negation of time and in
addition is 'not in any way timeless* then:
*0n the contrary, as the source of time it is supreme
and absolute time, i.e., the immediate unity of
present, past and future; of now, once and then;
of the centre, beginning and end; of movement,
origin and goal. In this way it is the essence of
God Himself; in this way God is Himself eternity.
Thus God Himself is temporal, precisely in so far as
He is eternal, and His eternity is the prototype of
time, and as the Eternal He is simultaneously before
time, above time, and after time. But time as such,
i.e., our time, relative time, itself created, is the
form of existence of the creature; it is in contra¬
distinction to eternity, the one-way sequence and
therefore the succession and division of past, present
and future; of once, now and then: of the beginning,
middle and end; of origin, movement and goal.'
(CD III/l, pp. 67-8)
In this passage the assertion of the primary distinction
of eternity as the essence of God himself and time as the
form of existence of the creature is the context in which we
encounter conceptual temporal contrasts within the theolo¬
gical structures. In the theological terms with which we
are familiar, eternity is interpreted firstly as the 'source
of time* which is understandable if God is indeed to be the
Creator. God's eternity is therefore 'supreme and absolute
time' and 'the prototype of time'. This is reminiscent of
22
exemplarism and the Augustinian cast of thoughc that has
been apparent in earlier consideration of Earth's doctrine of
eternity. Furthermore, as eternity is supratemporal so it
hat, the 'immediate unity' of present, past and future once
more reflecting the Boethian notion of divine eternity. In
Earth's account of creation he is without doubt using certain
22. Cf. comment upon this in Chapter VI above.
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of the basic concepts of the theological tradition.
Cullmann can argue that there are 'alien presuppositions'
(i.e. to a truly Biblical theology) insofar as the terms
of common theological currency appear. The question the
theological inquirer must put is the following. Does
Barth's theological and ontological end justify the
conceptual and terminological means he employs? In other
words does Barth's work transcend the strictures of a
nominalistic approach? This raises questions parallel to
those in J. Barr's resolution of semantics without remainder
into syntactics,for here without doubt Barth is above all
concerned with the semantic references involved in the
creative encounter of eternity and time. Barth is con¬
stantly seeking to crystallise in words theological inter¬
connections that are of ontological import or they are
nothing.
In the passage that has been quoted the strictly
conceptual and temporal means of distinguishing time and
eternity is based upon the contrast presented by the Boethian
conception of the toturn simul over against mundane human time.
If eternity is an 'immediate unity' of present, past and
future in an undivided duration which excludes division
and therefore the possibility of succession, then time, as
the form of human existence, lacks precisely this unity for
it consists of division and succession. Whereas eternity
is simultaneity (this is a stronger word for the connotation
of 'immediate unity') time is the irreversible order of a
'one-way sequence' composed of the succession and division
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of past, present and future. This contrast is the
distinction of eternity and time once the theological
architectonic has been penetrated and discussion is at the
level of linguistic and logical argument. In short, can
we remain satisfied with conclusions that are purely logi¬
cal or terminological in the face of putative realities
which are potentially trans-logical,without sinking into
irrationality? This is avoided only if in fact it is the
case that in theological investigation a creative encounter
is made which demands intellectual and conceptual adjustment
as ontology determines epistemology. It is necessary,
however, to notice when there is an apparent transgression
or overstepping of the logical in the interests of theolo¬
gical fidelity. The contrast of time and eternity is just
such an occasion.
The positive impulse of eternity understood as the
creative supremacy of God - underlies time and is its very
possibility. This generalisation is represented in the
doctrines of creation and covenant through which the living
purpose of God is realised from eternity in temporal actual-
isation. At the centre of this bona fide theological move¬
ment is it not nevertheless true to say that the opposition
of simultaneous duration (that is duration without division)
in eternity and succession and division (without duration,
by implication) in time exists in what is virtually its
classical form of a distinction of tirnelessness and time?
This would be the case if Barth*s concept of eternity lacked
temporal characteristics to the extent of emptying its claim
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to be 'absolute time'. Despite Earth's Herculean labours
does not there remain a certain logical problem and
conceptual difficulty in asserting that eternity is the
prototype of time when it lacks exactly those aspects of
transience and succession which are inevitably associated
with time? It is sufficient to note here that in fact in
the final analysis Barth's juxtaposition of time and
eternity in creation is not unrelated to those categories
present in the traditional assessments of this problem.
This is of course inevitable unless the whole Christian
tradition were mistaken. Cullmann demands the impossible
if the inescapable is not to be avoided by illicit means.
In 'The Redeemer in God's Eternity' Hans Ktlng argues that
the pre-existence of Jesus Christ is a question for the
theologian which demands temporal transcendence as part of
its answer for 'the truly divine supra-temporality of
24
eternity must remain preserved'. It is this task to
which Earth applies himself at great length and which
Cullmann ignores in the name of an exclusively biblicist
approach.
In the pre-history of the divine and trinitarian
eternity its temporal structure is that of the 'immediate
unity' of the past, present and future which constitutes
the origin of human history and time in, and subsequent to,
the act of creation. The arguments that follow for a
23. CD III/l, p. 275.
24. Justification, pp. 272-288.
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temporal creation, that is one in which time is 'actualised',
are intended to affirm the reality of eternity and of time.
Earth* s arguments have an ambiguous tone because although
eternity must be utterly distinct from time as the
essence of God's existence, it nevertheless is the source
of time in creation for, 'It is undoubtedly true that God
25
in His eternity is the beginning of time'. A spate of
double negations indicates the near-paradoxical tension in
this attempt to overcome the threat of timelessness which
postulates an eternity which is 'not merely the negation
26
of time, but an inner readiness to create time'. This
undeniable ambiguity is ineradicable unless either the
linear time approach of Cullmann or the elimination of
Platonism advocated by Jenson is adopted, for Berth is trying
to maintain that the God who is the transcendent One is in
fact the Creator. He is to be both transcendent and
immanent if he is to be the God of Christian revelation.
The relation of eternity to time in the mystery of creation
is shrouded by its very nature but is subordinate to the
greater mystery of revelation in Jesus Christ, who embodies
the relation of eternity and time in hypostatic condescension.
The generality of ontological categories becomes contingent
and particular in the God-man Jesus Christ. In Earth's
own words the temporal ambiguity of the transcendent yet
Creator God is expressed as follows:
'That it is not in time is something that can be
said only of God's eternal being as such, i.e., God
in His pure, divine form of existence. Even in this
25. Ob.cit., p. 68.
26. Ibid.
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sense God is not non-historical and therefore non-
temporal. He is not non-historical because as the
Triune He is in His inner life the basic type and
ground of all history. And He is not non-temporal
because His eternity is not merely the negation of
time, but an inner readiness to create time, because
it is supreme and absolute time, and therefore the
source of our time, relative time. But it is true
that in this sense, in His pure, divine form of
existence, God is not in time but before, above and
after all time, so that time is really in Him.
According to His word and work, God was not satisfied
merely with His pure, divine form of existence. His
inner glory overflowed outwards. He speaks His
Word and acts in His work with and for "another" than
Himself. This "other" is His creature.'
(CD III/l, p. 68)
The distinctive feature of time is that the creature
of time lives in a 'one-way sequence, in that succession and
separation, on the way from the once through the now to the
27then'. As time is therefore characteristically irrever¬
sible and eternity not bound by this time order, God, as the
Eternal, can only enter into relation with the creature in
graceful condescension. God's grace towards creation is
essential to its actualisation. Indeed according to Barth,
God could have remained in his triune and unsearchable
essence but he chose otherwise,
'But according to His Word and work which we have been
summoned to attest He has willed and decided other¬
wise. He has had compassion on His creature and
accepted it. But if this cannot be gainsaid, we
cannot and must not deny or even question the further
fact that in giving the creature its existence and
form of existence, He Himself stooped down to it,
appropriated to Himself and s Word and work the
form of the existence of the creature, and therefore
as the Creator and Lord of time addressed and dealt
with it in time: in time from the very basis and
beginning; in the time which itself commenced because
as the Creator He gave to the creature its basis and
beginning. If this were not the case He would not
27. Ibid.
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have had compassion on the creature or accepted it.
He could not have begun to take it to Himself. If
His utterance and operation had been merely eternal,
this would inevitably have meant that it would not
have been a creative utterance and operation, the
beginning of intercourse other than Himself.*
(CD III/l, p. 69)
If God be God then in creating something other than
Himself he cannot act otherwise than in grace. Creation and
grace demand each other in a theology of mutual entailment.
Creation actualises grace and grace is realised in creation.
Covenant and creation are not set over against each other
but are different aspects of the one reality. Barth in
effect enlarges and qualifies the basic structure of
Augustine's doctrine of creation which uses, as we have seen,
28
the Boethian notion of the relation of eternity and time
but retains a Neo-Platonic tendency to detemporalise
creation. The real substance of Earth's criticisms is
directed against his failure to build up the reciprocity of
God and creation in terms of temporal source and divine grace.
Barth's great advance upon Augustine is in his interpretation
of the divine simultaneity in the dynamic, intensional and
creative sense apparent below.
'Prior to the creature there is only God's pure being
at rest and at movement in itself; and prior to time
there is only His eternity.'
(CD III/l, p. 70)
Thus far Barth and Augustine are in agreement but,
and this is Barth's advance in theological integration which
reflects the total impulse of his doctrine of God:
•His eternity is itself revealed in the act of
creation as His readiness for time, as pre-temporal,
28. Cf. Confessions, Bk.XI, Ch.16, and comment upon this in
Chapter iy aBove.
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supra-temporal (or co-temporal) and post-temporal,
and therefore as the source of time, of superior and
absolute time.'
(CD III/l, p. 70)
The Boethian notion of divine simultaneity has been
made the inner skeleton of a potent doctrine of creation and
developed in the context of a theology of covenant and
creation. The unity of God* s opus ad extra internum and
his opus ad extra externum is secured on the basis of the
history of creation being 'at one and the same time both the
originating divine activity and the originated creaturely
29
occurrence'. The distinction of activity and occurrence
corresponds to the distinction of eternity (in God) and time
(the form of time) lies fully within the theological circle.
We have noted in this thesis the existence (explicitly avowed
by Barth) of the theological circle and how this tends to
be expanded by the 'natural theology' of time apparent in
Barth's treatment of philosophies of time which dwell upon
the transcience and fleeting nature of the 'now' of human
temporal experience. The cramped nature of arguments based
entirely upon the structure of revelation emerges at this
point in Barth's thought on creation. Here he advances a
'theologic' which is highly ambiguous and which ultimately
remains unsatisfying because of its circularity. Eternity
and time have a conceptual Interdependence which is seen
clearly in the following.
•As creaturely being, emerging by God's creation, is
both something that has been and something that is
coming into being, the same is true of its time.
Beginning as present, it is as such both past and
future. It would not be real, i.e., our relative
29. CD III/l, p. 71.
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time, with its succession and separation of now,
once and then, if, beginning as present, it did not
at once have its past and future. In contra¬
distinction from eternity time is just this division
into present, past and future; this flux of that
which is from the past, through the present, and
into the future. It would not be really created, it
would not be really time in contrast to eternity,
if it were not immediately this flux.'
(CD III/l, p. 71)
On this somewhat repetitious basis Barth corrects
Augustine's Procul dubio non est mundus factus in tempore.
sed cum tempore by the substitution of mundus factus cum
tempore, ergo in tempore. Creation would not and could
not be creation if it were not temporal. Time commenced,
so Barth argues, with God's 'Let there be' as it had been
'from the very first the form in which creatures began to
exist'. Whereas the logic of Barth's position is similar
to that of Augustine, insofar as both use the fundamental
structure of the divine simultaneity as the basis of their
doctrines of creation, Barth differs in his systematic
mutual relation of creation and covenant and his emphasis
upon the sheer creativity of eternity, God's 'absolute time',
as the source of time. The eternal will of God realised
from eternity in Christ is actualised in the incarnation.
The unity of the opus ad extra in eternity and time on the
basis of the grace of God in creation and covenant exhibits
a degree of theological integration and genuine synthesis
unique to Barth.
In the preceding pages we have examined Barth's
primary arguments for a temporal creation by the eternal God.
We have found them to a degree disappointing, lacking some
of the compulsive power of Ms doctrine of God and Christology.
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In passing we would suggest that although knowledge of God
and Christ is rightly derived from revelation, the further
systematic attempt to derive true knowledge of creation
from revelation rather than from creation itself is mis¬
conceived. This is not to defend natural knowledge of God
but natural knowledge of the natural order. Barth, as we
have become aware, advances the latter and this will become
even more obvious when in the next chapter we examine 1Man
in his Time'. It is not only that we can know true
humanity only in the humanity of Jesus Christ, likewise it
is only in the time of Jesus Christ that we can know real
time. To condense this into an aphorism: true knowledge
of the natural order is revealed knowledge.
Barth continues to elaborate his theologically
inspired account of time in Volume III/l and this will form
the starting point of our next chapter, for in the ensuing
paragraphs he gives the first glimpses of his Christologi-
cally conditioned theological anthropology of time. In the
final stages of this chapter we shall retrace our steps in
some comparative comments, so as to set Barth's thought on
creation over against other highly influential accounts in
the Christian tradition.
In the first pages of this chapter we saw how two
contrasting impulses were apparent in patristic theology.
Origen's unifying and synthesising movement tended towards
what we shall term a monism in that the ontological dis¬
tinction of God and creation became blurred. Athanasius in
his thorough-going ontological yet dynamic distinction of
uncreated and created being tended (according to Florovsky)
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to match this legitimate dichotomy with a distinction between
God's being and acts. We have contended that Barth strove
seemingly to combine both emphases in his doctrine of
creation. Barth undoubtedly promotes a systematic
actualism the like of which has not been seen since the days
of classical Greek patristic theology. Within the unified
covenantal scheme of a single decree from eternity (which
is again reminiscent of Origen) Barth asserts the real
distinction of created and uncreated being as found in
Athanasius. Barth's creative synthesis is of course in no
way bound to its antecedents but offers interesting
parallels and can be evaluated in the light of these
previous theological trends.
As we noted above Barth's doctrine of creation is
ambiguous with regard to time. This is apparent in his
arguments which justify the unlikeness of time and eternity
yet establish the derivation of time from its source,
eternity. This fundamental linguistic ambiguity allows
the resolution of contrasting impulses to take place.
Eternity is ambiguous in that it shares both the 'transcendent*
quality of duration without division and yet the prototypical
temporal attributes of 'pre-history' and the capacity to be
the source and fulfilment of time. In the inner realis¬
ation of God's act in Jesus Christ from eternity - mani¬
fested in the one covenant and its consequent 'actualis-
ation' in time - there is a unified and integrated theolo¬
gical movement reminiscent of Origen. Eternal and temporal
categories of reality are united in a doctrine of divine
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actual!sm through the one covenant of creation and recon¬
ciliation, willed and executed by and through Jesus Christ,
in and from eternity which is founded upon the ultimate
doctrine of God* s being-in-act and his act-in-being. The
mutuality of covenant and creation is evident in the 1inner*
and the 'outer* aspects of the one movement in grace. In
Barth's overall doctrine of revelation, he achieves by means
of the integrated doctrines of God and Christology, a
fundamental and most remarkable unity of creation and recon¬
ciliation which has distinct affinities with certain
Origenistic patterns which have been largely lost in the
static categories of the Augustinian West and its ultimate
adherence to inflexible and alien doctrines of substance.
The unified impulse which renders concrete in
revelation the doctrine of God's being-in-act has to embrace
and give full weight to a rightly-understood ontological
distinction between God and man, and between God and
creation, if the pitfalls of Origen's ontological monism are
to be avoided. These issued, it will be remembered, in the
elision of the distinction between the eternal Word and
creation,which was allowed eternal status in the theological
vision of Origen. Thus in following an Athanasian dis¬
tinction of uncreated and created being Barth sought to
preserve the integrity of God in Trinity and creation in
the context of the unified and integrated doctrine of God
and revelation. Athanasius exploited the distinction of
'generation' and 'creation' which defended the integrity
of the eternal divine Word and the dependence of the originated
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created cosmos. This distinction was based (according to
Florovsky) upon a right understanding of the relation of
God's being (and thus the eternal integrity of the Word) and
his acts (therefore guarding the created order) which was
submerged in Origen's actualist aberrations. Without such
a distinction in God the contingency of creation was
sacrificed within an all-embracing doctrine of being. With¬
out radical contingency, conceived as the dependence in grace
of created upon dynamic uncreated being,the spectre of an
eternal creation co-existent with God would become a reality.
The danger of the Athanasian position is that whereas the
apparent tendency to disunite God, as apparent in Aquinas'
dichotomy between the One God and the Triune God may become
marked,it nevertheless permitted secondary theories to enter
in the attempt to account for creation. An unmoved static
God could be creator only if given the means as in, for
example, the doctrine of exemplarism. In fact the hint
of such a theory lingers on in the terminology of the
Church Dogmatics if not in its substance. The doctrine of
primordial causes conceived as existing in an exemplarist
manner in the eternal pre-ordination of God was developed in
30
its most distinctive way by John Scotus Eriugena.
Barth's assertion that eternity is the 'prototype' of time
contains something of this although be relates this by
analogy more closely to the prototypical man Jesus Christ
and discounts any form of systematic and unconditioned
exemplarisra.
30. Cf. De divisione naturae, 2, 27.
323
Jesus Christ is God's act and decision from eternity.
The world is created in and through Jesus Christ and re¬
conciled to God in him in the one covenant. This covenant
is the bridge which relates the reality of God end that of
world and man in Jesus Christ, as we have seen. In Jesus
"51
Christ time is fulfilled for he is the source of time in
his eternity. In theological terms there is no antithesis
(although there is an ontological discontinuity) between
eternity and time for created time has creative eternity as
its source. The distinction and relation of eternity and
time are conditioned theologically by both Christology and
creation. Thus the theological structure and ontology are
effected in the dynamic use of the unio hypostatics and
uncreated and created being. The problem with Barth's
doctrine is, however, to be found in the conceptual and
logical shortcomings of the temporal notions he employs.
Previously we noted that these temporal concepts could not
bear the theological weight set upon them and now we shall
be able as we have much wider perspective of the Church
Dogmatics before us, to substantiate this charge of an
inner inadequacy. In exposing this Cullmann's intuitive
complaint is rendered concrete but not in the way he
envisaged. We cannot postulate a mere linear eternity as
the 'biblical1 notion for this eliminates temporal trans¬
cendence. There is an alien remnant in the doctrine of
time in the Church Dogmatics and it is related to an
argument the invalidity of which has perilous consequences
31. Cf. CD II/l, p. 437ff.
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for the ontological security of the whole theological
structure. Both these weaknesses we are about to explore
represent logical and conceptual shortcomings,where the
power of the theological dynamic breaks the restriction
of formulations in Barth's attempted synthesis of the
contrasting Origenistic and. Athanasian impulses.
At the centre of the theological architectonic lies
the distinction of time and eternity, which in Barth's
thought in the Church Dogmatics is a re-presentation of
the antithesis of the pure undivided being of eternity and
the temporal flux and division to be found in Athanasius and
likewise Augustine. This antithesis lies in its logical
form at the base of Barth's distinction of eternity and time.
It consists as we have noted in this chapter and earlier in
the juxtaposition of duration without division and division
without presence. On this antithesis Barth builds the
theological imperative derived from his total dogmatic
structure. In the light of this, eternity is the 'source'
and 'fulfilment' of time. If the notion of duration with¬
out division is accepted then the theological use made of
this can follow. What Barth in fact does is to construct
a relation of necessity between the two. Eternity is un¬
created but in creating (setting an 'other' against the
original One) it 'must' (because it has already in fact
done so from the standpoint of man) posit an irreversible
time order with division and succession over against the
divine simultaneity of supra-temporal eternity. Barth's
argument is couched in the necessity of theological reality
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over against possibility. We must bear in mind that
although there is undoubtedly a theological motive in
asserting that eternity creates time, the actual logic of
the inner conceptual relation of eternity and time is an
antithesis based upon the bisection of our normal complex
concept of time. To speak of duration without division
and division without duration is to raise a linguistic
paradox to theological heights. The resolution of the two
factors is a synthesis indeed but logically trivial. The
ambiguity of Earth's temporal language is caused by this
curious and inadequate resuscitation of the traditional
antithesis of eternity and time as inherited from Platonic
thought. Thesis: simultaneity and duration of eternity
posits division and successive time order of time (effectively
an antithesis) and revelation of 'God's time' restores time
by 'fulfilling' it, causing a resolution back to 'perfect
presence* (final synthesis). There is in this conceptual
assertion, division and re-assertion of synthesis a logical
structure which retains the dialectic of eternity and time.
This is not characteristic of Barth's overall theological
effort, which is magnificent, but because the logic of the
traditional dialectic has unfortunately affected the
conceptual structure in the temporal language of the Church
Dogmatics. In other words the ontological profundity is
threatened by the logical weakness of certain basic concepts.
The consequences of this conceptual structure we have
briefly explored are not inconsiderable and lead in the
context of Barth's Christology to the threat of an ultimate
loss of the Athanasian balance between uncreated and created
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being in the interests of an overall unified and apocafetatic
structure not unlike that of Origen. Again this is
potentially an even more damaging assertion because it
affects not merely the conceptual weaknesses of language
but the very status of Barth' s theological theory of time
and his doctrine of creation.
The primary ontological statement (although not
primary in Berth's argument) is that God and the world exist
in mutual reality and probity. This is a contingent state¬
ment of fact which refers to two different modes of being
which are related in what is in turn a contingent relation
insofar as the world could not have existed if God had so
chosen. Given the actual contingency of this fact of
creation it cannot be used as the basis of a necessary state¬
ment. The Creator-created relation becomes a necessary
statement (i.e., one that could not be otherwise) when it is
used as the basis of the 'theological circle'. The
theological circle exists within Christology and the given
'simple reality' of revelation; but in turn the conceptual
dialectic of eternity and time (as duration without division
over against division without duration) lies within this
theological circle. Now if God and creation are related
contingently they must not be underlaid by a necessary fact
or statement or this contingency is immediately lost. Thus
if we begin, as Barth does, with Christology in the form of
the unified covenant of creation and reconciliation and
state quite categorically that this 'reality* is the
eternally willed basis of the 'possibility' of revelation
and use this in explanation as a theological circle, then
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creation ceases to be contingent. God and creation are
facts understood within the theological circle on the
ground of the covenant which is the primary item of all
theological knowledge.
The apparent contingency is ambiguous because, for
example in the case of time, the characterisation of both
eternity and time is in terms of the theological circle, not
the unique and disparate attributes of each reality. The
strictures of the dialectic unfortunately inherited from
the philosophical and theological tradition of the West and
ultimately from Platonic thought have been imposed upon the
immense power of Barth's Christian theology.
We have isolated two major difficulties in Barth's
thought on creation. First there is an inner logical
dialectic of eternity and time which is too fragile (yet all
too powerful in its effects) to carry the theological weight
it should bear. Second, a theologically necessary statement,
the covenant from eternity as the basis of the theological
circle is ontologically and epistemologically prior to the
•contingency1 of the relation of Creator and created order.
The combination of both factors is potentially even more
hazardous for the place of creation as the realm of our own
existence in Barth's Church Dogmatics. If the contingent
statement, *God created' is subsequent to the logic of the
covenant which is known only on the basis of its reality
(i.e. The reality of God in revelation is, therefore it is
known) then all created reality is truly known only on the
basis of revealed realities of the covenant. This leads to
the conclusion we have already stated that true knowledge of
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the natural order is revealed knowledge. But as revealed
knowledge (as for example the mutual derivation of
eternity and time) is only given from within the theological
circle which gains and loses its apparent 'necessity* as
it is applied to different spheres of reality then we have
to ask the following questions. Is there any place for
contingent reality within the ontological structure of the
y
f)
Church Dogmatics; As we have observed true knowledge of
man and of time is in effect revealed. Given the infrangible
connection between epistemology and ontology, does Barth
allow - once the logical order of priority in his arguments
is demonstrated - for contingent empirical reality as it is
experienced daily? We in no way assert that Barth is some
sort of idealist but in terras of his ontological structure
in the Church Dogmatics is contingent reality any more than
a surd factor once total priority is given to the reality of
the covenant wrought and consummated in Jesus Christ.
Is it not the case that the contingency of the world
has been on the one hand lost to the supreme reality of the
covenant actualised in Jesus Christ, and on the other reduced
to a surd status? This is because the only place for man and
creation in the theology of the Church Dogmatics is secondary,
that is in solidarity with Jesus Christ. This solidarity is
by assertion and is a derived ontological basis. Man and
creation are only comprised in the necessary reality of the
32. By this epigrammatic statement we do not assert the
identity of revealed and natural knowledge, but the
fulfilment (with regard to eternity and time) of the
knowledge of natural (fallen) time by 'real' time,
that is eternity. The relation of the two is
highly complex as can be seen in this study.
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theological circle, which is revealed and made concrete in
Jesus Christ, by ♦solidarity* in him. Consequently in
relation to this fundamental ontology our (that is my)
existence is contingent only insofar as it is comprised in
the being of Jesus Christ. The distinction of necessary
and contingent existence may be crude and reflect alien
doctrines of static ontology but it does allow for the
mutual if distinct realities of created and uncreated being.
It seems that Earth*s doctrine of creation endangers this
and is perhaps the least satisfactory aspect of the Church
Dogmatics that we have yet encountered.
It is not without trepidation that we have ventured
some fairly trenchant criticism of Earth* s overall
theological position as we find it expressed in his theolo¬
gical assessment of creation. We are despite this grateful
to Barth for the immense thoroughness of his work and,
moreover, for his account of time which is possibly the
most extensive ever attempted. In the next chapter the
temporal consummation of this account will be stated and
analysed, allowing us to complete our exposition and
examination of this important theme and structuring
element in the Church Dogmatics.
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CHAPTER IX
MAN IN HIS TIME:
TRUE TIME
In Chapter VIII we hegan with the assertion that it
is only in the light of God's revelation in Jesus Christ
that we can come to a knowledge of our creaturely existence.
It was this fundamental Christological priority that was
obeyed in putting Christology before creation in this thesis.
This priority which is both epistemological and ontological
is exploited with great power by Barth. Given the intrinsic
bond of ontology and epistemology in the Church Dogmatics
and the eternal priority of God's will as rendered concrete
in Jesus Christ can creation be given an adequate basis?
As became clear in our last chapter the ontological dis¬
tinction of God and cosmos was threatened by the all-
determinative unity of the eternal act of God in Jesus Christ."'"
The generalised opposing viewpoints of Athanasius and Origen
were related to Barth in whose thought can be seen an
attempt to resolve these contrasting impulses. Underlying
the temporal aspects of this attempted synthesis is Earth's
use of certain concepts which, it has been argued, tend to
weaken rather than strengthen the creative theological and
ontological derivation of time from eternity. In the final
paragraphs it was argued that the logical order of Earth's
assertions placed contingency in the created order after
the necessity of the 'theological circle', the net result
being the danger of eliminating the ontological distinction
1. Cf.6h.WH.
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of uncreated and created being. The question which
finally emerged concerns our own status, that is the
status of man in the cosmos, as a product of the overall
theological ontology. The preliminary conclusion reached
was that man (i.e. ourselves, not Jesus Christ as the man
above all men) existed in Barth's theological scheme only
in solidarity in Jesus Christ, insofar as he is our
representative. In the chapters that are to follow it is
precisely the strength and importance, or lack of it, of
the distinction of creation and Christology in temporal
terms which will be central in our thoughts on Man in his Time.
It would be easy at this juncture to find our thought
diverted into many channels in the mighty exposition of
Barth's Church Dogmatics and so we -will move with extreme
care to avoid the dangers of irrelevance and yet on the
other hand the elision of vital elements in the theological
structure of his doctrine of time. The actual context of
theological anthropology is in the mutual reality of
creation and covenant which is developed in the latter
stages of CD III/l. In Barth's argument:
•The inner basis of the covenant is simply the free
love of God, or more precisely the eternal covenant
which God has decreed in Himself as the covenant of
the Father with His Son as the Lord and Bearer of
human nature, and to that extent the Representative
of all creation. Creation is the external - and
only the external - basis of the covenant.'
(CD III/l, p. 97)
The core of Barth's position is in the eternal
covenant and the creation is, as the external basis of the
covenant, bound up Christologically with the Father. The
relation of the internal and external bases comprises three
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fundamental elements as we can observe in the following
quotation and these are: the primary will of God; the
analogical parallel of creation and the relation of God and
man in the covenant of grace; and the positing of creation
as the sphere of the outworking of divine grace. Only in
this concatenation of factors is it possible to understand
the absolutely crucial role of theological anthropology
in this exposition of the problem of time. In commenting
on Genesis 1/1 Barth explicates this understanding of God,
Christ, covenant and creation.
'It is the divine will and accomplishment in relation
to man - and nothing else - which really stands at
the beginning of all things. It was in this way
and no other - that heaven and earth originated....
This and nothing else, took place at the beginning,
for anything else that might have taken place had
already passed in virtue of the fact that this had
taken place. The present and future of this
beginning of all things, even of the beginning of
time, and therefore of all genuine present and future,
was this divine volition and accomplishment. Thus
the work of this beginning was not an accidental
thing, either self-formed or formed by a 3trange
idea and force, but a cosmos, the cosmos, the
divinely ordered world in which heaven and earth - a
picture of the relationship between God and man in the
covenant of grace - confronted one another in mutual
separation and interconnexion as an upper sphere and
a lower: the one essentially invisible to man, the
other essentially visible; the one transcending him
in unknown heights, the other his own and entrusted
to him. This is the creation chosen, willed, and
posited by God; the creation which for this reason,
is "good", indeed "very good", in His sight. It is
so because, in virtue of its nature, it is radically
incapable of serving any other purpose, but placed
from the very first at the disposal of His grace.*
(CD III/l, p. 99)
In the remaining passages of CD III/l Barth provides
an immensely positive and affirmative account of creation,
which in the light of its integral nature (creation is not
alien to the purposes of God as in Marcion and Schopenhauer)
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with the covenantal purpose, is 'the actualisation and
justification of the creature' and, therefore, 'creation as
p
benefit'. Because of this integration of God's reconciling
and creating purpose in creation, and furthermore because
at its core there is the encounter of God and man and thus
revelation, it is not possible, according to Barth, to sub-
sume creation into a world-view. It is not our intention
to affirm or contest but to clarify this assertion for it is
the consistent consequence of the theology that we have
explored and therefore can only be judged in this wider total
setting. Barth defends this distinctiveness of all true
theology, which, because it has 'to recognise and confess
creation as benefit because it is the work of Gcd in Jesus
Christ' is on a different plane to 'philosophy' which is
4
intrinsically incapable of such a confession. It might
well be argued that such a systematic distinction divorces
Christian theology from the wrorld by positing distinct
realities corresponding to distinct epistemologi es. In
other words this tends dangerously close to a total isolation.
The fact that the referents of both theology and philosophy
2. CD III/l, pp. 340-1.
3. In this chapter a parallelism is exploited between 'ontol¬
ogy* and 'world-view'. The former is primarily theolo¬
gical in the Church Dogmatics whereas the latxer tends to
expression in what has been generically termed 'philosophy*.
This broad categorial distinction is the product of the
serious attention which has been accorded to the discrete
and revealed ontological foundation of the Church Dogmatics
over against the distinct sphere of non-theological reality.
The relation of the two has concerned us in the study of
the interaction of eternity and time which bridges this
dichotomy.
4. Cf. CD III/l, pp. 343-4. Again 'philosophy* is a short-hand
for "^human understanding of non-theological reality as a
whole* in other words a metaphysics.
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coincide in the worldly direction although they diverge
absolutely with regard to the activity of God in Jesus
Christ means that real agreement and. disagreement must
take place.
It is this distinctiveness of Christian theology,
which in its purported antagonism to and incompatibility
with extra-theological modes of explanation, forms the
basis of Barth's theological anthropology in Volume III/2
of the Church Dogmatics. The overwhelming purpose of
creation consists in its being God's arena for his self-
disclosure, for in creation 'the Creator Himself has become
5
creature'.
•The secret, the meaning and goal of creation is that
it reveals, or that there is revealed in it, the
covenant and communion between God and man, and
therefore the fulfilment of being as a whole, which
is so serious and far-reaching that the Word by which
God created all things, even God Himself, becomes as
one of His creatures, being there Himself like every¬
thing else, like all created reality distinct from
Himself, and thus making His own its twofold deter¬
mination, its greatness and wretchedness, its infinite
dignity and infinite frailty, its hope and its despair,
its rejoicing and its sorrow. This is what has taken
place in Jesus Christ as the meaning and end of
creation. His humiliation and exaltation as the Son
of God are the self-revelation of God the Creator.'
(CD III/l, p. 377)
This is the unique basis of Christian theology and
within this functional scheme we are to find the temporal
aspects of theological anthropology. Once more right at
the centre of theological anthropology there exists this
unparallelled degree of theological integration whereby
Jesus Christ becomes all in all and it is in the light of
his actual humanity lived out in relation to God we must
5. Qp.cit., p. 377
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understand the problem of time. In this thesis the basic
theological impulse of Earth's thought has been followed in
such a way as to reveal the inner logic of the Church
Dogmatics. There is in this approach the danger of over¬
emphasising the theological realities at the e;q?ense of
human or cosmic realities thus distorting Earth's arguments.
This is a point about which special care must be exercised
because although it is certainly true that Barth has no
desire to undervalue the basis of the realities that we
experience daily and that he reacts specifically against the
powerful idealist trend in German thought, it nevertheless
remains true that his ontology is not without problems. The
ambiguity evident in the Church Dogmatics with regard to man
is systematic in CD III/2 for we can only know true human
nature by knowing the perfect human nature of Jesus Christ.0
Likewise there now comes the comprehensive exposition of the
analogy between 'flesh' or human nature and time. Both are
presented in their full reality in the incarnation for with
Jesus Christ the fulfilment of the fallen order is achieved.
In CD III/2 a new emphasis is immediately apparent
for the latent implications of the general categories of the
doctrine of creation presented in £D III/l, as an exposition
of Genesis Iff. are made Christologically specific.
'Because man, living under heaven and on earth, is the
creature whose relation to God is revealed to us in
the Word of God, he is the central object of the
theological doctrine of creation. As the man Jesus
is Himself the revealing Word of God, Hs is the
source of our knowledge cf the nature of man as
created by God.*
(CD III/2, p. 3)
6. Cf. CD III/2, p. 43.
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Given the centrality of Christological anthropology
in the doctrine of creation then what has to happen to a
doctrine of the totality of the cosmos? Earth overcomes
the incipient danger apparent in III/l by the assertion that
it is man 'living under heaven and earth', that is man in his
full ontological Sitz iin Leben of space and time and so on.
In CD HE/1 the 'analogy between God and man, is simply the
existence of the I and the Thou in confrontation' for 'this
is the first constitutive for God, and then for man created
7 ft
by God'. Critics of Earth (Ninian Smart in this instance)
have claimed that there is a sterile personalism present in
Barth's thought at this juncture which precludes serious
consideration of extra-human factors (e.g. space and time as
objective realities) which are nevertheless intrinsic to the
human condition. In this chapter it is possible to under¬
stand the issue in terms of the question as to whether
created reality is sufficiently distinguished from Christology
(that is as 're-created' reality in traditional theological
thought).^ This most fundamental of questions may be
formulated as follows. If the primary reality is 'in
Christ* as the fulfilment of fallen creation, and if this
7. CD III/l, p. 185.
8. Smart argues in 'Karl Barth' in the Encyclopaedia of
Philosophy, New York/London, 1967, edited by P. Edwards,
that,
'The Bible (according to Barth) presents no cosmology,
but it does contain an anthropology; and thus God's
relation to the natural world can only ba understood by
analogy with his saving revelation to huaan beings.*
9. That is indistinct in Barth inasmuch as bot.i are founded
upon the doctrine of God's acts in his being, that is
upon what he has termed the actus purus et singularis.
We refer to discussion in Chapter VIII above.
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reality is only known to faith but at the same time gives
us true knowledge of the original creation which is 'lost'
to us, then are the original created, categories given
adequate weight? Does an incarnation in whict both human
and divine categories are posited in the dynamic movement
of enhypostasia and anhypostasia.and which is used as we
have seen as the basis of the reconciliation of other
categories (i.e., eternity and time), allow in the notion of
'fulfilment' sufficient and distinct ontological ground for
the relation of creation and Christology? again to
approach this from yet another direction, can we dispense (as
Earth appears to do) with an ontological account of the
relation of God and cosmos which is not subsumed into the
central doctrine of Christology, the hypostatic union? Once
more we are grappling with a fundamental problem in the
theology of Earth which we cannot ignore, even if we cannot
answer it adequately in our concern with the problem of time.
Before proceeding to a detailed exposition and analysis of
Man in his Time it is necessary to clarify further Barth's
position at the outset of III/2, for without this his account
may be misrepresented. This is in answer to the deceptively
simple question as to what it is exactly that is spoken of
as the 'time' which awaits us in the later section of this
volume."^
10. There is indeed tremendous ontological grounding of
the relation of creation and Christology (in re-creation)
but doubts arise as to the distinction of the two
realities.
11. I.e., Section 47, Man in his Time.
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It is necessary that we establish with the utmost
precision the exact order of Earth's argument, for its
implications are very important if we are to isolate the
status of the theory of time implicit in Man in his Time.
By 'status* we mean the ontological basis of time and its
place in the overall structure of related realities comprised
in the architectonic of the Church Dogmatics asd in turn its
relation to other accounts of time. Without this extensive
introductory survey we should merely reiterate in summary
12
Earth's exposition (as indeed does P.W. Camfield most ably)
without subjecting it to relevant analysis. Such relevant
analysis must begin from the theological standpoint with
some understanding of the ontological complexities which
undoubtedly underlie the crucial passage Man in his Time.
From this it becomes obvious that Earth's account of time
is highly original and quite distinct from what may be
termed the traditional approaches.
Barth argues that Creator and creation exist in
relation and that in consequence the creature cannot be
understood as such apart from the Creator. Although 'in
practise the doctrine of creation means anthropology* it is
essential to realise that man 'is only a creature and not
ix
the creature*. The creature of God is 'the totality,
the whole cosmos of the reality posited by Him and distinct
from Him, in the plenitude of which man is only a component
12. Cf. 'Man in his Time', S.J.T. 1950, pp. 127-48.
13. CD III/l, p. 3.
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part'. In a passage of critical realism Barth secures
at the outset the mutuality of man and cosmos and it is
important that we record at some length his words, for much
that follows might seem to conflict with the assertion of
the reality of both man and cosmos. It is the relative
nature of this reality which becomes apparent in the subse¬
quent Christological critique and ultimate fulfilment to be
found in the perfection of Jesus Christ in the revelation
of God's Word.
•We are concerned with man as set in the cosmos and
therefore not with man as alone before God or alone
addressed by Him; not with a cosmos concentrated
in man, and perhaps having no independent reality,
but being only the phenomenal world as radical
Idealism maintains, of the mind of man. We have to
do with the man who in the cosmos is confronted by
another reality, and who is the more conscious and
sure of his own humanity and therefore his own
reality by the encounter of man with man and of God
and man.'
(CD III/2, p. 4)
Despite this affirmation the task of theology is not
to outline a cosmology or elaborate a world-view because;
'The Word of God is concerned with God and man. It
certainly gives us an ontology of man, and we shall be
concerned with this in the doctrine of the creature,
i.e., with the ontology of man living under heaven
and on earth. But the Word of God does not contain
any ontology of heaven and earth themselves.'
(CD III/2, p. 6)
The distinction Barth asserts here has only an apparent
plausibility for it implies either a radical distinction of
man and cosmos (which he denies) or the derive! status of
the cosmos (which he is to embrace) in relation to the
primary God-man axis. Let us note the stages in Barth's
argument, the logic of which becomes extended and even
14. Op.cit.. pp. 3-4.
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dangerously attenuated. First, man in relation to God is
the primary object of the doctrine of creation and the
cosmos is the context of this relationship. Second, as
this knowledge is derived from a knowledge of <reaturehood
which is again only made known in the Word of God because
our human nature is 'lost* to us. It follows, thirdly,
that it is in Jesus Christ that both man and God are made
known perfectly as the Creator enters creation as creature.
It is therefore in the reality and humanity of Jesus Christ
that we may alone see true humanity and along with this
become aware of true time and so on. The strength and the
weakness of this approach is that the God-cosmos relation is
understood completely in relation to Christology, conceived
as a wide-ranging theological anthropology of the man Jesus
Christ. This can now be shown in Barth's exposition,
which in consequence might tend towards an all-embracing
cosmological and Christological personalism against which
much of the positive v/ork of T.F. Torrance appears to be a
reaction. Torrance has extended arguments into the cosmo¬
logical area with great vigour and has attempted to re¬
establish ontological thinking in theology in particular
with regard to space and time.
It is man who is 'the point in the cosmos where, in
spite of its very different nature, its relationship to
15
God is illuminated' and in this brief statement we have the
15. CD III/2, p. 18. The point Barth makes is parallel to
tEat of Athanasius in the Contra Gentes and De Incarnatione.
My critique of Barth is directed at the consequences
involved in the problematic relation of the prototypical
humanity and temporality of Jesus Christ to our own
humanity and temporality.
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key to Barth* s theological antliropology. The task of
theological anthropology within dogmatics is highly
specific but has extra-dogmatic consequences in that, as we
shall see, we learn about the true nature of humanity and
indeed of time.
•It is the task of dogmatics generally to present the
revelation of the truth of the relationship between
God and man in the light of the biblical witness to
its history as a whole. Anthropology confines its
enquiry to the human creatureliness presupposed in
this relationship and made known by it, i.e, by its
revelation and biblical attestation. It asks what
kind of being it is which stands in this relationship
with God. Its attention is wholly concentrated on
the relationship. Thus it does not try to look
beyond it or behind it. It knows that its insights
would at once be lost, and the ground cut from
beneath it, if it were to turn its attention elsewhere,
abstracting from this relationship. Solely in the
latter as illuminated by the Word of God is light
shed on the creatureliness of man. Thus theological
anthropology cleaves to the Word of God and its
biblical attestation. But in the revealed relation¬
ship between God and man genuine light is thrown, not
only on God, but on man, and on the essence of the
creature to whom God has turned in this relationship.'
(CD III/Z, p. 20)
In this relationship, •the disclosed relationship of
God with man there is disclosed also His relationship with
universe*. It is, as we have already asserted, in Jesus
Christ that this relationship is perfectly realised by
the Word of God and therefore perfectly known. For it is:
'As the man Jesus is Himself the revealing TWord of
God, He is the source of our knowledge of the nature
of man as created by God. '
(CD III/2, p. 20)
Barth proceeds to elaborate this in his character¬
istically dynamic fashion but it is in this insight that
•the nature of the man Jesus alone is the key to the problem
of human nature*lo which gives the guiding impulse to
16. CD III/2, p. 43; See Note 15 above also.
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Earth's reflections. Once more our investigation of the
problem of time in the Church Dogmatics is to te illuminated
by the analogy of humanity and time. In a direct parallel
with the following passage the theory of time finds its
stated basis in Christology the source of true knowledge,
through revelation,of creation itself. The founding of
anthropology on Christology (and temporality or. Christology
likewise) is in direct conformity with all that we have
found in Earth*s thought in the Church Dogmatics. The
specific is prior to the general.
'in so doing, we leave the traditional vay, which
was to try to establish generally what human nature
is, and on this basis to interpret the human nature
of Jesus Christ in particular. Our whole approach
to the relation between human sin and human nature
has led us irresistibly in the opposite direction.
Human sin excludes us from understanding human
nature except by a new disclosure through the
perception of divine grace addressed to man and
revealing and affirming true humanity in the midst
of human sin, i.e., a disclosure which is genuinely
new, involving faith in the divine relation. But if
we ask where we may find an authentic revelation in
this respect, we are not lead to man in general but to
man in particular, and in the supreme particularity
to the one man Jesus. Thus contrary to the usual
procedure, we must first enquire concerning this one
man, and then on this basis concerning man in
general.'
(CD III/2, p.- 44)
We do not intend, having given this long but quite
essential introduction, to explore Barth's theological
anthropology of 'Man for God', etc., but to move directly
to 'Man in his Time' and to explore this in relation to the
total development of Earth's doctrine in the Church Dogmatics.
The basis of theological anthropology in Christology is
once more a highly developed version,following early Reformed
thought,of the classical patristic doctrine of enhypostasis
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and erihypostasis:
•The fact that He is a person, that He is the soul of
a body, that He has time and so on, does not make
Him real man. It merely indicates His possibilities
as a man. He becomes and is real man, and is
there as such as God is there in Him, as the Saviour
of each and every man. This man is there in and by
the sovereign being of God by which He is bom and
by which He is sustained and preserved and upheld.
Mot the juxtaposed realities - a divine and then a
human, or even less a human and then a divine -
constitute the essence of man, this man, but the
one, divine reality, in which as such tne human is
posited, contained and included.'
(CD III/2, pp. 69-70)
Upon this foundation the doctrine of man and man in
time is built for 'the ontological determination of humanity
is grounded in the fact that one man among all others is the
man Jesus1 and that 'He is the creaturely being in whose
existence we have to do immediately and directly with
17
being of God also'. We are not as we have said to
criticise this notion but exa ine the resultant doctrine
of time in its relation to the total structure of the Church
Dogmatics. Barth continues in CD III/2 to develop a
relational notion of humanity in correspondence with the
concept of human nature we have found in earlier parts of
the Church Dogmatics, that is,'human life is a being in
TO
responsibility before God*. He works this out in terms
of a dynamic anthropology of 'soul and body' as the animate
and inanimate aspects of human nature which form a 'man
(who) exists because he has spirit...that...means that he is
17. Op.cit.. p. 132.
Op.cit., p. 176.
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grounded, constituted and maintained by God as the soul of
19
his body*. This is developed in relation to Jesus Christ
and in terms of man-man relational!ty and is ours by
20
solidarity, for it was on our behalf that his life was
lived out.
21
Barth*s whole doctrine of humanity is presupposed
by time as the form of creaturely existence and in the highly
important section 47 we are to find the consummation of
Barth*s doctrine of time. Barth begins his account by
stressing the actual dependence of theological anthropology
upon time. That is of man's existence as 'the soul of his
body as established by God, namely by the Spirit of God'
which in being a 'series of acts of his own movement,
22
enterprise and activity* presupposes a sequence of events
in succession, a concept of time as opposed to eternity and
simultaneity. At the outset Barth establishes the basic
elements which have been present in the doctrine of time in
the Church Dogmatics. These are of course the theologies
of God and man as Creator and creature, with all that this
implies, which now come together in a mutual explication.
'Even the eternal God does not live without time. He
is supremely temporal. For His eternity is authentic
temporality, and therefore the source of all time.
19. Op.cit., p. 344. This specific theological anthropology
developed in contrast to Nietzsche is summarised on
pages 416-8 of CD III/2.
20. Cf. CD III/2, p. 439, '... we must take our bearings
first and decisively fro"» the man Jesus in His time.
This will enable us to press forward to propositions in
which the general Christian understanding of man will
find expression in the light of the problem of time.'
21. The basis of the solidarity of Jesus' humanity with our
own is stated on pages 211-2 of CD III/2.
22. CD III/2, p. 437.
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But in His eternity, in the uncreated self-subsistent
time which is one of the perfections of His divine
nature, present, past, and future, yesterday, today
and to-morrow, are not successive, but simultaneous.
It is in this way, in this eternity of His, that God
lives to the extent that He lives His own life.'
(CD III/2, pp. 437-8)
This is of course the standard definition of divine
eternity that Earth has used throughout the Church Dogmatics
which is 'authentic time' as opposed to the 'inauthentic
time' of man.
'But man, who is not God, who is a creature and not
the Creator, cannot live like tiiis (that is like God).
If He is to live at all, he needs an inauthentic
temporality distinct from eternity. He needs the
time created by God, in which past, present and
future follow one another in succession, in which he
can move from his past through his present to his
future, in which these three elements, corresponding
to his life-act as a whole and in detail, form a
sequence. We speak of "created time", but it would
be more accurate to say "co-created". For time is
not a something, a creature with other creatures,
but a form of all the reality distinct from God,
posited with it, and therefore a real form of its
being and nature.'
(CD III/2, p. h38)
The distinction of time and eternity is not arbitrary
but reflects in temporal terms the theological, discontinuity
and relation implied by the mutual realities of Creator and
created. To live his life God has to be eternal and to
live man has to be in time. God's Lordship is temporally
transcendent and unbound by time as is its 'source'. Man's
responsibility and frailty is bound up with h:.s dependence
upon God and his response to him in covenant and history,
the essence of which is succession.
'Man lives as he has time and is in his time. It is
his time to the extent that it is not God's eternity,
not the simultaneity of present, past and future, but
their succession. And it is his time to the extent
that it is given him in a fixed span when he is
created the soul of his body to live before God.
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It is for the sake of this life willed by God, and
as its form, that he has time. He has it, therefore,
as his lifetime; and as the time for each of his
individual life-acts and for their connected
sequence, his total lifetime. He has no more and no
less time than this, and no different time. He is
in this time, and in this time alone. The constitution
of man's being as the soul of his body presupposes
his temporality.'
(CD III/2, p. 438)
Barth recognises that this dual approach raises the
problem of time in both theological and non-theological
contexts. The universality of the temporal pre-condition
is recognised,but Barth's generalised account of theological
anthropology is to be based not upon observation of things
as they seem to be to us but as they are concretely displayed
in Jesus Christ. The fundamental contrast of eternity and
time - which we have stated following Barth - is universal
in that all human existence would be impossible -without time,
but that beyond this, the real nature of time is only to be
seen and understood when its contrast with eternity is
grasped as the relation of Creator and dependent creature,
in covenant and history. It would have been plausible to
argue that as time is the universal conditio sine qua non of
theological anthropology and human in existence in general,
it would have been possible if not desirable to examine time
as such, but, in conformity with his overall theological
conceptions Barth has not done this. The same arguments
that apply to human nature here are applicable to time for
the ambiguity that afflicts the latter is present in this
account of time. This ambiguity is in the presentation of
general categories as the concrete particularities of Jesus
Christ which are then in turn used in the explanation of the
basis and nature of general human existence. The fundamental
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distinction which Barth lays out at the beginning of Section
47, that of eternity and time as simultaneity and succession
is now to be used in the exposition of the primary theological
datum, Jesus, Lord of Time.in whom the truth is both concealed
and revealed.
In his exposition of 'Jesus, Lord of Time' Barth sets
his o*/n account of the man Jesus in his time against the
minimising view of Bultmann in particular and places it in
the context of the New Testament. Our attention will be
concentrated upon Barth's positive structure for it is this
that reveals most directly the inner continuity of the
doctrine of time in the Church Dogmatics. From the outset
the dynamic mutuality of the God-man in hypostatic unity
underlies the temporal 'fulfilment' spoken of in the New
Testament.
•Like all other men, the man Jesus is in His time,
His lifetime, the time he needs like all other men
to be able to live a human life. But in this time
of His He lives as the One He is in virtue of His
unity with God. That is, He not only lives with God,
but for Him; not only as His Elect and Called in
responsibility before Him, but as His representative
to men. And He not only lives with men, but for
them; not only as a man like themselves in encounter
with them, but as their Representative before God.
He lives in His time as the Judge by whose word and
work the right of God is vindicated in the sight of
men, and therefore that of men is vindicated before
God and among themselves; by whom the Kingdom of God
is thus established among men and His covenant with
them fulfilled. It is in this two-fold representation
and vindication of right that the man Jesus lives in
His time. And it is this content of His life which
makes the barrier of His time on every side a gateway.
As in His unity with God He lives the life of the
supreme Representative and Judge, His life does not
belong exclusively to Himself. It is a life lived
for God, and therefore for men, And as He lives this
life in His time, it ceases to be exclusively His
time. His time becomes for God, and therefore for all
men.'
(CD III/2, p. 439)
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Barth's arguments are highly distinctive standing
2^5
in contrast to those of Bultmann and Cullmann in particular.
This distinctiveness consists precisely in the primal
duality in unity of Jesus Christ in his life and resurrection.
The life of Jesus Christ is the living-out of Gcd-in-manhood
on behalf of men and represents God's solidarity with the
human temporal condition and man's grateful response. Barth
presents this in the following paragraph and upon the basis
it offers in conjunction with the previous quotation he is
able to explicate the implications of this temporality.
'The answer given by the life of Jesus to the questions
of God and man makes His time the time wliich always
was when men lived, which always is when they live,
and which always will be when they will live. It
makes this life at once the centre and the beginning
and the end of all the time of all the lifetimes of
all men. It is the time of man in its whole extent.
Wherever men live and have time the decision taken
in the life of Jesus holds good; the content of His
life affects and embraces them all because it is the
answer to the question which God addresses to all men
and which they address to God. The two-fold answer
fchich He gives, to God on the one hand and to men on
the other, makes Him the Contemporary of all men,
whether they have lived, live or will live. The way
in which He is their Contemporary varies according
to whether they live with Him, lived before Him or
will live after Him. Yet He is the Contemporary of
them all because He lives for God and for them all.
The man Jesus has therefore His time, but has more
than just His own time. He lives in His time, and
while it does not cease to be His time, and the times
of other men do not cease to be their tines, His time
acquires in relation to their times the character of
God's time, of eternity, in which present, past and
future are simultaneous. Thus Jesus not only lives
in His own time, but as He lives in His own time, and
as there are many other times both before and after
Him, He is the Lord of time.'
(CD III/l, p. 440)
This is indeed as Barth remarks the insight to be
established and expounded for in it the particularity of the
r
23. These are cited along with W.G. Kummel, M. Barth and




life of Jesus Christ in time and its universal significance
coincide. The life and time of Jesus Christ in conformity
with hi's divinity and humanity in hypostatic unity has the
characteristics of both time and eternity. It is both
particular and relative to the one man,yet at the same time
universal, in that it impinges upon the past, present and
future lives of all men. In other words it reflects the
characteristic distinction we have noted throughout the
Church Dogmatics. It is temporal and subject to the
division implicit in the distinction of before arid after, and
yet eternal insofar as it applies without exclusive differ¬
entiation to past, present and future. The duality in
unity of the God-man Jesus Christ is exploited dynamically,
for his time becomes eternity for man. Once more Barth's
argument is explication, for the life of Jesus Christ
('lived for God, and therefore for men') is a fact, not an
inference or speculation; and as a theological fact of reve¬
lation it exists within the circle of such realities that
are inter-explanatory. Thus the deductions in the two
extended quotations above are to be understood in the light
of their context. Barth's assertions linked by the
locutions 'therefore' could be misleading unless they are seen
as theological explanation because only on the basis of the
theological impulse of the revealed realities of the Church
Dogmatics do they gain any real force.
The reality of Jesus Christ was supremely manifested in
the events of the forty days of 'easter history and Easter
24
time' which reveal the contingency and the utter finality
2Z<-* Op.cit., p. 442.
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of his life and time. Barth juxtaposes the temporal and
the eternal aspects of the reality of Jesus Christ in terms
of ♦form' and 'content* and establishes the basis of his
dogmatic and biblical exposition in the first section of
Man in his Time from the perspective of the resurrection.
'The event of Easter is as it were their prism
through which the apostles and their communities saw
the man Jesus in every respect of His relation to
them - as the One who "was, and is, and is to come"
(Rev. 4,8). But this prism itself is not just a
timeless idea, a kind of a priori, hovering as it
were above the relations between Jesus and His
followers, above their memory of His life and death,
above His presence in their midst or their expectation
of His second coming and the final consummation. No,
it happened "once upon a time" that He was among them
as the Resurrected.'
(CD III/2, p. 442)
By his systematic appropriation of this vantage point,
Barth places himself in accord with modern critical under¬
standing of the New Testament, which recognises the fact that
the writers themselves were imbued with the Easter faith on
the basis of which they sought to witness to and penetrate
the mystery of revelation. The parallel exposition that
follows constitutes the foundation of the phenomenological
(Given Time) and schematic (Allotted Time) accounts of time
that conclude CD III/2. Brief analyses of these important
passages will follow in two short chapters to follow this
present chapter. At this juncture Barth is attempting to
show that his doctrine of time is in fact that underlying the
New Testament witness and that it is congruent with those
passages most notably concerned with time as such. As we
shall see Barth's efforts here have been frequently misin¬
terpreted and underestimated for in fact they comprehend
more of the relevant factors than do either Cullmann or
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Bultmann, who minimise temporal transcendence and the actual
historicity of the resurrection, respectively.
Hans Kung points to the indispensability of
25
accounting for the pre-existence of the revealed Christ.
In contradistinction to Cullmann, Barth seeks on the
specific ground of the resurrection to assert the full
temporality (and this all-embracing contemporaneity) of the
Incarnate Logos and to show that this is underlying the New
Testament and enlivening the Church. In answer to Ktlng we
have seen that the incarnation is 'powerfully prepared from
eternity in God's unalterable decree' in the theology of the
Church Dogmatics. Beyond this Barth is striving to
include past, present and future in his theological anthro¬
pology and as we shall see his efforts are consistent with
what we have so far discovered in his thought, yet they are
at this point self-consciously biblical in their inspiration.
The core of the passage Jesus Lord of Time is a
schematic analysis of the temporal being of Jesus as
reflected in the New Testament. Barth stresses precisely
26
those aspects of his transcendent temporality and actual
mundane temporality (as in his resurrection and subsequent
real appearances) seen as affirmations of faith merely, by
Bultmann . The three basic tenses of past, present and
future are subject to separate development and exposition,
but are unified in Jesus Christ as the fulfilment of time for he
himself participates in and. imparts God's time, that is
25. Justification, p. 272.
26. Cf. op.cit., p. 275. Ktlng shows that Cullmann attacks
the notion of the pre-existence of Jesus.
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eternity. In virtue of his humanity and his divinity as
the eternal One in time,past, present and future do not
fall apart,but are one in the continuity and contemporaneity
of Jesus Christ as the Lord of time and by direct derivation
in the community, which lives through faith in him by the
power of the Holy Spirit. In this co-location of human and
divine temporality we encounter once more the Boethian notion
of divine simultaneity as Barth effectively realises the
unio hypostatica through the temporal transcendence of
eternity in its encounter with time, and in doing so he re¬
presents, as we shall see, those concepts we have found
consistently characteristic of the Church Dogmatics.
Barth establishes his understanding of Jesus in time
from the standpoint of the 'forty days' of resurrection time.
In this latter period the hidden mystery of the being of
Jesus Christ has been exposed for 'during these forty days
the presence of God in the presence of the man Jesus was no
longer a paradox....He had been veiled, but He was now wholly
27
and unequivocally and irrecoverably manifest'. Over
against Bultmann this concrete revelation and its attendant
temporality depends upon the resurrection as real event.
(This dependence is the 'later Barth's' saving feature in
the eyes of conservative Calvinist critics who see this as
his repentance and turning from the dialectical and a-histor-
ical. Such an assessment is misplaced as we have seen for
Barth has been striving to come to terms with the multiplex
factors of the divine and the historical over the pages of
27. CD III/2, p. 449.
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the Church Dogmatics). For Barth the resurrection is
indeed fundamental because 'God Himself, the object and
ground of their faith, was present as the man Jesus was
present in this way. That this really took place (and it
could as we have noted only take place on the basis of the
resurrection) is the specific content of the apostolic
28
recollection of those days'. Only on the basis of the
resurrection is Jesus declared and known to be Lord, exalted
from the dead.
'He was thus the concrete demonstration of the gracious
God, who in the death of this man did not will that
His own right, and that of man, should go by default,
but willed to vindicate them, as He did in great
triumph. He was then the concrete demonstration of
the God who not only has authority over man's life
and death, but also wills to deliver him from death.
Moreover - and this is what interests us especially in
this connection - He was the concrete demonstration of
the God who has not only a different time from that of
man, but whose will and resolve it is to give man a
share in this time of His, in His eternity. The
concrete demonstration of this God, His appearance, is
the meaning of the appearance and appearances of this
man Jesus, alive again after His death, in the forty
days.'
(CD III/2, pp. 450-451)
In this act God's time overcomes discontinuity. The
hiddenness of God in Jesus Christ is in His time-bound
existence as a man made subject to death. This bondage is
broken and God's temporal continuity made manifest in the
29
resurrection. In this the contrast of time and eternity
as division, and as continuity and simultaneity, respectively,
is apparent, though not in so many words in Barth's actual
28. Ibid.
29. Cf. Chapter V, 'Predestination and Resurrection' above
which contains a preliminary account of Barth's under¬
standing of the central event of the resurrection.
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argument. This may, however, be legitimately deduced from
the contrast implicit in the following passage when it is
understood in the context of what we know to be Barth's
doctrines of time and eternity.
'This man, the incarnate Word of God, had not only to
be present but to be apprehensible as the triumphant
justification of God and man, as the revelation of
the divine sovereignty over life and death which
delivers man, and finally as the One who exists in
the higher, eternal time of God. This, the Revealer
of hidden glory as God's eternal Wford incarnate, is
what Jesus was in His real and therefore physical
resurrection from the dead, in His appearances as the
One who was really and therefore physically
resurrected.'
(CD III/2, p. 451)
The whole integrity of Earth's Christology is made
(quite rightxy as we are aware from I Cor. 15) to rest upon
the historicity of the resurrection and turns on the axis
of the resultant forty days of the fullness of time which
is built into the very heart of the doctrine of time in the
Church Dogmatics. Having repudiated Bui tularin* s account of
the resurrection Barth exposits the Hew Testament allusions
to time in a way different from Cullman yet congruent with
the overall understanding of the relation of time and
eternity in the Church Dogmatics.
A crucial passage for the interpretation of Jesus,
Lord of Time occurs on pages 455-456 of Volume III/2. In it
Barth combines many themes which are developed later as well
as reiterating insights that have been apparent throughout
our study.
'The Easter time is simply the time of the revelation
of the mystery of the preceding time of the life and
death of the man Jesus. The two times are inseparably
linked. They are together the time of the man Jesus
to the extent that His person existing in His words and
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works, His mystery first and then its revelation,
constitute its content. But this means that this
whole time is the time of the appearance and presence
of God. At the heart of all other times, both before
and after, it is the time in which God Himself was
this man, and therefore had time, a life-time. It is
the Creator of all reality distinct from Himself who,
taking flesh of our flesh, also took time, at the
heart of what we think we know as time. It is the
Lord of time who became temporal and had time: His
own time at the heart of all the times of the being
created by Him; and this time in the same way as He
had it in Himself before all created being, and as He
does not cease to have it above all created being, and
as He will have it with all created being when the
time of this being is over. Here, in this creature,
in this man, who had His own time of life and death,
and beyond this His time of revelation, God, the
Creator and Lord, had already had time before His time,
eternal time. It is the time which He took to Him¬
self, thus granting it as a gift to the men of all
time. It is the time which He willed to have for us
in order to inaugurate and establish His covenant. It
is the time which is the time of all times because
what God does in it is the goal of all creation and
therefore of all created time. Since God in His Word
had time for us, and at the heart of all other times
there was this particular time, the eternal time of
God, all other times are now controlled by this time,
i.e., dominated, limited and determined by their
proximity to it. This means positively that they are
not shown to be mere illusions. The many philoso¬
phical theories of time which deny its reality and
regard it as a mere form or abstraction or figment of
the imagination can only be finally abandoned when we
consider that God Himself took time and thus treated
it as something real. But it also means criticially
that there is no such thing as absolute time, no
immutable law of time. Not even its irreversibility
can be adduced as an inviolable principle in relation
to the time which was once real at the heart of time
as that of the life and death and revelation of the
man Jesus. There is no time in itself, rivalling
God and imposing conditions on Him. There is no god
called Chronos. And it is better to avoid
conceptions of time which might suggest that there is.
On the other hand, we need not be surprised if the
nature and laws of all other times, and all we think
we know as time, are seen to be illuminated and
relativised by this time. Relativised does not mean
discarded. Time is real, and will always be so.
Even its end - and it will one day come to an end
as it once began - will not mean that it is thrown
away. Yet even now its meaning does not lie in it¬
self. But as all creation has its goal in what God
purposes and will do and does within it for man, for
us, so time as its historical form has its meaning in
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the particular time which God once took for the
execution of this purpose, for establishing His
covenant with man. This is the hidden meaning of
all time, even of all other time. And time itself
has no property, no laws, to preclude the control of
all other times by this time, or to prevent this time
of Deus praesens impressing upon them - in varying
degrees and in different ways - the stamp of its own
nature and law. The fact that all other times have
been placed in proximity to this time means that
even in them there may be discerned traces of this
eternal time, of the true and proper time in which
they necessarily have a share because, even though
at a different level, they too are real times.'
(CD III/2, pp. 455-456)
In the exposition of the following pages of Jesus,
Lord of Time Earth develops the duality of Godhood and man¬
hood in Jesus Christ in terms of the distinction of time and
eternity in a passage which represents the farthest reaches
made by the theological impulse that we have traced from its
inception in eternity, in the being of God in act. The
fundamental Christological insight that informs the Church
Dogmatics governs in turn the account of time, for, 'without
ceasing to be God, He has made Himself a worldly, human,
30
temporal God in relation to this work of His'. Barth
applies his theological and exegetical elaboration of the
W^COjUcc ToO ^fOVOU and the notion of divine teapot as
he finds them in Old and New Testaments^ to the unique event
of Jesus Christ, who in himself and in his life is the
realisation of the fullness of time. Time as pictured by
the writers of Gal. 4, Eph.l, and Mk.l, is an 'empty vessel,
not yet filled', which waits 'to be filled up at a particular
32
time'. The fulfilment of time is the determinant of time,
30. CD III/2, p. 457.
31. Op.cit., pp. 456-7.




'This event (i.e. the mission of the Son) does not
merely make this particular time fulfilled time.
This fulfilled time is before or after all other
time. Hence it makes all time, as such,
in the sequence and succession of which this fulfil¬
ment was achieved, fulfilled time. The raison d'etre
of all time, both past and future, is that there
should be this fulfilment at this particular time.
Time may seem to move out of the void, but it is
actually moving from this event. The fulfilment of
time has now "come", epitomising all the coming and
going of time. Henceforth all time can be regarded
only as time fulfilled in this particular time.'
(CD III/2, p. 459)
So as to preserve the balance of divinity and humanity
Barth takes steps to ensure that revelation is not de-
historicised (and thus endangered by docetism) for there is
'no fulfilment of time without the time of fulfilment'.^
Yet at the same time these events are:
'eternal time; the time which God has assumed for us,
and thus granted to us, the men of all times; the
time of His covenant; or, as the Bible sees it the
great Sabbath; the year of salvation; fulfilled
time.'
(CD III/2, p. 462)
Our interpretation of the Church Dogmatics turns on
the relative success of the balance of eternity and time
which Barth seeks to achieve, as it is found in the following
passage. The ontological equilibrium of time and eternity
rests upon the validity of the acts of Jesus in time and
their transformation by eternity. In Christological terms
of humanity and divinity -(which must be understood from the
standpoint of the theological ontology which predominates in
the Church Dogmatics) Barth preserves the balance through
systematic exploitation of the Athanasian (and Patristic)
concept of God's self-positing as man in the unio hypostatica.
33. Op.cit., p. 462
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It is in the actual conceptual out-working of the particular
categories ostensibly shared by divine and human existence
that problems develop. In this passage Barth states his
goal and it is in relation to this that we must judge his
achievement in the application of this insight to the three
dimensions of time.
'...the time of Jesus is also a time like all other
times; that it occurred once and once for all;
that it had beginning, duration and end; that it was
contemporary for some, future for others, and for
others again, e.g., for us past. Only a docetic
attitude to Jesus can deny that His being in time
also means what being in time means for us all. Our
recognition of His true humanity depends on our
acceptance of this proposition. Even the
recognition of His true deity, implying as it does
the identity between His time and God's, does not
rule out this simple meaning of His being in time.
On the contrary, it includes it.'
(CD III/2, p. 463)
As God embraces manhood in Jesus Christ so in His
eternity he undertakes time. How does Barth work this out
specifically? This question concerns us for the remainder
of this chapter where the threefold contrast of past,
present and future in the life of Jesus Christ is made with
the nature of these distinctions in our own lives and
temporality. With these questions in mind we may now
proceed to outline the initial Christological parallelism
of time and Jesus' time to be found in the latter stages of
Jesus. Lord of Time. This will prepare the ground for
consideration of the 'Zeitlichkeit' elaborated in final
passages, Given, Allotted, Beginning and Ending Time.
Barth explicates the time of Jesus Christ on the
basis of the presupposition of his divinity and humanity.
This he does by means of the related but contrasting notions
of time and eternity which are used repeatedly throughout
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the Church Dogmatics and which we have traced at length in
this study. Thus Barth singles out the separatedness and
non-contemporaneity of past, present and future as the pre¬
dominant and characteristic feature of 'our* time. (As we
shall see in the next chapter the nature of the transition
from one state to the next, that is, present to future, for
example, and the 'Now' of God's time comes to the fore as
the predominant phenomenological feature of time). According
to Barth 'all other times are confined to the three
dimensions. They begin, they endure, and they come to an
end. According to the standpoint of the observer, they are
34
future, contemporary or past'. This stress on the
strict non-contemporaneity of future, present and past is in
direct contrast to the nature of the time of Jesus, which is
35
not bound by 'these limitations of all other times'. Thus
in conformity with the antithesis of time and eternity as
developed earlier (that is succession and division over
against duration and continuity) Barth asserts that the
distinctive feature of the time of Jesus is 'the removal of
the limitations of its yesterday, to-day and to-morrow of its
36
once, now and then'.
The dialectic of time and eternity consists in the
double affirmations that Barth makes in the following passage
which we quote at length as a representative statement of
what Barth is to develop in the ensuing pages of Jesus. Lord
of Time.
34. Op.cit.. p. 463.
35. Ibid.
36. Op.cit.. p. 464.
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*1. The life of Jesus begins, and therefore it was
once future. But the man Jesus already was even
before He was. Hence the time before His time, the
time when this was still future, because it hastened
forward to His future, was also His time the time of
His being.
2. The life of Jesus has duration, and therefore it
was once present. But for all its singularity this
present reaches back to His past when His time was
still future, and forward to His future when His time
will be past. The man Jesus is as He was and will be.
Even the time of His present, just because it is the
time of His present, is also the time before and after
his time, and is thus His time, the time of His being.
3. The life of Jesus comes to an end, and therefore
there was a moment when His time became past. But its
end is such that it is always present and still
future. The man Jesus was as He is and will be.
Even the time after His time, the time in which His
time is already past, because it is the time of His
past, the time which derives from Him, is the time of
His renewed presence, the time of His new coming, and
therefore again His time.*
(CD III/2, p. 464)
In consequence of this and in congruity with the
doctrine of hypostatic unity and the general doctrine of
eternity:
•This means, however, that from the standpoint of the
three dimensions of every conception of time,, His
time is not only the time of a man, but the time of
God, eternal time. Thus as the title of this sub¬
section suggests, He not only is in time and has time
like other men, but He is also Lord of time.*
(CD III/2, p. 464)
In other words the concrete particularity of Jesus*
life and death manifesting his actual solidarity with the
human condition is not limited but has validity at all times
because his time is also God*s time. Thus
'For as such, according to its manifestation in Easter-
time, it is also the time of God; eternal time; the
time of the covenant; the great Sabbath; the year
of salvation; fulfilled time. What is for all other
times, the times of all other living creatures, an
absolute barrier, is for Him in His time a gateway.*
(CD III/2, p. 464)
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The ground for the claim that Jesus is Lord of Time
is as we have seen previously the resurrection. In this
event the apostles and Church of the New Testament saw the
real meaning of Jesus1 previous existence in time and made
this point axiomatic in their thought. The declaration and
exaltation of Jesus Christ from the dead is the revelation
37
of the unlimited nature of Jesus' temporal being, of his
actual life and death. Barth conceives the core of this
revelation of special temporality as revealing the central
unity of the total Christian revelation. This reality is
most clearly expressed in the statement of what we termed
'temporal transcendence' (this does not imply a denial, but,
in conformity with Barth's thought, a supreme affirmation of
time) made in Rev. 1,8. Jesus Christ is the self-declared
'Alpha and Omega, ...which is, and was, and which is to come,
38
the Almighty'. This 'life embraces a present, past and
future. Here is no timeless being, but a strictly temporal
one, though of course it differs from all other temporal
39
being as that which is divinely temporal'. Through the
supreme *1 am* of Jesus' being, the simple succession of the
three temporal dimensions of present, past and future is
precluded. The being of Jesus in the light of the *1 am* of
37. That is to say that Jesus' being in time is without the
fragmented and fallen characteristics of the division of
before and after. In the 'forty days the presence of
God in the presence of the man Jesus was no longer a
paradox....the total, final, irrevocable and eternal
manifestation of God Himself'. Op.cit., p. 449. God's
temporal being enters time unequivocally in Jesus Christ
in the forty days: thus Jesus has unlimited temporal being.
38. CD III/2, p. 465.
39. Ibid.
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Revelation 1,8 means, according to Barth, the following.
'I am all this simultaneously. I, the same, am;
I was as the same; and I will come again as the
same. My time is always simultaneously present,
past and future. That is why I am the Alpha and
Omega, the beginning and the ending, the first
and the last. Since my present includes the past
and the future it is both the first and the last of
all other times. All times have their source and
end in my time. Of course, all these other times
are real times, for at the heart of them I have
time. But other times are previous or subsequent
to mine. They are overshadowed, dominated and
divided into periods by my time. It is my present
that makes them past or future, for my present includes
them both. I was, and I am to come, as surely as I
am and I live.*
(CD III/2, p. 465)
Some hostile critics have argued that this notion of
divine temporality is similar to a doctrine of idealism
(that is to say the concept of the transcendental unity of
apperception, originating in Kant and developed by Fichte)
which is the projection of human self-consciousness writ
large on the plane of the infinite. This criticism presented
40
by C. Van Til can only be made upon the basis of a
doctrine of God which is both *self-contained* and utterly
inaccessible, and relies in turn upon the abyssmal nature
of God existing over against his revealedness. Clearly
Barth's theology in the Church Dogmatics is a systematic
repudiation of the crypto-Deism of this position, as it is
both dynamic and actively trinitarian in its analysis of the
relational reciprocity of the divine nature. In addition
it is arguable that the ontology of Kant expressed in the
notion of the intrinsic temporality of the transcendental
unity of apperception which has then been taken up by
40. This charge is made along with many other manifest dis¬
tortions and wilful misunderstandings in Christianity and
Barthianism. Philadelphia, 1965.
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Heidegger is in fact a product of the Christian tradition
itself not a hostile progeny of the Enlightenment.
Shereover argues the first part of this thesis in Heidegger.
/ 1
Kant and Time and illuminates the relation of Kant and
Heidegger will thus provide a starting point to our later
reflections, when we turn in our next chapter to Barth's
ontology of time considered as a phenomenological account
with objective consequences.
In fact the most convincing aspect of Earth*s argu¬
ment at this juncture is the powerful correlation he
establishes between his systematic theory of time as we
have seen in its development and the New Testament. If the
so-called orthodox critic were to come to grips with this
feature of Barth*s exposition then much less would be
heard of 'alien philosophical presuppositions* lurking in
the darker recesses of the architectonic of the Church Dogmatics.
Contrary to the demythologising approach of Bultmann et al.,
Barth asserts specifically the pre- and post-existence of
Jesus Christ as indispensable features of the fundamental
insight of the New Testament, that Jesus Christ is the same
'yesterday, today, forever'. As we will see later in the
chapter to follow Barth seeks to combine this assertion of
temporal transcendence (understood as the fembrace* of time
by God's time) with a phenomenological account of time as
temporality, or Zeitlichkeit. The major defenders of
41. Charles M. Shereover's thorough but unexciting book
(Indiana, 1971) covers the difficult ground between
Kant and Heidegger's response.
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Bultmann (e.g. Malet)^2 claim that he truly reflects the
understanding of existence of the New Testament through
the medium of Heidegger's categories. We shall see that
in the first instance Barth certainly manages to give a
coherent account of the time of Jesus Christ from the
standpoint of the New Testament as it comprehends past,
present and future. Barth argues directly contrary to the
position that the pre- and post-existence of Jesus Christ
is mythology (that is the projection of a primitive,
falsely objectified self-understanding) on the grounds that
Jesus Christ is 'absolutely present temporally*, allowing
him to become the Contemporary of the post-resurrection
community. By Jesus' presence at a particular time Barth
does not allow him to cancel his past and future in a dis¬
solution of his time. Barth binds prophetic pre-existence
and eschatology to the One who is the 'I am* of the Book of
Revelation. This unity (reinforced by means of the
scriptural exposition of the fundamental insight implicit in
Barth's doctrine of eternity and time) can be illustrated by
the following passage which indicates the direction in which
Barth*s (unfinished) eschatology would probably have moved.
'the presence of Jesus in His community is full of
import for the future. His presence impels and
presses to His future, general and definitive
revelation, of which there has been a particular and
provisional form in the Easter history. Hence even
the presence of Jesus in the Spirit, for all its
fullness, can only be a pledge or first instalment of
IA-
42. A. Malet launches a reductio ad absurdam against Barth
which fails to grasp the latters attempt to overcome the
dualism of the Kant, Heidegger and Bultmann tradition.
Cf. The Thought of Rudolf Bultmann, Shannon, 1969,
especially Chapter 18 for this scurrilous misinter¬
pretation.
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what awaits the community as well as the whole
universe, His return in glory. But it must never
be forgotten that He who comes again in glory, this
future Jesus, is identical with the One proclaimed
by the history of yesterday and really present to
His own to-day.*
(CD III/2, p. 468)
Barth is attempting to avoid a reduction of past,
present and future to a single eternal and timeless
presence and yet at the same time to escape the reductionist
and linear 'one-dimensional' temporal thinking of Cullmann.
Thus the presence of Jesus Christ is born of his past re¬
surrection but is at the same moment pregnant with the future
implicit in his coming parousia. As we have seen this
understanding is that of Rev. 1,8 which asserts that 'I am
(he that) is' for, so Barth argues,
•The present in which there is a real recollection of
the man and the particular and preliminary revelation
accomplished in Him, and real expectation of this
man and God's final and general revelation with Him -
this present "between the times" is His own time,
the time of the man Jesus.'
(CD III/2, p. 468)
Each dimension of time is explored in a trans-histori¬
cal yet, so Barth would argue, fully temporal perspective
provided in the being of Jesus,which is now infused and
charged with God's time and fully revealed after the resur¬
rection in the 'forty-days*. Present,^ past,^ and
45
future are each related by the supra-temporal continuity
of the being of Jesus. This recognition of Jesus as Lord
of Time, made possible by the resurrection and. recounted in
such passages as the account of the incident on the Emmaus
43. CD III/2, pp. 466-74.
44. Op.cit., pp. 474-85.
45. Op.cit.. pp. 485-511.
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road^ (Luke, 24f.) is of:
'The hidden power of the first time, the fact that it
is not past hut present, is now disclosed. Jesus
was not found among the dead, hut among the living;
the living One and the Lifegiver. He was the self¬
same Jesus who had previously gone ahout with his
disciples; thronged by the multitudes and the devout
of Galilee and Jerusalem; seen, hut not really
perceived; heard hut not really understood:*
(CD III/2, p. 471)
The present of Jesus is a presence which reveals the
fullness of time in the fulfilment of the covenant and the
concrete making-known of the supreme 'I am' of divine being.
47
His past is the fullness of the 'time which was', recol¬
lected by the New Testament. This past is recapitulated by
the Holy Spirit which brings the events of salvation into the
present from the other side of 'the great dividing line...
secretly but very really drawn which masks off the new age
48
from the old*. As noted previously Barth asserts the
theological concreteness of the pre- and post-existence of
Jesus Christ as the basis of the existence of the life of
the Church over against the thrust of the demythologisers.
In this Barth follows out once more the unifying vision of
the Fathers (H. Kting stresses this) in identifying the
'past' of Jesus' time with the 'yesterday' of the New Testament
which is the prophetic time and history of the people of
Israel. Moreover beyond this, the unity of time extends
into the fundamental purposes of God as they are realised in
Jesus Christ. This is the consistent outcome of the overall
46. Luke 24.
47. CD III/2, p. 474.
48. Ibid.
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scheme we have been studying in Earth's thought. In the
fulfilment of the covenant the eternal purpose of God is
achieved and insofar as this is consummated in Jesus Christ
(who is the one 'I am* of the Book of Revelation) a compre¬
hensive transhistorical (yet not ahistorical) unity is
achieved through the notion of God's time.
•Hence for the apostolic community the yesterday of
Jesus extends beyond the prior yesterday of the Old
Testament to the primal history and primal time
which are beyond the reach of "historical" investi¬
gation, not only in practice, but in principle; to
the history and time when being, history and time began
as such. Is this just speculation? But surely if
creation and covenant are so integral to one another
even in the Old Testament that neither can be
considered apart from the other; if in the Old
Testament the covenant is always eschatological and
prophetic in character, and is never realised; if
finally - and this is the point on which everything
else depends - Jesus is the One who was to come as
the fulfilled reality of the covenant, is it specul¬
ation to say that even the time of creation was His
time? To the extent that it was the time when the
Creator began to execute His will. It too was His
time; the time when He was the primary, proper
object of this divine will, foreseen and foreordained
in the creation of all things.'
(CD III/2, p. 477)
The unity of trans-historical and historical is
achieved in the God-man Jesus Christ, who is the historically
concrete yet universal point of consummation of the divine
purpose. Within the all-embracing domain of the Rev. 1,8
the concept of divine eternity allows for the Christological
synthesis and conditioning of the total theological scheme.
'As the man Jesus had been in His appearance on the
way, in the prefiguration and expectation of the
divine covenant with Israel, and in the divine fore¬
sight and foreordination in creation, so He had been
in the counsel of God before creation and therefore
before all time. If the lesson of Easter is true,
if the man Jesus was really the manifestation of God,
how can we possibly think of an eternity of God
which does not also and primarily include His time,
His future, His present, but also His past? How can
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it be denied that in God's free plan and resolve He
was before the beginning of time and all things, and
therefore that He was really, and therefore that He
was really, supremely and fully, that He divinely
was?'
(CD III/2, p. 477)
Barth specifically and unmistakably refers to the
application of the concept of eternity as the unity of time
which 'legitimates' past, present and future. The Word of
God spoken of in John I is not a timeless existence but
refers to an eternity which,
'includes not only the present and future, but also
the past. God's eternity does not invalidate past
present and future, and therefore time; it
legitimates them. In it they have their origin and
true character. In it yesterday, to-day and to¬
morrow are one, and in their unity genuine and real.
The man Jesus is this genuine and real yesterday of
God's eternity, which is anterior to all other
yesterdays, including the yesterday of creation.•
(CD III/2, p. 484)
Analogously Barth relates the future to the trans¬
cendent temporal unity posited in 'God's time' for 'There is
no difference of degree between the being of Jesus in the
three dimensions, whether in substantiality, importance or
49
urgency, in dignity or value* for the New Testament looks
forward 'not merely to a better future, but to a future which
sets a term to the whole time process, and in its perfection
50
includes and surpasses absolutely all the contents of time.'
This future is conceived eschatologically as a 'wholly new
order* which is 'wholly and utterly His time, the time of
51
Jesus, the time of His being'.^ This future kingdom is not
^9. Op.cit., p. 485.
50. Op.cit.. p. 486.
51. Ibid.
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a detached or arbitrary happening but is the concrete hope
of the community which arose after the resurrection. Barth
argues that,
■What will take place at His return is just that the
arch of His time which began with the revelation of
His first coming, and then vaulted over the interim
time of the community, of the Gospel and the Spirit,
of faith and love, the time given for the conversion
of the world will then be completed.'
(CD III/2, p. 486)
In the perspective of the future and the general out¬
line Barth offers, indicating the direction in which he
would elaborate the doctrine of the Last Things, we can see
that the 'arch of God's time* is not merely one more item in
the vocabulary of what Cullmann has called Earth's 'figurative
speech* about time in the context of , dogmatic theology. It
is one more aspect of the consistent and systematic develop¬
ment of a unified - and theologically unifying - doctrine of
time which explicitly structures the Church Dogmatics. Thus
in consequence of this unity of temporal being Barth asserts
quite explicitly the intrinsic bond of resurrection and
parousia in a vital and notable theological integration and
dynamic synthesis.
•As the One He has shown Himself to be He must again
appear in confirmation of the fulfilment of time, in
a glory which is no longer particular and transitory,
but universal and permanent, embracing the whole of
creation both in heaven and earth. The unity of His
glory and our glorification already achieved in His
resurrection has again become the future, His future,
for us. For us, therefore, the resurrection and the
parousia are two separate events. But for Him they
are a single event. The resurrection is the antici¬
pation of His parousia as His parousia is the
completion and fulfilment of the resurrection.*
(CD III/2, p. 490)
In brief Barth argues, *The future to which we look
forward from the present of the man Jesus is, like this
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present itself, and the past which lies behind it, His time,
52
the time.of the man Jesus' and this whole consciousness
and understanding of time is summed up in the phrase of
Rev. 1,8. Such is the structure of Earth's exposition of
Jesus. Lord of Time, which we have considered at great length
because it furnishes not only the consummation of Barth's
Christology in its temporal aspect, but also in achieving
this it provides the basis of his understanding of human
being-in-time, the phenomenological theological ontology of
the latter sub-sections of Man in his Time in Volume III/2 of
the Church Dogmatics. The passage that has been examined
is rigorous and demanding because in it Barth combines three
major threads in his thought. The absolute primacy of the
Chalcedonian impulse of the two natures as the dynamic
foundation of the Church Dogmatics is united with doctrine of
eternity inherited from Augustine and Boethius which is con¬
centrated upon the eternal 'how* of the divine present
embracing without division past, present and future. This
synthesis is developed with the third major factor, a
sustained biblical exposition an extended systematic theolo¬
gical exegesis of Rev. 1,8.
The success of this passage rests with the acceptab¬
ility of the notion of divine eternity implicit in Barth's
arguments. The conceptual relation and qualified opposition
of time and eternity constitutes the vertebral logic of this
sub-section and if it is granted as the basis of what ensues,
then Earth's account is remarkable for its power and
52. Op.cit.. p. 493.
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thoroughness. Given our hesitance and doubts as regards
this concept, our feelings remain those of admiration as
we proceed to our next chapter. In this the more
philosophical and directly temporal issues of the remainder
of the section Man in his Time will be examined on the basis
of the theological foundations laid in Jesus. Lord of Time.
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CHAPTER X
MAN IN HIS TIME:
GIYEN TIME
In Barth' s extended study of time in Volume III/2 of
the Church Dogmatics he first considers the being in time of
Jesus Christ and then that of man in general. This is con¬
sistent with his overall doctrine of analogia fidei and his
presentation of Jesus Christ as prototypical humanity. In
our last chapter this former, and in Barth's eyes, primary
reality was examined as it provides the fundamental ontolo-
gical framework which underlies general human experience and
understanding of time. Many objections to this may be
raised, both to the method of analogia fidei as a whole and
to the putative accessibility of the humanity of Jesus Christ
as a guide to the understanding of human nature as we know
it from day to day.1 It is not our intention to examine
these issues but to state and analyse Earth's theory of time,
having provisionally accepted his indispensable premises for
the purposes of argument. As a background to this part of
our study we shall assume an acquaintance with the thought of
Kant, Heidegger and Bultmann on temporal ontology. The term
'ontology' has a specific meaning for students of the latter
tradition of interpretation which is different to that
2
employed so far in this thesis. J. Macquarrie clarifies this
1. The issues raised by this feature in T.F. Torrance's
article, 'Natural Theology in the Tnought of Karl Barth',
Religious Studies 6, p. 133* "the basic question as to
the relation between the 'new man' in Christ to 'man' as
such, the 'good creation' of God".
2. J. Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology, London, 1955*
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distinction by pointing to the contrast between the 'ontic'
and the 'ontological'. The following argument is of
importance for our study of the doctrine of time in the
Church Dogmatics because as will become apparent Barth
postulates an arguably untenable distinction between the two
categories of insight.
•A statement may be ontological (ontologisch), that
is to say, it will tell us about the being of some¬
thing and its range of possibilities. Or a state¬
ment may be ontical (ontisch). that is to say, it
will tell us about some entity in its actual relations
with other entities. But every ontical statement
carries ontological implications, for to say that A
is, in fact, B implies that A has the possibility of
being B. This is a statement about the being of A,
namely that its being is such that A can be B.'
(An Existentialist Theology, p. 30)
The difficulty exists not only in the implication of
the ontological by the ontic but in whether the reverse also
applies. As we shall see Barth provides what may justifi¬
ably be called an 'ontology' of time but retains a curious
hesitance over the 'ontical'. The scepticism over the
latter in the face of extensive ontological evidence that is
characteristic of Barth is resolved by a complex theological
and dogmatic solution. This obscure assertion will become
clear later in our study as Barth's contrast of human and
God's time is explored in this chapter.
Having established to his satisfaction the being of
Jesus in time Barth now turns with devastating negation to
the time of man and mounts an assault worthy of the most
hardened sceptic. Barth's scepticism is reminiscent of
that in Cicero's Contra Academicos and in his response Barth
also reflects Augustine, who in his own Contra Academicos
asserted the certainty of knowledge by faith over against
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the uncertainty of human knowledge. The patterns of
sceptical argument that Barth advances has affinities with
•3
those used by F.H. Bradley and J.M.C. MacTaggart^ in arguing
against the reality of time and the nature of the time order.
We now are able to state Barth's argument in the light of the
more specifically ontological and phenomenological problems
of recent Continental thought. We are therefore to concen¬
trate upon the exact structure of human time argued for in
his scepticism and the reality that relieves this loss of
time. The precise relation between these factors of 'lost
time' and 1 given time' raises difficult problems and once
more forces us to assess how Barth relates contingent
reality to that brought to us in revelation. Does Barth
fall into an ontological self-sufficiency so pervasive as to
confine true reality to the theological circle and thus be
in danger of an overall docetism despite his systematic and
methodological attempts to escape this manifest hazard?
Man's time has to be understood in contrast with that
of the man Jesus Christ. For man the past is a 'great
flood of forgotten reality'^ and of the future Barth says
5
'we do not and cannot conceive its contents'. Memory and
anticipation are the only imperfect means available to man
whereby he may have access to past and future. These Barth
dismisses as nothing more than vain and vague ways of
extending man's grasp upon his experience and thus his time.
3. Cf. the allusion made to this on page lt>V above.
4. CD III/2, p. 512.
5. Ob.cit.. p. 513.
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Worse still, man's present is in doubt and under threat.
'For what is our present but a step from darkness to
darkness, from the "no longer" to the "not yet", and
therefore a continual deprivation of what we were
and had in favour of a continual grasping of what we
will (perhaps) be and have? Our past and future
do at least have real if limited content, but the
fullness of our present is obviously only the
remarkable act of existence itself in which we have
already been deprived of our past, but have not yet
been able to ©?asp the future, everything being wholly
behind us and everything (or nothing) wholly before
us. What are we now? And what do we have?'
(CD HI/2, p. 514)
This scepticism which echoes that of St. Augustine,
both in the Confessions as regards the analysis of future and
past and the Contra Academicos in his response to Cicero,
forces us to consider this 'present'.
'But what is Now? What is the present? It is the
time between the times. And this, strictly speaking
and as we experience it, is no time at all, no
duration, no series of moments, but only the boundary
between past and future, a boundary which is never
stationary, but always shifts further ahead. It is
the moment we can never prevail upon to stay, for it
is always gone or not yet come.'
(CD III/2, p. 514)
This radical but time-honoured doctrine means that
time becomes a 'riddle' yet this is an 'ultimate truth' of
human existence. Out of this puzzle presented by time
arise the concepts of infinity which surround the regression
into past and future. Infinite too are 'the succession of
moments, or rather constant shiftings of the boundary, between
the darkness there and the darkness here'. Again we may
detect in this a Kantian flavour for it is out of the anti¬
monies, including those of the time-order, that the illusory
knowledge of metaphysics arises. Curiously enough Kant's
6. Op.cit., p. 515.
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words, *1 have therefore found it necessary to deny
7
knowledge, in order to make room for faith' are to find
their theological fulfilment in Barth's account which speci¬
fically repudiates metaphysics but nevertheless seeks to
speak of God as bounding and conditioning time.
In his exposition Barth finds in the poetry of
IlSlderlin the consummate appreciation of our being in its
time which 'is in its infinity an infinitely tragic destiny'
O
and a 'life-long insecurity'. Barth asserts the irreducible
succession of moments which constitutes the 'flight* of
man's time and over against this he presents the Christolo-
gical contrast, the 'I am...which is, and which was, and
Q
which is to come, the Almighty'. The fact that this con¬
trast bears a close formal similarity to the opposition of
the empirical determinations of inner appearances and the
transcendental unity of apperception in the Critique of Pure
Reason10 is of interest. Whereas Kant in the Transcendental
Deduction sought to demonstrate the synthetic a -priori status
of this unity Barth ascribes this possibility to God.11 In
this passage Kant ascribes necessity (that is 'transcendental'
necessity) to the unity of apperception as the condition of
experience. It might well be possible to argue that Barth's
distinction of fallen time and God's time runs into diffi¬
culties from the Kantian standpoint because it attempts to
7. Critique of Pure Reason, Preface to second edition, p.29.
8. CD III/2, p. 515.
9. Op.cit.. p. 516.
10. Cf. Critique of Pure Reason. A353, A355, A402, B220.
11. Op.cit., A107.
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synthesise the extremes of idealism (the 'I am' of trans-
temporal unity in God) and empiricism (the flux of unbound
moments of time). What we must note at this juncture is
that the influence of Kant*s arguments have been of immense
importance and prefigure not only the work of Barth but
that of Heidegger and the phenomenological-ontology tradition.
The contrasting conclusions of these traditions will help
show us the exact structure and status of Barth's theory of
time.
The complexity and ambiguity of Earth*s position
becomes apparent when he unfolds his exposition of sinful man
in time who has *lost* his time and who is alienated from
12
his Creator and therefore from himself*. This ambiguity
which we have encountered before concerns the relation of
created to revealed reality and the role of revelation as a
guide to natural theology. Barth's intentions are ambitious
1^
for he is to 'break through and invert the concept of time'.
The following pages of Earth* s Church Dogmatics which expound
this theological departure are crucial to our understanding
and analysis of this work. We therefore proceed with
caution and care as we assess this attempt to outflank and
overcome once more with a theological answer the perennial
problems of human existence and philosophical ratiocination.
Man has not been left in this dilemma of contradiction
and alienation from himself and from God. In the being of
Jesus Christ a protest is made against the 'perverted and
14
disturbed realityr of man. The existence of the man Jesus
12. CD III/2, p. 517.
13. Qp.cit.. p. 553.
14. Op.cit., p. 517.
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is a demonstration to us that God did not will man's
existence to be like this. God has 'come to our rescue,
and therefore to the defence of our true creaturely nature
15
against the unnatural condition into which it had fallen'. v
Man is lost because the truth of his time is 'lost*. More
accurately man's time has been 'mislaid' because Earth
argues that he lives in a false reality in which his
experience of time is perverted. Jesus' being in time
recalls men to the truth as 'It allows us no rest in this
falsehood, because it is itself the truth which confronts it,
1A
the truth of human nature as God created it.' This point
is of absolutely fundamental importance: revealed reality
of time in the being of Jesus is, created reality which re¬
calls us to the truth of our own being. Jesus Christ is
both a 'unique determination' of human being (he is the Son
of God with all that implies) but this 'includes a being in
time which is true and genuine in contrast to the plunge
into falsehood'.1^
Earth's assertion concerning the meaning and signifi¬
cance of the being of the man Jesus in time is clear. What
proves ambiguous is what exactly it is that has fallen: is
time itself fallen or merely man's being in time. In other
words is our fleeting fallen time merely our subjective and
perverted experience which does not move beyond these bounds?
If this is so does this matter? Given Earth's limitations
15. Op.cit., p. 518.
16. Ibid.
!7. Op,cit.. p. 519.
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upon the nature of time and our knowledge of it could we
have ever known true time without having been God in the
first place? The problem that confronts us arises out of
the explicit subjectivity of Barth*s epistemology at this
point. He desires to assert the objectivity and veridical
nature of time on the basis of revelation, yet at the same
time as we shall see, he confines our possibility of knowing
the objective truth about time to the realm of being as
phenomenology. Consequently we may ask if the being in
time of Jesus Christ is to remind us of what we should know
or what we could possibly know? Barth has confined his
argument to our experience of time and has so far remained
agnostic as to the possibility of ascertaining the objective
state of affairs. This agnosticism does not last for long
as will soon be apparent.
Barth maintains the characteristic tension of
continuity over against division through the contrast of the
•I am' of Jesus' being the flight characteristic of man's
being. Given this fundamental dichotomy overcome in Jesus
Christ, what consequences flow from the restriction of this
to the realm of 'being'? Barth's undoubted actualism in
his doctrine of being drives him away from substantialist
thinking with regard to God, man or cosmos and so 'lost time'
and 'God's time* understood in terms of 'being* occupy a
13
category with close affinities to the Dasein of Heidegger.
18. There is a parallel between Heidegger and Barth's
analyses of time which is explored in this chapter.
This stems in the main from their reactions to Kant
but the ultimate goal of each is of course quite distinct.
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The categories of existence bear similarities in that in
both cases they concern human being in the world and in
relation, understood basically in terms of intentionality.
Of course the differences are enormous as regards the inter-
pretation of human existence and the conclusions reached,
but both Barth and Heidegger share a Kantian heritage at this
juncture. The difficulty is that whereas Heidegger may
argue that the traditional arguments of scepticism and
dogmatism about the external world do not concern him as
the analytic of Dasein transcends this (it is •transcendental'
in a sense related to that of Kant) of dispute, the theologian,
on the contrary, has no such freedom. We must now see if
Barth does in fact remain inside the bounds of an ultimate
subjectivity and if so how he can argue beyond this about
the external world and time order. Besides this we must
probe the implications of Barth's conclusions for theological
ontology, understood in its general sense of the study of
what in reality exists. To revert for a moment to the other
use of this term it will be remembered that Macquarrie
argued that Heidegger's distinction of the ontological and
the ontic was based on a necessary relation of the former to
the latter. In the context of theology the reverse applies
at this point. Can we speak of the ontological in theology
without reference to the ontic? Is it not the case that
Barth is in danger of doing this in the following key passage
which we quote at length. We shall then contrast this with
his argument for objectivity.
•We do not know what time means for animals or plants,
or for the rest of the universe. We live in constant
relationship to the rest of the universe. Therefore
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since we ourselves are in time, we may conclude or
suspect that time is the form of existence of every¬
thing created. At any rate, the mode of existence
of the earthly cosmos as observed and conceived by
us shows countless analogies to our own to support
view. Even the apparently timeless truths of mathe¬
matics may be observed and conceived by us only in the
form of temporal acts of consciousness, analyses and
syntheses, demonstrations and definitions. Moreover
the biblical accounts of creation, especially the
first, seem clearly to imply that time was created
simultaneously with universe as the form existence.
Like man, the whole universe in time is in time as
created by God and therefore real. But to the
universe there also belongs heaven as the upper
cosmos - the inconceivable and inaccessible side of
created reality. And we would be making a bold step
to say that this has time as the form of its existence.
Indeed, we do not know what it means for beings in the
earthly cosmos to be in time. We have no means of
observing or conceiving their temporality. But we
can and must see and apprehend that we ourselves are
in time and only in time; that - whatever its signi¬
ficance - we are only in the movement from the past to
the present and no mere "presupposition" of human
reality, as though the positioning of it, or the
reality as such, were really timeless. Man is, only
as he is in time. Even in eternal life he will still
be in his time. For he will then be the one who,
when there is no time but only God's eternity, and he
is finally hidden in God, will have been in his time.
Just as he is the soul of his body, so he exists in
his time. We might almost say that he is himself his
time in the sequence of his life-acts. He is himself
his time fulfilling itself in the sequence of his
life-acts. So close is the relation between the real
being of man and the real time in which he is.'
(CD III/2, p. 521.)
This argument (or series of arguments) is vital to
gaining an accurate insight into the Church Dogmatics. There
is a strict delimitation of the extent of human knowledge of
time which is confined to our own awareness of personal
temporality, for 'We can and must see and apprehend that we
ourselves are in time and only in time....Man is only as he
19
is in time'. We can have no certain knowledge that time
is the form of the rest of the universe or the objects that
19. Op.clt.. p. 521
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that lie in it. Our conclusions about the external world
are surmise, or inference by analogy from ourselves. Time
as something unconnected to human or divine existence in
the Heideggerian sense of an apprehension of the phenomeno¬
logy of being-in-time, is secondary. Once more the
theologian does not (and cannot on Earth's view as it is
expressed here) indulge in speculation either cosmological or
philosophical. He must argue on the basis of the inner
dialectic of eternity and time, as it is manifested in the
contrast of Jesus' duration and consistent *1 am', with the
fleeting, fragmented, 'fallen time* of human temporality.
We have seen that Barth's limiting argument precludes
direct knowledge of time in the universe. His positive
argument directed against this agnosticism is based in turn
upon a rigorous scepticism. Barth is radical in the extreme:
'Illusion always results when we seek light on human nature
20
from any other source than the man Jesus Christ*. It is
only possible to know our temporality as it is bound up in
our humanity itself. It is only possible to know truly our
own humanity as it is in Jesus Christ. There are, therefore,
two waves of scepticism to be overcome before we can become
aware of the truth. This is not a parody of Earth's argument
but its very kernel. It is only in the positive assertion
of revelation itself, Jesus Christ, that we may know humanity
and thus time. We approach the core of Earth's argument and
the touchstone of the problem of time in the Church Dogmatics.
'The anthropological truth with which we are here
concerned may be combined with its christological
basis in a first proposition which must occupy us in
20. Op.cit., p. 520.
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this sub-section. It is that the existence of the
man Jesus in time is our guarantee that time as the
form of human existence is in any case willed and
created by God, is given by God to man, and is
therefore real.'
(CD III/2, p. 520)
This argument is not new for we have encountered such
an assertion previously. What is remarkable is that it is
combined with the specific sceptical agnosticism of Earth's
overall position. He continues in the next paragraph to
assert the primacy of Jesus' existence in time as not merely
the paradigm of real time for us, but also we shall see, as
the basis of our experience of such real time over against
our own fleeting temporal existence.
•It is real. We are, therefore, in time. Time is not,
therefore, the abyss of our non-being, however per¬
verted and corrupt we may be in it. We have time.
Threatened though we may be, we are not in time in
such a way that it continually slips away into infinity
and is therefore lost forever. Time is. It is the
form of man's existence, the form of our existence.
To be man is to live in time. Humanity is in time.
This is involved in the fact that the being of man is
his life, and that his life is reception and action,
rule and service. If this life of his is real, so
too is his time as the stage on which he lives out
his being.'
(CD III/2, p. 521)
Although, according to Barth, we cannot assert the
intrinsic temporality of the world of material objects it is
possible on the other hand to believe in the reality of the
•stage' of human activity only because of the guarantee of
the man Jesus in time. Barth proceeds to reinforce his
argument. As we have seen the core of his position is that
'Humanity is temporality'. But what, we may justifiably ask,
of time itself? Following the line set by the distinction
of the ontological and the ontic we may ask whether we can
speak of 'temporality' without establishing 'time*. At this
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point Barth once again resorts to scepticism as aid in
fending off possible speculation about time as such and he
rapidly rehearses some of the standard arguments and meta¬
phors in the analysis of time. Does time move? Do we move?
Such questions all assume, so Barth thinks, a distinction
between ourselves and time which is absurd. In fact given
the background to this assertion it might equally well be
argued that the only distinct and fully discrete realities
in the whole scheme Barth elaborates are those of man and
God, for external objects are either surmise or inferences
or established with certainty only in the humanity of Jesus
Christ. Barth argues:
♦This much at least is certain - that it is as diffi¬
cult to separate time as the form of our existence
from ourselves as it is to separate ourselves from
time. All such abstractions are as absurd as the
separation of body and soul.1
(CD III/2, p. 552)
Barth*s position is anti-metaphysical and anti-specu-
21
lative and this is consistent with what he has said earlier
in the Church Dogmatics. Given his overall aim, which is
to articulate the logic of divine revelation and to establish
this exposition on the basis of its reality, then his efforts
with regard to time are again consistent. Unfortunately for
Barth this inner consistency strikes difficulties when he
argues about time. We have noted in the earlier parts of
this study that time was a category diared by both divine and
human existence, but which beyond this called into question
21. Barth thinks out with rigour the implications of his own
theological stance which is structured by its own ontolo-
gical presuppositions as we have seen in this study.
This involves a rejection of extraneous abstractions.
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wider issues because of its very nature. To be precise,
temporal assertions made within theology have implications
beyond the immediate area of theological explanation. This
is what Barth is facing as a dilemma. Either he is to
maintain the unity and integrity of a pure theology of the
Word of God made flesh, which cannot but be explained upon
its own terms, or he has to accept that theological explana¬
tion of the problem of time has to relate to other under¬
standings of time. The first alternative can only be
sustained by the divine-human account of time as purely
•temporality*, that is an account generated out of con¬
trasting phenomenologies which in turn imply particular
ontologies. If this is maintained then the following criti¬
cal argument may be pressed. Given the exclusive source of
knowledge about human nature (the man Jesus Christ) and if this
•flesh* is understood as man*s God-relatedness alone, then it
is sustainable to argue that in Jesus alone there is this
perfect representation of humanity. Once Barth speaks of
time as perfectly represented in him then we may consistently
ask if all •real1 attributes of human existence and by
inference those of the objective world are so present in him.
The problem which underlies this is that which we have
noted before in relation to the doctrine of creation. What
is the ontological status of creation in the ontology of
the Church Dogmatics in the face of the overwhelming reality
of the Word of God Jesus Christ? The ambiguity we encounter
is in respect of the created order. Jesus Christ may be
seen as on the one hand the source of the true reality of
time, but on the other hand he appears as the sign of the true
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reality, causing us to recognise the truth about the time
in which we have our being. The difference is great be¬
cause if the former is true then all true realities must be
derivable from Jesus Christ, but if the latter is true then
he comes merely as the corrector of misconception. Is the
world fallen or merely our perception of it as manifested
in our experience of 'fallen time*?
This construction of Earth's dilemma is not contrived.
His exclusion of consideration of 'time' per se is not
derived from the nature of revelation itself (which would be
consistent with his fundamental theological method) but is
based upon an agnosticism emanating from his uee of
traditional sceptical arguments which are in turn drawn from
speculation about cosmic, not theological realities. Barth
uses the 'intimate relation' between man and time to exclude
consideration of time itself, except insofar as it is
temporality, that is 'being in time'. These two basic
arguments are of great importance.
'Humanity is temporality. Temporality, as far as our
observation and understanding go, is humanity. The
first of these two statements is clear. However we
may interpret it, human life is that movement from the
past through the present into the future. Human life
means to have been, to be, and to be about to be.
Human life means to be temporal. The second state¬
ment is not so clear. But at any rate we do not
know what we are really saying when we ascribe to
"temporality" a different content from "humanity".
We cannot espouse with confidence even the more
modest statement that the concept of temporality
might have other contents.'
(CD III/2, p. 522)
Barth is operating a formidable reverse form of
'Ockham's razor' eliminating those aspects of time which
are to him theologically unnecessary or embarrassing. It
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has been established for better or worse that Barth's
account of time is based upon the opposition of human and
divine * temporality*; this latter being understood in the
sense of *being in time*, a phenomenological ontology.
Ontological questions which move beyond this circumscribed
area are precluded for reasons we have rehearsed. All
that is to follow in our exposition presupposes this
foundation which we consider to be of crucial importance in
our exposition and analysis of the doctrine of time in the
Church Dogmatics.
Barth continues with a justification of the approach
we have outlined based upon the intrinsically temporal nature
of man's relation to God and to other men.
•What God and my fellow-men are to me, they are in
the history of their being and action, and therefore
in the time they have for me. And what I am to God
and to my fellow-man, I am in the history of my
being and acting, and therefore in my time, to the
extent that in some way I am in my time for them.'
(CD III/2, p. 522)
Barth again denies that we can know time is intrinsic
to the being of plants and animals because there is no analogy
between man's relationship to God and that relation that
exists between man and the natural order. We know with
certainty that our relationship with God is * temporal* for
'What we must know is that it is essential to us, that it
belongs to our nature, to live in time, as is conclusively
proved when we recall our relationship to God and to our
2?
fellow-man'. This 'certainty' is opposed to the
•inference and conjecture* which is the only basis upon
which we may ascribe time to the 'being of plants and animals
and the rest of the universe*. Immediately Barth specifies
22. CD III/2, p. 522.
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the relation of God to his * creatures'(i.e. man) in a com¬
bination of actualist and personalist categories. This basis
has been encountered previously in our study. The combin¬
ation of God's temporality and his relation to us provides
an indispensable key to understanding the Church Dogmatics.
Let us analyse this briefly.
God's relationship to his creatures (again we must
specify that this means men) is not a 'permanent, universal
relation' like that existing between finite and infinite,
matter and spirit and so on but is a 'necessary action in
2^5
its concrete particularity*. J for,
'The God of Holy Scripture does not hover motionless
above the flux of human history, above the times with
their kaleidoscopic variety, above the passage of
each individual from yesterday through to-day and into
to-morrow. God accompanies them in person.*
(CD III/2, p. 523)
Suffice it to say that Earth's assertion of the actual
and the personal and his denial of what we might term the
objective and ontological (that is the 'ontic) factors is
24
an approach open to the reductio ad absurdum of R.W. Hepburn.
If, however, Barth were to have asserted the first aspects
of the divine-human relation but have remained uncommitted
upon the second, then his account would have been far easier
23. Op.cit.. p. 523.
24. Christianity and Paradox. London, 1968, Cf. Chapter V,
'Meaning and Mediator'.The argument of this thesis is
that the particularity of Jesus Christ (which is used as
the focus of all theological assertions as abstractions
cashed out into statements concerning this man in this
situation) is precisely underlaid by an ontology and
unified doctrine of time. Thus D.M. MacKinnon's illum¬
inating analogy based upon Bertrand Russell's injunction
(that 'Y/henever possible, let us substitute logical
constructions out of the observable for inferred, unob¬
served entities') is only a partial characterisation of
the structure and method of Barth's thought.
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to sustain. What Barth's work inaugurates is an acute
need to return to consideration of cosmological and
objective ontological questions as is evidenced in the
work of T.F. Torrance. Barth has shown inadvertently the
acute difficulties which result from a theological method
which bases itself upon the expanded, but ultimately limited
and isolated categories of the personal and the actual with
respect to both God and man. The net result is the need to
derive all other categories from these basic elements or,
alternatively, to explain other categories through these by
a 'cashing out' procedure. Thus it is with time that a huge
structure underlying the whole of the Church Dogmatics is
built upon several limited concepts of time and eternity which
have to perform a formidable series of tasks in binding to¬
gether God and man. The concrete, massive and apparently
solid structure has its potential weaknesses but these only
become clear when we probe the basis upon which this is
built. Barth's achievement is breath-taking but its
fundamental ambiguity is systematic and therefore extremely
difficult to detect. Once located, however, the ambiguity
of reality in creation and in Christ and the construction of
an architectonic of time exclusively upon the basis we have
outlined must cause us to look upon Barth's Church Dogmatics
from a new angle, which reveals both its strengths, and
unfortunately, its undoubted weaknesses.
We may now begin to examine Barth's development of the
consequences of his primary positive arguments concerning the
'inextricable unity of man and time'. In confirmation of
our exploration of this Barth reasserts the integral nature
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of his anthropology of man as spirit and of man as temporal.
From these primal facts the other theological factors
emanate. We cannot think of human nature without thinking
of time. Beyond this we cannot escape time as it manifests
itself as our own temporality. Above all Barth argues we
cannot reverse the time-process. The inescapability of
time suggests that 'time as the form of existence is no less
25
ordained by a higher power than existence itself'. Now,
in the context of his fundamental method Barth advances an
argument working towards a new natural theology. This is
a natural theology fulfilling the theological ontology of
the Church Dogmatics from within. Barth offers an account
which is a combination of factors derived from what he
conceives of as human experience of time and the evidence
of revelation which confirms this. In fact there is a
confirmation (by the removal of illusion and misconception)
of nature by grace. Again the ambiguity of this account is
whether the time of Jesus Christ confirms or re-creates,
whether it merely removes an illusion or actually restores
time itself.
Barth proceeds to elaborate a theological exposition
which clearly adheres to what we have called the 'confirmation'
view.
'The presence and gift of God cannot, therefore, be
ignored in this matter if we are to think of human
nature. For it is in virtue of the presence and gift
of God that temporality belongs to human nature. All
man's unbelief, error and superstition cannot alter
this original relationship of God to him or its far-
reaching implications. Unbelief, error and. super¬
stition certainly involve a misuse of time given by
25. CD III/2, p. 525-
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the presence and gift of God. By means of them man
may very well compromise himself. His being in time
may acquire the character of dissipation and
corruption. But it cannot be destroyed. For God
Himself, His presence and gift, cannot be abrogated
or destroyed. Time as the form of human existence
is always in itself and as such the silent but per¬
sistent song of praise to God.1
(CD III/2, p. 525)
Time is not merely on the one hand the form of human
existence created and willed by God for man (however he may
pervert this). In Barth*s words 'Tiqie, then is willed
and created by God as the form at any rate of human
existence', but on the other hand time is also,
•In all its hiddenness it is the rustling of the Holy
Spirit by which, however deaf to it we may be, we are
surrounded in virtue of the fact that we are in the
movement of time and are obliged to make this move¬
ment in and with our own life, so long as we have it.
And in the modest garment of time, this mere form of
our existence, given in such sovereign freedom, we
are actually confronted by the presence and gift of
God's grace. If we are to speak of pre-venient
grace it is difficult to see in what better form it
may be better perceived and grasped than in the simple
fact that time is given to us men.'
(CD III/2, p. 526)
Thus Barth understands time as not solely the arena
of the hist o rical outworking of the covenant but as also
the bearer of the reality of the Holy Spirit dynamically
present to man. This view of the Holy Spirit (which is a
combination of the doctrines of Athanasius and Basil in a
positive development by Barth) brings us towards the
consummation of his analysis. As a purely dogmatic account
Barth*s summary is quite unexcelled. It is only when we
consider this in the context of wider issues that we become
aware of potential difficulties. The theological doctrine
of time is built upon the foundations we have outlined and
in particular the relation of time and eternity. Within the
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limitations of his scheme Barth provides a degree of inte¬
gration and comprehensiveness unrivalled in the history of
Christian theology. It is only when we begin to examine
the relation of this theological time to other 'times', as
for instance in the world-order outside immediate the
theological rationale, that doubts may arise. We quote
Barth's summary at length for it demonstrates both strength
and weakness of the Church Dogmatics.
'Time, then, is willed and created by God as the form
at any rate of human existence. A few words of
explanation are needed here. Time is not eternity.
Eternity itself is not timeless. It is the simul¬
taneity and co-inherence of past, present and future.
Thus eternity is the dimension of God's own life, the
life in which he is self-positing and self-sufficient
as Father, Son and Holy Ghost. It is this in contrast
to time as the dimension of our life - the dimension
in which past, present and future follow in succession.
Eternity is not created. Eternity is God Himself.
For as God is self-existent, He is also His own di¬
mension. But time is willed and created by God as a
reality distinct from Himself. It is willed and
created as the universe is willed and created, and in
the universe man. It is willed and created to be our
dimension, corresponding to His. This must obviously
mean that God willed and created time as the dimension
of the life He ordained for us when we were willed and
created, and therefore as the dimension of a life in
communion with Himself as the eternal and living God,
and also in relationship with our fellow men, to whom
He has given that same dimension for the same life in
communion with Himself. Time was in fact willed and
created in order that there might take place His
dealings in the covenant with man, which finds its
counterpart in the relationship between man and his
fellows. It is for this reason and in this sense
that time is the form of our existence. As our
existence is not an end in itself, neither is time as
its form. It is our time and we have it only to the
extent that we belong to God, i.e., to the God who
turned to us even in His eternity. It is ours and
we have it only to the extent that as our time it
rests in His hands, from which beginning to end are
of course at work for us. It is this sense and to
this extent that time is given to us, and this mighty
ordinance of time, which we can only accept as such,
is as we receive and possess it a hymn of praise to
God, a proclamation of His mighty acts, the hidden
rustling of the Holy Spirit, the garment and form of
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the grace in which God wills to meet us. Everything
depends upon the fact that God willed and created
time for this purpose.•
(CD III/2, p. 527)
Thus Barth concludes the analysis of the "basis of
man's temporality which gives rise in experience to his
understanding of time. In this passage we see most of the
elements that have been examined in the course of this
thesis which all contribute to Barth*s understanding of time.
Time is both the theatre of the man's acts and those of God.
It is thus the realm and medium of both 'nature' and 'grace'.
In short, time as the 'form of our existence' and the 'garment
and form of grace' is a manifestation of the theological unity
informing the structure of the Church Dogmatics. The cate¬
gory of divine-human temporality is a shared, though in¬
wardly distinct reality which is intrinsic to both God and
man. This doctrine of time has implications developed far
beyond those in Barth*s understanding of space, and it has a
role of very great importance, study of which leads us to the
very heart of the Church Dogmatics.
Having established to his satisfaction both the nature
of time as it is in the being of Jesus Christ (in Jesus,
Lord of Time, the subject of our last Chapter) and the time
of man as he experiences it in his being in time (in Given
Time which we have just been examining) Barth now presents
a combination of the two in describing man as the subject of
revelation. The basic theological impulse underlying this
is concisely presented in the following short passage which
illustrates the ambivalence of time as manifestation of human
fallenness and bearer of grace.
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♦Its secret is the will and act of God - the
Creator who will not he thwarted or confused by
human sin, but remains faithful to Himself and
therefore to us in defiance of sin and its
consequences. The dangers to which the reality of
our time is exposed may bewilder and terrify us, as
indeed they must. But they do not invalidate the
truth of His -presence and gift.*
(CD III/2, p. 527)
Once more Barth uses the threefold pattern which he
considers expresses the fundamental form of time as present,
past and future. Thus he begins again with the present.
Man's present is a 'crossing of the frontier between the
past and future'. Is this present real or a dream perhaps?
I recollect the 'Now* of the past and I anticipate the
♦Now' of the future. My life in time is structured with
reference to the present as its base-point.
•In other words from the standpoint of the present
I always see and understand my being in time as the
totality of the previous and subsequent times now
distinguished by me and meeting in my Now; and I
always see and understand my past and my future,
and therefore the totality of my being in time, as a
present like my actual present. But is this present
real? And if not what about my whole being in time?'
(CD III/2, p. 528)
Outdoing the sceptics who find refuge in the 'I am'
of the present Barth denies them even this unsure foothold,
for 'the present is without duration or extension'. Left on
our own Barth argues that we have no basis for our present in
time. 'But we are not left to our own resources in this
matter if we have reason to believe that the will and act of
God are the secret of our time, of our being in it, and there¬
fore of our being in the present moment, in each present
Now'. w It is not our intention to evaluate the particular
26. Dp.cit.. p. 528.
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philosophical merit of Earth* s preliminary arguments for
they are not designed to be conclusive but cumulative and,
moreover, they are subordinate to an overall theological
purpose within the Church Dogmatics. Earth alludes to
Schleiermacher's contention that 'we are eternally in every
moment', this detemporalises man's being and attributes to
man an eternal being that can only be postulated of God.
If only, Barth exclaims, Schleiermacher had spoken of the
27
eternity of God and not of man. Barth's primary purpose
is to show how time is underpinned by God's eternity and
this of course means that the core of time, man's ungrasp-
able present, has to undergo transformation. Thus Barth
argues that the present, 'the basic form of our time as a
whole*, is as we have seen 'without duration or extension,
disappearing as soon as it comes'. Over against this
deficient present, this fleeting 'now' Barth argues:
'Primarily, however, it is not we who are now but
God who is now: God who created us and is process
of rescuing and preserving us; God who is not
dismayed at our sin, and does not cease to be for
us, nor reverse our determination to be for Him and
in mutual fellowship; God in all the defiance of
our unfaithfulness by His own faithfulness. He is
now primarily; and we secondarily.'
(CD III/2, p. 529)
God 'is now properly' but we are 'improperly in
relation to Him* because 'He is in His self-existence and
self-repose; we "pass hence, and wander from one year to
no
another".* The dynamic of God's eternity is in his being
27. Op.cit.. p. 628-9.
28. Op.cit.. p. 529.
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as Creator and as the One who actively loves man. Thus
we do not find God in static or passive relation to man's
time (as we have seen it is not in Earth's view a relation
of finite and infinite, matter and spirit and so on) but
a lively relationship.
'He is now as Creator. But this means that there is
first a divine stepping from the past to the future.
This is His present. We speak of His eternity, in
which the past is not "no longer" nor the future "not
yet", in which therefore the Now has duration and
extension. It is in His eternity that God is now.
But we do not speak of God's abstract eternity, but
of the eternity of His free love, in which He takes
and will take time for our sakes, in which He wills
to be for us and also wills that we should be for
Him and therefore in mutual fellowship. That God
is now means that all this is now the meaning of a
divine stepping from the past to the future, of a
divine Word spoken now, of a divine action performed
now. *
(CD III/2, p. 529)
Barth proceeds to affirm the distinction of relation
and relationship in his immediate denial of both 'abstract
eternity* as well as 'abstract time*. His account insofar
as it is abstracted is basically phenomenological and
developed in conjunction with purely theological postulates.
'And now we continue that there is also - in relation¬
ship from the very first to what God is and does -
our human stepping from the past to the future.
This is our present in our time, in which the past is
no more and the future not yet and therefore the Now
is that middle point between the two with neither
duration nor extension.'
(CD HI/2, p. 529)
Once more at this juncture the objection might well
be put to Barth that by asserting this two-sided doctrine of
the fleeting present (under-pinned by the Now and the
theological doctrine of God implied in this relationship)
but denying on the other hand 'abstract' temporal speech he
is falling once more into a sophisticated subjectivity. In
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this we do not imply that God and men are mere 'objects* but
that relational language is inadequate if 'time' is to be
understood not merely as the relational schemata of God and
man's acts, but as one of the fundamental characteristics
of the cosmos and the history of world activity.
The account we have outlined culminates in a complex
series of arguments which we are bound to expound at length
and comment upon. This complexity does not reflect any
great virtue in Barth's thought at this point because there
is at work a double dialectic. He has to assert the Now of
God's eternity as the basis of our time yet deny its actual
detectability as an experiential datum. This interpre¬
tation may sound both aggressive and radical but when we
examine Barth's thought with care we see this to be the
truth out of which emerges a new and exciting doctrine of
divine and human temporality to be seen in the following
passage.
•That we are in the present means that we are in the
present of the gracious, judging, commanding will
and action in which He has turned wholly to us, but
claims us wholly for Himself, for fellowship with
Him, and therefore for human fellowship. It is in
doing this that He gives us time, and first of all
the present, and what the present is in our time,
that moment between the times which is without dur¬
ation or extension. It is our past on the basis of
His, in His and for His. That is why it takes the
form it does. That is why it is a stepping from the
past to the future. That is why it means a leaving
of the past which is "no longer" and a grasping of
the future which is "not yet". And finally that is
why it is in itself only that frontier and our crossing
of that frontier and therefore apparently nothing in¬
trinsically its own. That God is present to us is
what fills our present: from the past, for He is not
"no longer", into the future, for He is not "not
yet"; and therefore also in the centre, because His
movement from the past into the future has the dur¬
ation and extension which escape our own Now. That I
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am now - with all the inescapable problems which
this involves - means that as I am continually
there in movement from my past to my future, I am
referred wholly to Him and cast back upon Him, upon
His being in time addressed to me. Without Him,
without the fact that He is for me, I should have
no time and therefore, since I can be only in time,
I should not be at all. The very fact that I am
now far from giving that boastful certainty of my
real being, would then show me only that I am in
process of sinking into nothingness. But I really
am now because God is, and is first, and is not only
for Himself but for me. Because God loves me
without cause or merit, I am now. And I can add
with confidence, and with a precision of which the
prophets of "I am" have not the slightest inkling,
that because God loves me I really am now, and really
have time as I have it. I do not sink into a void,
although I still have that great "no longer" behind
me and the great "not yet" in front of me, and al¬
though I have only the unstable moment, the ice-floe
of the present, beneath my feet. If I have God (or
rather, if God has me), I need no more. I have space
and therefore time. Time is given me, and with all
the certainty and solidity that I could desire
because it is given me directly by Him, because, as
I am in time in this way, I have to do with Him, and
therefore with eternity as the fount and sum and
source of all time. His presence as such is the
gift of my time. He Himself pledges both its reality
and its goodness. I am His creature. All I need
to be this is time. Only if I want to be as God can
I desire more, and suffer and sigh and complain be¬
cause I only have time, and my now has the remarkable
form of this transition. Only if I had to be a
creature without God should I have to regard this
transition as my destruction. But I am a creature
under God and with Him. I have time. I have my
now in the form in which I need it. I am where I
may live neither threatened by illusion nor enmeshed
in falsehood, i.e., in real time, in the present of
God. Tersteegen is right after all: "Content, is
he, who hath Thee, Whose spirit to Thee cleaveth,
Every yearning leaveth.•
(CD III/2, pp. 530-531.)
In Barth* s doctrine of time there is the temporal
correlate of the veiled and unveiledness of revelation en¬
countered in the early volumes of the Church Dogmatics.^
29. The assertions in this paragraph are justified by the
foregoing analysis in this thesis which has demonstrated
the integral nature of Barth's understanding of time in
his theological thought.
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Thus the assertion of revelation is made in and through the
worldly particularity of the Word of God in Jesus Christ,
but as in the other forms of the Word of God, we cannot
point to God ourselves as only he can cause us to witness
to him in the acknowledgement that is the knowledge of
faith. Likewise with regard to the passage we have just
quoted, time is undertaken by eternity, in asserting this
we do not postulate an observable state of affairs. On
cursory examination this might not seem to be the case as
the careless reader might imagine that the 'Now* of God's
eternity actually altered our perception of our own time or
time itself (however this is conceived). In fact what we
are witnessing is a transformation in Earth's thought, for
the very opacity and unsatisfactory nature of this crucial
passage seen from the standpoint of the dialectic of
scepticism and theological ontology gives way to a new
understanding of time. Granted the provisos that we have
laid out earlier in this chapter (which trace Barth's
apparent tendency towards a separation of the 'phenomenolo-
gical' from the 'ontological', i.e., the 'ontic') we find a
new aspect to Barth's doctrine of time. This is profoundly
dynamic, offering both (in terms of Heideggerian categories)
an 'existential' horizon of enhanced dimensions, as well as
a sharp impulse towards the grasping of actual 'existentiell'
possibilities. The 'is' of God's time constitutes a great
'ought' of commitment.
God provides 'His movement from the past into the
future' which has 'the duration and extension which escape
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our Now*. God's 'present' is not static as we might
have expected from that facet of Barth's doctrine of
eternity which stresses the abrogation of the 'before and
after' in the distinction of 'past, present and future'.
On the contrary God's present is precisely the movement from
past to future which is given us in time and which prevents
our lives from sinking into nothingness. Although 'I have
only the unstable moment, the ice-flow of the present,
beneath my feet' and the past and the future lie irretrievably
after and before me God nevertheless gives my time 'certainty
31
and solidity'. This is not because God effects some
material or metaphysical or even phenomenological change in
my time but because he 'pledges both its reality and its
32
goodness*. In reality God's time is a promise to us that
our time is not merely the devouring Chronos of mythology
or the passage we make to constant annihilation. God's
'presence as such is the gift of my time'-^ and in the light
of this I do not have to regard this transition (in the now
of the movement from past to future) as my destruction.
Thus God* s temporality, that is eternity, does not annihilate
time or eternalise it into timelessness but allows us to
live assured that our own time is the time that God has
willed for us because he is fully temporal in the three
tenses. In this passage Barth is striving to eliminate the





dualism of the western tradition by the assertion of a
divine temporality that is the affirmation of our time
understood within the framework of a truly Christian faith
and theology.
It is because of this that Barth can say 'I have my
now in the form in which I need it. I am where I may live
neither threatened by illusion nor enmeshed in falsehood,
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i.e., in real time, in the present of God'. God's time
assures us that 'God loves me as I really am now, and really
35
have time as I have it'. Contrary to those expectations
engendered in us by the Platonic tendency in most theological
speculation about time, influenced by the notion of the
eternal 'Now' or present, Barth is now arguing for a fully
temporal and dynamic doctrine of God's eternity. This is
the temporal culmination of the whole Church Dogmatics, for
as we have seen there are a variety of strands of thought on
eternity and time which are now united in the creative healing
of human time. Again we quote at length to secure Barth*s
insights without distortion.
•We next ask concerning the significance of the fact
that man is always now. We have seen that all human
being, action and experience is either now or else
unreal. Even as past and future it can be understood
as a totality only in relation to the present, as a
past or present now. We are always in this transition.
Our own reality depends upon the reality of this
transition. And this transition, and therefore the
Now in which we are, is real as and because the
present of the eternal God as the Creator of time is
the secret of our present. What is this transition,
then, but the offer, the summons, the invitation, to
be with God now, to be present with Him, to make this
transition with Him, recognising that He always
precedes us, not without us, but for us and on our
34. Op.cit.. p. 531.
35. Op.cit., p. 530.
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behalf? He always does this now. This is what
gives our present its distinctive weight, but also
its distinctive lightness; its distinctive serious¬
ness, but also its distinctive radiance. God is
primarily and continually present. He is always the
same, yet always new, always with a particular offer
and summons, always with a particular invitation.
In this way, in this particularity, God's present is
the secret of our own. It is not merely like the
dominant undertone of a painting, or the sustained
basic note at the beginning of the St. Matthew Passion.
It always has its own particular sound, character
and lustre. It is the present of the living God, not
of an exalted but static picture of God. And this
means that our present is not like the millions of
identical oscillations of the clock with which we
measure it. It would be like this if we had to
live it without God, if our present were lost time,
if it were not real but non-existent. The fact that
the living God is present makes our present not only
real but weighty and therefore important. It
encloses the mystery of what God has for us now, of
what He has to say to us, to allow, to command us,
to give us. It encloses the opportunity which He
wills to be realised in and through us now. It
encloses, therefore, the mystery of the grateful
response we now owe to Him and in consequence to our
fellow-men.'
(CD III/2, p. 531)
In consequence of this special present Barth further
argues that 'Only now can we see how significant it is that
my How, in its particular relation to the past and future,
is an opportunity which comes only once and then, perceived
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or grasped or not, passes never to return'. As we shall
see in our third and final chapter on 'Man in his Time'
Barth's analysis offers the opportunity of being towards
life and choice as against the negative inevitability of
the Heideggerian analytic. In the passage we have just
quoted Barth has discovered the 'present of the living God'
and by so doing supplants the dualistic understanding of the
relation of eternity and time by the fundamentally Christian
36. Op.cit.. p. 531-
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mystery of the divine presence demanding response in trust
and faith.
God's being in time is not static for, as we have seen
it is a 'movement', divine transition in temporality from
past to future. Beyond this, however, God's presence has
'particular moments, . todpot , in His being, speech and
action in relation to us; moments which continually come
37
and go'. In consequence God's time demands decision as
the response of man for 'Now we must step out and act as the
38
men we really are'. God's 'Now' is by its very structure
an imperative and an opportunity not an invitation to
mystical or pietistic escape into passivity.
This passage presents to us a major nodal point in
Barth's thought on time, not because the concommitant
doctrine of God is absent earlier in the Church Dogmatics
but because here we find a departure from accepted categories
of analysis. There is a radical appropriation of a theolo¬
gical ontology which attempts, through the phnnomenological
structure of time to comprehend the relation of man and God
as a relationship of intersubjectivity, conditioned and indeed
constituted according to the fundamental postulates of the
New Testament temporal structures. Whatever reservations
we may have about the problem of the relation of the time of
the cosmos and God, it can be truly said that this account
is the most thoroughly emancipated account of time in
theological thought yet to have emerged, struggling to shake




off the remaining alien philosophical shackles of Platonic
dualism and idealist reductionism. The limitations of
this analysis made by Barth are manifest as we have seen,
but despite this many strands are woven into his under¬
standing of time and eternity providing a truly outstanding
synthesis and integrated theory of time.
In these pages of Given Time there is presented a new
understanding of divine temporality. Out of the negative
and sceptical arguments of the initial paragraphs there
emerged a doctrine of time as affirmative encounter and
opportunity in a living present of divine transition and
transformation of time.
There is a strong parallel between the transition
that Barth effects and that to which Heidegger alludes
between the thought of Hegel in the Phenomenology of Mind
and his own analysis of time in Being and Time. According
to Heidegger, Hegel argued that,
'"Time, as the negative unity of Being-outside-of-
itself, is likewise something simply abstract, ideal.
It is that Being which, in that it is is not, and
iahich, in that it is not, is: it is intuited becoming.
This means that those differences which, to be sure,
are simply momentary, transmuting themselves immediately,
are defined as external, yet as external to themselves."
For this interpretation, time reveals itself as
"intuited becoming". According to Hegel this signi¬
fies a transition from Being to nothing or from
nothing to Being. Becoming is both arising and
passing away. Either Being "makes the transition",
or not-Being does so. What does this mean with
regard to time? The Being of time is the "now".
Every "now", hwwever, either "now"-is-no-longer, or
now is-not-yet; so it can be taken also as not-Being.
Time is "intuited" becoming - that is to say, it is
to say, it is the transition which does not get
thought but simply tenders itself in the sequence of
39. This is made clear on pages 482-86 of Being and Time,
Blackwell, Oxford, 1967.
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"nows". If the essence of time is defined as
"intuited becoming", then it becomes manifest that
time is primarily understood in terms of the "now",
and indeed in the very manner in which one comes
across such a "now" in pure intuition.*
(Being and Time, pp. 482-3)
The resultant synthesis in Hegel between the eroded
past and future and the eternalised 'now' of the present
suggests a very strong affinity with the thought of Barth
as we have analysed it above in this chapter. Again
Heidegger analyses Hegel and reveals even more clearly the
close affinities with Earth's attempt to synthesise a
temporal thesis and antithesis, an attempt overcome by a
radically new approach as in Being and Time.
'That Hegel interprets time in terms of this primary
orientation by the "now" which has been levelled off,
is evidenced by the following sentences: "The
'now' is monstrously privileged: it 'is* nothing but
the individual 'now'; but in giving itself airs, this
thing which is so exclusive has already been dissolved,
diffused, and pulverised, even while I am expressing
it." "In Nature, moreover, where time is now, no
'stable* (bestehend) difference between these
dimensions" (past and future) "ever comes about".
"Thus in a positive sense one can say of time that
only the Present is; the 'before' and 'after' are not;
but the concrete Present is the result of the past
and pregnant with the future. Thus the true Present
is eternity."' (Being and lime, p. 483)
There is a close parallel here with the structure of
Barth's argument. What is even more crucial is that a
further factor emerges. Not only do we have the dialectic
of becoming (the demise of past and future under attack and
the assertion of the eternal present in the Church Dogmatics.
which is subjected to an even more ruthless attrition by
Barth, as he demonstrates in turn the insubstantiality of
this conception) but also a transformation of the under¬
standing of time, a veritable renewal of fundamentals. Is
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it not the case that in the passage of the Church Dogmatics
we have just analysed, Given Time, we find an ontology pre¬
supposed in the very possibility of temporal existence?
Thus Heidegger argues for a basis similar in categorial
structure to that of Barth,although of course with disparate
development and conclusions.
'Our existential analytic of Dasein, on the contrary
(i.e. to that of Hegel), starts with the "concretion"
of factically thrown existence itself in order to un¬
veil temporality as that which primordially makes such
existence possible. "Spirit" does not first fall into
time, but it exists as the primordial temporalising of
temporality. Temporality temporalises world-time,
within the horizon of which "history" can "appear" as
historizing within-time. "Spirit" does not fall into
time; but factical existence "falls" as falling
from primordial, authentic temporality. (Macquarrie
here notes the difference between Hegel's verb
"fallen" and Heidegger's "verfallen"; This"falling"
('Fallen'), however, has itself its existential
possibility in a mode of its temporalizing - a mode
which belongs to temporality.*
(Being and Time, p. 406)
There remains, despite the new basis of the relation
of man's time and God's time in the Church Dogmatics, the
problem of world time and the time of the cosmos in its
spatio-temporal continuum. Neither the Heideggerian nor
Barthian re-comprehension of time moves beyond the onto-
logical to the ontic (in this very extensive sense of time
as a cosmic reality bound up with the fabric and possibili¬
ties of modern post-Einsteinian science). The great positive
quality of this step forward (found in the parallel we have
drawn between Heidegger and Barth) lies in the possibility
of a new and positive understanding of God's existence as
temporal, that is God's eternity as fundamentally creative
and affirmative rather than negative or timeless. It
remains true that the core of this transformation is valuable
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and positive, but as long as cosmic time and reality
apart from man remain assumptions (Heidegger), or the
product of theological inference and conjecture (Barth),
acute problems remain for the Christian doctrines of
creation and eschatology as well as contemporary providence.
Again the hint of Being ondTime^0 at such an understanding
41
of God*s temporal being, which is developed by 0. Poggeler
42
and used by Schubert M. Ogden in an article of exemplary
brilliance, is a further indication of an extensive, even if
implicit response on Barth*s part, to the atheistic ontology
of Heidegger. Once more Barth reacts to both an ally and
an opponent without explicit or ostentatious reference, but,
as with Augustine, the scale of the encounter in the later
sections of the Church Dogmatics with which we are now engaged
is both pervasive and profound.
In a final exultant set of statements Barth fuses
these factors around his daring but much contested union of
Gospel and Law in which we see the identity of creation and
reconciliation. V/ith the following comments we turn to a
brief consideration of the past and future as they are
expounded in Given Time. This will conclude our analysis of
the inner structure of time as it is presented in this sub¬
section and lead to the final expository chapter in which we
will examine Barth*s account of the bounds of time as the
horizon of man* s being.
'This, then, is how the present is filled. It is
real. And from this we are entitled to conclude that
40. Op.cit.. p. 499, note xiii, (English translation).
41. Per Denkweg Martin Heideggers. Pfullingen, 1963.
42. 'The Temporalitv of God', in The Reality of God, London,
1967.
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all our time is real, that we are really in time,
that we really have time. God's presence and gift
creates, delivers and sustains this reality, this
means judgement and grace. This is the mystery of
the whole Gospel and the whole Law. But this
means that though we are sinners who have forfeited
our time, and indeed ourselves, we are not lost,
but as we were created, so we are sustained and
delivered.*
(CD III/2, p. 532)
A number of constructions might be put upon this
final paragraph on the present in Given Time. In this
chapter it has been understood as creating the basis of a
fundamental innovation which stands in the Church Dogmatics
overlaid by the residue of original materials and the
accumulated preconceptions of Barth*s interpreters, awaiting
exploration and development.
We shall now embark upon some concluding exposition
and comments concerning the 'past* and the 'future*. My
present perishes in passing into the past. Memory or
oblivion may be used against this loss but neither offers a
real remedy. Barth maintains that we attempt to re-create
the past in memory or consign it to oblivion seeking the
future exclusively. 'But we are not dependent on ourselves
if we accept the fact that the will and act of God are the
AX
meaning and ground of our being in time'. Indeed our
past is given substance because 'God also has been'.
'For there is a Then, a genuine past, in God's
eternity, as surely as it is the eternity of the
living God. Of course no lines are drawn there.
The past is not left behind, nor does it fade. The
God who was, is now, and ever shall be. It is in
the coinherence of past, present, and future that
His eternity is original, authentic and creative
time.'
(CD III/2, p. 536)
43. CD III/2, p. 535.
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This argument raises once more the issue of eternal
simultaneity over which we shall not linger at this stage.
Barth's primary postulate that informs the whole of this
sub-section is that 'If our whole time is the gift of God,
44
then God also pledges to maintain its reality as a whole'.
So the argument follows a pattern established previously
with regard to the present which is summed up in the
assertion that 'The truth is that we may really have our
time as given by God; our whole time, even in its character
45
as past and passing time'. God's love is constant as 'He
loved us in our time then, and because He has not ceased to
46
do so, we are real even in that time'. God's judgment
stands over the past and although he (that is God) never
forgets, mercifully the imperfect memory of man draws a
partial veil over the recollections of past consciousness.
Finally Barth turns to the future and once more casts
47
doubt on our guarantees of future continuity of identity
for 'That step forward may be a step into the void, into the
48
abyss'. Once more we are presented with a choice which
this time is flight or confrontation; we may be optimists
or pessimists in face of the future and so on. Barth's
systematic reply is parallel to that offered for the past.
*0n the contrary, we can count on the fact that the
will and act of God are the meaning and ground not
only of our being in time generally, but also of our
44. Op.cit., P. 537.
45. Op.cit., PP . 537-8.
46. Op.cit., P. 538.
47. Op.cit., P. 541.
48. Op.cit., P. 542.
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being in the future. True, the future stands at
every moment under the question whether it will be
our future, our time at all. But in the first
instance it is not we who will be in the next moment,
to-morrow, or a year hence. It is God, our Creator,
Deliverer and Sustainer, who will still be for us
and faithful to us.'
(CD III/2, p. 545)
Barth invites us to •see the eternity of God, not
4q
abstractly, but as His eternity for our future*. Thus
in Barth*s account all three tense dimensions of man*s time
are not alienated from each other and do not resolve into
an eternal present or alternatively annihilation. On the
contrary 'As created by God, human reality has been
50
embraced by God and His covenant from all eternity*.
In terms of intensionality our existence in time is
an affirmed even if not assured future allowing us to live
*unreflectively* for 'if this provokes concern, it is not
our concern but God's. In contrast to Heidegger our
51
concern is cast upon God and thus we may live today with
52
'little interest....in the things of tomorrow*. 'The
only thing we can do with our anxiety for the future is to
cast it resolutely upon God* as we can be secure in the
knowledge 'That He constantly gives us life, and the time
55
needed for it'. ^ Our terror of the future must therefore
be transmuted into a fear of God because of the temporal
49. Op.cit., p. 545.
50. Op.cit.. p. 546.
51. Translation of 'Sorge'. Macquarrie renders this 'care'
in Being and Time.
52. CD III/2, p. 547.
53. Op.cit., p. 548.
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consequences of the truth that 'from all eternity (he)
54
has been our Covenant-Partner and Friend1• Human
existence is restored through the rediscovery of the real-
temporality of God's time which is trans-temporal from the
standpoint of our fragmented and anxiety-fraught existence
in time. In summary Barth argues:
•This then is how man is in the time given him by
God; this is how he is before God in his present
and moving from his past and into his future. The
time which we have been considering in these three
tenses is the time created by God. We have not
been speaking of God's eternity, but of our time
as God created it and gave it to us; yet not of
what it must become and be on the presupposition of
our alienation from God, but of the time as God gave
it to man in creation, and constantly renews it in
allowing him to live; of the time which as the
form of his existence belongs no less to his natural
reality than the fact that man is the soul of his
body. Always against the background of God's
eternity, we have tried step by step to isolate
human time - the time created and given by God - from
its distorted and obscured manifestation, and to
study and present it in and for itself. We began
with an analysis of time in the distorted and
sinister form we know only too well; and we found
that Holderlin has the last word on that subject.
We then proceeded to analyse time in the reality in
which it may be seen as the time given us by God.'
(CD III/2, p. 551)
In the sub-section Given Time. Barth has offered an
integration of the doctrines of Christology, creation and
reconciliation within the area of time, thus effecting a
transformation of philosophical and existential analyses
of time. In Jesus as 'Lord of Time*, God is eternal 'for
us' and 'In Him God utters His gracious and saving contra¬
diction of man without God and therefore of a concept of time
without God, checking self-perverting and ignorant man and
54. Op.cit.. p. 549
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arresting the development of all false and cheerless
conceptions of time'."^ In nuce, it is 'In Him we see
56
ourselves as God willed and created us'"^ thereby demon¬
strating God's own constancy towards man in that he re¬
asserts 'the nature in which God has not ceased to see us,
and which has not therefore ceased to be our true nature
57
in spite of all the disruption and error caused by sin'.
The emptiness of time that we all too readily experience
has been challenged and overcome by God himself in Jesus
Christ and as 'Jesus is risen and is the Lord of time....
therefore we can say positively of man that in the true
nature in which God sees him he is not destroyed, but he
58
has real time and may live in it.'
Whatever we may say about the implications of the
latter statement as soteriology it is possible to assert
that it is only in virtue of Jesus* death and resurrection,
his victory over contradiction that he is Lord of Time.
This Lordship is the presupposition of Given Time and as
Earth says, 'Christology gives rise to a definite anthropo-
59
logy in respect of the concept of time*. In this way
he binds the universality of God's time to the concrete
particularity of Jesus Christ, whose time is in itself the
overcoming of man's alienation from the truth of his own
time, thus showing us that we have 'real time and may live
55. Op.cit.. p. 552.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. Op.cit., p. 553-
59. Op.cit., p. 552.
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in it'. We cannot do better than quote Barth's summary
at the end of Given Time. This reveals his purpose which
we have attempted both to state in some detail, but also
to penetrate beneath the obvious into the dialogue Barth
conducts with other thinkers, so giving his monumental work
both historical interest and contemporary significance.
•This conclusion, developed in our second analysis,
rests on the promise given us in Jesus (i.e., the
revelation of the truth about man's being in time),
on His resurrection and Lordship over time. For on
this depends the fact that we can relate man's time
to God's eternity, and that God* s eternity can and
must be seen and understood as His eternity for us,
God Himself as the Creator and Giver of our time,
and therefore our being in time as a reality. All
this depends on the reality of the divine being,
intervention and work for us as it takes place in
Jesus. All speculation - even that which is based
on a perfect idea of God, let alone any other - will
inevitably end in a vicious circle. But in theology
we are not free to ignore the reality of this divine
being, intervention and work, or to start our
thinking at any other point. And if we make this
our starting point, we shall find it possible and
necessary, compelling and illuminating, to break
through and invert the concept of time along the
lines attempted. Yet we shall not forget that this
starting point is not a formula to be adopted and
appropriated at will, but an actual encounter with
the reality to which theological presentation can
only point.*
(CD III/2, p. 553)
This passage we have studied at length is of inesti¬
mable importance for the doctrine of time in the Church
Dogmatics and, v/hilst not free from complex issues common
to the whole architectonic, it reveals a radical and gripping
re-interpretation of the problem of eternity and time con¬
stituted and conditioned by fundamental postulates of
Christian theology. As such it is the culmination and ful¬
filment of those profound and pervasive theological and onto-
logical impulses that we have traced from their inception
414
throughout the Church Dogmatics* In this full perspective
we are able to see the mighty response Barth has made to




MAN IN HIS TIME:
BOUNDED TIME
In the previous two chapters Christology andtRe.
anthropology of man in time has been examined in the order
dictated by Barth's basic theological^postulates. In this
third and final chapter on the theology of time itself, and
the corresponding understanding of human temporality, the
consequences of the two earlier chapters will be discussed
as they are developed in the final sections of Allotted Time,
Beginning Time and Ending Time.1 These are particularly
concerned with 'time as it were from the outside, as the
i
totality of that movement, as the succession of those
moments of transition in which we continually come and go,
continually leaving ourselves behind us and having ourselves
2
before us*.
The basis of this exposition is that man's time is
allotted (befristete) and therefore bounded in duration.
Man, however, protests against this and would wish his time,
his life, to be 'an unfathomable, inexhaustible reality'.
The problem that faces the theologian is how can man achieve
legitimate fulfilment within the God-given bounds of his
temporal finitude. This demand for fulfilment is not a
mere striving after the infinite but an authentic reflection
of man's createdness. 'Human life is ignorant of its own
1. Cf. CD III/2, pp. 553-640.
2. Op.cit.. p. 554.
3* Op.cit.. p. 555.
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true nature when it accepts the fall as its original and
authentic destiny, and therefore when it is not troubled
by the demand for duration and finds no problem in the
allotment of its time'.^
The theological reason for man's protest against the
bounds placed on his existence is that human life is created
by God and for him and in relationship to other men. As
humanity and divinity are the 'original and authentic
determination' of man then human life 'demands no less than
5
perfection*. Barth distinguishes between 'an abstract
craving for life' and the legitimate craving for 'duration*.^
Indeed man's desire does not stem from the experienced in¬
sufficiency of the human condition but the Word of God which
reveals our two-fold determination. The reality of man's
condition is not known to him outside knowledge of the Word
of God but nevertheless a godless existence is intolerable to
him. He demands perfection and 'What but an unlimited,
permanent duration can be adequate for the fulfilment of this
7
duration?' Only within the theological circle is both the
source of human dissatisfaction in its actual falsehood known and
thus its removal and overcoming made possible. Once more
Barth does not argue from incidental facts about the nature
of human existence but from the Vford of God as it has been
conceived and expounded throughout the Church Dogmatics. To






does not therefore begin with an analysis of the human
condition as does Heidegger but begins once more with the
contrast of divine and human time which, as we have seen,
underlies the whole theological architectonic.
Hunan life needs time as its dimension. This
transcendental dimension of time has been asserted earlier
and is now presupposed in Barth's exposition of God's time
in its limitlessness over against man's limited time. The
'allotment' of man's time is not to be conceived from the
standpoint of mortality but from the fundamental theological
contrast between eternity and time. Thus we penetrate
through the concentric rings of Barth's thought into the
sphere of the truly ultimate which is the indication not
merely of theological realities but of the ground of human
existence to be found in faith alone.
'God also lives in His time. But His time is
eternity, which has no fixed span, no margins, no
other measure but Himself. Eternity is not time
without beginning or end. Time is the mode of
existence of the creature. To identify eternity
with time without beginning or end would be to
attribute to it an idealised form of creaturely
existence. This would be wrong; for to say eternity
is to say God. And God does not live in an
idealised form of creaturely existence. God Himself
is not only the ground and content but also the form
of His existence. To the extent that He is His own
form of existence He is eternal, and He is in eternity
as in His time. When we say this, we say only that
He is in Himself. Hence in His eternity He is indeed
Creator of time, but as its Creator He is the One who
was, and as such is and will be; who is and as such
was and will be; who will be, and as such was and is.
In His eternity He is beginning and middle and end.
He is not, therefore, apart from all these. If He
were, we should have another false definition of
eternity. Eternity is not timelessness. It is
beginning, middle and end in fullness, for it is all
three simultaneously. It is always the first and
second as it is also the third. Thus God is His
own dimension. And this dimension underlies, conditions
and includes that of His creature, so that that of His
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creature is always His own, and where His creature is,
He is also. But His dimension has no fixed span, no
margins, no measure but Himself.'
(CD III/2, p. 558)
Man's life is in time and the fundamental feature of
this is a contrasting set of limits. The following para¬
graph in relation to the above is of quite crucial importance
in the Church Dogmatics, for through the central linguistic
and conceptual contrast of duration and simultaneity Barth
distinguishes time and eternity once more in a way that
follows in essence the Boethian tradition, yet runs into
philosophical difficulties when pressed.
'Man on the other hand lives in the time created and
given him by God. If he were God and not man, the
allotment of his time would not be a problem, for
his time would not be allotted. For he would be
eternal. But that is a dream, and a bad one at that.
Since man is man and not God, and he is not there¬
fore eternal, the dimension which he is left,
and over which he has no control (as God has over
His, because He is His own dimension), is created
time, which in distinction from the eternity of the
Creator has a beginning, middle and end which are
not simultaneous but separate, distinct and
successive, so that it has margins and a measure in
its beginning and end, and is thus allotted time,
the time between its beginning and end.'
(CD III/2, pp. 558-559)
It is, according to Barth, the entirely proper coro¬
llary of God's temporal aseity that human life should be
bounded. The dimension of eternity is the expression of
God's being in its life which is not only 'unfathomable and
inexhaustible, but self-grounded and self-creative, welling
8
up from within itself'. In contrast the time of man is
the perfect expression of his creatureliness for 'The
proper dimension for the life of the creature which is not
8. Op.cit., p. 559.
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self-grounded or self-creative, welling up from within it¬
self, "but has its basis in the life of God, is the time in
which beginning and end are distinct, and therefore con-
Q
stitute its boundaries'. Because man stands by virtue of
his creation in relation with God he cannot be satisfied by
an attitude to existence which has abandoned the demand 'that
he shoiild endure and burst the limits of temporality'."1'0 The
true reason for this human discontent is the revealed truth
of our createdness which gives man a 'promise, gift and task*.
Given that man desires unlimited or even infinite time
rather than allotted time, then would infinite time ('enduring
time without beginning or end*) answer this human craving for
duration and fulfilment? As Barth notes we have met this
notion previously and it is 'the expression of the infinite
embarrassment into which man without God is plunged by the
question of the reality of his being in the present, past
and future*.11 To treat time as an endless process for the
infinite development of human life would only be an adequate
answer to this craving if the time available were indeed
infinite and in fact guaranteed that it corresponded to God.
This desire for 'long life' is expressed in the thought of
Israel. In fact this desire for a longevity is frustrated
firstly by the actual limitation of any man's time and,
secondly, by the merely assumed congruence of everlasting





his transcendental exposition of time by asserting, in
correspondence with what we have traced in our previous two
chapters on time, that: 'Time is only the conditio sine qua
non, only the indispensable opportunity, both for life it¬
self, and for the realisation of its legitimate craving for
12
duration and fulfilment'. Crudely put, Barth is arguing
for a reappraisal of time in qualitative rather than
quantitative terms. Infinite time would mean only infinite
opportunities for fulfilment not the opportunity for infinite
fulfilment. In the light of revelation Barth can assert
that 'No infinity of space or everlasting time can achieve or
even guarantee this negation, this removal of restrictions,
this realisation, which consists in the perfection of the
1"3
relationship to God and fellow man to which it aspires'.
Such an infinity of opportunity would be absolute unrest and
'life as an endless process'.
It is within the bounds of allotted time that final
satisfaction must be sought but not in the series of oppor¬
tunities with the persistent unsatisfied demand for duration
and perfection. We must abandon abstraction and realise
that God has given our time to us under the form of limi¬
tation. Having accepted that we have *a limited life in an
allotted span of time' we should therefore concern ourselves
not with the limitations of our lives but the God who limits
it. Our extreme frailty as 'vapour, sigh or flourishing





God, our 'beyond*. God is behind and before us and
therefore our duration and perfection leads to him, not into
a void. 'If we ask concerning the beyond...there is only One
either behind or before us, either before our beginning or
15
after our end. He, God, is this beyond'. With this
assertion of the ultimacy of God as our 'beyond' we once more
enter the theological circle of statements that are mutually
justifying. In the ensuing pages of Allotted Time there is
advanced an argument which raises a basic issue concerning
fundamental ontology. Y/hereas the tension of time and
eternity is bound up with the distinction of succession and
duration (which is in turn related to distinct philosophical
problems) the arguments that Barth develops on limitation and
the unlimited cause us once more to consider the relation of
theology qua theology and theology qua ontology. This pushes
our reflections even further for in the final count we must
discover what exactly is the role of time and eternity in
the Church Dogmatics. On the one hand the use of the dis¬
tinction of time and eternity forces us to consider the role
of philosophical concepts in dogmatic theology, despite the
overt but sophisticated biblicism of the Church Dogmatics.
On the other hand the role of the temporal structure and
interconnections in Barth's work when compared with other
major theologians (in particular St. Thomas Aquinas), causes
us to appreciate the difficulties into which a theology
without metaphysical presuppositions may fall when it has




to offer an account of the traditional categories involved
in an analysis of human and cosmic reality. There are thus
two major problems which arise directly out of this study
of the doctrine of time in the Church Dogmatics: the first
involving a comparison of Barth's theory of time and eternity
with analogous arguments in philosophy; the second an over¬
all assessment of the actual role assumed by time.
In the light of these comments we may now probe
Barth* s argument in Allotted Time which is both theological
as well as being 'metaphysical'. Once more it is the fusion
of both elements which causes us to question the very
foundations of the Church Dogmatics as a presentation of
divine revelation as it is made known in Jesus Christ. In
our comments upon this series of arguments we shall adumbrate
on a small scale a criticism potentially applicable to the
whole theory of time in the Church Dogmatics. In doing this
we begin to explore the second line of comparison alluded
to above, in which we attempt to assess the role of time as
a whole.
'And we shall see Him indeed as the One in relation to
whom our life has its limit and our time is allotted.
16. In this chapter a broad comparison is drawn between a
theology in which 'substance' (this of course is not a
simple notion) and one in which a purely theological
ontology is employed. In relation to this it is
necessary to account for the basis and interrelation of
the other categories to this fundamental and generalised
category. Whilst making no assumptions about the
exact historical provenance of these notions (to be found
initially in Aristotle's Categories and the Metaphysics)
we are concerned at all points to isolate what might be
termed the 'nuclear realisation of being' to which
Professor D.M. MacKinnon refers in his recent contri¬
bution to the Cambridge symposium on Christology (see
Bibliography). It is the very ambivalence of the
theology of Karl Barth \Ath regard to this question which
has been at the centre of our thoughts.
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We shall see Him as the One who has created and
wills to have us within this limit and allotted span.
The final longing for an unlimited life in unallotted
time necessarily falls away once we realise that the
limit and set span of our existence is the condition
which must be fulfilled in order that He, the eternal
God, may be our Counterpart and our Neighbour as des¬
cribed, and that we may be His counterparts and His
neighbours. Limit in the creaturely dimension means
a clear-cut outline and contour. Man would not be
this man, here and now, the concrete subject of this
history, if his life did not have this outline and
contour, if it did not have these limits and
boundaries. A being in unending time would be
centrifugal. It would not be that of a concrete
subject to whom God can be an equally concrete
Counterpart and Neighbour, with whom He can enjoy
communication and intercourse.'
(CD III/2, p. 565)
The first four sentences of this quotation are derived
from revelation insofar as they are what God is known to
have willed and to will now. God has created and willed
that our time be allotted, that is limited. Our longing
for unlimited time gives way when we realise that this
limit is the condition of his relationship with us. The
dimension of creaturely limitation is clearly determined
(i.e., by the needs of this relationship). After this
series of related assertions Barth then proceeds to argue
metaphysically from the nature of being in unending time.
By this he supplements an argument from revelation with the
assertion that *A being in unending time would be centri¬
fugal*. The limitation of temporal being is a condition of
God being able to enter into relation with a subject. Barth
has made a metaphysical assertion which is used to prove a
conclusion about divine relationships, a conclusion which, in
fact has already been used to prove the metaphysical assertion.
The theological circle has been completed. Correspondingly
God's being cannot be indefinitely enduring time, because if
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it were, it would again be centrifugal and relationally
incapable. In fact the only justification for this is that
God and subject must be 'concrete1 to relate to each other.
The hidden implication is that endless being is incapable
of relation. This is argued petitio principil with regard
to man but on a linguistic basis with regard to God.
'...it would be quite nonsensical to say that God was,
is and will be, that He is beginning, middle and end,
because in Him there could then be no beginning or
end. God, however, is eternal. That is to say, He
is simultaneously and in fullness beginning, middle
and end. In this respect He is utterly different
from us. But in this respect, for all the difference,
He is a concrete Subject, which can encounter us and
be our Neighbour on all sides.'
(CD III/2, p. 565)
Barth's justification of God's non-infinity of time
is derived from the general concept of eternity which Barth
takes to belong to the category of truths revealed in the
Word of God's very nature. Again, however, he resorts to a
quasi-metaphysical justification of God's temporal concrete-
ness. It would be 'nonsensical' to assert the infinity of
God because he would have no beginning or end. If he had no
beginning or end he could not be simultaneously beginning,
middle and end. Thus he would fail both to be the eternal
and the concrete God. This argument is justified on the
basis of revelation but appears to consist of just the kind
of derivation of ontology from language which has undergone
17
severe criticism in recent philosophy. Given provisional
acceptance of the fundamental postulate that eternity is so
composed of beginning, middle and end, and so on, then we
can accept Barth's argument. What is more remarkable is
17. Cf. Chapter IV p.'Ft' above.
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that the centrifugal nature of human infinite time is
dependent upon this argument. One might contrast Earth's
argument with that of Aquinas,whose angels in 'aeviternity'
had a beginning but no end,yet who nevertheless enjoy a
\
18
relationship with God. In other words our objection to
Barth's argument is this. Is it absolutely essential that
man or any 'subject* in relation to God be so bounded in time
for a relationship to be possible? In matter of purely
theological fact it is the case that man, a limited being in
time, enters into relationship with God on the latter's
initiative. What is questionable is how this is necessarily
so except insofar as it contingently is so. The necessity
is apparently in the limitation of time being a condition of
relation taking place or even being possible. The theological
justification is obvious, given Barth's theological method of
derived and related truths, but the proof of the metaphysical
assertion that endless being is 'centrifugal' is far less
compelling. By arguing from the temporal nature of the
divine-human encounter to the ontology (i.e. the 'concrete-
ness*) of the participants, Barth is using human temporality
as the ground of ontology at this point. We add this last
proviso because elsewhere it might be thought with justifi¬
cation that Barth does the reverse. The function of tempor¬
ality (spelt out in the relation of time and eternity) is
therefore of greater potential significance in the Church
Dogmatics than might have been thought. In this provisional
allusion we consider the possibility that in fact the role
of time may be of much greater importance than would at first
18. Cf. 5-f. la ,50-At-, 106-if.
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appear, given the power of the theological ontology itself.
We might well find ourselves diverted along interesting
byways at this juncture but we will confine ourselves to the
assertion that in this sketch, based upon Earth's primary
arguments in Allotted Time, we may detect a function attri¬
butable to time which runs far beyond the immediate needs
of biblical exposition of the relation of God and man or the
schematic representations of history in for example the work
of Cullmann. In conformity with his over-riding theological
impulse Earth interprets the encounter of concrete subjects
as the expression of divine affirmation, that is the fulfil¬
ment of the * set span* which can therefore be seen as
'benefit*. Thus the temporal character!sties of the God-man
relationship form part and parcel of the total integrated
theological scheme of divine grace and human response made
in gratitude.
The proper task of man is to seek for 'duration and
perfection* understood in the full sense of ultimate fulfil¬
ment. This finds its goal in the work of God. 'It is in
Him, in His eternal counsel and work, that God and man, and.
man and man, are brought into the intimate fellowship which
we necessarily but disturbingly see to be the goal of our
life'.1^ We therefore seek the fulfilment of a God-given
*
and indeed divinely prescribed determination in the form of
our limited time. Limited time constitutes both the con¬
dition and the possibility of the divine-human encounter and
relationship. Without limited time there could be no
concrete subjects. With limited time comes the positive
19. Qp.cit.. p. 566.
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bounding of our time by God and the intended relation of
concrete subjects. The weakness of this position is the
absence of cogent proof that unending time and concrete en¬
counter exclude each other's possibility, except inasmuch
as this is derived from theological presuppositions, which
are presented as part and parcel of Earth's overall dogmatic
structure in the Church Dogmatics. The central notion of
limitation is a highly adaptable and apposite theological
tool which Barth is able to develop. We have not questioned
the theological use of this conception of 'limited time*, but
its apparent justification by somewhat inadequate argumentation.
This serves to reveal to us one minor aspect of what may well
prove to be a much more extensive interpretation of the
function and structure of Karl Barth's doctrine of time in
the Church Dogmatics.
In Earth's final 'decisive proof' he places the fore¬
going argument into the context of a theology of grace.
God's free grace in Jesus Christ is highly specific and is
perfectly realised through the temporal structure that has
been developed.
•This is the free grace of God,which is not just a
benevolent attitude towards man, but the turning to
him of God in person; of the God who, in inverse
ratio to his deserts, enters into solidarity with
him, thus interposing Himself, making the life of
man His concern, the salvation of man His need, the
peace of man the cause for which He fights and wins,
so that all human affairs, be they great or trivial,
individual or collective, are first and last His
concern, ordered and solved by Him. That He Himself
receives us to Himself is God's free grace. And this
God who is gracious to us in freedom is the very One
who limits our life and bounds our time.'
(CD III/2, pp. 567-8)
This is the specific grace of God as realised in
Christ. This is not, however, God's only activity. His
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role is providential in the general sense of preserving
our being from dissolution. What we must note is that the
foundation of this account is temporal because God's
maintenance of being consists in the limiting of time, and
that loss of being is the 'inevitable fate* of 'disinte¬
gration'. This observation is most important because it
reveals to us the ontological role of time and temporal
concepts. However well the theory of time fits into the
theological structures of creation, providence and indeed
grace, it is nevertheless also functioning as a conceptual
explanation along the lines of a metaphysical system. There
is in fact a subtle 'cashing-out' operation in progress
whereby the theory of time is playing both a material and a
formal role in the structuring of divine and human being and
their relation. Let us note the second related and
immediately subsequent passage.
'He does not only do this (act in grace and solidarity).
He bears and sustains our life even with the span
allotted to it. In willing to have it so, He disposes
and fashions that it may always be life, so long as He
permits. He protects and preserves it from the disin¬
tegration from which it cannot protect itself and
which would be its inevitable fate if it were to run
its course without Him. He governs it in accordance
with the determination which he has given it - and
against the intentions with which we would like to
govern it. He leads it towards His revelation; the
revelation of His glory which consists in the fact
that we may live under Him and with Him. Yet in doing
all this He also limits it. And thus He is certainly
present to us, so long as we have our time and are
privileged to be grateful recipients of His gifts and
responsible executors of His commission in this time
of ours as knowing and active subjects.*
(CD III/2, p. 568)
In consequence of this:
'There is no part of our time which is not as such
also in His. It is, so to speak, embedded in His
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eternity...at the very points where we emerge from
non-existence and return to non-existence, we are
confronted in a particular way by the gracious God.*
(CD III/2, p. 568)
According to Barth, God 'bears and sustains our life
even with the span allotted to it', moreover, in this
limitation he 'protects and preserves it from disintegration.'
Now what exactly is the import of this? Is it not the
following: the structure of our time (as it is 'allotted')
is the basis of its being insofar as it preserves it from
non-being (that is 'disintegration'). In the simplest terms
does not this doctrine of time function in a manner analogous
to, for example, the doctrine of being as underlying the
notions of 'cause' employed by St. Thomas? If this is the
case then Barth is effecting a transposition of time and
eternity into a new ontology. There is nothing intrinsi¬
cally objectionable in this but the actual status of 'being*
and its prime focus must be isolated. Even though in
purely theological terms Barth's efforts are very success¬
ful we must pursue the weaknesses of his arguments. The
foregoing analysis has allowed us to probe into the ultimate
theological rationale of the Church Dogmatics as it attempts
to overcome the constrictive parameters of contemporary
thought. This will lead us eventually to a judgment upon
the degree of success enjoyed by Barth's attempted emanci¬
pation of western theology from the epistemological and
ontological bondage of the post-Kantian era.
In the passages we have quoted above there is expressed
an essential unity of what we shall term 'nature' and 'grace'
in that the created time of man's being is preserved from
falling into non-being (in the sense of a 'disintegration'
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that Barth advances) by the movement of grace. The
limitation of our time is the prerequisite of relation and
reconciliation. God posits our limitation in time as an
affirmation of our being insofar as this is bounded by God's
past and his futurity (his 'end* and his 'beginning'). How
God is related to us in the present remains a problem
expressed in the apparent hesitance of Barth himself. God's
past and future stand at the border of our being but only
•near' to our present.
'Either the gracious God (and He alone) is for us, or
nothingness is the abyss from which we have emerged
and to which we shall return. But if we are con¬
fronted, not by nothingness, but exclusively, unequi¬
vocally, fundamentally and definitively by the
gracious God, we are obviously near this God at these
two points in a way which cannot be said of our being
in the time between, though He is certainly near us
there as well. What characterises the nature of
man at these frontiers of his being is that, as the
God who is wholly and utterly for us, God is wholly
and utterly outside us, namely beyond all our other
possibilities. This is generally true as He is
near us. But it is clear and essential only at the
point where we can cling to no one and nothing but
Him who as outside us is for us; neither to the
world nor to chaos, to angel nor devil, nor even our
own selves.'
(CD III/2, p. 569)
There is an embarrassment in Barth's thought at this point
for in asserting the proximity of God in 'confrontation'
(in his 'nearness'), we are presented with an unanalysed and
perhaps even an unanalysable relation. Given that Barth
has previously argued for the dynamic role of the divine
21
'present' in the 'I am' of Rev. 1,8 in Jesus. Lord of Time
20. This movement of grace is to be conceived in terms of
God's 'act' which is the basis of Barth's theological
ontology.
21. See Chapters IX and X above.
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and in its application in Given Time, there still remains
apparent this uncharacteristic vagueness of the 'nearness'
of God at this juncture in Allotted Time. Let us contrast
this with Aquinas' overtly metaphysical argument in the
22
Sumrna contra Gentiles where he considers the statement
'That God preserves Things in Being'. God is the first
cause of all things. Arguing by analogy from movement and
cause, and given that the being of a thing is participated
being, and again that only God's being is self-sufficient,
Aquinas asserts the causal dependence of all natural things
on the power of God. The Aristotelian background of
Aquinas' arguments, and indeed their implicit Neoplatonic
presuppositions notwithstanding, the doctrine of 'final
causes' does allow of a coherent (even if misconceived)
understanding of the relation of created and uncreated being.
Of course as we have seen more truly biblical accounts have
been offered by, for example, Athanasius, and figurative
description advanced in the 'contrapuntal relation* of
T.F. Torrance. Our problem with Barth is that whilst
dealing with 'being' he does refer to a relation of 'concrete
subjects'? This means in temporal terms human and divine
'temporality' as once more we have become aware in our
previous two chapters. Barth is attempting to create a
doctrine of being expressed through a theory of time without
lapsing into an autonomous metaphysics of being. In Aquinas
22. Summa contra Gentiles, Bk.III, Ch.65.
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the relation of God and cosmos is specified and reducible
to Aristotelian concepts of causality. In Athanasius this
23
relation may be specific but analysable. In Barth this
relation does not exist except insofar as there is a
second order relation constructed by derivation from the
24
structure of the relation of time and eternity. The
ambiguity in Barth's thought is once more revealed: is he
in fact moving beyond an account of the structure of time
and eternity (as they are expressed through the ontology of
God and man's being understood upon what is, in the final
» s
analysis a phenomenological basisy to a general ontology
with 'ontic' implications generated from temporal concepts?
Such a question in turn leads to ask a further one which
has underlaid this thesis throughout. Does Barth's dog-
25
matic structure represent a systematic construction based
upon a number of primary axioms rather than a reflective
penetration of theological and non-theological reality?
Sympathetic interpretation is along the latter path but we
must ask in the light of the emergent role of time whether
Barth's ontology is a construction of being and reality
derived from 'temporality1 but presented as objective reality.
The adequacy of the theological exposition of the Church
23. This raises a number of issues concerning the place of
Jesus Christ as the focal point of our knowledge of the
God-man (and by 'inference1 the God-creation) relation.
This referred to by R.Y/. Hepburn in Christianity and
Paradox. Chapter 5.
24. This 'derivation' is by no means simple and calls into
question the complex interface of conceptual and ontolo-
gical factors in the Church Dogmatics.
25. This expresses the tension that becomes apparent in
Barth's thought in CD III/2 between the ontological im¬
pulse traced from CD~I and CD II and the negative natural
theology to be found in his sceptical arguments based
upon the ungraspability of time in human experience.
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Dogmatics is not in question at this point but merely the
place of non-theological being in a scheme dominated and
determined by divine realities. In other words is Earth's
derivation of the general (e.g. vis a vis anthropology) from
the particular in Jesus Christ not failing to provide a
soundly based account of the natural order except by extension
from theological (that is primarily Christological) postulates.
The issues we have been examining in this exposition of
Allotted Time are related to this central potential criticism,
for the account of being we have studied is born out of
Christology by means of an ontology that has distinct
affinities with the tradition of Husserl and Heidegger.
These factors have been instrumental in producing the subtle
but potentially ambiguous theory of time in the Church
Dogmatics.
There is lacking in the thought of Barth that explicit
p/r
concern referred to by Tillich in the Systematic Theology
to account for 'the ground of all causal dependence and all
accidental changes....the power of being itself' which was
characteristic of Aquinas. Tillich is of course arguably
no great example in this direction as his own account of the
traditional categories (time, space, causality and substance)
27
is also undertaken 'in the light of human finitude' and
under the influence of the phenomenological-ontological tra¬
dition. Both Heidegger and Barth argue on the basis of an
assumption of veridical reality and maintain that neither the
26. Systematic Theology, Nisbet, 1968, Vol. II, p. 80.
27. D.E. Roberts, 'Tillich's Doctrine of Man' in The Theology
of Paul Tillich. New York, 1952, p. 121.
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theologian nor the philosopher (i.e. the Heideggerian
explorer of the phenoraenological and transcendental) need
be concerned with its proof. In fact with regard to
Barth as we have become aware,the existence of God in the
assertion of his Word is the fundamental truth; certainty
in other areas is built upon this. The extension of this
systematic architectonic of theological certainty reaches
its outer limit with the temporal construction of an
ontology of being. If we ask a simple question about the
place of the traditional categories in the Church Dogmatics
we note the presence of space and time but neither causality
or substance. With an ontology of temporal being the role
of causality and substance has been assumed by time and
eternity and exploited within the realm of a reality
ultimately derived from human and revealed divine subjectivity.
This latter is all we can know for time as it is in itself
23
is beyond our knowledge. God is eternity; man is
temporality. It is around this axis that Barth has built
his ontology, but, as has now become clear to us, this
structure is fraught with potential problems.
Over against the theology of the nineteenth century
Barth has striven to pre-empt the strictures and limitations
of Kantian criticism by beginning his theology from the
objective fact of Jesus Christ, man and God. This he
attempted by a conscious rejection of philosophy as a
legitimate way of knowing God or explicating revelation.
Philosophy is, we would argue, a bona fide way of approaching
28. Cf. CD III/2, p. 521, 'We do not know what time means...'.
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human reality, and insofar as theology (necessarily if
its Object is to be known to us) has entered our reality
in its pursuit of truth, then it can ignore the basic in¬
sights of philosophy into ordinary reality only at its
peril. Grace has consumed nature only to offer it back to
us in the form of a theological regurgitation. The product
of this reconstruction cannot by its very origin offer all
the characteristics that we know nature to possess when
analysed in philosophical terms, and so it has to create them
by derivation. Neither substance nor causality feature as
such but as their role is indispensable they are obliquely
inferred through the internal and pervasive structure of the
doctrine of time and eternity.
In the first half of this chapter "there has been made
what might well be regarded as an outright attack upon
Barth* s account of time in the Church Dogmatics. This would
indeed be a misreading of our intentions, for what we have
tried to show is firstly the use to which Barth puts this
theory and secondly, the highly involved inter-relation of
his arguments when they are explicated. Our critique of
the core of his doctrine of time and eternity, the antithesis
and yet resolution of duration and simultaneity over against
division and succession, will come in the next and final
chapter of this thesis in which we will recapitulate the
theory of time in summary form. We shall now be free to do
this having stated the whole theological scheme of temporal¬
ity which characterises the Church Dogmatics. It has been
our first concern to provide such a representative and full
account of the doctrine of time for only having done this
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may we offer a fair assessment of the fullest and most
comprehensive theological account of time in the history
of western theology.
Barth renders his analysis of Allotted Time even more
concrete and particular for in the final paragraphs he re¬
states the Christological core upon which his anthropology
is built. His starting-point has been Jesus Christ and so
according to Barth it is this datum which is to determine our
understanding of man and indeed time. In reality this
analysis is not quite accurate for we have noted the compo¬
site arguments that are used in Man in his Time which are
combined in the production of a dogmatics with both theolo¬
gical and extraneous factors.
There is a coherence and structure to Barth's thought
in the Church Dogmatics which is highly original and the
product of a response to the most basic dynamic loci of his
theological vision. Thus in the penultimate and the final
sections of Man in His Time Barth applies the central ele¬
ments of his Christology and anthropology of time to the
human experience and understanding of the beginning and the
end of time. It is therefore in the light of primary
doctrines of the •fulfilment* and the 'allotment1 of time,
with all that these entail, that we now turn in examining
Barth's account of the extremities of man's temporality.
Beginning from the assumption that 'non-being' (das
Mchtsein) threatens our being 'before' and 'after' Barth
can now turn to the attempts of the 'older theology' to
account for the origins of human existence in terms of the
genesis of the soul. In conformity with his theological
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anthropology Barth avoids entering into discussion of the
controversies of pre-existence or creationism, because
however psychological or physiological factors may be
resolved, there is a more fundamental categorial level of
human existence which must first be considered. It is from
this that the theological solution will emerge to pre-empt
the abstruse complexities of the traditional arguments. So
once more Barth resolves problems through the theological
ontology we have seen him develop.
'Before the being of the individual as of the race
there was somewhere a non-being. And this non-being
from which the individual and the race come is the
non-being to which we also move. In the language of
traditional theology (which we now find obscure and
unacceptable), there was a time when ray soul did not
exist. In terms of a more biblical view of man,
there was a time when I myself as the soul of my
body, I myself as the unity and totality of my psycho¬
somatic existence, did not yet exist, but I began to
be. That this is the case is the occasion of a
serious theological concern to which it is possible
to give a serious theological answer.'
(CD III/2, p. 574)
In this way we are aware that Barth places his own
'more biblical view of man' at the centre of his exposition.
Before proceeding to state what this is we must note that
there is a potential ambiguity in his assertion. Moreover
the quality of Barth's anthropology is highly distinctive
and directly reflects the arguments of the previous sections
of Man in His Time whose relation to recent thought in
philosophy and phenomenology cannot be ignored. As regards
the ambiguity we must ask if this 'biblical view of man' is
something general or the highly specific anthropology based
upon the concrete particularity of Jesus Christ. Barth
expands this 'biblical view',
433
•...that even from my origin I am threatened by
annihilation, being marked as a being which can
only advance towards non-existence. Before a
certain point I had no past; the time before this
point was not my time; I had no dimension to live
in. i
(CD III/2, p. 574)
So once more the basic insight emerges of the past
and future of both individual and race as subject to both
'shadow and deficiency*. Although we indeed come from
non-being we do not come from nothing because 'the eternal
God was before we were' and he was 'in the unattainable
29
life-space before ours'.
'We can never regard Him as belonging to the past
like everything before us, as something lost which
cannot be recaptured because only our non-being was
before us. He has preceded us in time, in all the
times of our non-being. Indeed, He has proceeded
the non-being of all creation, the beginning of all
time in its dimension of life. Where do we come
from? From the being, speaking and action of the
eternal God who has preceded us. This is the par¬
ticular answer to this particular question. Before
we were, this gracious God was our gracious God: the
God who even when we were not was not without us but
in all that He was Himself for us; therefore God
for us; wisdom and omnipotence for us; holy and
righteous, merciful and patient for us; eternal and
ineffably glorious for us; for us the origin and
fullness of all perfection. His inner life as Father,
Son and Holy Spirit, His will and purpose in relation
to heaven, earth and ourselves, His already accompli¬
shed and uninterrupted work in execution of it) this
was the content of the time before our time, the
meaning of the pre-history before our history. Hence
there is nothing mysterious or terrifying about the
time before we were. It does not really entail any
deficiency or shadow. Our yearning to expand our
being backwards into the past is pointless. Whatever
our end may be, our beginning does not lay us under
any threat or curse. Regarded in the light of its
beginning, our life in our allotted time is tolerable
because at this point it does not hang lost and help¬
less over an abyss but is reliably held and supported,
secured and guaranteed. Indeed it stands under a
promise....For the eternal and gracious God, who is the
boundary of our beginning, will surely guarantee the
whole of our life, the span which we are given, and
its final end.' ^CD X11/2f p. 577)
29. Op.cit., p. 577.
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Here we see in summary the cohesive structure of
Barth's theological thought for in this passage he combines
all the major elements in the Church Dogmatics as they affect
and are affected by the problem of time. God*s eternal
being in inter-Trinitarian act sustains all time as its
•content* and its •promise1. The •reality1 of this fcontent
of the time before our time' belies the deficiency or shadow
of the time we know and fear. This answer has undoubtedly
certain difficulties in its development and formulation but
these stem not so much from deficiencies in its statement
as from the assertion of a purely theological account of the
problem of time. Thus it is the whole status of such a
theory in ontological terms which has concerned us. The
truth of this theory is conceivable primarily as its
coherence within what we have called the theological circle'
(using Tillich^s phrase for our own purposes) and its
correspondence to, or assumed penetration into, the theo¬
logical structures made known in the Word of God. The
question of the correlation of theological truth with the world
known in mundane empirical experience has always been
crucial in this study of Barth. His assumption of natural
theology into the sphere of revelation has consistently made
such natural knowledge problematic. As we have become
aware with regard to time and human nature these are both
truly made known in Jesus Christ, the Word of God, who is
both the sole and supreme datum of revelation and the source
of true knowledge of humanity in its categorial complexity.
It is by moving along the frontier between theology as
it is grounded in the revelation of God in Jesus Christ, and
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philosophy as it strives to analyse the transcendental in
both the traditional form as metaphysics and in the con¬
temporary insights of analysis and 'descriptive metaphysics',
that we risk mutual incomprehensibility. It is here alone
that the questioner can hope to relate the contrasting and
indeed competing and conflicting fields of putative truth-
schemata. In the words of S. Korner^0 it is in attempting
to explore the possible commensurability of such conflicting
schemata, that the intellectual isolation of Christian
theology (and most particularly dogmatics) may be broken down.
As we have become aware in our examination of this sub-section
of the Church Dogmatics, Man in His Time, there are a number
of tensions in Barth's account which stem from the fact that
time is a fundamental unifying category which is shared by
both the theological and the cosmic, scientific and human
spheres of existence analysed by corresponding thought and
disciplines. If this unity and diversity is infringed by
an account of one area (i.e., theology) which denies (tinder
the guise of natural theology) the validity of other paths
of reality and of ratiocination, then an inevitable tension
will emerge when this special discipline uses a category of
universal validity. The intrinsic unity of the time-con¬
tinuum will demand a resolution in terms of a single system
or related systems when it is faced with an intellectual and
ontological imperialism stemming from one area of analysis.
30. 'Abstraction in Science and Morals', Eddington Memorial
Lecture, Cambridge, 1971. My reference is to the gist
of his lecture as delivered extempore. KOrner's non-
reductive pluralism has contributed much to the
technique adopted in this thesis.
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This series of points leads us to the brink of many
problems that are basically concerned with the validity of
Barth's presuppositions over against others which might
well conflict with, or be of potentially equal worth to
his own. Besides this, the question of time in this much
wider context raises issues which impinge upon our study
in initial outline only. The theological self-consistency
of the Church Dogmatics works against such considerations in
principle. All v/e can hope to achieve in this thesis on
Barth's thought is to show that such isolation is reflected
in the inner difficulties of the Church Dogmatics and its
doctrine of time. This is apart from any objections raised
31
to the method (N. Smart) or overall logic of Barth's
arguments (W.W. Bartley III)^ from the standpoint of an
outsider.
We raise these issues at this point for we have just
seen how in asserting the time of God in his eternity (as
the past and the futurity of man in promise, over against
his non-being as nothingness) we are aware that Barth has
combined insights of diverse inspiration into the temporal
aspect of his 'biblical view of man'. Again we have noted
that his arguments are in fact not entirely rid of elements
which might well be regarded as 'alien' or 'philosophical'.
It might well be concluded that such impurities were inev¬
itable if theology is to be saved from systematic irrelevance
31. Cf. Smart's article on Barth in the Encyclopaedia of
Philosophy cited earlier in this study.
32. The Retreat to Commitment, London, 1964 (New York, 1962).
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and disrelatedness to ourselves when it is bound up with
the 'concrete particularities* of revelation that overwhelm
the experience of man in the name of *reality* and 'truth*.
In the final passages of Beginning Time Barth states
the biblical evidence for his account. Israel knew its
'Whence?' was God who was the 'living rock* and whose
election and covenant were the prius upon which they depended.
In the New Testament the Saviour is the fulfilment of the
covenant and 'His person is the grace of God in which ancient
Israel sought and found its refuge from generation to gener-
ation'. History, that of Israel and humanity, culminates
in Jesus Christ. So Barth re-iterates in textual reference
and exegesis the pattern of the covenant and its fulfilment
in Jesus Christ, whose post-resurrection presence through
the Holy Spirit invigorates the Church.
Having applied the insights of Allotted Time to the
beginning of man's time, Barth now turns to the end of
man's time, to the problem of death and finitude. Once more
he argues on the basis of the primary concepts of temporal¬
ity and limitation. Our being in time relies upon the
transitory present and demands a future. One day this will
end, for we shall have been, we will in fact be, but we
shall he no longer. Our time is finite and therefore it
is always overshadowed by this end. This is all Barth's
particular application to the end of man* s time of the
doctrine of fleeting temporality and the limitation of time
analysed in Chapters IX and X above. The reality of this
33. CD III/2, p. 581.
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end, death, is not evaded by the Bible but faced as an
"54
'incomprehensible, inexplicable and unassailable reality'-^
that confronts man. In essence death is the withdrawal
of freedom for action and relation.
•What the living person had and was is now gone;
death has brought it to extinction. Gone is his
character as a living person, his being as the soul
of his body. For the fact that he is dead means
that the spirit, the power of the living breath of
God which constituted him an existent subject, has
been withdrawn. He exists only as one who has been,
who is therefore deprived of the Spirit, who has
disintegrsted, and who is thus incapable of enjoying
the good things of life, well-being, fortune,
security, prosperity and honour.'
(CD III/2, p. 589)
Our concern is with time and the question that Barth
isolates as of supreme importance likewise impinges
directly upon the temporality and finitude of human existence.
Barth asks how far we are to understand the finitude of our
allotted time - and death as the determination of human life -
as a determination of the divinely created, and therefore
good nature of man. In other words is there not a conflict
between the goodness of God and the evil presented by the
reality of death and the termination of human existence?
What place can this have in a doctrine of man as creature of
God? Barth argues that our entry into being is positive
insofar as we come from God. This is established by Barth
in terms of the ontological link of past, present and
future made by God's time as the time beyond our apparent
fragmented and fleeting time. Correspondingly Barth argues
that death can be negative only if it means 'passing not
35
only into non-being but into the negation of being'.
34. Op.cit., p. 588.
35. Op.cit.. p. 595-
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This distinction is of course of fundamental importance to
Barth's exposition and expresses the difference between the
extinction of being, and a return to a non-being which is
by virtue of the supra-temporality of God, a return to God.
We have according to Earth a real past in the non-
being prior to being, insofar as this is God's past, and,
likewise in the future a non-being with God, post mortem.
In between we have the opportunity of life in positive
relation to God and to man, which we spurn. Why is this
repudiation made by man? There is no clear answer given
to this for there exists the 'fact of the abysmal and irre¬
parable guilt which we have incurred from the beginning of
•556
our existence'. Curiously enough, 'guilt' looms with
aweful vigour but 'sin' is scarcely mentioned. The reader
wonders how it is possible that Barth can escape the conclu¬
sion that man's actual 'fallen' state is entirely arbitrary
and inexplicable. This passage must be quoted because it
illustrates the difficulties of Barth's position in
attempting to account for death as the termination of man's
time.
'...between our emergence from God and our final con¬
frontation with Him, there stands the fact of the
abysmal and irreparable guilt which we have incurred
from the beginning of our existence, are still incu¬
rring and will increasingly continue to do so until
the end: guilt in relation to God and also to our
divinely appointed fellows; guilt of many kinds,
great and trivial, gross and refined, blatant and
complicated, but always guilt. Guilt means retro¬
gression. And retrogression consists in a failure
to use our God-given freedom; in a failure to be
truly human in our relationships with Him and our
fellows; in an inconceivable renunciation of our
freedom; in our incredible, inexplicable and
36. Qp.clt.. p. 596.
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impossible choice of the imprisonment of a being in
renunciation on both sides; in our incomprehensible
lapse into a state of ungodliness and inhumanity.
That we are guilty in this boundless and quite inex¬
cusable way is what will confront us at the end of
our time and stare us in the face when we die. It
is in this irreparable state of transgression that
we shall be translated from being to non-being and
brought face to face with our Creator. With all
our life up to this point, with our life as it is now
concluded and a thing of the past, we shall meet Him
and be wholly dependent upon Him. That we shall be
no more will mean concretely that our past will be
only one of total guilt and retrogression - one long
failure. Can we doubt that for this reason death
must inevitably seem to be negative and have only the
character of an unqualified evil? What else can its
onset mean but the approach and execution of God's
judgment upon us? What can this judgment mean but
our rejection? And what can its execution mean but
the ending and expulsion of our unworthy and degenerate
life from before the eyes of the Creator from whom it
has already alienated itself by its guilt? What can
it mean but its total destruction, dissolution and
abolition in confirmation of what it has made of
itself? What fate can measure up to life's deserts,
and what can its goal be, but absolute negation?
Was it not a thing of nought? What has it to expect
from its end but the divine subscription to its
nothingness? As we approach our end, we approach
God. And since we are guilty in relation to Him as
our Creator, this excludes any other prospect.
Not to be any more is to be powerless to alter the
fact. To die is to be caught in the toils of this
unalterable fact. It is to be at the point to which
we fall. And because even now we are powerless to
alter it - and the less so the longer we live - our
life is already overshadowed by its end. Hence Holy
Scripture is right in describing the realm of death
not only as an underworld but as an onslaught to
which man's life in time is already exposed.'
(CD III/2, p. 596)
There seems in fact to be in Barth's thought a con¬
fusion of 'transgression' and 'retrogression' for without
the former (which is absent) then the state of man as
guilty and under God's condemnation is apparently arbitrary.
In this passage the guilt is inexplicable, but hardly
'inexcusable', for, as Barth shows, there is no alternative
way open to man. We appear to choose the inevitable and
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the inescapable. If, however, we grant that man is under
the condemnation of God then 'Death as it actually encounters
•37
us men, is the sign of God's judgement'. The choice of
not entering this state of guilt is entirely hypothetical
but the situation we actually occupy is characterised by a
finitude we are to think of as 'unalterable'. Death is a
'sign' of God's judgement because in fact Jesus Christ has
suffered death on our behalf. Our lives bear all the marks
of impending judgement (i.e., in death) but this does not
represent the original intention of God in creation. Behind
the grim face of this sign of divine condemnation, which is
to be feared with a fully legitimate fear, there is the
lost order of creation. Christ's death is a unique, and
uniquely efficacious death as our Representative. Our death
is not the death of negation (i.e. utter annihilation) for
this death has been borne by Jesus Christ. On the contrary
it is the death in which we are to fear God for it is he
who is our 'beyond'. The power of death is the power to
•convince the creature that strives against God, sinful
man, of his nothingness before God'. Thus Barth uses
a feature in the existence of man's being towards death
as an element within his theological scheme of encounter.
So in death, annihilation is converted in virtue of Jesus
Christ into the finding of the 'radical comfort* of a
gracious God who is encountered in the midst of death. Our
death is absolutely real but God is not likewise transitory.
37. Ibid.
38. Qp.cit.. p. 608.
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We cannot indulge in speculations about immortality, but
only hope in the ultimacy of God as the frontier of death
itself.
All this of course hangs upon acceptance of Barth's
doctrines of vicarious humanity and the link of • solidarity'
between Christ's humanity, and therefore his life and death,
and our own lives and death. This is not our concern
except insofar as we must point out that this relation is
the necessary condition of the applicability of the following,
thus demonstrating the temporal conclusion of this
soteriological victory over the annihilation of death.
•In Him (Jesus Christ) God Himself has really turned
to us, and acted for us, and indeed become our own.
In Him the promise of eternal life - not just an
extension of this life in a continuation of time, but
a life in communion with the eternal life of God
Himself - is really given. In Him the fulness of this
life is already poured out upon us. This One, in
whom all this is introduced in a concrete, tangible
and unmistakeable form, is the new factor in the New
Testament revelation and perception of God in His
relation to death.*
(CD III/2, p. 614)
We have not lingered over the detail of Barth's
exposition at this point because it has been the consistent
outworking of the theory of time that we have seen developed
in the sub-section Man in His Time. This major part of
Volume III/2 of the Church Dogmatics has consisted in the
development of a theological anthropology constituted and
conditioned by the person of Jesus Christ as the focal point
of Barth's thinking. We shall now briefly review this
structure as it has been reflected and subjected to analysis
in the last three chapters. Having achieved this we shall
then proceed in Chapter XII to recapitulate in a single
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systematic statement the whole doctrine of time in the
Church Dogmatics. Having presented this summary we shall
examine the most fundamental characteristics of the
contrast of time and eternity, the distinction of duration
and division which constitutes the nub of Barth's
theological theory of time.
In these last three chapters we have followed out the
impulse of Barth*s thought and found it to be centred in
certain fundamental notions. First, in conformity with
his Christological preoccupation Barth established the
supremacy of Jesus Christ as the fulfilment of time; the
One whose time is the union, in dynamic action, of the
eternity of God and the time of man. Second, we examined
Barth*s account of the time given to man in Jesus Christ
which overwhelms the flawed and fragmented fleeting time of
man. Third, the time of man is limited; yet within these
limitations God has made himself known in Jesus Christ and
the boundaries of man's being do not present him in reality
with the nothingness which he fears, but the being of God as
man's beyond. These three systematic stages in Barth's
thought have been set against questions that arise from the
general nature of Barth's doctrine of time and its ontolo-.
gical status. We have seen that despite the great struggle
to establish a theological architectonic of time this has
not been an unqualified success. Barth's theology of time
has great strength but correspondingly great weaknesses
which are apparent only after forceful grappling with this
extraordinary work.
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In the light of the •fact that God has wiped out
men's sin and guilt, and therefore abolished their death,
by taking the place of all others in this man, so that He
"59
has become their Deliverer from death in this One* how is
the finitude of our being to be understood? Jesus Christ
suffered the •second death1 of which our own deaths are only
a 'sign1 for this second death is the judgement of God upon
sin. The death we are to undergo is therefore not this
divine judgement but a sign not merely of its having been
suffered and triumphed over in Jesus Christ. Christ took up
finitude in the incarnation and therein overcame death, so
likewise we are not to spurn life in time and its limitations.
It is therefore the consequences of the incarnation and the
atonement which justify the finitude of human existence on
analogy with the outlook that brought forth the cry '0 fellx
culpa1. The arena of the demonstration of God's right¬
eousness demands limitations. The necessity of the actual
pattern of the redemptive events is such that time and its
limitation of human life are essential to the application
of those benefits. 'We have to be finite, to be able to
die, for the &(j> ocnoc^ of the redemption accomplished in
40
Christ to take effect for us.' The fact of revelation
constitutes its necessity. Without finitude we could not
be the recipients of divine grace, God could not reveal his
glory unless we were threatened by a death which was abrogated,
that is 'relativised' by the death of Jesus Christ. Man dies,
39. Op.cit., p. 626.
40. Op.cit.. p. 631.
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for his death is a 1 step from existence into non-existence'.^1
The Christian hope is not continued existence but his
'beyond', that is God. He will share in eternal life and
with this assertion Barth enters the realm of the strictly
42
inconceivable for man ceases to be in the hope he has of
God alone. Man is to live in this hope in God for,
'...the definitive prospect in which he rejoices is
for him an authorisation and command to serve God
in his allotted span with all the preliminary joy
without which his joy is his end and new beginning
with Him would be purely imaginary. He affirms
Jesus Christ as his beyond. And it is for this
reason that he understands his life here and now as
one which is affirmed by his beyond.'
(CD III/3, p. 640)
41. Op.cit., p. 632.




This study began with a brief description of the
historical background against which Barth reacted. Within
the general limitations created by the complex theological
tradition of Kant, Hegel, Trendelenburg and Kierkegaard,
Barth had to find a new or renewed basis for theological
method. This Barth undertook by exploiting the impulse of
fides quaerens intellectum and beginning from within funda¬
mental theological postulates he elaborated a hermeneutic
of the Word of God. His starting-point is systematically
exploited in the demonstration of the threefold Word of God
which relies upon the 'essence' of the Church, Jesus Christ
in a 'fundamental transcendence of all human possibilities*
Grace is not static or infused but happens in 'the present
instant in which Jesus Christ Himself speaks and is heard,
2
when the light divine is created in our hearts'. The
continuity of identity of God's Word through time is not
provided by immanent structures or human effort of any kind
but by God's own immanence made on the basis of his trans¬
cendence. God in his positive relation to the Church-
is not an essential 'timeless ground' but 'in the midstream
of becoming, being moved only by itself, in the mid-ocean
of the unsettled, changeable, and self-changing, the fixed
3
event, the fulness of time'. Thus at the outset of the
1. CD 1/1, p. 44.
2. Op.cit.. p. 45.
Ob»cit.. p. 133.
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Church Dogmatics on the basis of the discrete and distinctive
happening of the Word of God an ontology and temporality aie
posited in mutual reality. The questions of ontology and
of time appear simultaneously and are answered together.
Where is the source of the knowledge of God? The answer is
of course in God's Word which becomes a reality for man on
the basis of God's own self-objectification in the positing
of the hermeneutical circle. How is the 'pure event' of
revelation, 'the fulness of time' to be both of God and yet
be in time? This can be achieved by the continuity of
God's temporal transcendence which is grounded 'only within
L
the Trinity'. The danger of an occasionalism is overcome
by the very life of God in act and in the Trinity. The
continuity of the revealing events is secured on the basis
v~
of its 'contingent contemporaneousness', the correlate of
the equation of God's Word and God's act.
This identity is absolutely fundamental to the Church
Dogmatics, for insofar as 'God's Word is, God's act' demands
its 'contingent contemporaneousness'^ we are faced with the
duality (not the dualism) of God's act in his being and his
act in time in revelation. These are one, 'a contingent
illic et tunc from the standpoint of the God who speaks,
and also with a contingent hie et nunc from the standpoint
of man who hears'. Barth's definition of an 'act' runs
in the following way: an act is (over and above a word) 'a
4. Op.cit., p. 134.
S* 0p»cit.. p. 169.
6. Ibid.
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relative alteration in the environment...an active partici¬
pation in history...' but the 'Word of God is the identity
of word and act and here Earth's words must be noted with
exactitude,
'But for the Word of God these distinctions do not
hold. For it is precisely as a mere word that it
is an act. Nay, as a mere word it is the divine
Person, the Person of the Lord of history, whose
self-utterance as such is an alteration and an
absolute alteration of the world, whose passlo in
historv is as such an actio.'
(CD 1/1, p. 164)
Such an act is 'insusceptible of general determin¬
ation* ; in other words we cannot reproduce an act of God
ourselves. This argument is in its actualism parallel to
that of Bultmann in his article 'What Does it Mean to Speak
of God?* where he argues that 'Love is there only when I
love or am loved; it has no existence alongside me or
7
behind me'. As with human love, so with God's omnipotence,
which cannot be a 'universal truth', conceived outside the
actuality of the total determination of our existence by
God. So with Barth there can be no 'abstractions' only the
'claim* of God (Bultmann) or knowledge in 'acknowledgement'
(Barth). The divine reality instantiates itself in
revelation and man responds or rebels against the Word of God.
Barth*s 'absolute alteration* and Bultmann's 'determination
of our existence' both drive inexorably to the same con¬
clusion: that God can only be known in the 'obedience of
faith' (Bultmann) and 'faith seeking understanding' (Barth).
Bultmann accepts without question the radical antithesis
7. Faith and Understanding, London, 1969, p. 54.
454
Q
and dualism of the static 'unified complex of this world'
inherited from the Renaissance and the Enlightenment over
against the 'Wholly Other'. T.F. Torrance has rightly
criticised the Deistic rigidity of this outmoded and
obsolescent world-view which Barth's thought does not
reflect. Bultmann's God is 'occasional' in his manifestation
which takes place in kerygmatic events, and here Harrier's
criticism would apply. Barth in contrast to Bultmann is
providing an explication of that basis upon which God acts
in his self-revelation although both begin with an analogous
Q
sense of obligation: 'We must speak or we must keep silent'.
It is God who makes himself known and man who responds in
obedience.
The parallel drawn above between Barth and Bultmann
is important; because whereas both begin with God himself
(as the veridical basis of man's knowledge of him as he is
manifest in his acts) there is subsequently an immediate and
striking contrast. Bultmann cannot escape the charge of
occasionalism but Barth does, as has been seen at length
in this thesis. By relying upon the temporal aspects of
his doctrine of God to maintain the divine continuity by
and through his 'contingent contemporaneity* Barth is
venturing out upon the precarious path of relating divine
and human existence in terms of their mutual but contrasting
temporalities. Bultmann makes no such endeavour for the
incognito of the divine is complete. Barth posits the
®. Op.cit.. p. 58.
9. Op.cit.. p. 61.
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•veiledness and unveiledness' of revelation; in other
words, the systematic ambiguity of the events of revelation.
The former is satisfied with an explication of Christian
existence which is generated by the kerygma confronting man
who responds in the 'free act* of obedience. The latter
sets out to unfold the inner structure of the Christian
event of the knowledge of God and within this actualised
and dynamic starting-point is to be found the only bona fide
source of the knowledge of God. There is from the outset
a duality of 'times', the resolution of which must now be
recapitulated in summary on the basis of the foregoing study
of the Church Dogmatics.
The central notion of 'contingent contemporaneousness'
in the doctrine of the Word of God directs attention to its
basis in God's being. The 'times' of Jesus Christ, of
prophecy and so on10 are unified on the basis of their 'to¬
getherness with Christ'.11 It must be borne in mind that
the temporal unity that this implies is grounded in the
'free act of God'; this act is the contingent revelation of
God, the expression of his 'freedom, ontic and noetic
12
independence'. It is within these limits that the time
15
which is to be truly 'God's time' must be understood.
The ground of this time is in God's being which forms the
primary pole of the great axis of antecedence and consequence
that informs the Church Dogmatics. It is in the doctrine
10. CD 1/1, p. 161.
11. Op.cit., p. 167.
12. Op.cit., p. 352.
13. CD II/l, p. 5.
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of eternity (that is 'God's time') that the 'possibility'
corresponding to the 'reality* of the 'contingently
contemporaneous' event-acts of revelation is to be found
in the extraordinarily powerful theological ontology of the
first two volumes of this work.
God's being in act and in eternity is the foundation
of Barth's theological ontology and the temporal structure
of this being is (because of the mutual reality and identity
of God's being and his time) a formal structure of the
Church Dogmatics itself. The axis of eternity and time has
indeed a truly vertebral role in the thought of Barth. More¬
over his theory of time is an original and highly developed
synthesis of several dogmatic impulses, forerunners of which
may be detected in the history of Christian theology. The
irreducible ontological datum of the Church Dogmatics is God's
being in act,
'...with regard to the being of God, the word "event"
or "act" is final, and cannot be surpassed or com¬
promised. To its very depths God's Godhead
consists in the fact that it is an event - not any
event, nor events in general, but the event of His
action, in which we have a share in God's
revelation.*
(CD II/l, p. 263)
This doctrine has been presented in full above and
so now it is necessary merely to isolate the temporal aspects.
In these is to be found the theological key to the assertion
of 'contingent contemporaneity' in the doctrine of the Word
of God. God's being is an actus purus et singularis yet
its unity does not mean that it is located in, or bound to
past, present or future. It is all of these and Barth argues
for a catholicity of temporal being-in-act which is to
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inform the doctrine of eternity in every area of its
application.
•It is not, therefore, an event which has merely
happened and is now a past fact of history. God1s
revelation is, of course, this as well. But it
is also an event happening in the present, here and
now. Again, it is not this in such a way that it
exhausts itself in the momentary movement from the
past to the present, that is, in our to-day. But
it is also an event that took place once for all, and
an accomplished fact. And it is also future - the
event that lies completely and wholly in front of us,
which has not yet happened, but which simply comes
upon us. Again this happens without detriment to
its historical completeness and its full contem¬
poraneity. •
(CD II/l, p. 262)
The concept of temporal transcendence that this
passage introduces is the dimension of time in which past,
present and future are included without mutual exclusion.
The dualism of contingent and necessary truths is surmounted
by Barth through the basing of this concept of 'time' upon
the act of God. This not only makes acts of God as
recorded in Scripture concrete and particular, but also
allows an unparalleled integration of God's being and his
attributes. God i_s in his attributes, his active per¬
fections. Both 'time* and 'act' are supremely realised in
God and correspondingly form the basis of Barth's attack
upon the abstract opposition of the categories of finite
and infinite and the irrecoverability of the events of
history in historicist thinking. This central doctrine
that is founded upon the unity of act-time in God's being
is the ontological and unifying nodal-point of the Church
Dogmatics as regards time and also underlies and informs
the unfolding theological architectonic. In drawing to¬
gether these elements it must be remembered that Barth's
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primary concern is the theological integrity and fidelity
of his efforts - this conclusion is merely an attempt to
crystallise the logic of his temporal arguments. So it
is seen that the •contingent contemporaneity1 of the Word
of God is made possible (in Barth's technical sense of
theological explanation) by the integration of the doctrines
of time and God*s being in act.
In a corresponding way God's omniscience knows no
temporal limitations for his •absolute priority and super¬
iority. ..to every possible existence to his own' is a
temporal transcendence which gives God knowledge that 'is
not actually tied to the distinction between past present
and future being'.The actual distinction of eternity
and time is expressed in purely temporal (as opposed to
theological and expository) terms by the contrast of 'true
duration' and time. The 'duration without separation
between beginning, succession and end' which characterises
eternity and the division characteristic of time in the
separation of past present and future into before and after
is central in the exposition that follows. The tension of
the nunc stans and the division of time is understood within
a thoroughly theological context in the ensuing volumes of
the Church Dogmatics as each doctrine is related to the
others upon the basis of this fundamental temporality-ontology.
The doctrines of eternity, election, Christology,
creation and providence all reveal this doctrine, as has been
argued in the above study. The fulfilment of time by
14. Op.cit.. pp. 558-9.
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eternity is in the resurrection,when the brokermess and
division of human time is overcome by the demonstration in
God's power over death of the undividedness of eternity and
the future of God's time. The impulse of God from
eternity in Jesus Christ in his act of election therefore
finds its concrete fulfilment in the resurrection. The
axis of eternity and time corresponds to the overall
structure of divine and dynamic prototype and human or
earthly flawed reality. On the level of generality as
regards time there is the contrast of eternity, made
actively concrete in the decree of election, and time brought
to its fulfilment in the resurrection. Does Barth's
understanding of time as fulfilled by eternity do justice
to the meaning of the resurrection as an 'act* and 'event'
or does it in fact damage this notion? Is 'real time' not
in danger of abrogating what is understood by time, that is
its division and fluere?
There is in Barth's thought a complex integration of
this notion of the interaction and creative unity of
eternity and time; both in the incarnation and resurrection
and in the assumption of grace in Christology. The abstract
opposition of eternity and time, finite and infinite is
comprehended within a Christology which is in turn a dynamic
expression of the doctrine of God's being in act. The
attendant problems lie in the ambivalence and ambiguity of
Barth's notions of 'act* and 'time'. As both 'act' and
'time' receive increasing emphasis and as greater and
greater weight is placed upon them so further and further do
these notions appear to become removed from both popular and
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even more sophisticated philosophical concepts of time.
The argument that both these realities exist in a special
and distinct sense (once the divine and prototypical
origin is seen) runs into difficulties when these con¬
ceptions begin to conflict radically with more generally
accepted notions. The ontological weight of the Church
Dogmatics tends towards a resolution of this tension of
eternity and time on the side of 'real time*. On reflection
it must be asked that whether in denying the dividedness of
time in eternity and expressing the recreation and restoration
of time through the resurrection Barth is not dramatically
weakening the actual framework of human experience and
historicity. As was noted earlier this undoubted
ambivalence in the thought of Barth has lead to the con¬
trasting resolutions in subsequent theology.
Barth has provided the greatest theological synthesis
of the problem of time in western theology into which he
draws positive elements of Augustine, Boethius, Athanasius,
Calvin, Luther and so on, in an integrated and dynamic
Christologically-conditioned vision which is grounded upon
an ontology of time and being in the reality of God's
eternity. The fulfilment and application of this structure
is in the doctrine of man's being in time. It is now possible
to consider briefly the final section of Man in his Time
having pointed to the inevitable dialectic of eternity and
time which persists (even if only upon a linguistic level)
throughout the Church Dogmatics. It is not possible to
offer any short or easy final Judgement upon the theological
achievement of Barth as regards the problem of time for the
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material of this thesis has demonstrated (if it has done
nothing else) the comprehensive integration of his thought
in the Church Dogmatics.
Given the ontological ground of the Church Dogmatics
in the doctrine of God's being in eternity and its fulfilment
in the incarnation and the resurrection then the understanding
of man in his time that Barth offers is the consistent out¬
come of the interaction of eternity and time as it has been
developed within in the incarnation and Christology. Under¬
lying his theological anthropology a number of problems
attend Barth's understanding of the relation of creation
and Christology as both are grounded in the being of God in
act. Throughout the Church Dogmatics the inner juxta¬
position of the axis of eternity and time informs the
divine-human relation, whether it is the man Jesus Christ in
relation to God or through him humanity itself. This manifests
itself in an external complexity and yet inner simplicity
with regard to ontology. The ontology-temporality of the
Church Dogmatics could certainly be regarded as an articu¬
lation of what T.F. Torrance has regarded as the 'inner
logic' of Barth's theology. In the foregoing thesis an
attempt has been made through a statement of the primary
postulates of the Church Dogmatics to allow the inner temporal
structural articulation of the architectonic to stand re¬
vealed. There is an essential tension between the ontolo¬
gical impulse from eternity and the resurrection in time at
the foundation of Barth's work. Both refer to God's 'act',
'time', and 'movement' and yet within this relation of
factors, of 'events', there remains a pervasive ambivalence
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which can be most clearly seen in the consideration of
'Man in his Time'. When does an 'act', 'time* or 'move¬
ment' cease to be such? Does Barth in his assertion of the
temporality of God escape ambiguity or even worse a slide
into timelessness?
The inner paradox of time and 'God's time* is most
explicit in the passage 'Man in his Time'. Here Barth
argues that 'the eternal God does not live without time*.
15
for 'He is supremely temporal'. God's eternity is
i
'authentic temporality' and the 'source of all time' and as
such it is 'the uncreated self-subsistent time' in which
'present past and future, yesterday, today and to-morrow
are not successive, but simultaneous'.1^ The paradox is
not in the contrast of eternity ('God's time*) and time,
but in God's time itself. Man's time is 'inauthentic*,
that is a time in which 'past, present and future follow
one another in succession' answering man's 'need' for
created time as the 'form of all reality distinct from
17
God'. A paradox arises in that despite the need of man
for successive time, his true 'temporality' ('real time*)
is simultaneous time. Thus the time of Jesus Christ
'acquires in relation to their times the character of God's
time, of eternity, in which past present and future are
"JO
simultaneous*. In short is it not the case that the
15. CD III/2, pp. 437-8.
16. Op.cit.. p. 438.
17. Ibid.
18. Op.clt.. p. 440.
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closer man1s time comes to eternity (that is God's or
'real* time) the farther the concept of 'time' employed
moves from any notion of time that can be acceptable as
time? With the increasing emphasis upon the alleged
/
reality of God's time so there is an ever greater departure
from the structure of time. The stridency of the
assertions of 'past, present and future* in simultaneity
without the division of before and after is undermined by
the very subtraction that has taken place. The reality
of God's time insofar as it is made upon the basis of the
New Testament statements about the 'I am' of Jesus' temporal
being is a laudable insight. The further interpretation of
this in terms of the dialectical contrast of a simultaneous
past, present and future in the nunc stans with the division
of fragmented fleeting human time is introducing a tension
which tends on a linguistic level towards a nominally
'timeful', but in reality 'timeless*, concept of so-called
'real time*. This is a serious charge which may be
tempered by the complexities and subtleties of Barth's
exegesis. This point must therefore be enlarged if it is
to be sustained.
In reply to the above argument Barth's defender might
immediately respond that 'The many philosophical theories
of time which deny its reality and regard it as a mere form
or abstraction or figment of the imagination can only be
finally abandoned when we consider that God Himself took
19
time and thus treated it as something real*. Here we see
19. Qp.cit.. pp. 455-6.
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the paradox of Barth*s position "because he asserts a •time'
which has consciously lost those very features which allow
us to call it time, that is its determinate transience.
20
•Real time1 is not even necessarily bound by irreversibility,
for God*s time does not merely •illuminate1 and •relativise'
time but enlarges and projects the movement and teleology
of the temporal process, the flux of past, present and
future whilst eliminating the inevitable and intrinsic loss
of time in its division and transience. Barthfs theological
♦real time1 might be thought of as a selective extraction and
expansion of one intrinsic aspect of concept of time at the
expense of another equally intrinsic aspect. If the result
is •time* then the reader must recall its provenance and
limitations for it is in danger of being a hypostatisation of
one arm of a linguistic distinction. As such it may display
considerable intellectual ingenuity, but is nevertheless highly
questionable in its source. The relativisation of all time
by the •fulfilment of time* is based upon this abrogation
of the division of time in •God's time*. There is an inner
dialectical tension in the temporal structure of the
Church Dogmatics, which if the reader is not to capitulate
his own rationality in the face of the apparent rationality
of revelation, indicates to him that despite Barth's emphasis
upon 'real time* over against human transience there is an
apparent tendency towards a timelessness implicit in the
notion of Godfs eternal simultaneity.
20. Op.cit.. p. 456.
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Barth is aware of the danger of an overall onto-
logical and temporal docetism when he argues that,
'Only a docetic attitude to Jesus can deny that His
being in time also means what being in time means
for us all. Our recognition of His true humanity
depends on our acceptance of this proposition.
Even the recognition of His true deity, implying as
it does the identity of His time and God's, does not
rule out this simple meaning of His being in time.
On the contrary, it includes it.*
(CD III/2, p. 463)
Can Barth be understood to maintain this duality?
What does 'being in time mean for us all'? In the preceding
sentences Barth has made it quite clear that he means by
this 'time* the 'once-for-allness' of the life and death of
Jesus Christ. It has happened and therefore it is in the
past. This means that the division of 'before' and 'after'
applies. It is contingent because these events could have
happened otherwise; they had a beginning and an end. This
being in time that we recognise as such is 'included* in
God's time. The weight of Earth's ontology, which is
structured and mediated through the architectonic of God's
time,appears to bear down upon and overwhelm the contingent
in an 'inclusion* which tends to amplify the continuity and
simultaneity of the past, present and future whilst eliding
their real distinction in the division of before and after.
Can there be in the inner logic of the Church Dogmatics a
renewed dialectic which resists all Barth*s attempts at a
resolution? Does Barth's resolution not appear to effect
in theological terms a synthesis of categories within
Christology and theological ontology analogous to that of
Hegel? Given the ontological chain that Barth has forged
can it be that his theological integration overwhelms the
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extra-theological conception of time in the final inclusion?
Earth's own words cannot fail to convince as he puts them
in the mouth of the Christ of Revelation 1,8.
'All times have their source and end in my time. Of
course, all these other times are real times, for at
the heart of them I have time. But other times are
subsequent to mine. They are overshadowed, dominated
and divided into periods by my time. It is my
present that makes them past or future,for my present
includes them both. I was, and I am to come, as
surely as I am and I live.'
(CD III/2, p. 465)
Barth's overall theological inversion of ontological
priority is here at work for not only is the contemporaneity
of man's times with that of Christ postulated in its
'inclusion' by his time but also their 'division* by his
time (which is of course God's). Here there is at best a
certain ambiguity (how can the divisionless simultaneity of
eternity divide time?) and at worst an outright contradiction.
What appears to happen is a subtle process of conceptual
sleight-of-hand in which premisses are entering, with¬
drawing from and re-entering Barth's argument as they are
required to maintain the apparent duality of the mutually
related realities of created and uncreated temporal being.
An ontological monism in the Church Dogmatics would seem
quite inevitable if the doctrine of time and eternity does
ultimately resolve itself on the side of 'real time'
(eternity) as opposed to divided time. Barth's thought is
rightly ambiguous on this issue for he is quite naturally
concerned to maintain the reality of both. If, however,
the foundation of his dogmatics in an exclusively theological
source (the Word of God) is granted then how can its 'time'
be more than a theological construction, albeit a valid and
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veridical reflection of that reality posited as the basis
of fides quaerens intellectum? Can there be two realities
in the Church Dogmatics if Barth is true to his initial
postulates? Is it possible for either man or time to
exist within theology anything other than the status of
derived entities, or alternatively, as suggested earlier,
as a surd element in the Church Dogmatics? The ambivalence
in Earth*s thought stems from this double thrust; he must
speak of God and of man, of eternity and of time. Given the
basis of his thought how can he speak of man or of time
other than as theological constructions drawn out of the
'real' and 'simple reality* of the Word of God in its full
manifestations?
The reality of the Word of God in its multiplex mani¬
festation is the basis of all theological reality but can
also be seen as the renewing basis of all reality in the
Church Dogmatics. The 'humanity* of Jesus Christ and his
'time' is part of that act of God from eternity the
contingency of which is secured in virtue of its being God's
act. The conceptual openness of Barth's theological system
appears to be an openness to reality as a reality given
within and explicated on the basis of the 'theological
circle'. This 'circle' is both logical in that it
comprises the structure of revelation and ontological in
that this structure has its foundation in God's act from
eternity, realised in the incarnation and resurrection of
Jesus Christ. Can and does Barth move outside the limi¬
tations that have been located in this study? The non-
theological reality required to realise the theology of the
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Word of God in time, and in history, cannot but be
derived from Barth's theological postulates if he is to
be (as indeed he is) faithful to his initial stance. This
is but merely an interpretation of Barth*s immensely rich
and well developed arguments. As has been recounted at
length in the course of the foregoing study of Barth' s work
there is a deep and utterly pervasive theological condition¬
ing of all aspects of the Church Dogmatics. In fact the
reader's perspectives must undergo a series of alterations
if he is to grasp the thoroughness of the theological and
Christological constitution of the work of Barth. Even in
Romans this was evident and here in assessing the achievement
of the Church Dogmatics with regard to time there is a
parallel fidelity to theological principle which is complete.
Only in the context of a full appreciation of this response
made in faith on Barth*s part can justice be done to his
thought.
If, however, the reader were to ignore the qualifi¬
cation made above some interesting conclusions might be
drawn. There is undoubtedly an extremely powerful ontology
in the Church Dogmatics in which the axis of time and
eternity plays a most important part. Given the fact that
eternity is the being of God and that the being of God is
being in act then could it not be plausibly maintained that
temporality (that is as 'God's time') is ontology? Time
and eternity in infrangible interconnection and this axis
is the ontological structure of the Church Dogmatics, based
of course upon the Word of God. If indeed this were the
case and the distinction of eternity and time was a theolo-
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gically derived construction then would it not be
plausible to argue (given in turn that man's 'time* is
•inauthentic' and 'unreal') that although there might well
be an ontological distinction of God and man, God and
cosmos, there was in fact no real temporal distinction.
Alternatively it would be even more radical to argue that
there was, given the mutuality of temporality and ontology,
no ontological distinction either. Unfortunately such
speculations are perhaps encouraged by Barth's refusal to
deal with natural and cosmic time except insofar as it is
inferred from human time. Besides this Barth's extensive
use of the parallels between 'flesh* and 'time* as the
paradigms (and ontological base in Jesus Christ) of the
knowledge of real humanity and real time also tend to rein¬
force these difficulties.
It could hardly be denied that whatever interpretation,
hostile or sympathetic is put upon Barth*s work the role of
eternity and time is quite crucial in the Church Dogmatics.
This Conclusion is not intended to impel the reader into any
rapid or ill-considered judgement of Barth's achievement
but merely to provide certain thoughts which might be used
in reflection upon the foregoing materials in this thesis.
Once the inner logic of time and eternity is shown in
relief in the Church Dogmatics then it can be seen to have
both an extremely important intrinsic role but that it also
acts as a touchstone with regard to the ontological status
of each part of the whole system.
Christian theology must do justice to the mutual yet
distinct realities of man and God. Does it appear that
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Barth has done this or has he in fact derived the latter
from the former? There is no simple answer to this
question hut it could be argued on the basis of Barth's
own presuppositions that the reader is on occasion led to
the brink of timelessness,in a •time* which is fundamentally
•simultaneity', yet which is expounded dialectically through
the doubtful distinction of 'past, present and future' from
'before and after'. The 'time' postulated as 'God's time*
is a most singular conceptual construct and however much
it may be defensible upon theological grounds it would seem
to trade upon a linguistic ambiguity (involving a dialectic
of concepts in a 'real time') which is allied to a further
series of ambiguities in the relation of ontology and
temporality which has been explored in the course of the
foregoing exposition and analysis.
V/e must therefore ask if in fact there is an identity
of ontology and temporality underlying the Church Dogmatics.
If this were found to be so, thus making all theological
reality dependent upon the actus purus et singularis of
divine being as interpreted through the doctrine of 'real
time' (eternal simultaneity), then could not the whole
massive architectonic be thought of as teetering on the
brink of the abyss of timelessness, once the dialectic of
'real time* had been exposed? This is a hard-thinking
and admittedly reductive interpretation of the Church
Dogmatics. The essential many-sidedness of Barth*s work
(sealin less hostile terms as systematic ambiguity) would
allow the proponent of Barth to argue from the historicity
of the resurrection and the incarnation to a different view
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of his achievement. The immense skill and energy of
Barth has resulted in a complexity in the involution of
theological argument and ontology which is quite capable
of resisting simplistic reduction once responsible attempts
are made to grapple with its intense theological seriousness.
Finally so as to expand this brief critique of
Barth's theological theory of time it is necessary to
examine the basis of the terras used to denote the temporality
of God's being. These are primarily 'act', 'movement' and
'time' itself with all its corollates. Each of these
terms is posited in Barth*s characterisation of the divine
being and is there supremely exemplified. In being thus
elevated each loses in accordance with the degree of ampli¬
fication and exaltation those features which distinguish
it from the notion of supra-temporality, the simultaneity
of divine eternity. Such a process is noted at length in
this thesis with regard to 'act' and 'time*. A further
example is found in the most inspiring and theologically
surprising section of 'Man in his Time', where Barth
introduces the notion of 'movement* into the time of God.
It will be remembered that Kierkegaard took particular
exception to Hegel's use of the concept of movement within
a system which purported to attain total and comprehensive
rationality. It is vital that Barth does not fall into the
same pitfall in his doctrine of God and if this is a real
/
KiYY^ot^ then he escapes the logical and categorial reduction
characteristic of Hegel. Barth argues as follows in the
context of his radical scepticism with regard to human
•inauthentic* time. Man has neither past nor future and
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even his present is lost. Thus primarily 'it is not we
who are now but God who is now' and there is a 'divine
21
stepping from the past to the future*. This is a
divine action performed now* that is 'His movement from
the past into the future' that 'has the duration and
22
extension which escapes our own Now'. It is plausible
to grant that God's'nowM.s the basis of our human present
for in Barth's eyes 'we have seen that all human being,
action and experience is either now or unreal'. This is
plausible in the theological context but what is questionable
is the ascription to God of 'movement*. Is there not
perhaps an implicit contradiction in asserting the actus,
purus et singular!s of God's being and the multiplicity of
movements as in Barth's later argument? 'At any rate we
have to reckon with each moment because God Himself has
particular moments, poi , in His being speech and action
23
in relation to us; moments which continually come and go*.
Barth is here asserting the 'movement' in God's being which
demands the discrete particularity of 'moments'; yet this
is specifically excluded by strict simultaneity although it
is allowed by his equivocation over time as 'duration'
without 'division'. Once more Barth is forced into an
ambiguity which can only be detected when the whole of his
ontological conception of the axis of eternity and time is
subjected to analysis.
21. CD III/2, p. 529.
22. Op.cit.. p. 530.
23. Op.cit., p. 532.
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Barth repudiates the intrusion of *philosophy' into
theology. By this he means the elaboration of
*Veltanschauungen' and generalised theories or explanations of
the nature of reality. This thesis has been an attempt to
combine the methods of dogmatic and philosophical theology
in a study of a major contemporary work of theology. We
have sought to escape Barth's condemnation by using the
methods of simple logical analysis so as to expose the
tensions and ambiguities within the structure of ontolo-
gical and theological assertion and construction made in the
Church Dogmatics. By this an attempt has been made to do
justice to his work both as an achievement in purely
theological terms as well as a system of thought as open
as any other to the common tests of rationality. As regards
purely theological criteria then Barth's work is a magnificent
creative synthesis. As regards the latter philosophical
standpoint then greater difficulties emerge. The former
cannot be divorced from the latter without an attack being
launched upon rationality, and to take this step would be
grave indeed. A simple set of contradictions, antitheses
or antinomies could well be anticipated in any dogmatic
theology which set out to relate man and God or to explicate
and expound the dogma of the Trinity but what we appear to
have in the Church Dogmatics is something far more subtle.
Barth is generating on the basis of the doctrine of the
Word of God, and expressing through an immense architectonic
a total theological explanation in which features of all
reality must appear. Unfortunately the semantic and
linguistic tools used to achieve this are misused and thus
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broken and distorted as regards time. This is because
there is a single ultimate ontological source of reality
in the Church Dogmatics and in accounting for aspects of
non-theological reality which inevitably impinge upon man's
experience and thought Barth would have to draw some features
of these other aspects out of his ontological monism. It
is only possible to do this partially because of the
intrinsic incompatibility of these features. To achieve
this a selective borrowing and conceptual pruning takes
place. We have recounted what seems to happen after that
above. The alien features are elided and the compatible
ones amplified., this process disguising the loss as greater
emphasis takes place. Whenever Barth seeks to temporalise
God by utilising the method of analogia fidei this becomes a
species of ontological and semantic parasitism. Certain
concepts have to draw semantic vitality from what they deny.
This issues in a systematic ambiguity which despite its
apparent theological virtues is in the final count not free
from a dubiety when tested by logical criteria.
In this thesis a path has been driven through the
Church Dogmatics by means of a study located in the
immediate historical and theological context in which Barth
found himself. The immense and compelling scheme lies
behind us. There is more to explore undoubtedly but we
have laid out the vertebral ontology of this work, expressed
as it is through the doctrine of time. The truth of
T.F. Torrance's judgment is evident. Barth has indeed
thought through into each other 'the being of God in his
acts and the acts of God in his being, in a thoroughgoing
475
integration of the ontic and the dynamic, and then in the
light of the inner organic connections that come to view,
and the fundamental grammar of God's revelation as Lord,
(interpreted) the whole of Christian theology by setting it
24
once more squarely upon its proper foundations'. This has
not proved an unalloyed blessing for in interpreting the
'dynamic' in terms of 'time' and positing the identity of
being and act (as Torrance demonstrates) so the danger of
acute categorial reduction appears when the whole of Christian
theology is founded upon this. There is an implosion of
time into the 'act' of the 'being-in-act' which can only be
resisted (given absolute fidelity to this ontological
foundation) by the ambiguous re-assertion of 'time' in an
•eternity' ('God's time') developed by breeding from
emasculated temporal assertions. These are used to create
'real time' which ostensibly 'heals' man's 'inauthentic*
and 'unreal time'.
Barth exploits the axis of time and eternity.as the
ontological medium for the reality of his whole theological
structure in a manner analogous to that of 'substance' in
traditional theological assertion. As such this axis is
not value-free and it cannot be used in an all-embracing
theological system with a single ontological source,
without the destruction and distortion of indispensable
features of that medium. By using what amounts to a meta¬
physical doctrine of being expressed in the axis of eternity
and time which the structural link in the Church Dogmatics
24.'Newton, Einstein and Scientific Theology', Religious
Studies. 6, p. 248.
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Barth has introduced strains and ambiguities, which
whilst all-pervasive, are difficult to detect. The
systematic nature of this ambiguity may only be seen when
we examine and state the totality of his ontological
achievement. It is this that has been attempted in this
thesis where we have analysed the interconnection and
Christological reciprocity of the major doctrines, drawing
forth through careful attention to logical, as well as onto¬
logical and theological considerations the form and nature
of Barth' s fundamental temporal ontology.
Hopefully we have seen something of the limits of
both theological and philosophical thinking in this thesis.
Great credit is due to Barth for the multi-dimensional
character of his thought which demands an equivalent
response on the part of the student. Unfortunately this
categorial catholicity does not extend far enough and there
is in Earth's work the greatest and doubtless the last
movement in the western tradition of attempts to surmount
the antitheses of man and God, eternity and time, and so
on in living synthesis. Earth's attempt is both theolo¬
gical and Christological but it is at root ontological.
This is only the beginning of his problems not the end of
them; for ontology is, temporality in the Church Dogmatics,
but real being in act is only nominally, and with the
greatest ingenuity, to be regarded as 'temporal' in anything
other than a very Pickwickian sense. The inner dialectic
is held off by Herculean efforts, but careful analysis shows
that the categorial reduction is intrinsic and ineradicable
in the doctrine of eternity and time employed and exploited
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with such systematic zeal in the Church Dogmatics.
The foregoing critical analysis is presented in the
context of a full study of the work of Karl Barth as a very
great theologian. The fidelity of Barth to the object of
his study, the living Word of God, is so great that only
when we grant him in full his theological stance and
credentials can we begin to grasp and to appreciate the
total and uncompromising authenticity of his theological
endeavour. This does not, however, prevent us from
retaining our critical faculties following Barth into the
labyrinthine depths of the Church Dogmatics, and from
keeping our grip upon the slender thread of rationality
granted to us. In this way it has seemed to this writer
possible to examine the work of Karl Barth as regards the
problem of time from the stance of both theology and
philosophy without relapsing into comparison and repetition
on the one hand, or, on the other, into mere linguistic
word play and futile nominalism.
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